

The EU Constitution and Positions on Governance

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Abstract

This paper examines whether the left-right cleavage, structuring preferences at the national level, has also been influential regarding the process of Constitution-building during the European Union (EU) Convention (2002-2003). Our approach to constitutionalism presumes that cleavage theory is well equipped to explain differences between parties, but it is not able to explain the process with which parties arrive at a consensus. Our modified cleavage approach of constitutionalism explains these findings by uncertainty about probability distributions, "epistemic consensus" and the characteristics of the European institutional context.

Our data analysis confirms the assumption that the left-right cleavage was not dominant in the Constitution-building process, but it illustrates that the division into party families had a strong impact on the process of coalition-formation. At least half of all documents submitted to the Convention were set up together with at least one member of the same party family and/or with a member of a nearby party family. Our analysis also shows that the process of consensus-formation was facilitated by the fact that many extremist and new parties, challenging the existing structures, were excluded from the deliberation processes.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A large number of national and supranational actors have been involved in the constitution-building process of the Convention and the IGC since 2002. Representatives from political parties from both national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) were the central players during the Convention¹ (see Appendix I. for an overview of these actors). The main task of the Convention was to draw up a draft Treaty establishing a European Constitution -- an endeavour clearly constituting a land-mark in the process of European integration. This paper examines whether the left-right divide, structuring preferences at the national level, has also been influential during the process of Constitutional-building. We expect a moderate impact of this divide, weaker than the one existing at the national level. Our modified cleavage approach to constitutionalism explains this outcome by uncertainty about probability distributions, "epistemic consensus" and particular characteristics of the European institutional context.

In general terms, it is recognised on the website of the Convention² that the main goal on the new Constitution is to enhance efficient policy-making in a globalising and enlarged Europe. It is emphasised that Europe cannot take on these ambitious tasks at the international level unless it puts into place a 'machinery' enabling it to meet new challenges and speak to the world with a single voice. The same website lists a number of general policy goals which are to be achieved by means of the Constitution: justice and security, action against crime, control of migration flows, enhancing employment, combating poverty, preventing social exclusion, improvement of economic and social cohesion, prevention of pollution, climate change and improvement of food safety. In essence, the Constitution is expected to provide a solution for the paradox with which Europeans confront their leaders and representatives: a European Union (EU) which is, not least regarding its institutional setup and decision-making structures, simple and transparent, while respecting citizens' various rights, but also taking action in more and more policy-making domains.

It is important to note that these and other policy goals may be viewed as public goods, producing externalities. Hence, they cannot be introduced without generating external effects. Outcomes of proposals tend to be interdependent so that a policy-mix is to be constructed that takes these various effects into account. Clearly, the implementation of various policy goals, with partially contradicting effects, makes traditional left-right cleavages relevant in the study of policy preferences: it is difficult for actors to formulate specific policy positions without making explicit their preferences regarding in which areas, and by which means, they desire common EU intervention or regulation.

In order to clarify such possible left-right cleavages, also in the framework of processes of European Constitution-building, we aim to extract information from documents submitted to the Convention. But how can left-right dimensions be derived from documents issued during the Convention? In this paper, we opt for a dictionary-based content analysis, not least because this technique has shown to be interesting and useful in other analyses. Expressed in general terms, the dictionary discriminates between the main vocabularies representing different types of patterns of social and economic policy-making, i.e. the traditional state-driven (left) and market-driven (right) preferences. The extracted left-right positions are then used to determine the preferences of actors in three ways:

1. Preference aggregation between countries (i.e. how similar or dissimilar are the positions taken by countries on the main dividing line?);
2. The cohesiveness of national preferences (i.e. how divided are the delegates and parties of one country on this dimension?);
3. and finally, How did the preferences of actors relate to the final outcome of the Convention deliberations, the draft Constitution?

Hence, we are using the left-right scores to analyse preferences at several levels of the European constitution-building process: the level of individuals, of party (families), the national level and the European level. This multi-level approach appears to be justified especially by the multi-layered nature of the Constitution-building process. In addition, it allows us to compare the outcomes with existing data on the preferences of actors on these different levels.

By including (nearly) all actors and all documents issued at the Convention into our analysis, it is possible to determine whether the existing knowledge on the preferences of political parties regarding different aspects of the European integration process are also applicable to the constitution-building process as a whole. However, a challenge is to determine whether these preferences, representing major domestic cleavages, are indeed recognisable during the debates on the draft constitution. Our starting hypothesis on this issue is that it indeed is possible to position parties on this major dimension on the basis of all their contributions during the Convention. However, we expect that the differences between parties on issues to be dealt with at the European level are smaller compared to the national level, because their preferences and behaviour are affected by the new European institutional context in which they are operating.

