Penélope Hernández RojasUniversity of Valencia | UV · Departamento de Análisis Económico
Penélope Hernández Rojas
PhD Economics
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59
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Introduction
Publications
Publications (59)
Centralized sanctioning in social dilemmas has been shown to increase efficiency with respect to standard decentralized peer punishment. In this context, we explore the impact of sanctioners’ motivations through their payoff scheme, not only on their actions but also on the actions of the monitored individuals. To do so, we compare the implementati...
Automation is a big concern in modern societies in view of its widespread impact on many socioeconomic issues including income, jobs, and productivity. While previous studies have concentrated on determining the effects on jobs and salaries, our aim is to understand how automation affects productivity, and how some policies, such as taxes on robots...
We study a setting where individuals prefer to coordinate with others but they differ on their preferred action. Our interest is in understanding the role of link formation with others in shaping behavior. So we consider the situation in which interactions are exogenous and a situation where individuals choose links that determine the interactions....
This paper applies a Machine Learning approach with the aim of providing a single aggregated prediction from a set of individual predictions. Departing from the well-known maximum-entropy inference methodology, a new factor capturing the distance between the true and the estimated aggregated predictions presents a new problem. Algorithms such as ri...
We follow the example of Gossner et al. (Econometrica 74(6):1603–1636, 2006) in the design of a finitely repeated 2-player coordination game with asymmetric information. Player 1 and Player 2 and Nature simultaneously decide whether to play 0 or 1 and successful coordination requires that all actions coincide. Nature’s moves are known only by Playe...
Ensuring safe and satisfactory online shopping activity, especially among vulnerable consumers such as elderly and less educated citizens, is part of a larger set of consumer policy objectives seeking to strengthen trust in the electronic marketplace. This article contributes to that goal by testing the effectiveness of nudges intended to prevent t...
Additional Screenshots of Webpages used in the Experiment.
(PDF)
Full Data Set of the Experiment.
(ZIP)
In this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernández et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understan...
In this paper, we define two strategies for crowdsourcing systems to encourage users to participate at a cost that is close to the optimal cost for the system. In the scenario considered, the system has temporal constraints and potential participants have dynamic behaviors related to the expected rewards (i.e., users’ expected rewards in exchange o...
We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but where not all have a preference for the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying...
This paper studies the interaction of automata of size m. We characterise statistical properties satisfied by random plays generated by a correlated pair of automata with m states each. We show that in some respect the pair of automata can be identified with a more complex automaton of size comparable to mlogm\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepacka...
This paper experimentally analyses the relationship between cognitive ability and strategic behaviour. In our experiment, individuals play in a sequential game, where computing the equilibrium is challenging. On completion of the game, we measure each player’s cognitive ability using Raven’s Progressive Matrices test. Our results reveal that the nu...
Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants compete...
This chapter presents the basic concepts of game theory used in this book. The main objective is to provide the necessary basis for understanding the analysis and the answers to questions posed in the other chapters.1 We start by explaining the concept of a game, and then proceed to study different types of games under the assumption of complete in...
In this chapter we focus on strategic situations, which fall under the umbrella of coordination games. Both in daily life and in the world of economics there are numerous situations in which we are required to coordinate with friends, professors, colleagues, other firms, etc. Coordination may sometimes appear to be an easy task, but yet in some cas...
New systems can be designed, developed, and managed as societies of agents that interact with each other by offering and providing services. These systems can be viewed as complex networks where nodes are bounded rational agents. In order to deal with complex goals, they require cooperation of the other agents to be able to locate the required serv...
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (...
In local social migrations, agents move from their initial location looking for a better local social environment. Social migrations processes do not change the number of social agents of a given type (i.e. the empirical distribution of the population) but their spatial location. Although cellular automata seems to appear as a natural approach to m...
Experimental economics has many works that demonstrate the influence of emotions and affective issues on the process of human strategic decision making. Personality, emotions and mood produce biases on what would be considered the strategic solution (Nash equilibrium) to many games. Thus considering these issues on simulations of human behavior may...
This chapter illustrates the potentiality of the application of experimental-behavioral methods to gain global competitive advantages based in the anticipated measurement of how consumers and citizens would behave when exposed to specific innovation actions to be implemented by an organization. To this end, the chapter presents a brief background o...
This paper compares two alternative methodologies—the experimental–behavioral approach and the contingent approach—for measuring the value that an attribute of a good (product or service) creates for potential customers. In the experimental–behavioral methodology, potential buyers make actual purchase decisions by receiving financial incentives. In...
This work proposes a teaching-learning activity encouraging students to think and discuss on social values: respect, solidarity, and a like. The main goal is the student becomes aware of economic and social extend of her own decisions. To this purpose, we design an activity combining experimental economics and structured debate discipline. This act...
En este trabajo presentamos el diseño y los resultados de un experimento económico realizado por estudiantes de primero del grado de administración y dirección de empresas en el transcurso de una clase práctica de la asignatura transversal de incorporación a los estudios universitarios. Los estudiantes tomaron sus decisiones en un marco donde coexi...
