Pierre Jacob

Pierre Jacob
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales | EHESS · Institut Jean Nicod

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77
Publications
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Publications

Publications (77)
Article
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Non-cognitive gadgets are fancy tools shaped to meet specific, local needs. Cecilia Heyes defines cognitive gadgets as dedicated psychological mechanisms (e.g. cooking and sporting expertise) created through social interactions and culturally, not genetically, inherited by humans. She has boldly proposed that many human cognitive mechanisms (includ...
Article
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In a (2018) paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states (e.g. beliefs), young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that bi...
Chapter
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The action-oriented approach in cognitive science emphasizes the role of action in shaping, or constituting, perception, cognition, and consciousness. This chapter summarizes a week-long discussion on how the action-oriented approach changes our understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience, combining the viewpoints of philosophers...
Article
Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view (unlike the former) assumes that f...
Article
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Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain (by Frédérique de Vignemont and Tania Singer and Vignemont and Pierre Jacob). First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on...
Book
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Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as “enactive.” This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts...
Chapter
Full-text available
The action-oriented approach in cognitive science emphasizes the role of action in shaping, or constituting, perception, cognition, and consciousness. This chapter summarizes a week-long discussion on how the action-oriented approach changes our understanding of consciousness and the structure of experience, combining the viewpoints of philosophers...
Article
Full-text available
What makes one individual’s experience vicarious is that it is both similar to, and caused by, another’s psychological state. Vicarious responses are mediated by the observation of another’s goal-directed or expressive action. While the evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests the ubiquity of vicarious responses to others’ goals, intentions, s...
Article
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We address the puzzle about early belief ascription: young children fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but they demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Based on recent converging evidence, we articulate a pragmatic framework to solve this puzzle. Young children do understand the contents of others' false belief, but they are ove...
Article
This paper is devoted to an assessment of the three-step model offered by Gallese and colleagues in support of the thesis that the function of the mirror mechanism is to mindread an agent's intention. The first step of the model is the acceptance of the direct-matching model of action understanding. The second step is the endorsement of a different...
Article
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Theoretical rationality and practical rationality are, respectively, properties of an individual's belief system and decision system. While reasoning about instrumental actions complies with practical rationality, understanding communicative actions complies with the principle of relevance. Section 2 reviews the evidence showing that young infants...
Article
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Alva No?'s version of the enactive conception in Action in Perception is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what N...
Article
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We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientif...
Article
This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human prima...
Article
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To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark (2008a) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s...
Article
This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological s...
Article
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The 'two-visual' systems hypothesis has recently come under attack regarding its proposed functional dichotomy between vision-for-action and vision-for-perception as well as for the limited interaction it allows between visual awareness and processing in the dorsal stream. Schenk (2006) questions the rigid functional dichotomy between vision-forper...
Article
This book is about human vision. It results from the collaboration between a world famous cognitive neuroscientist and an eminent philosopher. In the past forty years, cognitive neuroscience has made many startling discoveries about the human brain and about the human visual system in particular. This book brings many recent empirical findings, fro...
Article
This is the entry of 'Intentionality' designed for the Sanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
Article
Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent’s perceived movements onto her own mo...
Article
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The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified...
Article
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En este documento se presenta un panorama breve de las tesis (y por supuesto de los autores) de la filosofía de la ciencia que sirvieron de trampolín para el surgimiento de la revolución cognitiva en la década de los 50. Y es a partir de esta fecha que surge un nuevo paradigma en la ciencia que no ha dejado de reelaborarse: la ciencia cognitiva.
Article
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According to an in? uential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), ? rst discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer ' s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent's brain and this resonance process retrodictively g...
Article
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I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called 'enactive' approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible w...
Article