There are several reasons for this assumption. First, expert surveys have demonstrated that many national political parties have made a move during the 1990s towards a centre-right position, a development that facilitates processes of consensus-building. Second, on the European level, the centre-right position has become dominant during the process of European integration, where policies enhancing processes of "negative integration" (i.e. market driven policies) have received far more attention and support than policies invoking "positive integration" (e.g. Arnold and Pennings 2004). Third, the Convention appears to have been dominated by the interests of major established parties. By comparison, small and extremist parties were hardly present or influential in this process. Again, this is a factor likely to have facilitated processes of consensus-formation. Finally, as will be shown below, it is only possible to arrive at a European constitutional consensus when the main national dividing lines does not dominate the respective negotiations.

Hence, in order to be able to explain the positioning and preference distributions of actors during the Convention, a modified cleavage theory of policy preferences needs to be applied. This approach must account for the importance of cleavage lines, but simultaneously adapt the general theory in order to make it applicable to the European constitution-building process at the supranational level. This can be achieved by an integration of cleavage theory with theories on constitutionalism, an approach we will apply in this paper. This adaptation of existing theories, and therefore an effort at further theory development, is not only useful for the study of the European convention, but also helpful to understand the position of Europeanised political parties within an enlarged EU. While cleavage theory focuses on domestic political parties within national arenas (e.g. Bartolini and Mair 1990), it can get adapted in order to be applicable to parties being Europeanised. In this sense, they may be considered to be players in a two-level game. The convention is then seen as an experimental European arena, expected to affect the preferences and behaviour of political parties, which can not be explaining by theories with a domestic politics orientation.

This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we aim to explain our 'modified cleavage approach' to the process of EU constitution-formation. In section III, we describe our data as well as the research design we apply for this paper. Subsequently, in section IV, we show how the data aggregate for EU member states and EP political groupings. Section V discusses, on the basis of our results, whether left-right cleavages structure the process of European constitution-formation. The final section offers conclusions and a summary of our main findings.

II. TOWARDS A MODIFIED CLEAVAGE APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONALISM.

Cleavage theory has proven to be a useful device to explain party differences towards policy goals. Existing research illuminates that this theory is not only able to explain party differences at the national level, but also at the European level (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Gabel and Hix 2002; Pennings 2002). In this paper, we acknowledge that cleavage theory is well equipped to explain differences among parties, but that it is less able to explain how these parties arrive at consensus. This is an important shortcoming when analysing the preference-aggregation process during the Convention, since the process of constitution-building was not meant to be a battle between the antipodes of the left and the right (Bräuniger et al. 2001; Collignon 2003; Crum 2004). We will argue that "epistemic consensus", uncertainty about probability distributions and the European institutional context transform the delegates into actors with more moderate preferences than they normally take in the context of the national arena.

In this, we follow the reasoning of Stefan Collignon, who argued that a process of constitution-formation is only possible when traditional cleavages are transcended (Collignon 2003: 27). It is completely rational for actors to 'agree to disagree' on distributive matters, as long as they agree on some higher-order choice rule. An "epistemic consensus" on decision-making procedures is more fundamental than consensus regarding the evaluation of substantial and distributive issues (Collignon 2003: 28). Parties located on the left and right of the political spectrum may disagree on distributional issues, but simultaneously accept the constitutional rules, as long as the probability distribution of likely policy outcomes does not favour either the left or the right. When groups expect a zero probability of ever seeing their own preferences prevail, because the constitutional rules contain an implicit bias, it is unlikely they would agree with the establishment of the constitution. Hence, when actors evaluate their position towards formal rules to be incorporated into the constitution, they do so by calculating the extent to which these will favour or hamper the realisation of their ideal policy goals. This means that the connection between cleavages and constitutional issues is an indirect one. The formal rules and procedures are evaluated by the actors on the basis of the criterion of how they affect the expected utility of future policy outcomes. For this reason, the distinction between 'left' and 'right' is important in view of the constitutional debate, since these groups can only agree on the constitution when the constitutional tools to realise 'left' and 'right' goals respectively are not biased in either direction. It follows from this that all relevant actors evaluate formal rules by relating them to expected policy outcomes. This can be done implicitly or endogenously, but it can also be done more explicitly during the deliberations and debates on the pros and cons of the constitution's formal rules.

