

**Prospects for Resolving the Conflict with North Korea
in 2013 and Beyond:
Looking at the Past in order to help Change the Future**

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Presented at
The Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) 8th Biennial Conference
Jun 2013

Abstract

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Although there is an abundance of literature on North Korea and the Korean War, little attention has been given as to why the conflict with North Korea remains elusive in terms of resolving, violent and protracted. This paper aims to help fill this analytical void by examining the conflict through the lens of Edward Azar's four clusters of variables as preconditions for protracted social conflict (PSCs): communal content of society, human needs, state's role and international linkages.

The analysis will examine and integrate Korea's unique historical and political landscape in light of Azar's four clusters of variables. As these clusters are explored, they will be further expounded on by introducing other key conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) theories such as basic human needs, structural violence and positioning, which build on Azar's framework and the greater understanding of this PSC. The analysis will culminate with a new understanding of the roots of this PSC and then turn to what has been done at the international level to help resolve it. After this is done, a series of new foreign policy (FP) and CAR driven recommendations will be introduced. The goal of this paper is to discover and put forth new ways of peacefully dealing with this deadly Cold War legacy conflict in 2013 and beyond.

Many of the conflicts today are intractable and rooted in legacy Colonial divisions, Cold War ideologies, attempts at hegemony, and poor FP decisions. In addition, they are often supported or fought in proxy such as what we see in the Middle East (Amante 2010; Watts 2012). Although there is an abundance of literature on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea and the Korean War, little attention has been given to why this conflict remains elusive to resolve, violent and protracted. This paper's aims to help fill this analytical void by examining the conflict through the lens of Edward Azar's four clusters of variables as preconditions for protracted social conflict (PSCs): *the communal content of society, human needs, the state's role and international linkages* (1990, 7–12).

As these clusters are explored, they will be further expounded on by introducing other key conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) theories such as basic human needs, structural violence and positioning, which build on Azar's framework and the greater understanding of this conflict. The analysis will culminate with a new understanding of the roots of this PSC and then turn to what has been done at the international level to help resolve it. After this is done, a series of new foreign policy (FP) and CAR driven recommendations will be introduced. The goal of this paper is to discover and put forth new ways of peacefully dealing with this deadly Cold War legacy conflict in 2013 and beyond.

The purpose of using Azar's four clusters over other epistemologies, theoretical frameworks is that it provides a CAR lens to examine the historical roots and drivers of this conflict at the communal, state and international levels. Moreover, this framework has the potential to open up a valuable window into which new ways to resolve this conflict can be introduced by providing a context for critically examining diverse possibilities. Traditional international relations (IR) theories are based largely on realism and neorealist frames, which

tend to describe and analyze state relations and conflicts based on specific problems such as leadership, competition, security, the power of states and national interests. While insightful in terms of the dynamics of realpolitik, this level of analysis often excludes the power above or below the logic of the system or state (Mearsheimer 2002; Korab-Karpowicz 2013; Sterling-Folker 2005). In addition, IR often relies on such theories as Game Theory to see how these relations or conflicts will evolve given linear causal relations amongst actors that are assumed to be rational (Brecher and Harvey 2002; Correa 2001). However, Azar's framework takes a CAR position. Instead of focusing on the event, phenomenon or symptom, it looks at the deep, complex and often multiple roots to state-to-state relations, problems and conflicts. In other words, it is more holistic in its analysis of the conditions that contribute to conflict, which this author feels is better suited at identifying, analyzing and resolving this conflict.

This paper will be broken down into four parts. The first part will provide a brief historical framework and introduction for which the rest of the paper will be based on. The second part will lay the theoretical foundation through the lens of Edward Azar's four clusters of variables as preconditions for PSCs (1990, 7–12) . The third section will describe the need to match the complexity of conflicts with holistic complex efforts to resolve it along with recommendations for new types of FP and CAR initiatives. The fourth and final section will recap what was presented and hopes for future research.

1.0 Background on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea:

The Korean Peninsula has had a turbulent history full of conflicts due to its location within East Asia that provides great land and water access to the continent of Asia along with several deep water ports that could be used by states for trade or war. This key location has been

the place of many wars, with Korea suffering from invasions by the Chinese, Japanese, the Manchus, Mongols and Russians (Stueck 1997, 13). The final war of the 1800's was between Japan and Russia with the winner—Japan gaining power and influence over Korea (Blank 1995). During this time, the U.S. was also trying to forcefully expand its trade and colonial dominance into East Asia. Japan's victory over Russia allowed for a FP deal to be reached between Washington and Japan, which gave the Japan the ability to freely move onto the Korean Peninsula (Schmid 2000). The signing of the Japan-Korea Protection Treaty in 1905 gave Japan virtual complete control over Korea, and in 1910 the Japanese officially annexed Korea and exploited it until the end of World War II (Lone 1991).

