Steffen Ganghof

Universität Potsdam · Department of Politics and Public Administration

In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids pow...

This chapter discusses the comparative constitutional theory of presidential government, parliamentary government and various hybrids. Section 2 clarifies its methodological approach. Section 3 then specifies the choice space by distinguishing six basic executive formats. Section 4 discusses proceduralist arguments for and against some of these. Se...

There are two big, but seemingly separate debates about democratic institutions: one about forms of government organized around the famous work of Juan Linz, another about models of democracy organized around the famous work of Arend Lijphart. This chapter integrates these debates with a special focus on how constitutional design can make democraci...

Demokratien unterscheiden sich grundlegend in ihren Regierungssystemen: Wie wird die Regierung ausgewählt und abberufen? Und in welchem Verhältnis steht sie zu Wählern, Parlament und Staatspräsident? Steffen Ganghof erläutert die Grundlagen demokratischer Regierungssysteme – auf dem neuesten Stand der Forschung und anhand von Beispielen aus aller W...

Eine berühmte Hypothese der Politikwissenschaft betrachtet das präsidentielle Regierungssystem als Gefahr für die Demokratie. Das Kapitel stellt die Diskussion darüber vor. Es unterscheidet dabei zwei Aspekte des Präsidentialismus: die Gewaltenteilung einerseits und die Konzentration von Regierungsmacht in einer Person andererseits. Es diskutiert a...

Die Schweiz ist in der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft als halbdirekte Demokratie und als Vorzeigebeispiel einer Konsensdemokratie bekannt. Beide Charakterisierungen sind überwiegend positiv konnotiert und werfen die Frage auf, warum die schweizerische Art des Regierens international keine echten Nachahmer gefunden hat. In diesem einführenden Ka...

Themen: Demokratie als Entweder/Oder-Frage Elektorale Demokratie als Kontinuum Liberale Demokratie Eine Regime-Typologie Weitere Konzeptionen von Demokratie

Steffen Ganghof's Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that "in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is no...

This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among o...

Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei überaus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ansätzen in der Policy-Forschung und darüber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätzen. Neben den Grundzügen beider Ansätze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansätze teils...

This chapter explores how semi-parliamentary systems can balance the competing democratic visions of simple and complex majoritarianism. It compares the institutional design of the seven semi-parliamentary cases (the Australian Commonwealth, Japan, and five Australian states) and positions these cases on a two-dimensional empirical map of democrati...

This chapter introduces the book’s main thesis. In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be a good thing, but executive personalism—the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being—is not. Semi-parliamentary government is a way to decouple these two aspects of democr...

This chapter uses the book’s insights about semi-parliamentary government to articulate a systematic instrumentalist case against presidentialism. It discusses major justifications of presidential government to be found in the academic literature and shows that virtually all of them concern the separation of powers, not executive personalism (i.e....

This chapter discusses the conditions under which semi-parliamentary government can be stable. It responds to two conjectures about “strong” bicameralism: that constitutional designers who prefer strong second chambers have to be willing to accept (a) either a presidential system of government; or (b) oversized and ideologically heterogeneous cabin...

This chapter explains the normative approach of the book and clarifies the distinction between instrumentalist and proceduralist evaluations of political institutions. It defends a minimalist form of proceduralism, which highlights the comparative evaluation of institutional schemes, as well as potential conflicts between horizontal and vertical eq...

The chapter defends the need for the concept of semi-parliamentary government, provides operational and ideal-typical definitions, compares empirical cases and explains how this constitutional structure can balance visions of democratic majority formation. While the book focuses on the visions associated with different electoral systems, semi-parli...

This book argues that, in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be a good thing, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being—what I call executive personalism—is not. This thesis may seem plausible, perhaps too plausible to be interesting. Yet, almost the e...

This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power...

This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power...

Zusammenfassung Die Fragmentierung europäischer Parteiensysteme und damit verbundene Schwierigkeiten bei der Koalitionsbildung haben zu einer Neuauflage altbekannter Debatten über unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme geführt. Einige Autoren sehen dabei bestimmte Wahlsysteme als optimalen Kompromiss zwischen den Prinzipien der Mehrheits- und der Verhältnisw...