The central assumption of our modified cleavage approach is that if constitutional issues and programmatic policy objectives amalgamate, this may hamper the emergence of a constitutional consensus. But simultaneously, the actors' policy goals are decisive regarding their preferences for formal rules determining the decision-making process. However, given the history of European integration, 'left' and 'right' are not on an equal basis in terms of political power and impact. Traditionally, the left has a somewhat disadvantaged position compared to the right regarding the realisation of policy goals. This was clearly demonstrated during the Convention, for example, when the Praesidium was initially unwilling to admit a Working Group on Social Policy, fearing the integration of social goals and harmonisation might invoke vetoes against parts or even the entire draft constitutional treaty. When such a Working Group was finally admitted, however, it was internally divided on a number of important issues. The group recommended the inclusion into the draft constitution of social values including solidarity, social justice, and equality (notably between men and women). In addition, it recommended inclusion of a large number of social objectives into Article 3 of the

draft constitutional treaty. The group was divided, however, on the important topic of the decision-making rules to be applied on social policy-making (Arnold and Pennings 2004).

Many scholars who have analysed the evolution of 'negative' and 'positive' integration have come to the same conclusion (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Scharpf 1996; Arnold and Pennings 2004). In the case of the constitution, this implies that many delegates will regard 'negative integration' as a constitutional rule, creating 'freedom'. By comparison, they will perceive 'positive integration' as a regulative rule with a stronger normative mandate, rather to be kept out of the constitution. We expect that this reasoning is internalised and implicitly accepted by many actors, including representatives from the political 'left'. If this assumption is correct, we can expect leftist participants to frequently refer to 'rightist' goals (such as negative integration, including the establishment of free markets) during the Convention process. In such a situation, left and right representatives of the political spectrum do not represent anti-poles. Whereas the traditional 'right' goal of free markets is an uncontested part of the draft Constitution (and all previous Treaties), the question of distributive justice, important especially to the 'left', has to be decided by the political process according to most delegates. Hence, it cannot be realised in by means of the constitution.

Traditional cleavage theory is unable to explain such. Our modified theory appears to be better equipped to do this, because we link policy preferences to formal decision-making procedures, introduced during the course of more than forty years of European integration. Inevitably, these procedures are incorporated into existing treaties, and are therefore also a part of the draft constitution, which aims to integrate and renew these treaties. This means that national actors can take positions in the European arena which can to some extent not be explained by domestic policy backgrounds, since they are influenced by interactions at the supranational level (Hooghe and Marks 1999; 2001).

When we evaluate positions taken during the Convention focusing on left-right positions, a number of aspects should however be taken into account since it is not evident immediately how this political division may affect the contents of the draft constitution. On the one hand, representatives from all major ideological groups were invited to participate, a fact that underlines the importance of cleavages and the party groups related to these political divisions. On the other hand, it is contested how the draft constitution itself relates to it. Collignon (2003) argues that the two important principles of 'liberty' and 'equality' should be addressed on an equal basis by the constitution. This is to be achieved by incorporating constitutional means able to realise both goals, without incorporating a bias towards one of them. This is not least important because liberty -- in the sense of freedom of entrepreneurship -- has traditionally been the main goal of the political right, and equality -- by means of, for example, employment and social protection -- the main goal of the political left. However, it is contested to state that a constitution must give an equal weight to both types of goals. Scharpf, for example, has argued that the right is systematically favoured by open markets and Europeanisation, so that the anchoring of social equality into the constitution (at least at a minimal level) could provide a counterweight to the clearly stronger forces of the political right (Scharpf 2003). According to this perspective, the right is able to dominate policy outcomes if liberty and equality are two equally likely outcomes of decision-making on the basis of the constitution, since the political weights of left and right are unequal.

What actually happened during the Convention was that the plea for a 'Social Europe' was undermined, mainly because no consensus is possible if the result is a shift from unanimity to majority decision-making in this policy field (Barbier 2003). Nonetheless, the improvement of social policy coordination, plus the adoption of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in fields like social exclusion and social protection, indicate that the conditions for social policy-making were enhanced, although without the explicit goal-setting related to negative integration (Crum 2003). However, important for our empirical analysis is

not what the constitution should (not) contain or emphasise in a normative sense. Central rather is the question to what degree actual preferences of the actors can be explained by a modified (Europeanised) cleavage theory, recognising that national parties are moved up to a European level, with respective repercussions on their policy preferences due to the institutional context in which they negotiate.

