Robert Kirk- University of Nottingham
Robert Kirk
- University of Nottingham
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Publications (69)
If zombies were conceivable in the sense relevant to the ‘conceivability argument’ against physicalism, a certain epiphenomenalistic
conception of consciousness—the ‘e-qualia story’—would also be conceivable. But (it is argued) the e-qualia story is not conceivable
because it involves a contradiction. The non-physical ‘e-qualia’ supposedly involved...
An influential argument against physicalism goes: (1) If physicalism is true, transposed and absent qualia are impossible; (2) Transposed and absent qualia are possible; (3) Therefore physicalism is false. I argue that physicalism commits you to the 'strict implication thesis', hence to a strong construal of premiss (1). Neither the identity theory...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book's two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence...
Is truth ultimately made, not discovered? Is reality something we construct, by thinking about it? In this article, Robert Kirk gets to grips with the popular idea that truth and reality are, in the last analysis, our own invention.
Suppose P is the conjunction of all truths statable in the austere vocabulary of an ideal physics. Then phsicalists are likely to accept that any truths not included in P are different ways of talking about the reality specified by P. This 'redescription thesis' can be made clearer by means of the 'strict implication thesis', according to which inc...
Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. (It is presupposed that all explicable physical events are explicable physically.) Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is ‘No’, but why. (I conc...
Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. (It is presupposed that all explicable physical events are explicable physically.) Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. (I conc...
L'A. denonce les exces theoriques de l'ultra-externalisme qui redefinit l'experience de la perception selon l'information (ou contenu representationnel) qu'elle transmet, sans rendre compte des processus mentaux internes, ni de la notion cartesienne d'intimite radicale
DISCUSSES AND ATTACKS QUINE'S THESIS OF THE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION
INTRODUCTION Quine’s doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation has been described as “the most fascinating and the most discussed philosophical argument since Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” Yet it has proved extraordinarily hard to state clearly without trivializing it. An illustration will give a preliminary idea of what it...