Die Fragmentierung europäischer Parteiensysteme und damit verbundene Schwierigkeiten bei der Koalitionsbildung haben zu einer Neuauflage altbekannter Debatten über unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme geführt. Einige Autoren sehen dabei bestimmte Wahlsysteme als optimalen Kompromiss zwischen den Prinzipien der Mehrheits- und der Verhältniswahl an. Wir argu...

A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority gove...

Was Sie in diesem Springer "essential" finden können: * eine Unterscheidung dreier grundlegender Typen von Forschungsdesigns in der Politikwissenschaft * die Illustration der drei Typen anhand 14 qualitativer und quantitativer politikwissenschaftlicher Beispielstudien * die Hervorhebung der Rolle von (formalen) Modellen für die politikwissenschaft...

Dieses Kapitel diskutiert verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die drei grundlegenden Forschungsdesigns innerhalb einzelner Studien zu verbinden. Da y-zentrierte Studien – insbesondere qualitative Fallstudien – nur schwache Tests der kombinierten Erklärung darstellen, ist vor allem bei ihnen die Ergänzung durch x-zentrierte und/oder kontrastive Elemente zu...

Das Plädoyer für kontrastive Designs ist teilweise mit einer Kritik x-zentrierter Designs verbunden, denn letztere werden häufig falsch interpretiert und manchmal falsch eingesetzt. Statistische Studien mit x-zentriertem Design schätzen die Größe eines theoretisch spezifizierten kausalen Effekts. Sie testen nicht die Korrektheit der theoretischen A...

Dieses Kapitel entwickelt eine einfache Typologie grundlegender Forschungsdesigns. Da diese Typologie theorieorientiert ist, sind zunächst einige Begriffsklärungen sinnvoll. Ich grenze den Begriff der Theorie zunächst von drei anderen Begriffen ab: Hypothese, formales Modell und Kausalmodell.

X-zentrierte Designs versuchen einen theoretisch spezifizierten kausalen Effekt (oder wenige solcher Effekte) zu identifizieren und seine Größe möglichst genau zu schätzen. Wir identifizieren kausale Effekte, indem wir die Störvariablen benennen, die berücksichtigt werden müssen, um den Effekt ohne Verzerrung schätzen zu können. Diese Berücksichtig...

Keines der drei Designs ist den anderen grundsätzlich überlegen. Welches Design – oder welche Kombination von Designs – wir wählen, hängt von unserer Fragestellung und unserem Verständnis der relevanten Theorien ab.

Y-zentrierte Forschungsdesigns werden manchmal als Versuch charakterisiert, Phänomene möglichst vollständig zu erklären. Tatsächlich ist es aber schwer Forscher zu finden, die tatsächlich an die Möglichkeit vollständiger Erklärungen glauben. Y-zentrierte Designs sind Versuche, mehrere komplementäre Theorien über kausale Effekte so zu kombinieren, d...

The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evol...

The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presi...

Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system, which mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: It...

Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies' performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and repr...

The paper proposes a new way to combine the " proportional " and " majoritarian " visions of democracy. The proposal blends elements of mixed electoral systems, parliamentarism, presidentialism and bicameralism. Voters are given a single vote to make two simultaneous choices: one about the proportional composition of the legislature and one about t...

Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. The article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamen...

The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research designs: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the "contrastive" design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of...

A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue-specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typo...

The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research design: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the “contrastive” design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of t...

Der Beitrag stellt erstens eine Typologie vor, welche die empirisch relevanten Grundtypen von Regierungssystemen vollständig und logisch konsistent bestimmt. Er verknüpft diese Typologie zweitens mit einer theoretischen Diskussion von grundlegenden Zielkonflikten bei der Wahl von Regierungssystemen. Der Fokus liegt auf einem dreiseitigen Konflikt –...

Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. The article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the " testing "...

An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter...

Der Beitrag führt in die Grundlagen und wesentlichen Entwicklungslinien der Vetospielertheorie sowie von Vetopunkt-Ansätzen ein. Anhand von Beispielen werden die Potentiale der Theorien und Ansätze für die Policy-Forschung diskutiert und worauf bei ihrer Rezeption und Anwendung zu achten ist. Bei der Diskussion der Vetospielertheorie unterscheiden...

