Silvia Martinez

Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción | UCSC

A principal makes a binary decision based on evidence that can be manipulated by a privately informed agent. The principal’s objective is to minimize the expected loss associated to type I and II errors. When the principal can commit to an acceptance standard, the optimal test features ex-post inefficient standards, to internalize the agent’s manip...

We generalize the disutility of effort function in the linear-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) pure moral hazard model. We assume that agents are heterogeneous in ability. Each agent’s ability is observable and treated as a parameter that indexes the disutility of effort associated with the task performed. In opposition to the literature (the...

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers’ imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in the market can be of two exogenously given qualities and...