At the end of World War II, in a series of political barterings, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two parts with Russia occupying the north and the United States occupying the south (R. T. Johnson 2010; Pritchard 2010). This now official division into two separate countries, greatly exacerbated tension on the Korean Peninsula and pushed it towards the first conflict of the Cold War period. The colonial and political bartering by the U.S. and Cold War division mentioned are important parts that will be discussed further when we analyze Azar's four cluster PSC model.

1.1 Introduction to the Beginning of Korea's Protracted Social Conflict:

In June 1950, the North Koreans, supported by the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China, launched a surprise attack against the south. The U.S. and UN responded and after a turbulent three years of fierce fighting and over three million people deaths, the war finally ended on 27 July 1953, when an armistice agreement was signed (Matray 2005; Stueck 2002). At that time, there was an understanding that a final peace agreement would soon follow (Wilma

2001). Unfortunately, those that negotiate peace often focus on temporary dispute settlements, resulting in what Johan Galtung referred to as negative peace and the protraction of conflicts (1964). Instead of striving for positive peace, which is the integration of human society, the Cold War powers pushed for an armistice (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010, 1). Thus, the Korean War remains the longest remaining Cold War legacy conflict (Feffer 1999; Hart-Landsberg 1998).

Michael Colaresi and William Thompson describe protracted conflict as something which “embodies intense and violent conflict over important issues persisting for long periods of time” (2002, 168). Conflict Resolution scholar Edward Azar describes protracted social conflict as “a struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance,” which includes monopolizing power by dominant individuals or groups (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011, 84–87). These groups can be at the local, state, region or international level. While there are normally recognizable differences in the dynamics of intrastate, interstate, regional and international conflicts, in many cases they are intractable and socially constructed. Although Azar passed away in 1991, this author believes he included space for most types of conflicts in his four clusters of variables as preconditions of PSCs. In the case of North Korea, the conflict has the dynamics of a domestic conflict with its own people; a regional conflict with its neighbors; and international conflict primarily with the U.S. and western values. Thus, if Azar were alive today, he would probably characterized or coin the phrase “hybrid PSC.”

2.0 North Korea’s PSC Through the lens of Azar’s Model:

Azar proposed four clusters as preconditions which are: *the communal content of a society; human needs; the state's role/governance; and international linkages* (Azar 1990, 7; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011b, 84–87). In the following paragraphs I will slightly rearrange the order of these four clusters and while doing so, provide CAR based theories and examples relevant to the context of North Korean.

2.1 Communal Content of Society:

Azar described the communal content of society as the “most useful unit” of analysis in PSC and how communal groups [and societies] have been influenced by colonial policies [meddling], rule and divisions (1986, 12-31; 1990, 7; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011, 83–84). North Korea is no acceptance to this first condition. It was the beginning of colonial expansion in East Asia discussed earlier, which allowed the Korean Peninsula to be forcefully annexed by Japan. It was the end of colonial expansion and the beginning of Cold War rivalries, which divided the peninsula into two parts. This division allowed not only separate ideologies to foster and grow, but also the formation of groups according to class and social structure. The Korean War and its aftermath did little to change this division and in fact, expeditiously pushed the divisions, ideologies and class structure much further, and allowed for even more influence and positioning by the U.S. FSU and China (Hunter 1999; Oh 2007; Harden 2012).

2.2 The State's Role:

Normally under Azar's four clusters, the state's role would come after human needs (Azar 1990, 7). However, there is a natural progressive linkage between the state's role and human needs (or lack of), during conflict. Broadly speaking, the role of the state in society is to govern. How or how well they govern depends, of course, on the form of government.

Unfortunately, “most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs” (Azar and Moon 1986; Azar 1990). North Korea falls directly into Azar’s classification. It is an authoritarian regime, and is also referred to as a dynastic dictatorship or a well-structured “hybrid dictatorship, which blends qualities of personalist, single party and military dictatorship” (Ezrow and Frantz 2011, 265; Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2010, 2-17; Linz 2000). Moreover, the regime uses extreme levels of structural violence to dominate, repress and control the population, which robs the people of their basic human needs (Galtung, 1969; Azar and Farah 1981; Azar 1983; 1979).

