
Pedro Daniel Jara-MoroniUniversity of Santiago Chile | USACH · Departamento de Economía
Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni
PhD
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12
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136
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Introduction
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August 2009 - present
Publications
Publications (12)
We examine the physical and mental health effects of providing care to an elderly mother on the adult child caregiver. We address the endogeneity of the selection in and out of caregiving using an instrumental variable approach, and carefully control for baseline health and work status of the adult child using fixed effects and Arellano-Bond estima...
We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary‐action, N‐player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile; players employ switching strategies at di...
We show that in large games with a finite set of actions in which the payoff of a player depends only on her own action and on an aggregate value that we call the (aggregate) state of the game, which is obtained from the complete action profile, it is possible to define and characterize the sets of (Point-)Rationalizable States in terms of pure and...
We propose an Integrated Stochastic Equilibrium model that considers both private automobile traffic and transit networks to incorporate the interactions between these two modes in terms of travel time and generalized costs. In addition, in the general version of the model, travelers are allowed to switch from personal vehicles to mass transit at s...
Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs, unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative eliminati...
We present a transit equilibrium model in which boarding decisions are stochastic. The model incorporates congestion, reflected in higher waiting times at bus stops and increasing in-vehicle travel time. The stochastic behavior of passengers is introduced through a probability for passengers to choose boarding a specific bus of a certain service. T...
We consider an economic model that features (1) a continuum of agents and (2) an aggregate state of the world over which agents
have an infinitesimal influence. We first review the connections between the “eductive” viewpoint on expectational stability
and standard game-theoretical rationalizability concepts. The “eductive” reasoning selects diffe...
We introduce adaptive learning behavior into a general-equilibrium life-cycle economy with capital accumulation. Agents form forecasts of the rate of return to capital assets using least-squares autoregressions on past data. We show that, in contrast to the perfect-foresight dynamics, the dynamical system under learning possesses equilibria that ar...
In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave revenue and convex costs we study a two stage game in which, first, firms engage simultaneously in capacity (production) and, after production levels are made public, there is sequential price competition in the second stage. Randomizing the order of play in the price subgame, we can find: (i) that the...
We introduce adaptive learning behavior into a general-equilibrium life-cycle economy with capital accumulation. Agents form forecasts of the rate of return to capital assets using least-squares autoregressions on past data. We show that, in contrast to the perfect-foresight dynamics, the dynamical system under learning possesses equilibria that ar...
There is a growing literature that aims at endogenizing the first mover in oligopoly models. Some of these articles have shown that, when market competition is in quantities, the most effi-cient firm –i.e. the one with smallest marginal cost– will endogenously emerge as a Stackelberg leader. In this paper we show that if firms know that market lead...