Ritesh Jain

Ritesh Jain
University of Liverpool | UoL

Doctor of Philosophy

About

27
Publications
4,313
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
33
Citations
Additional affiliations
May 2018 - June 2022
Academia Sinica
Position
  • Assistant Research Fellow
Education
August 2012 - May 2018
The Ohio State University
Field of study
  • Economics

Publications

Publications (27)
Article
Full-text available
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the forma...
Preprint
Full-text available
The past decades have seen tremendous progress in fundamental studies on economic choice in humans. However, elucidation of the underlying neuronal processes requires invasive neurophysiological studies that are met with difficulties in humans. Monkeys as evolutionary closest relatives offer a solution. The animals display sophisticated and well-co...
Preprint
Full-text available
The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions imple-mentable in rationalizable strategies. We offer two identical conditions, Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** and Partition Monotonicity. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2011) and Xiong (2022), Two-Player Generalized Strict Maskin Monotonicity** relies on the...
Preprint
Full-text available
Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim correlated rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash equilibrium) strategies.
Article
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR....
Preprint
Full-text available
We introduce a notion of rationalizable implementation for social choice functions , termed s-rationalizable implementation, and show that it is equivalent to robust implementation.
Preprint
Full-text available
We study rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Iterative Monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation when there are two or more players.
Preprint
Full-text available
We study rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Iterative Monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation when there are two or more players. Iterative Monotonicity relies on an iterative procedure that mimics the logic of rationalizability.
Preprint
Full-text available
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players' choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with boundedly rational players, the...
Article
A large literature has documented violations of expected utility consistent with a preference for certainty (the “certainty effect”). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of the certainty effect in explaining violations of the independence axiom. We use lotteries spanning over the entire probability simplex to detect violations...
Article
Full-text available
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r -monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of a SCC. W...
Preprint
Full-text available
When there are at least three agents, any social choice rule F is virtually implementable both in Nash as well as in rationalizable strategies, by a bounded mechanism. No ``tail-chasing" constructions, common in the constructive proofs of the literature, is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form a Nash equilibrium.
Article
Full-text available
Designers of economic mechanisms can often benefit by using discriminatory mechanisms which treat agents asymmetrically. This paper studies the extent to which a policy prohibiting biased mechanisms is effective in achieving fair outcomes. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented by symme...
Research
Full-text available
Designers of economic mechanisms often have goals that are inconsistent with fairness. This paper studies the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constrai...
Research
Full-text available
We generalize Arrow's theorem to allow for incomplete preferences
Article
Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mecha-nism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced f...
Article
Full-text available
This paper generalizes Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1950) in two directions. First we allow agents to have incomplete preferences, and the admissible domain of preferences can be a proper subset of the full domain.

Network

Cited By