The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the Westminster model – the "proportional" vision of democracy – comes in two variants, one focusing on proportional representation, the other on proportional...

Do upper houses matter for cabinet formation? If so, does it make a difference how powerful they are? The most sophisticated study to give clear answers to these questions is still Druckman, Martin and Thies (2005). It argues that upper houses influence cabinet formation, regardless of their formal powers. We dispute these answers theoretically and...

The Finnish electoral system has recently been changed to slightly increase proportionality, but nothing has been done to make cabinet alternatives more “identifiable” before the election. This outcome poses a major puzzle for one important theoretical approach to electoral system change. This approach sees normatively “unbalanced” systems as vulne...

The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell’s Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell’s conceptual alternative to the Westminster model – the “proportional” vision of democracy – comes in two variants, one focusing on proportional representation, the other on proportional...

Do symmetric second chambers – i.e. second chambers with democratic legitimacy and absolute veto power – matter for government formation? Are cabinets more likely to form when they control majorities in such chambers, everything else being equal? While existing research has produced inconclusive answers to these questions, we argue that coalition a...

What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while p...

The present article analyses types of democracy as combinations of institutions and of behaviour patterns which become resilient through the self-interest of political actors in the face of numerous possible influences. It takes up Philip Pettit’s analysis of ‘resilience’ as an independent explanandum of the Social Sciences as well as Josep Colomer...

Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favor more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the...

The article analyses a certain type of bicameralism not merely as a form of legislative organisation, but as a form of government - as a hybrid between parliamentarism and presidentialism. A new typology of pure and hybrid forms of government is proposed, which classifies bicameralism in Australia and Japan as chamber-independent government. This t...

The project of public reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member fro...

This contribution to the study of democratic inclusiveness advances three main claims, based on Lijphart’s original data. First, his measurement of executive inclusiveness is incoherent and invalid. Secondly, executive inclusiveness is best explained by the interaction of many parties and strong legislative veto points. This implies that executive...

Der Beitrag analysiert Demokratietypen als Kombinationen von Institutionen und Verhaltensmustern, die durch das politische Eigeninteresse der politischen Akteure gegenüber zahlreichen möglichen Einflüssen widerstandsfähig werden. Er schließt an Philip Pettits Analyse von „Resilienz“ als eigenständigem Explanandum der Sozialwissenschaften sowie an J...

This article contributes to the comparative study of democratic inclusiveness by reinterpreting some of Arend Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy. Three main arguments are advanced. First, Lijphart's claim that executive inclusiveness follows rather directly from a high effective number of parties is based on incoherent and invalid measurement. Second...

Governments that wish to redistribute through budgetary policy do so mostly on the spending side, not on the taxation side of the budget. The taxation side is nevertheless important, partly because less efficient tax structures seem to be associated with lower taxation and spending levels. Hence political conflicts over spending levels may partly b...

Dieser Beitrag betrachtet das Design parlamentarischer Demokratien mit Blick auf den Wert politischer Gleichheit. Politische Gleichheit ist einer der zentralen Grundwerte der Demokratie. Unsere Kernfrage bezieht sich auf die institutionelle Verwirklichung dieses Grundwerts: Wie sollten parlamentarische Demokratien gestaltet sein, damit die Interess...

Inhalt und Umfang der vorliegenden Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Herbert Döring sind das Ergebnis von zwei unvorhersehbaren Wendungen. Die erste ereignete sich im Laufe der akademi-schen Karriere des zu Ehrenden und erklärt, warum diese Festschrift politikwissenschaftlichen und nicht geschichtswissenschaftlichen Inhalts ist. Die zweite Wendung vollzog...

Wie wirken Vetospieler auf die Gesetzgebung? Welchen Vorteil besitzen dabei diejenigen Akteure, die Tagesordnung und Abstimmungsinhalte festlegen können? Diese Fragen stehen im Vordergrund des 13 Beiträge umfassenden Bandes zu Ehren von Herbert Döring. Zusätzlich werden thematisiert: Variablen der Kabinettsstabilität in Westeuropa, der Zusammenhang...

Denmark's income tax burden as the percentage of GDP is larger than the total tax burden of the United States, and it has increased further after 1980. How can this be explained, given increasing tax competition and widespread views that strong reliance on regressive taxes was conducive to building and maintaining large tax and welfare states? The...