2.3 Human Needs:

Human needs are considered by many as universal and include political access, security (which includes nutrition) and acceptance needs (cultural, religious and group expression/acceptance) (Azar, 1990, 7–12; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011, 86). John Burton states that “deep-rooted conflicts are based on fundamental human needs that are not negotiable” (1969;1987; Maslow 1943; 1970; Sites 1973). In addition, intractable conflicts tend to threaten the basic human needs of certain groups of people (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006; Coleman et al. 2007). For generations, countless numbers of North Koreans have been deprived of their basic human needs and are being physically and psychologically weakened by malnutrition; many times it seems deliberately (Lankov 2011). In the final cluster, we will explore international linkages and understand how they relate to Colonialism and the Cold War we discussed earlier.

2.4 International Linkages:

In Azar's fourth cluster called "international linkage," he argues that the state involved in PSC depends on stronger states for political-economic and military support, especially among regional and cross-border partners (Azar 1990, 10-11; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011). It is this linkage that we can now fully tie into the Colonia legacy and Cold War mentioned earlier in this paper. This cluster is one of the most important ones for this particular conflict as it directly affects the protraction more than any other cluster as countries continue to position for control and influence.

Positioning theory can be explained as an attempt to know or define your position in a certain place, space or time, and to establish a balance of parity and power (Harré and Langenhove 1998; Luberda 2006). We can posit that when dealing with states, positioning theory can be applied in the form of regional or global hegemony. Barrett quotes Antonio Gramsci in stating, "hegemony represents the status of the most powerful country in the international system or the position of a dominant state in a specific region" (1994, 239; Keohane 1991, 11). For the international powers involved with North Korea, we will discuss how they position themselves in this PSC based on self-interests, using their FP decisions, support, actions and interactions.

2.4A China:

For China, the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement provides the umbrella for the continued protection and support to North Korea (Vouchiounis 2011). Despite occasional frustrations, China makes a continued strategic choice or "position" to provide enough food, economic and military aid, and investment for North Korea to survive which protracts this conflict and allows the North Korean regime to

continue the structural violence (Bajoria 2012; Snyder, 2009). It also tacitly provides some military support while softening or rejecting UN sanctions on North Korea and trying to ensure it has a leadership position in East Asia affairs (Noland 2009).

2.4B Russia:

Until Aug 1991, the Former Soviet Union was generally more influential than China and provided North Korea with even more direct and indirect aid (Trenin 2011). However, after the collapse of the FSU economic aid and subsidies dramatically decreased. Although this economic decline pushed North Korea more into China's camp, Russia has continued to try and maintained its diplomatic support for North Korea and position in East Asia. Also, Russia like China, has provided military support while opposing many of the UN sanctions against North Korea (Finn 2007). Since Putin regained the presidency in Russia, it has also increased its effort to show leadership and strength in the region.

Finally, the United States also has a large role under international linkages. However, for the brevity of space, I will unfortunately have to neglect South Korea, not because its participation in this discussion is not needed or important, but since that country normally follows the overall lead of the U.S. (though at times reluctantly), its voices and actions can be heard through the discussion on the United States.

2.4C United States:

The U.S. has long played a rather heavy hand in positioning. "The past decade has shown how much it [the U.S.] likes being 'number one' and how determined it is to remain in a predominant position. The United States has taken advantage of its current superiority to impose its preferences wherever possible, even at the risk of irritating many of its long-standing allies"

(Walt 1998, 5). Unfortunately for the entire Korean Peninsula, this positioning goes back to Colonial times when Admiral Perry and his Black Ships went to Asia and Japan to open markets (Langellier 2012; Schechter 1999, 238). Moreover, due to the U.S.S. General Sherman incident in August 1866 the U.S. eventually forced Korea to sign a treaty opening up Korea to trade and giving free access to Japan (Park 2009, 62).

The international linkages and positioning by all these states briefly discussed here have the greatest effect on the other clusters in Azar's model and many aspects of the conflict including internal issues within North Korea. It is the primary cause for the continued protraction of this conflict and the further tension. If the international linkage could be resolved or used in a more constructive way, it would greatly increase the chances for peace. For the U.S., despite its stated desire for peace on the Korean Peninsula, its efforts towards North Korea have not worked to resolve the conflict—an area that will be discussed next.

