Rachel Cohon

University at Albany, The State University of New York | UAlbany · Department of Philosophy

Why do we have a moral duty to fulfill promises? Hume offers what today is called a practice theory of the obligation of promises: he explains it by appeal to a social convention. His view has inspired more recent practice theories. All practice theories, including Hume’s, are assumed by contemporary philosophers to have a certain normative structu...

In ethics, David Hume (1711–76) is best known for asserting four theses:

Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval...

I thank both my critics for their praise, their searching comments and objections, and their careful attention to my book. In the very short time allotted to respond to them both, I will address their objections in an integrated way, following the order of my book. Both Elizabeth Radcliffe and Don Garrett protest that for the last twenty years the...

This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three 'Humean' claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move u...

This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three ‘Humean’ claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move u...

This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three ‘Humean’ claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move u...

IntroductionThe Basic Features of the Indirect PassionsWhy These Four Emotions? The Foundations of the Distinction, between Direct and Indirect PassionsThe Moral SentimentsReferencesFurther Reading

The Moral SentimentsSympathyThe Distinction between Natural and Artificial VirtuesHonesty with Respect to PropertyFidelity to PromisesThe Natural Virtues and SympathyThe Common Point of ViewSpecific Natural VirtuesConclusion: Sympathy and JustificationReferencesFurther reading

Earlier versions of the four articles which follow were presented at a book panel session, on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, at the Hume Society meetings in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in August 2009. I am deeply grateful to Lívia Guimarães and Donald L. M. Baxter for planning this session, and to Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Don...

Hume's account of the virtue of fidelity to promises contains two surprising claims:

Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear fr...

This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three ‘Humean’ claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move u...

Rejetant l'interpretation non-cognitiviste de l'argument de la motivation developpe par Hume dans le «Traite de la nature humaine», l'A. montre que l'argument ne porte pas sur la representation du monde par le jugement moral et ne peut etre considere comme expressiviste ou descriptivisme. Ayant pour objet la possibilite des proprietes morales des a...

Rachel Cohon is at the Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305 USA. I am grateful to Elijah Millgram and David Owen for comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Annette Baier for discussion. Where I have responded to their comments, the paper has been greatly strengthened. 1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Natu...