Robert Rothschild

Lancaster University | LU · Department of Economics

A major barrier to starting small scale hydro power projects is an understanding of how much the scheme will cost. Empirical formulae to estimate the cost of electro-mechanical equipment and the costs of different types of turbines were developed through statistical analysis of cost data obtained from a range of turbine manufacturers. The approach...

This paper investigates the impact of trade restrictions on firms' capacity to maintain collusive agreements in an international "dominant group" cartel. The author shows, in particular, how tariffs and quotas can have different effects on the stability of these arrangements according to the composition of the cartel. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Pu...

Conversion of marine energy sources, including ocean waves and tidal currents, into electricity is a rapidly developing industry. Although many technologies have been proposed and some have generated electricity at full scale, it is difficult to predict which technology will be economic at large scales of installation. Several studies have been con...

In this paper we consider some limitations on the credibility of the threat of noncooperative behaviour as a response to cheating in cartels.

This paper investigates the role of expectations in determining the growth and stability of coalitions when agents may choose between membership and `free riding.' In particular we analyse the nature of coalitional stability under the alternative conditions of `tactical' and `strategic' behaviour on the part of agents with regard to other agents. W...

This paper addresses the problem of maintaining collusion in a differentiated duopoly with a finite lifespan. Using a trigger strategy devised by FRIEDMAN [1985], we identify two necessary noncooperative equilibria, and show that when both the prospective deviant and punisher are free to choose between price and output as their strategic variables...

This paper contrasts the implications, for cartel stability, of the non-spatial (`Chamberlinian') and the spatial (`Hotelling') models of product differentiation. Using the special case of a linear demand framework, we show that whereas the former approach suggests that cartel stability is non-monotonic but predictable in the degree of differentiat...

Simple game theory offers a number of important insights into strategic behaviour in a competitive business environment. Provides some flavour of the issues which can be addressed. Using a two-firm framework, considers how some familiar and recurring business decisions can be analysed as games. Shows that by such means a number of apparently comple...

This paper addresses a problem involving a 'principal' and a potentially large number of 'agents', in which the principal requires some rule which will ensure that agents are rewarded according to their effort. When the resources available make it impossible for the principal to monitor each agent's performance, it is desirable to ensure that any r...

This paper addresses the problem of maintaining collusion in a differentiated duopoly when both the prospective deviant and punisher are free to choose between price and output as their strategic variables. We show that the traditional formulation of the supergame in which firms commit for the duration to either price or output as their single comm...

This paper identifies conditions on the substitutability of product varieties, market price, and the number of firms in the industry, that ensure the existence of the conjectural equilibrium postulated by P. M. Sweezy (1939) and referred to as the "kinked demand curve." The authors show that the equilibrium thus identified will, under certain condi...

We consider a rule designed to maintain collusion in a duopoly made up of firms producing differentiated products. We analyse both price-setting and quantity-setting models, and show that product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of this rule. Our results contrast with those obtained by earlier writers.

The paper employs a variant of Perry and Porter's (1985) ‘oligopoly-fringe’ model to analyse the incentives for horizontal merger. We consider several ways in which mergers may form, and their impact upon the profits of both participating and non-participating firms. We investigate the alternative regimes of collusive and non-cooperative behaviour...

This paper investigates the impact of trade restrictions on firms' capacity to maintain collusive agreements in an international "dominant group" cartel. The author shows, in particular, how tariffs and quotas can have different effects on the stability of these arrangements according to the composition of the cartel. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Pu...

We consider an international ‘dominant-group’ cartel consisting of a subset of k ‘domestic’ firms and a subset of t ‘foreign’ firms. We analyse the impact of changes in the relative sizes of k and t, and of tariffs and quotas, on the performance of the domestic firms, measured in terms of profits and price-cost margins.

Office Policy in Britain: A Review, G. MANNERS and D. MORRIS, Geo Books, Norwich (1987). viii + 158 pp. £24.50. US$40.50 (hbk). ISBN 0 86094 212 0. The Economics of Imperfect Competition: A Spatial Approach, M. L. GREENHUT, G. NORMAN and C-S. HUNG, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987). xix + 408pp. £30 (hbk). £12.95 (pbk). ISBN 0 521 30552...

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University in 1927 and awarded the David A. Wells prize for 1927–28, has since become a milestone in the development of economic thought. Its impact on industrial organisation theory, gener...

This paper deals with the use of threats as a device for maintaining cartel stabi lity in the context of the static model. The author considers three a pproaches (Osborne, Reaction Function, and Cournot) and shows with th e aid of familiar analysis how they differ from one another in respec t to their credibility and their power to deter cheating b...

We analyse a relationship between market price and the stability of cartels. The approach yields insight into the size of the stable cartel relative to the economy.

We consider a problem involving cheating in a ‘cartel’ of finite lifespan. Cheaters may either maximise one period profits or pre-empt further cheating. The choice is shown to depend upon the number of firms relative to the duration of the cartel.

Postlewaite (1979) has argued that all individually rational, Pareto optimal resource reallocation mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation via endowments. In this paper we propose an ‘arbitration rule’ which renders such manipulation unprofitable.

An important aspect of economics arises when entry into a market of differentiated products is sequential and essentially irrevocable. An approach to the investigation of this problem is offered by the theory of spatial competition. We consider a market consisting of a line segment or its equivalent and assume irrevocable location choices for all s...