3.0 Current Initiatives and Interventions: Too Narrow, Too Few and Not Inclusive

The U.S. led efforts to resolve this conflict have primarily consisted of a FP strategy of containment and isolation, based on military led hard power, sanctions and limited conditional incentives (Ascione 2011). There have been few official attempts at direct and sustained dialogue with North Korea. It could be argued that until recently when North Korea started to acquire and improve technology needed for nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, the country was ignored by the U.S. and others content with keeping that country in isolation. This limited Track I diplomacy has been ineffective at promoting positive change in North Korea, or positively affecting the North Korean people. The FP decisions have been too narrow, too

few and have not included CAR and other FP tools such as public diplomacy which have been effective at ending other conflicts and opening up relations.

It is time the West, led by the U.S. shows true international leadership and initiative by considering alternative and multiple ways to defuse tensions, engage North Korea and end this conflict. With this in mind, there are many FP and CAR tools that can be used to interact and engage with, and positively influence North Korea, including the power of public diplomacy, non-governmental led cultural exchanges and peacebuilding approaches. These tools and recommendations will be discussed next in the context of complex interventions and if effectively initiated, can positively affect change in and with North Korea in 2013 and beyond.

4.0 Complex Conflicts need Multiplicity in terms of FP and CAR Interventions:

North Korea's PSC, like others, is inherently complex, and interacts and persists on many different levels. In complexity theory, it is widely recognized that to truly transform the dynamics of a conflict, one should simultaneously use multiple diplomatic tracks, non-governmental efforts and CAR based tools (Korppen, Schmelzle, and Wils 2008, 7; Johnson 2009, 72; Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006, 548). The complexity of international relations and conflicts, especially PSCs, need diverse multifaceted approaches, which have the greatest chance of effecting deep and lasting change (N. Johnson 2009a). Similar to complexity theory, Dynamical Systems Theory offers ideas and methods for addressing the dynamic nature of PSC and the need for multiple interventions linked across all levels (Johnson 2009; Urry 2003; Dynamics of Conflicts 2012). Thus, we must match complexity with complexity in terms of our efforts and institute a multidisciplinary framework of diplomatic and CAR efforts.


4.1 Intervention Design:

Similarly to the earlier section where I used Azar's framework to map, understand and analyze the conflict, I will use a framework to help map, inform and guide new FP and CAR driven intervention efforts. For this, I turn to John Paul Lederach's pyramid model. This model is used to "develop an analytical framework for describing the levels of an affected population" along with interventions¹ that may be appropriate at each level of conflict (Lederach 1998). Although this pyramid model was originally designed to explain conflict dynamics and CAR centered interventions, it also is well suited for showing how many FP tools can be integrated and positively affect both conflicts and international relations.

The three levels in Lederach's pyramid are: level 1—top leadership, which deals with such stakeholders as major military, political, and religious leaders, and falls under the term Track-One diplomacy (hard power); level 2—middle-range, which deals with such stakeholders as respective sector leaders, businesses, and intellectuals; and level 3—grassroots, which deals with such stakeholders as local leaders, NGO's, community developers, health officials and local citizens. Both levels 2 and 3 would use a type of Track-Two diplomacy or forms of soft power.² An illustration of this model adapted from Lederach for this paper is provided below.

¹ In the field of CAR, the terms intervention, effort and practice are usually synonymous.

² Track-Two efforts combined with Track-One efforts at the top level would result in what could be referred to as multi-track diplomacy or intervention.



As you can see from the above illustration, if the conflict is addressed at each level, it can increase the contact and communication of the various stakeholders directly involved in the conflict, and fosters civil society and a democratic culture (Almond and Verba 1989; Barber 2003; Davies 2004).³ In the case of North Korea, U.S. diplomatic efforts have been limited to the top level using hard power, and even then, normally only through the auspice of bilateral or multilateral efforts such as the six-party talks, which have been for the most part ineffective at resolving the conflict. Therefore, new and diverse efforts must be implemented.

4.2 Recommendation Interventions for Sustained Change:

In keeping with the theme of multiple and dynamic efforts to help resolve conflict, I will introduce you to several FP and CAR tools that can be used at each level of the conflict. Starting with the top-level, the efforts rely heavily on “smart diplomatic initiatives.”

4.2A Sustained Contact:

³ By democratic culture, I am referring more to a participatory form of participation and not institution building as is the Western thought of democracy.

