Sebastian Koehler

Sebastian Koehler
King's College London | KCL · Department of Political Economy

Dr.

About

19
Publications
1,588
Reads
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51
Citations
Additional affiliations
January 2017 - present
University of Konstanz
Position
  • PostDoc Position
September 2014 - December 2016
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Position
  • PostDoc Position
July 2008 - June 2014
Universität Mannheim
Position
  • Research and Teaching Assistant
Education
September 2008 - June 2014
Universität Mannheim
Field of study
  • Political Science
April 2002 - February 2008
Universität Mannheim
Field of study
  • Political Science / Economics

Publications

Publications (19)
Chapter
In this chapter, I discuss the data and the main variables. These include the measurement of preferences of interest groups and political decision-makers. Based on those, distance measures are developed. Lobbying costs and several control variables are operationalized.
Chapter
In this chapter, I combine the insights from the literatures on lobbying and bargaining into a formal model of interest group activities. I distinguish public and private communication as classes of structurally equivalent lobbying activities. I show that the bargaining environment constrains lobbying activities. I demonstrate theoretically that th...
Chapter
In this chapter, I test the formal model empirically. I analyze the decision to mobilize and the decision to send public or private messages. I can demonstrate that the decision to send public messages depends on the distance to the expected policy outcome, while the decision to send private messages depends on the distance to the constraining acto...
Chapter
In this chapter, I discuss the approaches to understand interest groups strategies. I show that both theoretically and empirically one of the major factors for lobbying is the demand for information. It is created by the fact that decision-makers decide in uncertain situations. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the provision of information is on...
Chapter
In this chapter, I discuss approaches to understand political bargaining. I show that bargaining implies a conflict of interest which creates uncertainty over the expected policy outcome. I discuss how the political process in Germany is structured and show that process uncertainty depends on the type of political process. This uncertainty is conse...
Article
Data Access, Transparency, and Replication: New Insights from the Political Behavior Literature – Corrigendum - Daniel Stockemer, Sebastian Koehler, Tobias Lentz
Article
Full-text available
Do researchers share their quantitative data and are the quantitative results that are published in political science journals replicable? We attempt to answer these questions by analyzing all articles published in the 2015 issues of three political behaviorist journals (i.e., Electoral Studies , Party Politics , and Journal of Elections , Public O...
Article
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/06/27/ uk-trigger-article-50-immediately/
Conference Paper
Interest Groups try to influence policy outcomes by transmitting information to political decision-makers who are involved in legislative bargaining. The communication can be private or public. Why interest groups choose a specific mode of communication is still poorly understood. Based on a theoretical model, I analyse data on lobbying in Germany....
Conference Paper
While some countries of the Eurozone were punished for their violations of the fiscal rules and others were not, we introduce a novel perspective on voters' preferences over fiscal solidity and European integration to understand both governments' compliance and enforcement of compliance by the European Commission. Because governments are spending f...
Article
Full-text available
The European sovereign debt crisis continues to hold Europe and the world captive. Will the euro and the fiscal mechanism of the eurozone survive? And how effective is the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)? Do the euro countries generally fail to comply with the rules of fiscal governance, or does the eurozone need a more member-specific fiscal mecha...
Chapter
Full-text available
Palavras Iniciais Quando no dia 19 de Julho de 1987 se realizaram as primeiras elei-ções para o Parlamento Europeu em território nacional, nada poderia prever que depois de quase trinta anos o sentimento português em relação à União Europeia (UE) seria tão distinto do de então. Alvo de intervenção externa desde 2011, Portugal encontra-se, ainda, a...
Article
Full-text available
Political leadership is one of the most important qualities of a political leader, especially in times of economic crises. People and markets expect political leaders to manage the crisis well. One can distinguish two aspects of a successful crisis management. The first one is the enactment of appropriate policy measures. The other one is to create...
Article
Political reforms are redistributive in the short-run, while their long-term effects are uncertain for the voters. Under these conditions, it is easy for opposition parties to mobilize voters against reform-making governments, which in response abstain from a radical policy change. In this study we argue that the success in reform-making depends on...
Article
Formal theoretical models of lobbying typically fall into one of two extreme classes: Informational models or rent-seeking models. While the underlying mechanisms in each type of model are compelling and interesting in their own right, neither class of model can be perfectly reconciled with stylized facts that emerge from the data. If the informati...

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Projects

Projects (5)