It is important to realise that the left-right division cannot be isolated from other political divisions, like the communitarian versus intergovernmental distinction, in the sense that some combinations of positions are less probable. Especially the combination of communitarian and substantive goals is likely to evoke resistance among citizens as well as politicians, who might perceive this in the sense of 'Brussels dictates'. Far more acceptable to such actors would be an intergovernmental bottom-up approach by means of voluntary cooperation. This, again, underlines that although the traditional cleavages are relevant to understand and explain policy preferences, the fact that the negotiations are conducted on a European level makes the positions taken on these dimensions different to those taken at the domestic level. In spite of the fact that governments and political parties, including those represented in party groupings of the EP, will often be inclined to represent national ideologies at the European level, they may have to adapt their preferences to the European polity, if consensus-building is to be possible. The experience of adapting national policy preferences to the European level is of course largely an elite endeavour, and the Convention and subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) provide an interesting test case to see to what extent the process of preference aggregation differs at the national as compared to the European level (Collignon 2003).

III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

This paper has set out to explain the process of preference formation of various actors -- including political parties and EU member states -- during the Convention process, applying a 'modified cleavage approach to constitutionalism'. Subsequently, in order to conduct our analysis, preferences of actors are derived from all documents issued at the Convention process.³ The total number of these documents is 7379. A large majority of these documents concern amendments (with n=6071, or 82 percent), implying that they have to be included into the analysis if one aims to position actors on the basis of their contributions during the course of the Convention. In practical terms, this implies that we collected all of these documents, since the relevance of the division between public and private, or the state and the market, is not limited to particular policy areas or constitutional issues, but may emerge during any debate or in any document. Consequently, we had to work with a huge amount of text, putting limitations on possible types of analysis.

Clearly, semi-automated or manual coding techniques are not feasible considering the number of texts, since they are clearly too time-consuming for coding thousands of documents. The then inevitable choice for computerised automated analysis implies that the investigation is based on word counting. So far, no automated techniques are able to go beyond this approach (Neuendorf 2002; Popping 2000). Clearly, this makes it difficult, for example, to determine directional policy preferences, or to disambiguate words and phrases (e.g. Laver 2001). However, since the analysis is limited to the most basic political cleavage lines, which can be cross-validated with alternative sources, we believe that this limitation does not seriously affect the validity of our codings (also see Budge et al. 2001; Laver 2001). Another complication is that around 25 percent of the document submissions during the Convention was in languages other than English. Since the number of applied non-English languages was limited, however, notably not including Scandinavian or Eastern European

languages, for example, it was quite feasible to translate these words into English and to code them subsequently.

There are several ways to arrive at a classification scheme suited to code words for left and right positions. One way would be to count which words are used mostly by either leftist or rightist political actors, but we decided against this approach due to its potentially tautological character: in this approach, actors are identified by words classified by using information on these same actors. In order to reduce the complexity of the process of dictionary building, we chose not to impose a classification scheme or dictionary onto the texts, but rather to extract one from them. This was done by the construction of frequency distributions regarding all words used by each actor. Subsequently, these words were classified into a category. The total number of unique words used by individual actors was 3.6 million.. Hence, our categorisation scheme classified all the words contained in the documents issued at the Convention into two categories:

1. Left-oriented issues: represented by terms relating to social issues (including human rights);
2. Right-oriented issues: represented by words related to market-driven activities and security;

Table 1 provides an overview of the words that were used most frequently. The table demonstrates that we have extended the concepts of 'left' and 'right' from the context of the national to the one of the European level. This implies that some words may not typically be representative of the 'left' or the 'right' at the national level, but are so for the European level, partly due to the strong juxtaposition of 'negative' and 'positive' integration. In most cases the coding we applied was based on the assumption that words are used in a positive sense (i.e. representing 'in favour of'). This assumption is largely justified, as earlier research has shown (e.g. Budge at al. 2001; Gabel and Hix 2002). However, there are some exceptions to this general rule. An example is the word 'dictatorship', counted as representing a leftist position, but with a negative connotation (the left typically being strongly opposed to political dictators).