Chris L Kleinke posits how gaze functions to provide information, regulate interaction, express intimacy, exercise social control, and facilitate service and task goals (Kleinke 1986). This gaze is a necessary function in all healthy relationships including group and international relationships, but can't be conducted unless there is social interaction or "contact." In 1954, Gordon Allport advanced the "contact hypothesis," also known as intergroup contact theory or just contact theory, which asserted that getting individuals of different races or ethnicities together under the right conditions either as individuals or groups would vastly change their perceptions of the other, help remove prejudices, and could lead to the development of positive relations and friendships (1954; 1979). Over the last sixty years, the U.S. has had little direct contact with North Korea and what contact it has had, was not been sustained. This sustained contact is vital to help diminish anxiety and allow North Korea and the U.S. to feel comfortable with each other. As part of this contact, embassies or cultural exchange missions are needed in each country, similar to the ones we had in the FSU and China during the Cold War.

4.2B Third Party Participation:

Third party participation can be an effective tool in dealing with closed societies such as North Korea. In the past, the U.S. has relied on the UN, its allies in the region and the six-party talk process to contact and assist in limited engagement with North Korea. For the most part, these efforts have been ineffective. However, if the United States were to ask a country neutral to this conflict, such as a former communist state like Bulgaria to approach North Korea and perhaps even offer them such things as public diplomacy and cultural courses, this could dramatically open up new doors and assist in breaking down the walls of division and mistrust. Next, I will introduce you to several tools that can be used at the mid-level of the conflict. These efforts rely on a combination of CAR and public diplomacy initiatives.

4.3 Interactive and Reflective Problem-solving Workshops:

Interactive and reflective problem-solving workshops are widely used in the CAR field to look at and address protracted and deep rooted conflicts (Burton 1969; Kelman and Cohen 1976; Hill 1982). Problem solving workshops have been effectively used in many protracted conflicts around the world such as: the Kashmir conflict where it help create the People’s Bus; and Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities where it helped to open up new space (Nan, Mampilly, and Bartoli 2011, 68-72; Broome 1997; Kelman 1999).⁴ Workshops for North Korea might consist of such diverse subjects as CAR, peacebuilding, agriculture or even environmental issues. This is a vital tool that can affect change at the mid-level. The next tool to discuss involves educational and cultural exchanges.

4.3A Educational and Cultural Exchanges:

Educational and cultural exchanges are by far, some of the best ways to reach diverse groups of people. Exchanges such as those conducted under the Fulbright Program and by private universities are excellent ways to bring two countries, its cultures and citizens closer together (U.S. Department of State 2013). These exchanges have been used successfully in the past to include at the height of the Cold War with the FSU. It was in the late 1950’s when the late Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev—known as the godfather of glasnost came to the U.S. on one of the first Fulbright scholarships (Jouzaitis 1991). It normally takes a long time to see the benefits of this type of diplomacy, but the change that can happen is positive and dramatic. This change is even more dramatic when education is used in unison with fine arts and sports exchanges.

⁴ Lederach suggest, “middle-range leaders (who are often the heads of, or closely connected to, extensive networks... can... play an instrumental role in working through the conflicts” (Lederach 1998, 51).

4.3B Fine Arts and Sports Diplomacy:

Fine arts and sports diplomacy are excellent tools that have been used successfully to interact with other countries. Such things as music, art and sports transcend hatred and extreme differences as those that participate connect through a universal language. In music, it was the late renowned U.S. pianist Van Cliburn who captured the hearts and minds of Soviet Citizens with his musical diplomacy (McLellan 2013).

Sports, like fine arts can be very effective at breaking down the cultural walls of mistrust. In 1972, it was Ping-Pong diplomacy with China, which helped eventually thaw relations with the United States (DeVoss 2002). Although Dennis Rodman's trip to North Korea was problematic on multiple fronts, this trip should have served as a wake-up call to the U.S. that it's not using all the available FP tools (DeHart 2013). However, it wasn't as the U.S. continues to solely focus its efforts on sending signals to North Korea that it is well capable of defending its allies and interests in the region, which alone, only further increases tensions and the possibility of escalation. There needs to be sustained support for fine arts and sports diplomacy. Next, I will introduce you to several tools that can be used at the grassroots level of the conflict. These efforts consist of: news and information flow, and NGO support.

4.4 News and Information Flow:

There is little doubt that news broadcast can help provide listeners in hard to access countries with a voice from the outside world. Despite the difficulties of pushing broadcasts into North Korea and the harsh penalty for those who listen to these broadcasts, research has shown that about 27% of North Koreans listen to such broadcasts as Voice of American (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA 2011; VOA 2012). These stations offer reports on the North Korean

government's corruption, human rights abuses, health and nutrition crises, and a variety of other issues. This is a powerful tool that needs to be increased and supported.

