Richard N. Clarke

Richard N. Clarke
AT&T · Global Public Policy

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13
Publications
2,282
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621
Citations
Citations since 2017
0 Research Items
145 Citations
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20172018201920202021202220230510152025

Publications

Publications (13)
Article
Full-text available
As demand for mobile broadband services continues to explode, mobile wireless networks must expand greatly their capacities. This paper describes and quantifies the economic and technical challenges associated with “deepening” wireless networks to meet this exploding demand. Methods of capacity expansion divide into three general categories: the de...
Article
This paper examines regulatory governance in the context of African telecommunications. Though there is already a substantial literature devoted to the regulatory practices in developing countries, it generally conceptualizes the quality of regulation ...
Article
An important issue in "network neutrality" is the degree to which networks that comprise the Internet may be "managed" by their operators. This paper examines the current costs of unmanaged/neutral network technology and demonstrates that as customer Internet usage patterns evolve and become both more bandwidth-intensive and real-time oriented, a m...
Article
Full-text available
This paper develops and simulates a dynamic model of strategic telecom competition. The goal is to understand how regulatory policy, particularly relative to lease charges for local network elements, affects telecom competition, investment, retail prices, and consumer welfare. The model assumes two products, local voice service and data (broadband)...
Chapter
Real options theories are an important advance in analyzing the value of various business arrangements. Because incumbent exchange carriers’ business arrangements with their new competitors are at the center of regulators’ efforts to demonopolize the U.S. local telephone industry pursuant to the Telecommunications Act, it is natural that these new...
Article
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is often used to divide firms into homogeneous markets. Firms classified into the same (n + 1)-digit SIC are thought to be more homogeneous than firms sharing only the same n-digit SIC. This study measures how well the SIC succeeds at combining firms into homogeneous economic markets. Assuming that firms...
Article
Using actual trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Community, this paper demonstrates how a trade negotiation such as the Tokyo Round, can be modelled as a game among countries attempting to minimize individual welfare loss functions. Once welfare functions are constructed, we compute both noncooperative and cooperative Nash...
Article
During the nineties, Europe became a major recipient of FDIs but Italian regions have been largely excluded from this process. Was it due to their characteristics, or were Italian regions “doomed” by a negative country effect? In this paper we address this issue by estimating the determinants of multinational firms’ location choices in 52 EU region...
Article
This study shows how scale economies, initial size differences among firms, potential competition, and adjustment costs may influence the entry of firms into a dynamic oligopoly. It also examines the effects of these factors on the final size distribution of firms in an industry, and on the welfare levels of consumers and producers. We find that lo...
Article
Two steps are required for firms collusively to restrict output in stochastic markets. Firms must homogenize their market estimates by pooling information and they must cooperatively allocate production levels. In this article I examine the incentives for firms to share private information about a stochastic market. I show that there is never a mut...
Article
This paper shows that in a ‘full Bayes-Cournot’ equilibrium, duopolists would prefer to keep their market information private rather than share it with their opponent. This is in contrast to a ‘fulfilled expectations Bayes-Cournot’ equilibrium where firms are indifferent to sharing.

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