<i>Table 1. A List of Keyboard Representing 'Left' and 'Right' Positions Used by Convention Actors *</i>	
Left	Right
transparency (1050)	competition (1384)
service (1051)	immigration (1513)
legitimacy (1065)	commercial (1566)
women (1088)	ecb (1588)
cultural (1097)	prosecutor (1645)
environmental (1112)	asylum (1785)
peace (1149)	police (2031)
santé (1242)	effective (2044)
health (1625)	crime (2095)
sociale (1682)	trade (2170)
environment (1704)	europol (2538)
democracy (1790)	expenditure (2591)
humanitarian (1852)	criminal (2615)
droits (1926)	budgetary (2662)
equality (2101)	monetary (2916)
employment (2521)	euro (3271)
solidarity (2785)	military (3495)
democratic (3067)	bank (3868)
human (3283)	market (4111)
prejudice (3465)	budget (4632)
services (4360)	financial (5662)
charter (4414)	defence (6344)
public (5810)	security (14302)
rights (8405)	
social (11145)	
* The sum of frequencies for all actors is given in brackets. Only words with a frequency above 1000 were accounted for.	

Although this may sound counter-intuitive, existing content analysis has shown that it is possible to arrive at valid results on the basis of this technique, as long as the classification scheme is kept simple (Laver 2001; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Neuendorf 2002). Left scores for all the delegates are given in Appendix I. This is not to deny that there is an ambiguity problem, demonstrated for example by a problematic expression like 'social security'⁴. For this reason, our results were cross-validated by comparing outcomes with external expert opinions, (indirectly) adding a directional component to our analysis.

IV. PREFERENCE AGGREGATION BY STATES AND PARTY FAMILIES


The total of 'constitutional actors' (including Turkey) was 28: 13 candidate countries and 15 EU member states. These countries were represented by a total of 239 delegates: 32 representatives of the EP, 71 national government representatives and 136 representatives of national political parties. Clearly, the latter group was dominant in the deliberations on the new constitution. This particular feature distinguishes the negotiations of the Convention from the final negotiations in the IGC framework, since during the latter government

representatives, notably cabinet members (prime ministers and ministers), clearly are most important. Essentially, this divides the constitution-building process into two rounds: a first one setting the stage and a second one constituting the formal round in which the outcomes of the first round are either rejected or approved, adopted and formalised. Since the candidate countries are not yet represented in the EP, the composition of their delegations was different: 33 members (32 percent) were government representatives, 71 (68 percent) representatives of national parliaments. By comparison, in the case of EU member states, 32 delegates (24 percent) represented the EP, 38 (28 percent) were government representatives and 65 (48 percent) delegates of national parliamentary parties.

In our analysis, we distinguish between constitutional actors (i.e. 27 countries), national actors (parties, governments) and trans-national actors (including European parties). Our overarching question is how we can explain coalition building by means of existing left-right cleavages. We assume that each phase of EU enlargement incorporates a new group of nations that have similar perspectives on questions related to the EU, having been ‘socialised’ by European integration for an equal number of years, possibly on rather similar terms, affecting not least their perception of what constitute left and right policy positions.. If this is correct, we may expect the existence of ‘proto-coalitions’ between countries according to the different phases of EU enlargement. We will distinguish between the waves indicated in Table 2.

Phase	Year	countries
Founders	1952	Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands
First enlargement	1973	Denmark, Ireland, UK
Second enlargement	1981	Greece
Third enlargement	1986	Portugal, Spain
Fourth enlargement	1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden
Fifth enlargement	2004	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

Figure 1. Dendrogram showing the distances between groups of countries per phase of enlargement



Legend: see table 2. EEC=founders. n=6 (these are the 6 means of the positions taken by delegates belonging to each enlargement phase).

The dendrogram represented in figure 1 partly confirms the hypothesis that potential allies have frequently entered the EU in the same phase of enlargement. In addition, they share a common view on the left-right cleavage, but there naturally are exceptions to this rule. It is striking that the 'founders' and the countries of the third enlargement phase are at a small distance from each other. In addition, their positions are quite distinct from all other countries. Since negotiations are only partially affected by the left-right cleavage, we cannot generalise processes of coalition building and preference aggregation along these lines for the draft constitution.

