
Ritesh JainUniversity of Liverpool | UoL
Ritesh Jain
Doctor of Philosophy
About
27
Publications
4,313
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
33
Citations
Introduction
Skills and Expertise
Additional affiliations
May 2018 - June 2022
Education
August 2012 - May 2018
Publications
Publications (27)
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the forma...
The past decades have seen tremendous progress in fundamental studies on economic choice in humans. However, elucidation of the underlying neuronal processes requires invasive neurophysiological studies that are met with difficulties in humans. Monkeys as evolutionary closest relatives offer a solution. The animals display sophisticated and well-co...
The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions imple-mentable in rationalizable strategies. We offer two identical conditions, Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** and Partition Monotonicity. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2011) and Xiong (2022), Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** relies on the...
Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim correlated rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash equilibrium) strategies.
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR....
We introduce a notion of rationalizable implementation for social choice functions , termed s-rationalizable implementation, and show that it is equivalent to robust implementation.
We study rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Iterative Monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation when there are two or more players.
We study rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Iterative Monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation when there are two or more players. Iterative Monotonicity relies on an iterative procedure that mimics the logic of rationalizability.
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of
some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players' choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with boundedly rational players, the...
A large literature has documented violations of expected utility consistent with a preference for certainty (the “certainty effect”). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of the certainty effect in explaining violations of the independence axiom. We use lotteries spanning over the entire probability simplex to detect violations...
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r -monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of a SCC. W...
When there are at least three agents, any social choice rule F is virtually implementable both in Nash as well as in rationalizable strategies, by a bounded mechanism. No ``tail-chasing" constructions, common in the constructive proofs of the literature, is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form a Nash equilibrium.
Designers of economic mechanisms can often benefit by using discriminatory mechanisms which treat agents asymmetrically. This paper studies the extent to which a policy prohibiting biased mechanisms is effective in achieving fair outcomes. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented by symme...
Designers of economic mechanisms often have goals that are inconsistent with fairness. This paper studies the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constrai...
We generalize Arrow's theorem to allow for incomplete preferences
Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mecha-nism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced f...
This paper generalizes Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1950) in two
directions. First we allow agents to have incomplete preferences, and the
admissible domain of preferences can be a proper subset of the full domain.