Purpose
This paper aims to analyze the role played by two dimensions of entrepreneurs' private social capital in the survival, growth and innovativeness of entrepreneurial service ventures: local size and preferential attachment degree.
Design/methodology/approach
Data were collected by a questionnaire, the unit of investigation being the private...
Purpose
The aim of this paper is to analyze the compatibility between entrepreneurial and social attitudes. Specifically, it seeks to analyze whether subjects with a more developed economic entrepreneurial attitude exhibit a less social attitude.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology integrates an economic experimental approach with a standa...
The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In...
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with
transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender
and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy
channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to
signals. The receiver's best response is to de...
We s tudy minimum cost spanning tree problems for a given set of users connected to a source. We propose a rule of sharing such that each user may pay her cost for such a tree plus an additional amount to the others users . A reduction of her cost appears as a compensation from the other users. Our first result states the existence of a sharing such...
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling's (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling's model theo- retically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move...
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the cost of memory goes to 0, includes the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. This result stands in...
This article shows the results of experiments where subjects play the Schilling's spatial proximity model. Two types of experiments are conducted: one in which choices are made sequentially and a variation of the first where the decision making is simultaneous. The results of the sequential experiments are identical to Schilling's prediction: subje...
The design of equilibrium protocols in sender-receiver games where communication is noisy occupies an important place in the Economic literature. This paper shows that the common way of constructing a noisy channel communication protocol in Information Theory does not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium. Given the decoding scheme, it may happen...
This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information transmission. The Language is pragmatic in the sense that...
This note provides a way to translate a strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. Coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition characterize the Core. We calculate the worth of the total coalition...
Una aproximació polièdrica al concepte microeconòmic
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of a pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunder-standings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those sender-receiver games, where there may exist noisy information tranmis-sion. The Language is pragmatic in the sense t...
La constatación de los importantes cambios en relación a la docencia que implica el proceso de Bolonia y la soledad en la que tales transformaciones deben llevarse a cabo por parte del profesorado, impulsó a un grupo de profesores de diversas universidades públicas españolas a plantear la oportunidad/necesidad de que los docentes intercambiaran opi...
Este artículo propone un enfoque tridimensional en el aprendizaje de cualquier concepto en microeconomía. Las tres facetasdel aprendizaje presentadas son la experiencial- vivencial, la gráfico-geométrica y la matemático-formal. En cada una de ellasel lenguaje utilizado es diferente, y el paso entre las tres facetas conforma el camino apropiado para...
This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design of both communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by bounded rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds on the work of...
This paper is a note in which we prove that Cellular Automata are suitable tools to model multi-agent interactive procedures. In particular, we apply the argument to validate results from simulation tools obtained for the classical model of segregation of Thomas Schelling (1971a).
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication eq...
Let (xt) be an n-periodic sequence in which the first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to some rational distribution. We prove there exists a constant C such that whenever mlnm⩾Cn, with probability close to 1, there exists an automaton of size m that matches the sequence at almost all stages.
We introduce a model of communication with dynamic state of nature. We rely on entropy as a measure of information, characterize the set of expected empirical distributions that are achievable. We present applications to games with and without common interests.
Classification JEL : C61, C73, D82.
We study a repeated game in which one player, the prophet, acquires more information than another player, the follower, about the play that is going to be played. We characterize the optimal amount of information that can be transmitted online by the prophet to the follower, and provide applications to repeated games played by finite automata, and...
The main contribution of this paper is to present a new procedure to reach cooperation through pseudorandom schemes in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, when strategies are implemented by automata. The equilibrium path consists of a communication process followed by a coordinated play. The choice of the set of communication messages is...
The fact that the Bologna process involves significant changes in teaching and that teachers are alone in carrying out these changes, encouraged a group of professors from different Spanish universities to present the opportunity / need for professors to exchange views and experiences in teaching, as is done in the field of research. All of this to...
Schelling presented one-dimensional landscapes populated with agents of two distinct 'types' in which micro-level agent preferences involve macro-level effects. Schelling's model exhibits the sectoral dynamics of individual pref-erences. A crucial feature in Schelling's model is the dynamic given the asyn-chronous movements of each agent. Given an...
This paper studies implementation of cooperative payoffs in finitely repeated games when players implement their strategies by finite automata of big sizes. Specifically, we analyze how much we have to depart from fully rational behavior to achieve the Folk Theorem payoffs, i.e., which are the maximum bounds on automata complexity which yield coope...
Este artículo propone un enfoque tridimensional de cualquier concepto en Microeconomía y analiza las implicaciones de esta multidimensionalidad en el proceso de aprendizaje-enseñanza de la microeconomía en educación universitaria. Las tres facetas del aprendizaje presentadas son la experiencial-vivencial, la gráfico-geométrica y la matemático-forma...