Since we will assume that the constitutional actors (i.e. countries) are non-unitary actors, we will examine to what extent these actors are divided on left-right issues, and how this variation is patterned. We do this by means of indicating standard deviations. When the file is broken down by country, and the correlation is given of the number of years these countries are members of the EU with the respective standard deviation on left and right issues, we find that there indeed is a significant link between years of membership and the standard deviation of 'rightist' issues ($r = -.44$; $p = .02$), but not between years of membership and 'leftist' issues ($r = .11$; $p = .59$). Hence, according to these results, the longer a country is an EU member, the less it is divided regarding issues on the right. This finding suggests that the candidate countries are most divided regarding issues on the right. In addition, this correlation analysis shows that in the case of EU member states there is no significant relation between the standard deviations of 'left' and 'right' emphases ($r = .26$; $p = .40$; $n=13$), whereas in the case of the candidate countries, there is a highly significant and relatively strong correlation ($r = .79$; $p=.000$; $n=15$). This pattern indicates that class cleavages in member and non-member states represent a different type and degree of cohesiveness, revealing the paradox that although the candidate countries are represented by fewer party families, they are slightly more divided than current EU members.

As we depart from the left-right cleavage assumption, and in addition assume that countries are non-unitary actors, we are also interested in (intra-) party family differences. The clustering of party families is important in order to understand how preferences are aggregated, that is, which potential coalitions are feasible. The preferences of all representatives are summarised by the two indicators for left and right. Assuming that these are important conflict dimensions, we can expect that the representatives cluster along these division lines. When analysing party families, we should be aware of the fact that they are unevenly distributed, as the frequency distribution in Table 3 illustrates.

Table 3. Frequency distribution of delegates per party family


		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	greens	8	3,3	4,1	4,1
	socom	7	2,9	3,6	7,7
	socdem	73	30,5	37,6	45,4
	lib	32	13,4	16,5	61,9
	cd	32	13,4	16,5	78,4
	cons	35	14,6	18,0	96,4
	ethnic	5	2,1	2,6	99,0
	agrarian	2	,8	1,0	100,0
	Total	194	81,2	100,0	
Missing	System	45	18,8		
Total		239	100,0		

Legend: lib=liberals; agrarian=agrarians; ethnic=ethnic/nationalist; cd=christian democrats; cons=conservatives; greens=greens; socdem=social democrats; socom=socialists/communists. Reading example: we identified 8 delegates from Green parties.

The total selection of cases consists of the members of national and European parliaments and government representatives (n=139). The frequency distribution reveals that more than 80 of these actors have been identified as members of a party family. More than 30 percent belong to the social democratic party family. The number of representatives of parties at the extremes of the political spectrum is low: nearly 90% of the representatives belong to the four larger party families, which are pre-dominantly in favour of European integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Evidently, this fact has enhanced the process of consensus-building during the deliberations of the Convention. By comparison, the candidate countries were not represented by any Green or agrarian parties. Hence, the political spectrum of the candidate countries is represented by a relatively small number of party families.

For this reason, in the following analyses, the agrarian, ethnic and right extremist (nationalistic) parties are merged into one category (labelled AGR) so that all party families are represented by at least 7 members. This cluster analysis produces a dendrogram summarising the (dis)similarity between the actors (both EU and candidate countries) on the basis of the two indicators of left and right with means calculated per party family. The dendrogram indicates that party families cluster to the left (Greens, Social democrats, Socialists/communists), to the right (Liberals, Agrarians and Christian democrats). The conservatives take a middle position, but are closer to the right than to the left. This pattern confirms that the representatives have emphasised issues during the Convention in line with their traditional positions on cleavages (expressed in plural, since the party families are based on more than one cleavage).

Figure 2. Dendrogram on party family distances on the left-right scale extracted from the documents issued at the Convention



Legend: Lib=liberals; agr=agrarians; eth=ethnic/nationalist; cd=christian democrats; con=conservatives; gr=greens; sd=social democrats; soc=socialists/communists.

The dendrogram (Figure 2) confirms the well-known hypothesis on parties and European integration, namely that the way parties react to Europe -- in our case their contribution to the Convention -- is affected by existing cleavages at the national level (Marks and Wilson 2001). However, we should be aware that there most likely is an interaction effect of third variables which may strengthen or weaken the impact of the left versus right division, including cleavages between large and small countries, candidate and established EU member states, rich and poor, or EU centre and periphery.

This pattern is confirmed when conducting pair-wise⁵ counts of how frequently members of one party family have submitted documents together with members of other party

families. These counts are based on the meta-information attached to the documents on the Convention website. We have aggregated the party families into four groups, since the number of participants outside the main families is small.

