Pedro Rey-Biel

Pedro Rey-Biel
Autonomous University of Barcelona | UAB · Departamento de Economía y de Historia Económica

PhD in Economics

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34
Publications
8,187
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1,469
Citations

Publications

Publications (34)
Article
Multiple-choice tests are extensively used to measure individuals’ knowledge and aptitudes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess using approximately 10,000 multiple-choice math tests, where, for all participants, in half of the questions, omitted answers were rewarded while for the other half they scored the same as wrong answers. Us...
Chapter
We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the USA and Spain – each of which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find that when individuals are informed about...
Article
In two‐stage elimination math contests participants from four different age groups compete to pass from stage 1 to stage 2 and later to be among the winners. Although female participants have higher Math grades at school the gender gap reverses in the two stages of the contests. More importantly, following the same individual participant across dif...
Article
We show that the existence of gender differences in performance is highly sensitive to the task used to measure performance, to existing stereotypes and to informational conditions. Out of sixteen purposely designed treatments we find that women underperform when competing only when two conditions are met: 1) the task used is perceived as favoring...
Article
We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find no cross-cultural differences in giving when indivi...
Article
We report evidence from a large field experiment that compares the effectiveness of contingent and noncontingent incentives in eliciting costly effort for a large range of payment levels. The company with which we worked sent 7,250 letters asking customers to complete a survey. Some letters promised to pay amounts ranging from $1 to $30 upon compli...
Article
Full-text available
First we discuss how extrinsic incentives may come into conflict with other motivations. For example, monetary incentives from principals may change how tasks are perceived by agents, with negative effects on behavior. In other cases, incentives might have the desired effects in the short term, but they still weaken intrinsic motivations. To put it...
Article
We compare the determinants of individual giving between two countries, Spain and the US, which differ in their redistribution policies and their beliefs over the causes of poverty. By varying the information about the determinants of income, we find that, although overall giving is similar in both countries when subjects know the actual role of lu...
Article
This paper uses subjects’ diverse self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot traveler's dilemma experiment. Principal components analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and penalt...
Article
Full-text available
In contrast to the simplifying assumption of selfishness, social incentives have been shown to play a role in economic interactions. Before incorporating social incentives into models and policies, however, one needs to know their efficiency relative to standard pay-for-performance incentives. We report evidence from a large field experiment compar...
Article
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We study how gender differences in performance under competition are affected by the provision of information regarding rival’s gender and/or differences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks that differ regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. We observe women’s underperformance only under two con...
Article
We present evidence from an experiment in which groups select a leader to compete against the leaders of other groups in a real-effort task that they have all performed in the past. We find that women are selected much less often as leaders than is suggested by their individual past performance. We study three potential explanations for the underre...
Article
Full-text available
This paper uses subjects’ self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot traveler’s dilemma experiment (TD). Principal components (PC) analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and pena...
Article
Full-text available
We ask whether the absence of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere.We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while in simple voting mechanisms the elimination of information abou...
Article
Affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants, and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament...
Article
We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3×3 normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the equilibrium prediction (70.2%) and were best-responses...
Article
Full-text available
This paper uses subjects' self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot traveler's dilemma experiment (TD). Principal components (PC) analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and pena...
Article
We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Costly surplus creating actions are most frequent with role uncertainty while selfish behavior is most frequent without role uncertainty. A classification of subjects into four different types of preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and Com...
Article
We use subjects’ actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification of individuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfare maximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects’ actions in the same modified dictator games to test how much of the existe...
Article
Full-text available
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mechanisms) we show that eliminating some co...
Article
Full-text available
We study how the optimal contract in team production is affected when employees are averse to inequity in the sense described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By designing a reward scheme that creates inequity of the desired equilibrium, the employer can induce employees to perform effort at a lower total wage cost than when they are not inequity averse...
Article
Full-text available
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter- natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this op- timal behaviour coincides with an in...
Article
Full-text available
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the...
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We study the mechanics of leading by example in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
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Parece ser cierto que existe una percepción general de que el Sistena Nacional de Salud (SNS) es manifiestamente mejorable. Quedan cosas por hacer y, según lo expuesto está mañana en el seminario celebrado, no parece que haya grandes obstáculos, al menos desde el punto de vista jurídico, para mejorarlo. Temas relacionados con la financiación, las l...
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I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear.
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We use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors’ choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by t...
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This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identifica...
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We study the consequences of inequity aversion in a purely non-cooperative model of team production where agents cannot negotiate efficient con-tracts. Introducing the notions of a conformity and a commitment effect of inequity aversion we identify conditions under which inequity aversion increases or decreases material efficiency, both for simulta...
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This paper aims to provide an economic explanation for the non-existence of a vaccine against AIDS. We comment on previously claimed economic reasons why private laboratories do not have incentives to invest in an AIDS vaccine and provide a new one: private companies already operate in the market for treatment of already infected patients which is...
Article
Full-text available
This paper provides an economic explanation for the non-existence of a vaccine against AIDS. It comments on previously claimed economic reasons why private laboratories do not have incentives to invest in an AIDS vaccine and provides a new one: private companies already operate in the market for treatment of already infected patients, which market...

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