I first argue that some of Block's formulations may misleadingly suggest that the function of mechanisms of so-called cognitive accessibility is to make one aware, not of visible features of the visible world, but of one's own psychological life. I then ask whether Block's view of phenomenology in the present target article is consistent with his e...
Article
Mirror neurons were discovered in the 1990's by cognitive neuroscientists from Parma. How central are mirror neurons in primates, social cognition. Do mirror neurons enable an observer to match the agent's observed movements onto her own motor repertoire? Does this matching enable the observer to represent the agent's intention, as argued by Rizzol...
Article
I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.
Article
There is, I believe, an emerging consensus among philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists as to the existence of two broad classes of mental representational states (or kinds of mental representations): on the one hand it is assumed by common sense and by cognitive psychology as well that intentional mental states such as thoughts and beliefs...
Article
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This is a summary of the book Ways of Seing co-authord witth Marc Jeannerod and published by Oxford University Press in 2003
Article
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Marc Jeannerod and I wrote a Précis of our 2003 book Ways of Seeing. The journal Dialogue asked Tim Schroeder, Alva Noë, Pierre Poirier and Martin Ratte to write a critical essay on our book. In this piece, we reply to our critics.
Article
Introduction There is today, or so I will argue in this chapter, a vast array of empirical evidence in favor of the ‘two visual systems’ model of human vision. Human beings are so visually endowed that they can see a wide variety of things. Some of the things that they can see are objects that they can also reach, grasp and manipulate with their ha...
Article
In this paper, we argue that no valid comparison between visual representations can arise unless provision is made for three critical properties: their direction of fit, their direction of causation and the level of their conceptual content. The conceptual content in turn is a function of the level of processing. Representations arising from earlie...
Article
Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observ...
Article
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Ce texte est un rapport d'étape issu de l'ACI cognitique.
Article
In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent...
Article
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This is the first chapter of Ways of Seeing co-authored with Marc Jeannerod. We ague for a representational approach to the puzzles of both visual perception and visually-guided actions.
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As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from b...
Article
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I explore Chomsky's naturalistic stance in cognitive science, his internalism in semantics and his attitude towards evolutionary assumptions
Article
I scrutinize the argument for why externally individuated mental content might not be causally efficacious in the explanation of an individual's physical movements. I argue that even though externalististically construed mental content might not explain an individual's physical movements, it might nonetheless explain his or her behavior on a compon...
Article
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I examine Mark Rowlands' book, "The Body in Mind".
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I examine two views of Professor Von Wright's: in the philosophy of action and in the philosophy of perception. I partly agree and partly disagree with him.
Article
Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being...
Article
L'étude de la transformation visuomotrice en neurosciences cognitives montre que voir n'est pas toujours percevoir. Voir inclut aussi les actions visuellement guidées dirigées vers des objets.
Article
I argue that Millikan's consumerist version of teleosemantics results in implausible content ascriptions. I try to provide an alternative teleosemantics without these undesirable results.
Article
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J'examine les rapports souvent conflictuels entre l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences
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My goal in this paper is to defend the so-called “higher-order thought” theory of conscious mental states, which has been presented in various places by Rosenthal (1986, 1990, 1993, 1994), from a pair of objections recently advanced by Dretske (1993; 1995). According to the version of the “higherorder thought” (henceforth HOT) theory of conscious s...
Article
Some of the things I do, I do for no reason: I inhale oxygen, I vomit, I cough, I hiccup, I perspire, I snore, and so on and so forth, if and when I do, for no reason. Other things I do, I do for reasons and some of my reasons for doing them are the contents of my beliefs and desires, i.e., my propositional attitudes. So I recently went to the trav...
Article
I discuss Fodor's examination of what he calls 'Frege cases' and which he takes to be exceptions to psychologica laws.
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I discuss Jerry Fodor's atomic theory of the contents of concepts.
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I ewamine and criticize two views held by John Searle, i.e., that the assignment of biological functions is relative to a conscious agent with beliefs and desires and that consciousness has priority over intentionality.
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This paper is about belief ascriptions and problems that arise for a Fregean theory.
Article
L'intentionnalité pose aux philosophes qui se réclament du matérialisme ou du physicalisme deux problèmes complémentaires qui sont les deux faces d'une même médaille. Premièrement, peut-on naturaliser l'intentionnalité? Deuxièmement, les propriétés intentionnelles des représentations sont-elles causalement efficaces? Un moteur peut-il être sémantiq...
Article
temoignent l'etude scientifique du raisonnement deductif et inductif, les etudes sur la dissonance cognitive et les « theories de l'esprit ». Les croyances et les attitudes propositionnelles en general ont un contenu ou des proprietes intentionnelles. Elles sont aussi tenues pour des causes du comportement ou de l'action intentionnelle. Le probleme...
Article
I discuss McGinn's distinction between strong and weak externalism.
Article
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First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" (...

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