Table 4. Coalition formation between party families based on the meta-information of submitted documents (column percentages)

Party family	The left*	Liberals	Christian democrats	Conservatives**
The left*	53% (17288)	09% (1959)	15% (6142)	16% (3883)
Liberals	06% (1959)	55% (11980)	07% (2641)	15% (3681)
Christian democrats	19% (6142)	12% (2641)	46% (18322)	40% (9884)
Conservatives**	12% (3884)	17% (3681)	25% (9884)	21% (5108)
Unknown	10% (3316)	07% (1476)	08% (3052)	08% (1988)
Total nr. of documents	100% (32589)	100% (21737)	100% (40041)	100% (24544)
Total nr. of representatives	80	32	32	42

* The left= Social Democrats, Socialists and Greens
 ** Conservatives include ethnic and nationalistic parties
 Example: From all instances in which a representative of the left submitted a document together with others, 6% was submitted together with at least one liberal.

Table 4 shows that from all instances in which a representative submitted a document together with others, around 50% was submitted with at least one representative from the same family. The only exception to this rule is the Conservatives, who submitted more documents together with Christian democrats than with Conservatives. This is understandable since at the European level, many Christian democratic parties are allied in the conservative group. The second largest group of document co-authors is often also at the closest possible distance: the left with the Christian democrats, the liberals with the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats with the Conservatives. Note that the submission ratio strongly varies per party family. On average, each Christian democrat co-authored 1251 documents, each Conservative 1013, each liberal 679, and each left representative 407.

When the party families are plotted into a two-dimensional space, the variation on left issues turns out to be much larger than variation on right issues. This can be explained by the process of ‘socialisation’ by the ongoing European integration process, gradually familiarizing political parties with the fact that Europe is intrinsically related to market-related (‘right’) goals and far less to (re-)distributive (‘left’) issues.




Figure 3. Scatterplot of the mean emphases on left and right issues per party family.

Finally, it is interesting to see whether the draft constitution itself is closer to the preferences of some states than to others. The same codings are also applied to this document, and distance is measured to the constitutional actors. It turns out that the draft constitution does not take a 'middle position'. It does position itself between left and right, but emphasises both types of issues stronger than the actors do. That is, the draft constitution puts the same weight on these policy positions than the constitutional actors do. Hence, one could argue that the draft constitution puts an equal weight to left and right issues, so that parties with leftist goal seeking will find references to these goals, but parties with rightist goals will also find an equal number of rightist aims. At the same time, the draft Constitution is positioned at a relatively large distance to all actors, in order to enable these actors to achieve their goals. Hence, when leftist parties win elections and enter government, they acquire as many possibilities to use constitutional devices in order to achieve their goals as right parties gaining power




Figure 4. Scatterplot of the mean emphases on left and right issues per country plus the positioning of the draft Constitution.

Figure 4 reveals that the draft constitution seeks to strike a balance and that there is no clear clustering of countries in terms of large versus small, centre versus periphery etc. This confirms Collignon’s hypothesis that consensus on a Constitution assumes that both poles (left – right) are equally emphasized by the Constitution, inspite of the fact that there still a small bias in favour of the right. It also brings a further specification of this assumption by showing that this equal weight is not achieved by a middle position, but by a maximised position. The strong emphasis on right issues can be explained by the fact that market-related objectives are prevailing in existing Treaties that form the basis for the draft constitution. The emphasis on left issues can be partly accounted for by the inclusion of the Charter of Human Rights into the draft constitution. Without this Charter, or in case of an alternative coding of words like ‘charter’ and ‘rights’, the draft constitution would show to be tilted to the right. Also note the different distributions on the two dimensions: a large majority follows the constitution in putting the same emphasis on left and right issues. Only a small group (given in the lower right quadrant of figure 4) puts more emphasis on left than on right issues. This is in line with what we expected in the beginning of our analysis.

V. DOES LEFT-RIGHT STRUCTURE GOVERNANCE POSITIONS DURING THE CONVENTION?

We have hypothesised that consensus-building on the Constitution would be hampered if the traditional left-right divide would dictate governance positions. We have also shown that the participants of the Convention largely represent the mainstream party families, which are

more or less in favour of European integration. As a consequence, we expect only a moderate impact of the left-right divide.

We will further test this assumption by relating the left-right positions we extracted from the documents issued at the Convention to the well-known expert survey on party positions on European integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). The goal is to analyse the political emphases during the Convention process and compare them with the positions these actors normally take at the national level. The rationale for this is that European integration puts national actors into an international context in which their room to manoeuvre is affected. The modes of competition and cooperation become different in a European context as compared with the national context.