The paper analyzes convergence patterns in the tax systems of EU and OECD countries. It uses the example of tax policy to discuss the importance of theoretically grounded answers to two questions: What converges? How does it converge? Moreover, the paper presents and interprets specific results of convergence analyses in the area of tax policy. One...

Dieser Beitrag behandelt Konvergenzmuster in den Steuersystemen von EU- und OECD-Ländern. Er verfolgt zwei Ziele. Erstens will er zur methodischen Diskussion über Konvergenzanalysen beigetragen. Ich will zeigen, wie wichtig theoretische Annahmen darüber sind, was konvergiert und wie es konvergiert. Zweitens sollen spezifische Ergebnisse steuerpolit...

This paper measures the relative importance of quality and quantity effects of corporate taxation on foreign direct investment. Quantity is affected if corporate taxes reduce the equilibrium stock of foreign capital in a given country. Quality effects arise if taxes decrease the extent to which investment contributes to the corporate tax base and t...

This paper questions the argument that strong and early reliance on ‘regressive’ taxes(consumption and payroll taxes) made it politically easier to build and maintain a large welfare state. It develops an alternative perspective which differs in two respects. First, a crucial ‘advantage’ of regressive taxes is that they imply moderate capital taxat...

In parliamentary systems, parties compete for votes and offices in the electoral arena, but in many, systems they also cooperate in the legislative arena. This article examines the question of how the government status of parties affects their legislative behaviour. We develop a simple spatial model that includes parties' positional goals (vote, of...

In parliamentary systems, parties compete for votes and offices in the electoral arena, but in many systems they also cooperate in the legislative arena. This article examines the question of how the government status of parties affects their legislative behaviour. We develop a simple spatial model that includes parties’ positional goals (vote, off...

When you observe conflict, think Deadlock - the absence of mutual interest -before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized.

Marginal income tax rates in advanced industrial countries have fallen dramatically since the mid-1980s, but level and progressivity of income taxation continue to differ strongly across countries. This study offers a new perspective on both observations. It blends theoretical inquiry with focused quantitative analysis and in-depth investigation of...

The article proposes a two-dimensional, institutional determination of types of parliamentary democracy, with respect to the proportionality of the electoral system and (quasi-)legislative veto points. Three basic types of parliamentary democracy are distinguished: pluralitarian, majoritarian and supermajoritarian. The typology has important advant...

Der Beitrag schlägt eine zweidimensionale, institutionelle Bestimmung von Typen parlamentarischer Demokratien vor, im Hinblick auf die Proportionalität des Wahlsystems einerseits und (quasi-)legislative Vetopunkte andererseits. Dabei werden drei Grundtypen der parlamentarischen Demokratie unterschieden: die pluralitäre, die majoritäre und die super...

This article compares national income tax reforms during the last 25 years. There were two competing models of income tax reform, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘dual’ income taxation, the latter of which was in many ways more successful. The reason lies in the structural constraints policy makers face. While taxation of capital income is very costly, creatin...

Reformtrends in der Besteuerung von Kapitalgesellschaften und persönlichen Einkommen spielen in der Literatur über » Globalisierung « eine zentrale Rolle. Der offensichtlichste Trend ist die starke Abwärtsentwicklung der (Spitzen-Steuersätze seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre. Der Beitrag analysiert die Konvergenzmuster bei Körperschaft-und Einkommenst...

[Die wesentlichen Inhalte dieses Beitrags finden sich in gekürzter, aktualisierter und ergänzter Form in Steffen Ganghof, 2019, Forschungsdesign in der Politikwissenschaft, Springer Essentials. https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658242596 bzw. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-24260-2] Die Debatte über das Forschungsdesign in der...

Over the past two decades there has been a worldwide fall in statutory corporate tax (CT) rates. Focusing on Australia, this article establishes three empirical facts which challenge much of the existing literature. First, CT competition was the crucial driving force behind CT cuts. Second, policy makers had to abandon tax-related investment incent...

Veto player approaches have come to occupy a central role in comparative politics. This article critically reviews the literature, focussing especially on veto player explanations of policy outputs and outcomes. The review highlights three problems empirical veto player studies have to face: 1) identifying the relevant veto players, 2) establishing...