Tobies Grimaltos

Tobies Grimaltos
University of Valencia | UV · Department of Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy

About

31
Publications
14,176
Reads
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20
Citations
Citations since 2016
6 Research Items
10 Citations
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20162017201820192020202120220.00.51.01.52.02.53.0
20162017201820192020202120220.00.51.01.52.02.53.0
Introduction
Lying, misleadind and other forms of trying to deceive.
Additional affiliations
November 1984 - present
University of Valencia
Position
  • Professor (Full)

Publications

Publications (31)
Article
El Principio de Posibilidades Alternativas (PPA) supone un problema para las posiciones compatibilistas respecto de la responsabilidad moral. Desde que Harry Frankfurt diseñara uno, los (supuestos) contraejemplos al PPA se conocen como casos Frankfurt. Una de las mejores líneas de defensa de este principio frente a los nuevos casos Frankfurt es la...
Article
Full-text available
Beliefs lead to action and are manifested in action. We act according to what we believe, and not always do our beliefs constitute knowledge. It is beliefs that lead us (given certain desires) to act, and as these may be false, our attempts are sometimes (for this reason) frustrated: our actions do not succeed. To the extent that our actions affect...
Article
Full-text available
In this article, we present a distinction (within the category of deceptive lies) between two kinds of lies: doxogenic and falsifying lies, defined in terms of the different conditions they need to satisfy; and we argue for the analytic significance of this distinction, overlooked in the literature on lying. In addition, we contend that the existen...
Article
Full-text available
It has been traditionally thought that, from a moral point of view, it is worse to lie than to deceive without saying something one believes to be false. And it has been thought that this is so regardless of the speaker's intentions or the kind of hearer addressed. In this paper, this view is challenged with a battery of reasons. It is argued that,...
Article
Full-text available
After more than half a century, the debate on the Gettier problem is still alive and continues to produce proposals of solution (or dissolution) that, regardless of their success, constitute interesting contributions to epistemology and even to other philosophical areas. As is well known, the Gettier problem is the challenge to provide an analysis...
Article
Full-text available
1. INTRODUCCIÓ Contínuament, en la nostra vida quoti-diana, necessitem contestar preguntes i resoldre problemes per tal de dur a terme els nostres plans i propòsits. Si he d'anar a Barcelona, necessite saber a quina hora ixen els trens que hi van, obtenir la res-posta correcta (i completa) a la pregunta «A quines hores ixen els trens a Barcelo-na?»...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
En los últimos años se han distinguido dos tipos de mentira de acuerdo con cuál es la intención o intenciones del hablante que se quieren cumplir mediante la aseveración. O bien se pretende simplemente aseverar algo falso (algo que se cree falso) en un contexto de justificación o un contexto en el que está en vigor la máxima griceana de no decir lo...
Article
Full-text available
Este artículo trata de profundizar en nuestra comprensión de la naturaleza de la creenciaen tanto que actitud proposicional. Tras contextualizar la cuestión, discutimos y rechazamosdiversas caracterizaciones de la creencia —como apuesta y como alta probabilidad subjetiva(cercana a 1)—, para acabar defendiendo que creer que p consiste meramente en a...
Chapter
Full-text available
El término externismo (externalism) fue utilizado por primera vez por D.W. Armstrong (v. Armstrong, 1973). Para este autor una concepción externista del conocimiento afirma que lo que convierte a una creencia en conocimiento es cierta relación entre el sujeto y el mundo. Desde entonces la distinción externismo/internismo se ha aplicado en diferente...
Article
Full-text available
I Know that P, but I am not sure According to David Lewis's Rule of Attention, the mere fact of attending to a possibility ,that we cannot discard, in which the proposition believed would be false, is sufficient, to make our knowledge of that proposition disappear, no matter how far-fetched that possibility may be. The aim of this paper is to criti...
Article
The paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence of our beliefs, we may not genuinely believe it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some fam...
Chapter
Full-text available
De acuerdo con el enfoque naturalista de la epistemología, la investigación debe estar en estrecha conexión con la ciencia. Frente a la aproximación tradicio-nal, apriorística, lo que los autores naturalistas reclaman es una reorientación empírica de la tarea del epistemólogo. Aunque hay diferencias apreciables entre los defensores del naturalismo...
Article
In this paper I defend that what I call modes of denotation are part of one¿s belief content, even if they are not part of the proposition expressed by the sentence one believes to be true. Two people, who believe of the same sentence (not ambiguous) that it is true can have different belief contents that they express by means of this same sentence...
Article
Full-text available
Resumen: Cuando uno hace una aserción (sin expresiones de seguro como " creo " , " me parece " , " es probable que " ...) está afirmando implícitamente que sabe lo que dice. Estar seguro es creer que la evidencia de que se dis-pone es suficiente, que no está cancelada. Si uno cree que sabe que p, la creencia de que su evidencia es suficiente (que n...
Article
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In Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam presents an argument aimed at showing that the modern skeptic hypothesis of a brain in a vat is self-refuting. In my view, and despite the enormous amount of literature about this argument, it has not yet been shown all the absurd consequences to which the assumption of the thesis that Putnam maintains i...
Chapter
Full-text available
HACE algunos años escribí un artículo en el que me oponía, entre otros, al argumento antiescéptico de Quine en <<The Nature of Natural Knowledge»• Quine sostiene allí que: En un mundo de sense-data inmediatos, sin cuerpos postulados .. ., una distinción entre realidad e ilusión no tendría lugar. Estimaba yo entonces que el argumento quineano compar...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper I shall argue that in order to know what a subject really believes the appropriate question is not "What propositional knowledge would she have if her belief were true and justified?", but "What erotetic knowledge would she have if her belief were true and justified?"; i.e., what questions and how completely she could answer. This, I...
Chapter
Full-text available
EN la epistemología de este siglo ha sido tradicional mantener las tres equivalencias o simetrías siguientes relativas a la atribución de conocimiento: 1) 'Saber' y 'saber que se sabe' son equivalentes. 2) Los criterios para Ja atribución de conocimiento en primera y tercera persona son idénticos. 3) 'Saber algo' y 'saber que algo es verdad' son lo...
Article
Traducción de: El joc de pensar Formulada como un conjunto de conversaciones que sostienen un profesor de filosofía y su hija adolescente, la presente obra tiene el objeto de exponer con accesibilidad y rigor una serie de temas filosóficos y el proceso mismo de hacer filosofía: qué produce admiración en la adolescente; cómo lo razona y lo dialoga c...
Article
Aproximación sistemática a los problemas filosóficos que plantea el conocimiento humano. Se divide en 5 apartados sobre temas importantes de la epistemología: Método, Definición y posibilidades de conocimiento; Justificación; Base empírica del conocimiento y relación entre semántica y epistemología.
Article
Full-text available
The time-gap argument is one of the classic arguments to introduce sense-data. It is based on the fact that we can perceive very distant objets, such as stars, which may have disappeared when we perceive them. Those in favour of the time-gap argument conclude from this that, in such cases, the objet of our perception can not be the extinct star, bu...

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Projects

Project (1)
Project
As epistemic and moral agents, we must try to be reliable in shaping our beliefs (we have to apply what I call reception scepticism here) and perhaps even more so when transmitting them (we have to apply what I call emission scepticism). Even more so in this so-called post-truth era.