Subir Kumar Chakrabarti

Subir Kumar Chakrabarti
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis | IUPUI · Department of Economics

Ph D.

About

33
Publications
2,242
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279
Citations

Publications

Publications (33)
Article
We show here that a stationary equilibrium in Semi-Markov strategies exists for stochastic games under just the condition of norm continuity of the transition probability that are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure on the state space. We also show that the result can be extended to the case of generalized games in which the feasi...
Article
We study the association between the minimum wage and food establishment hygiene violations between Seattle (the treated city) and Bellevue (the control city), both cities located in King County and sharing the same health inspection department. An increase in the real minimum wage of $0.25 is associated with an increase of at least 8% in total and...
Article
We argue that an approach that relies solely on the sequential structure of a game would be useful, and provide an alternative proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium.
Article
We show that the set of competitive equilibrium points of a pure exchange economy are the equilibrium points of a broader class of better-response demands than the usual utility-maximizing demand functions. The better-response demands are derived from assigning weights to all commodity bundles with higher utility than the current commodity bundle,...
Chapter
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We describe the dynamics of a better response map from the space of mixed strategy profiles to itself, used by Nash to prove the existence of equilibrium points for finite games. We do it for the case of 2 players and 2 pure strategies. The maps are classified, according to the dynamics, as dominant strategy, elliptic or hyperbolic.
Article
Full-text available
The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs. I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication. In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
We investigate the dynamics of the Nash better response map for a family of games with two players and two strategies. This family contains the games of Coordination, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Each map is a piecewise rational map of the unit square to itself. We describe completely the dynamics for all maps from the family. All trajectories converge t...
Article
We present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game that does not seem to be available in the literature. The existence of the minimax point plays an important role in the theory of games.
Article
Full-text available
An iterative procedure for the game of Matching Pennies is examined in which players use Nash's map to respond to mixed strategies of the other players. It is shown that even though the game of Matching Pennies has a unique Nash equilibrium point, the iterative procedure does not lead to convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In fact we find that if...
Article
We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using...
Article
This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection a...
Article
This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obta...
Article
We show that one can approximate an infinite action game by a finite action game in the sense that every behavior strategy combination of the finite action game can be mimicked by a behavior strategy combination of the infinite action game so that the resulting payoffs from the behavior strategies cannot differ by more than ϵ. Also for every behavi...
Article
We show that Markov perfect equilibrium exists for stochastic games which have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable in past period's realisation of the states of nature and actions, and norm continuous in past period's actions. The transition probabilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to some me...
Article
We show that one can approximate an infinite action game by a finite action game in the sense that every behavior strategy combination of the finite action game can be mimicked by a behavior strategy combination of the infinite action game so that the resulting payoffs from the behavior strategies cannot differ by more than ϵ. Also for every behavi...
Article
This paper examines the effects of the political organization of a chain of markets on the level of taxes and the volume of trade. Using a game-theoretic approach we note that, under certain demand stuructures, noncooperative tax policies implemented by independent jurisdictions entail externalities detrimental to trade. We show that the monoplizat...
Article
An allocation in an infinite horizon capital accumulation model is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period. The authors show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core, one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the...
Article
We prove the existence of equilibrium in behavior strategies for extensive form games when the game has infinite actions. The result is derived under the assumption that the behavior strategies satisfy the bounded measurability condition. The condition implies that the behavior strategies are restricted to those which can be viewed as continuous fu...
Article
We show that the folk theorem for repeated games with discounting will hold if strategies and threats are allowed to have only finite complexity, even without the fully dimensionality requirement that is required for the perfect folk theorem for repeated games with discounting. It is then quite easy to see that the perfect folk theorem for repeated...
Article
In this paper we present two formulations of an equilibrium notion for large games in which each player cannot observe precisely the moves of the other players in the game. In the context of large anonymous games where the moves of the other players are summarized by a probability measure on the action space, imperfect observability is formulated a...
Article
An inertia supergame is one in which changing strategies over time is not merely costly, but the cost incurred by any player in changing strategies is greater than any gains made in a single period. Complete characterizations of the set of payoffs of the perfect equilibrium points, as well as the set of payoffs of strong, perfect equilibrium points...
Article
The Aumann proposition establishes that an outcome in the -core of the one-shot gameG is the same as the strong equilibrium utility allocations of the associated supergame. We refine the -core by requiring that the threat strategies used to deter deviations be credible and examine the consequences for the Aumann proposition in the case of the refin...
Article
Full-text available
We give an example that shows that the set of perfect and hence sequential equilibrium points is a strict subset of the set of equilibrium points of the Agent normal form. We then provide a direct proof of the existence of a sequential equilibrium for finite games that relies solely on the structure of the sequential game. We also show that in the...
Article
Full-text available
We generalize the well-known backward induction procedure to the case of extensive games with perfect recall having certain information structure (called simple information structure). We prove that the back- ward induction assessments are precisely sequential equilibria, and show that the set of backward induction assessments for any game of simpl...
Article
Full-text available
The paper studies long run optimal contracts under adverse selection with limited commitment so that the contracts are open to negotiation in every period. Thus the contracting game is repeated over multiple periods and belief about the type of the agent is updated by the principal. We study both the finite-horizon case as well as the infinite-hori...
Article
Typescript (photocopy). Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 1985. Bibliography: leaves 115-116.

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Project (1)
Project
Extend the backward induction method to games of imperfect information and characterize the class of sequential games in which the method can be viewed as a direct extension of the classical backward induction method.