
Souhir NeifarUniversity of Sfax | US · Department of Accounting
Souhir Neifar
P.h.d
Assistant professor in Accounting and Taxation ;Habilitated in management science;Expert in tax advantages (trainer)
About
18
Publications
14,961
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278
Citations
Introduction
Souhir Neifar is Doctor in Accounting and Finance methods from the faculty of Economics and management of Sfax Tunisia. She is currently an assistant professor in FSEG Sfax, Tunisia and member on the Laboratory Governance, Finance, and Accounting, Sfax, Tunisia. She worked as contractual assistant and then as permanent assistant professor in several institutions: ESC Sfax, FSEG Sfax, ISG Sousse and FSEG Mahdia. Regarding her research area, she is a specialist in tax aggressiveness, financial aggressiveness, game theory and by level programming to resolve accounting and tax purposes. Reagarding her teaching area, she taught accouting and taxation: financial accounting, consolidation, tax benefits, corporate taxation , direct and indirect taxation and islamic taxation.
Additional affiliations
January 2020 - April 2020
September 2018 - present
July 2018 - July 2018
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (TU-Chemnitz- Germany)
Position
- Visitor
Education
January 2017 - May 2021
December 2011 - June 2016
September 2009 - November 2011
Publications
Publications (18)
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the effect of contractual factors and noncontractual factors on tax avoidance (TA).
Design/methodology/approach
The sample comprises 400 firm-year observations of 67 companies listed on the HDAX during the period 2008–2017. The generalized least square panel regression is applied.
Findings
The study results conf...
This paper aims to examine the impact of CEO attributes and Zakat on the performance of Islamic banks in the MENA region and Malaysia. In this paper, we test the effect of CEO tenure, foreign CEO, CEO duality, CEO education level and Zakat on the Islamic bank performance measured by ROA. The sample comprises 126 firm-year observations of 42 Islamic...
The main objective of this study is to design an optimal managerial compensation scheme and optimal auditor fees to counter income-increasing earnings management behavior. This study draws on game theory with three players: the shareholders, managers and auditors. It considers the possibility of collusion between the manager and auditor and analyze...
Due to the growing role of Zakat in reducing poverty, a trend of research has been conducted to call attention to the necessity of this Islamic duty to individual, cooperation, and the society in general. A common debate in Islamic taxation relates to the question of difference between zakat and taxation and about what drives zakat compliance. Few...
This paper aims to examine the impact of CEO compensation and CEO attributes on the level of tax aggressiveness of French companies.
The sample comprises 180 firm-year observations of 40 companies listed on the CAC 40 during the period ranging from 2008 to 2018. For the purpose of overcoming the problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, w...
We examine the influence of accounting opacity (earnings management [EM] and
tax aggressiveness [TA]) and CEO characteristics (CEO age and tenure) on stock
price synchronicity (SPS) of German companies and we test if CEO age and CEO
tenure moderate the relation between EM, TA, and SPS. Using the GLS regression,
we find that TA and EM have a signifi...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of earnings management (EM) and tax aggressiveness (TA) on shareholder wealth and on stock price crash risk (SPCR) of German companies.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample comprises 820 firm-year observations of 188 non-financial companies listed on German stock exchanges from 2008 t...
This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is used in order to estimate optimum tax authorities’ decis...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on the level of tax aggressiveness.
Design/methodology/approach
This work analyzes a sample of 471 observations of 100 companies listed on the NASDAQ 100 for the period 2008-2012. It uses a fixed effect panel model to analyze the effec...
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations of earnings management and financial aggressiveness levels in the big 100 companies listed on the NASDAQ 100 after the 2007 financial crisis.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses two samples. The first contains 471 observations of 100 companies listed on the NASDAQ 100 for the...
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between shareholders and managers when managing earnings and tax. We use bi-level bi-objective model to compute the different possible situations. Our aim is to determine the decision of the manager when he is faced to two conflicting objectives: maximizing financial income and minimizing taxabl...
The purpose of this paper is to examine the causes of tax evasion in Tunisia. The paper uses the survey methodology. We use a sample of 101 participants divided into three major groups: business students’ participants, medicine students’ participants and other students’ participants. The results show that medicine students’ participants are more op...
The main objective of this study is to estimate an optimal managerial compensation scheme and an optimal auditor fees in the presence of positive earnings management behavior. We study these issues in a principal-agent game between three players: shareholders, manager and auditor. We take into account the possibility of collusion between manager an...
A continuing debate in the area of financial accounting and reporting relates to the question of the principal-agent relationship. A common example of the agent-principal relationship arises between those who own a business (shareholders) and those who manage it (the manager). In a firm, the manager, who has private information can use his discreti...
This study examines the effect of the managerial compensation scheme and auditor’s fees on the earnings management and shareholders wealth. We study these issues in a principal-agent game between three players: shareholders, manager and auditor. We take into account the probability of collusion between manager and auditor in our model. We analyze t...
A continuing debate in the area of financial accounting and reporting relates to the question of principal-agent relationship. The common example of agent-principal relationship arises between those who own the business or organization (shareholders) and those who manage them (managers). In a firm, manager who has private information can use his di...
The flexibility offered by the accounting rules,
and the freedom of the standards are the major causes of
financial aggressiveness behavior. However, at a certain level
of aggressiveness, this behavior can damage firm’s reputation
and then shareholders wealth. Thus, the relation between
corporate governance mechanism and financial
aggressiveness se...
This research aims to examine the factors influencing the extent of disclosure on corporate governance in Tunisian context. In this study, we focus on a sample of 23 companies listed on the Tunis stock exchange for a period of three years (2007-2009). Our results show that companies which disclose more about corporate governance are those character...
Questions
Questions (5)
Dears,
I wanted to ask how can I measure discretionary working capital accruals.
Best
Dears,
In order to achieve my work regarding simulation in taxation, I need some estimations on:
Cost of tax audit per year (by countries)
Amount of tax evasion per year (by countries)
Amount of real taxable income per year (by countries)
Where can I find those estimations.
Thank you.
A current demand exists for an accepted tax management measure. Previous research has generally used effective tax rate (ETR) (e.g., Slemrod 2004; Dyreng et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2015); cash effective tax rate (CETR) (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2010), total book tax differences (BTD) (e.g., Wilson, 2009) and discretionary BTD (e.g., Desai et al., 2006 and Desai and Dharmapala 2006). Desai et al. (2006) have modeled a measure of tax management and test it in the American context (a context of disconnection between accounting norms and tax rules).This measure can be applied in contexts where it exists connection?
All the best