Strickland James

• Arizona State University

We assess the effects of two citizen-initiated proposals on housing costs in California and Florida. In 1978, voters in California approved of Proposition 13. In 1992, voters in Florida approved a similar measure, the “Save Our Homes” amendment. Both proposals instituted acquisition-value assessments: for tax purposes, real property is assessed bas...

We examine the historical effects of ethnic and racial diversification among legislators on identity group mobilization and the hiring of nonwhite lobbyists. We propose that diversification among legislators encouraged identity groups to lobby, that these groups hired lobbyists who reflected their members’ identities, and that all interests also hi...

Former legislators who lobby exacerbate the effects of financial resources on the relative political influence that various organized interests achieve. These lobbyists receive more income and achieve favorable policy outcomes more often than other lobbyists. The value of these revolving-door lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued prese...

Constitutional conventions are popularly expected to attract many organized interests seeking to enshrine particularistic benefits into law for perpetuity, but there is limited empirical research on interest mobilization and lobbying at conventions. I propose that conventions attract different types of interests than legislative sessions and that,...

Former legislators who lobby, also known as revolving-door lobbyists, exacerbate the effects of resource differences on the relative political influence of various interest groups. These lobbyists command higher fees and represent more clients, and achieve desired policy outcomes more often, than other lobbyists. The value of revolving-door lobbyis...

This study explores the consequences of legislative turnover for the hiring of lobbyists and influence of interest groups. We argue that lobbyists develop durable relationships with lawmakers in assemblies with low turnover. Such relationships allow lobbyists to attract clients. We use a new, state-level measure of multi-client lobbying to show tha...

Little is known about how legislature size affects the political mobilization of societal interests. I propose that legislative downsizing events increase the cost of campaigns, and thereby spur additional lobbying by organized interests that corral monetary resources efficiently. I examine how numbers of organizations with registered lobbyists cha...

Despite a growing body of literature examining the consequences of women’s inclusion among lobbyists, our understanding of the factors that lead to women’s initial emergence in the profession is limited. In this study, we propose that gender diversity among legislative targets incentivizes organized interests to hire women lobbyists, and thus helps...

What explains contemporary numbers of interest groups in America? To answer this question and help address conflicting narratives in research, I examine the rise of interest groups in the states. Assembling an original dataset based on archival and secondary sources, I find that relatively few groups lobbied legislators prior to the 1960s or 1970s....

The kinds of benefits that groups seek from government predict the kinds of lobbyists they hire. Group benefits are linked to lobbyist selection for three reasons: groups attempt to maximize economic efficiency and preserve political agency, but have different levels of a priori influence with elected legislators. These motivations, which are not d...

Revolving‐door” lobbyists are individuals who transition from governmental positions into lobbying for private entities. Such lobbyists thrive on the insider connections and political knowledge that they developed while in government. These assets afford former lawmakers more access to and influence over incumbent lawmakers. The value of their conn...