
Serkan SarıtaşMiddle East Technical University | METU · Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Serkan Sarıtaş
Doctor of Philosophy
About
30
Publications
739
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218
Citations
Additional affiliations
September 2021 - September 2021
January 2020 - August 2021
May 2019 - December 2019
Education
September 2013 - August 2018
September 2010 - May 2013
September 2005 - June 2010
Publications
Publications (30)
We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the attacker and make stealthy attacks detectable. However, the defender does not know the exact goal of the attacker...
We consider communications through a Gaussian noise channel between an encoder and a decoder which have subjective probabilistic models on the source distribution. Although they consider the same cost function, the induced expected costs are misaligned due to their prior mismatch, which requires a game-theoretic approach. We consider two approaches...
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized cheap talk problem for real random variables and quadratic cost criteria in which an encoder and a decoder have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, it has been shown that the number of bins in any equilibrium has to be countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford...
We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the attacker and make stealthy attacks detectable. However, the defender does not know the exact goal of the attacker...
In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets where a transmitter has a pair of messages one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed whereas the other message contains sensitive data and needs to be protected. The receiver wishes to estimate both messages with the aim of acquiring as much informatio...
Conventional single‐ and multi‐factor authentication are insufficient for preventing sophisticated identity theft attacks, such as account takeover attacks and session hijacking attacks. These attacks may cause catastrophic losses for companies and individuals, and possibly disasters for critical infrastructures. As an extension to traditional iden...
In this study, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of single-stage and multi-stage quadratic signaling games between an encoder and a decoder are investigated. In the considered setup, the objective functions of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned, there is a noisy channel between the encoder and the decoder, the encoder has a soft power constra...
We consider communications between an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, which have subjective beliefs on the probabilistic model of the source distribution. Even though the decision makers employ the same cost function, induced expected costs are different from the perspective of the encoder and decoder due to their subjective p...
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, it has been shown that the number of bins under any equilibrium has to be at most countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford and Sobel who considered sources...
This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader–follower) equilibria of dynamic signaling games under quadratic criteria. For the multi-stage scalar cheap talk, we show that the final stag...
This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic manner by rendering reactions against potentially harmful actions covert. The behaviors of the attacker and the de...
Identity theft through phishing and session hijacking attacks has become a major attack vector in recent years, and is expected to become more frequent due to the pervasive use of mobile devices. Continuous authentication based on the characterization of user behavior, both in terms of user interaction patterns and usage patterns, is emerging as an...
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or mi...
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or mi...
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, we have shown that the number of bins under any equilibrium has to be at most countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford and...
Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depend...
Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and multi-dimensional cheap talk, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is alwa...
In this paper, the problem of optimal power allocation over flat fading additive white Gaussian noise channels is considered for maximizing the average detection probability of a signal emitted from a power constrained transmitter in the Neyman-Pearson framework. It is assumed that the transmitter can perform power adaptation under peak and average...
This study investigates extensions of the quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problem, which has been introduced in the economics literature. Two main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources, and the extension to noisy channel setups as a signaling game problem. W...
This paper studies the decentralized signaling problem when the encoder and
the decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective
functions. In particular, the study investigates extensions of the quadratic
cheap talk and signaling game problem, which has been introduced in the
economics literature. Two main contributions of this st...
We consider fast and accurate solutions of electromagnetics problems involving three-dimensional photonic crystals (PhCs). Problems are formulated with the combined tangential formulation (CTF) and the electric and magnetic current combined-field integral equation (JMCFIE) discretized with the Rao-Wilton-Glisson functions. Matrix equations are solv...