Peter Graham

Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside | UCR · Department of Philosophy

PhD

About

35
Publications
2,607
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465
Citations
Additional affiliations
July 2001 - present
University of California, Riverside
Position
  • Professor (Full)
August 1999 - July 2001
Saint Louis University
Position
  • Professor (Assistant)
July 1995 - May 1999
Stanford University
Position
  • Professor

Publications

Publications (35)
Article
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This paper argues that as a name for a speech act, epistemologists typically use ‘testimony’ in a specialist sense that is more or less synonymous with ‘assertion’, but as a name for a distinctive speech act type in ordinary English, ‘testimony’ names a unique confirmative speech act type. Hence, like any good English word, ‘testimony’ has more tha...
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How should we undertand the role of norms – especially epistemic norms – governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability – and so the stability (the continue...
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Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright distinguish between justification and entitlement. For both entitlement is the new notion. For Burge, entitlement is warrant without reasons. Burge’s account of reasons is explained. For Wright, entitlement is a non-evidential right to claim knowledge of authenticity-conditions. Wright’s account is motivated by warran...
Chapter
Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright both distinguish two forms of warrant: entitlement and justification. But they use these terms in very different ways. Entitlement for Wright is a non-evidential, a priori rational right to claim knowledge against the skeptic. Wright’s project engages the skeptic. Entitlement for Burge is a truth-conducive good route...
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In ‘Perceptual Entitlement’ (2003) Burge argues that a perceptual competence that is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally confers prima facie warrant when functioning normally in any conditions, and so a normal functioning perceptual competence continues to confer warrant even when the individual is unknowingly massively deceived...
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The case of very young children is a test case for the plausibility of reductionism about testimonial warrant. Reductionism requires reductive reasons, reductively justified and actively deployed for testimonial justification. Though nascent language-users enjoy warranted testimony based beliefs, they do not meet these three reductionist demands. T...
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Alvin Goldman's paper "What Is Justified Belief " and his book Epistemology and Cognition pioneered reliabilist theories of epistemic justifiedness. In light of counterexamples to necessity (demon worlds, brains-in-vats) and counterexamples to sufficiency (Norman the clairvoyant, Mr. Truetemp), Goldman has offered a number of refinements and modifi...
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Cambridge University Press I'm a reliabilist about warrant, where warrant constitutively involves the reliability of the belief-forming process. 1 Though popular, reliability theories face (at least) two familiar challenges: the demon-world or brain-in-a-vat case (which apparently shows reliability is not necessary for warrant) and clairvoyant-powe...
Chapter
What is the biological function of perception? I believe perception has representing reliably as a biological function, for reliably accuracy enters into the functional analysis of our ability to survive and reproduce. Tyler Burge argues from principles and by example that this cannot be so. I show why Burge’s considerations fall short. At best Bur...
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David Henderson and Terry Horgan argue that doxastic epistemic justification requires the transglobal reliability of the belief-forming process. Transglobal reliability is reliability across a wide range of experientially possible global environments. Focusing on perception, I argue that justification does not require transglobal reliability, for p...
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According to John Greco and John Turri, virtue epistemology has two basic commitments. The first is that epistemology is a normative discipline and not merely a branch of natural or social science, pace Quine. This implies, among other things, that epistemology should focus on epistemic norms, epistemic value, and epistemic evaluation. The second i...
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Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer ‘Yes’; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In ‘The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism’ they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth...
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In Warrant and Proper Function and in Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga provides an intelligent design argument for the existence of God. Plantina's key premise is that "naturalism" cannot account for the proper functions of natural traits, but God as intelligent designer can. His argument for this premise relies on a thought experiment involving a...
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Warrants epistemically support beliefs. There are two prominent kinds: entitlements and justifications. Justifications involve reasons and reasoning; paradigmatically justifications are arguments in support of a belief. Entitlements do not turn on reasons. Paradigmatically warrant for perceptual belief turns on entitlements. It is argued in this ch...
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The standard taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification generates four positions from the Foundationalism v. Coherentism and Internalism v. Externalism disputes. I develop a new taxonomy driven by two other distinctions: Fundamentalism v. Non-Fundamentalism and Actual-Result v. Proper-Aim conceptions of epistemic justification. Actual-Result t...
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Introduction - John Greco Part One. Varieties of Skepticism and Skeptical Arguments 1. The Pyrrhonian Problematic- Markus Lammenranta 2. The Problem of the Criterion- Richard Fumerton 3. Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents- Jose Luis Bermudez 4. Hume's Skepticism- Michael Williams 5. Skepticism about the External World- John Greco 6. Sk...
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Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories und...
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Liberal Fundamentalism is anti-reductionist about the justification for testimony-based beliefs. Liberal Fundamentalism holds that it is a priori necessary that if a subject S (seemingly) comprehends a (seeming) presentation-as-true by a (seeming) speaker that P, and if that causes or sustains in the normal way S's belief that P, then that confers...
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Anti‐reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non‐inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's ar...
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Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e .g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and memory, preserve knowledge. An example from Jennifer Lackey - the Schoolteacher case - purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey's case fails to subvert the...
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C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p. I offer examples to show that Coady’s conditions ar...
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Are we entitled or justified in taking the word of others at face value? An affirmative answer to this question is associated with the views of Thomas Reid. Recently, C.A.J. Coady had defended a Reidian view in his impressive and influential book, Testimony: A Philosophical Study. His central and most original argument for his positions involves re...
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