TV shows and movies with the right context can provide valuable cultural information and a visual of the outside world. Despite regime efforts to keep these visual aids out of the hands of North Koreans, they are increasingly watching them, especially South Korean dramas, "usually in secret groups" (Telegraph 2012; J. Lee, Ahn, and Jackson-Han 2005). According to a recent report many North Koreans watch smuggled South Korean soap operas and American films like *Superman Returns* and *Titanic*. (Cain 2009). Starting in the 1940's, the U.S. in cooperation with Hollywood made films that were meant to increase domestic support, and provide foreign audiences with a new view of the U.S. (Staff Writer 2012; Lee 2008). Recently though, Hollywood has exacerbated foreign relations by producing movies such as *Olympus Has Fallen*, *Red Dawn* and *Zero Dark Thirty* that paints a ugly picture of the other. The U.S. should engage Hollywood and independent directors to produce more films that can show the best face of America and the west.

4.4A NGO Support:

Non-government organizations play a vital role in helping countries and its citizens all around the world, many times, at great personal risk. In North Korea, there are a number of NGO's from around the world actively engaged in helping North Koreans. These NGO's offer such things as food support, medical assistance and vaccinations, intellectual training and exchanges, and programs on agriculture, health, water and sanitation, and seed improvement (Taylor and Manyin 2011, 7). Many NGO's are working at the lowest levels of society and "have sought to increase the quality and quantity of contact... in order to gain a clearer

understanding and to communicate their goodwill directly to ‘ordinary North Korean’” (Kim 2009, 212). Some NGO’s launch balloons into North Korea, have radio broadcasts and are attempting to sponsor informal communications between governments (IBID, 10). The grassroots level work along with the attempts to make up for the lack of direct contact between key stakeholders shows the true value of these NGOs, many of which stay anonymous and work with little funding. These along with such efforts as those made by the United Nations, World Food Programs and others are the kinds of initiatives that should be given more funding, support and recognition by the U.S. government and World Community.

An illustration of this new model of FP and CAR driven interventions adapted from Lederach is provided below.



Source: Derived and Adapted from Lederach, 1997

As you can see from the diagram above, these levels should not be targeted in isolation. Each level should be well coordinated, both vertically and horizontally for durable and inclusive

solutions to the conflict, and properly monitored and evaluated for impact (Richmond 2001; Kriesberg 1997, 69).

5.0 Challenges to New Interventions of Engagement and Exchange

While the exact implementation of the recommendations for North Korea is a process that is beyond the scope of this short paper and may seem difficult given the regime's isolation and the current animosity, there is good precedent for these actions amidst such tension and distance. They have been effective in dealing with many countries such as FSU, China, Cyprus, and India. Even though these efforts will take time and initially be met with distrust, suspicion and rejection on all sides, they are some of the best options for avoiding war, and eventually achieving mutual understanding, positive change and peace. More importantly, the cost of doing nothing greatly outweighs the cost of working towards positive change.

6.0 Conclusion:

This paper examined North Korea's PSC through the lens of Edward Azar's four clusters of variables as the preconditions for protracted social conflict (1990, 7–12). After briefly looking at the historical content of Korea and the negative peace that took hold after the Korean War, we integrated appropriate CAR based theories into Azar's clusters. The paper then focused on how international linkages is such an important part of this conflict, and that U.S. efforts under this cluster has been too narrow, too few and not inclusive enough.

This paper also discussed the complexity of conflicts and the need for well-coordinated multiple levels of intervention. It culminated with dynamic and holistic recommendations that use the strengths of conflict analysis and resolution and foreign policy skills such as public diplomacy. Although it is recognized that much more research and efforts are needed, this

author believes that the recommendations provided here are important steps in positively dealing with the North Korea.

In closing, it is recognized that there is no easy solution to this protracted conflict and a strong military presence is indeed necessary to defend freedom, national interests and allies in the region. However, this should not usurp our CAR, FP and outreach efforts. Moreover, with a young relatively inexperienced Kim Jong Un leading North Korea, this is the time that the outside world should be trying to affect and influence his thinking before those in his inner circle guide him to a point beyond the possibility of engagement. The U.S. must show true international leadership and initiative by considering alternative and multiple methods to positively engage North Korea. If this is done, the latter part of 2013 and beyond can be much brighter than the past six decades.

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