Below we try to explain the positioning of parties on EU policies by experts by means of the left-right positions that we have extracted from the Convention documents. We expect that we will not be able to explain these positions as well as in the research conducted by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002). Our analysis will be restricted to the 15 EU members, since the candidate countries are not yet included into the survey. Our unit of analysis is the political party, since the actor preferences are aggregated to that level (n=46). The correlation between our left-right score (i.e. the means of the factor score per party) and the expert scores is -.40 (p = .006). Hence, the relationship is strong enough to confirm the external validity of the extracted left-right positions from the documents, but too low to expect that they can explain positioning on selected EU policies.

The inverted U-curve relation between left-right and the positioning on selected EU policies is not confirmed by this analysis. However, this is also the case when the expert position on left-right is taken. Hence, the near absence of extremist parties during the Convention affects the inverted U-curve. The main conclusion of analysis of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson is that the effect of left-right positioning is quite strong on policies to achieve European regulated capitalism (e.g. environmental policy, employment policy and cohesion policy) and quite weak on policies distant from egalitarian and regulatory concerns, such as EU asylum policy and powers of the EP. The following table replicates the analysis of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson and compares it with our left-right measure.

Table 5. Party positioning on EU-issues explained by left-right (expert-scores + Convention scores) (n=46)

	Expert left-right scores		Convention left-right scores	
	Pearson corr.	P	Pearson corr.	P
General EU integration	0.084	.57	0.072	0.634
European Parliament Powers	-0.257	.08	0.128	0.398
EU Asylum policy	-.262	.08	0.225	0.133
EU environment policy	-.513	.00	0.146	0.332
EU employment policy	-.510	.00	0.291	0.050
EU cohesion policy	-.298	.04	0.332	0.024
EU fiscal policy	-.080	.59	0.114	0.452

Table 5 shows that in case of the expert scores, the overall effects are stronger and more significant. This implies that these parties have taken a different (modified) position on left-right issues than they normally do at the national level, and that this may have impacted the policy positions during the Convention and (ultimately) enhanced the process of consensus-building. At the same time this makes it more difficult for voters to recognise which party is taking which position during the negotiations and the discussions on the constitution. This could mean (in the long run) that the more parties converge on the European level, the more

they get removed from the positions of voters on the national level. This may be good for agreement on the Constitution, but problematic for the domestic democratic process and for the acceptance of the Constitution by voters.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have combined two seemingly contradictory claims:

- Cleavages are important to understand where parties stand, also on European issues;
- Consensus on the new European constitution is impossible if the classic cleavage lines (like left-right) dominated the Convention.

The same paradox is also inherent in the constitution-building process itself: the delegates are representing the main party groups, and hence cleavage lines, but at the same time cross-cleavage consensus-building is essential in order to reach agreement. Our approach of constitutionalism states that cleavage theory is well equipped to explain differences between parties, but not able to explain how parties arrive at consensus. Our modified cleavage theory seeks to account for the paradox by expecting a moderate impact of the left-right divide. Hence, there appears to be an indirect impact of the left-right cleavage and the left-right positions during the Convention do not seem to be direct reflections of national preferences.

We have extracted left-right positions by constructing a dictionary which discriminates between left and right issues. Although the internal validity may be affected by the way the dictionary is constructed, the outcomes have been validated externally by a significant, though moderate, correlation with expert scales if we aggregate the individual preferences onto the party level.

Our data analysis has confirmed our assumption that the left-right cleavage was not very dominant, but also shows that the division into party families certainly had a strong impact on the process of coalition-building during the Convention. At least half of all documents have been submitted together with at least one member of the same party family and/or with one family member close by. The draft constitution did not take a mean position on the left and right issues, but in fact puts more emphasis on substantial goals related to left *and* right, giving an equal weight to both anti-poles. This confirms our modified theory on cleavages and constitution building and adds a specification to it, namely that the draft Constitution does not take a middle ground, but a maximising position on the left and right (i.e. putting more emphasis on it than the delegates do in their contributions). However, if we exclude the Charter of human rights, the draft Constitution appears to be strongly tilted to the right.

Our analysis also revealed that the process of consensus building was enhanced by the fact that many extremist and new challenging parties were excluded from the deliberation processes of the Convention. As a consequence, we may safely assume that a large majority of all delegates was more or less pro-Europe. This is an important additional explanation for the consensus on the draft Constitution.

Finally, applying our approach to the analysis of left-right divisions, we find that countries tend to cluster according to the year in which they have entered the EU. In addition, we find differences between the current 15 EU states and the candidate countries regarding the extent to which divisions occur especially within the right of the political spectrum.

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APPENDIX I. OVERVIEW OF DELEGATES AND THEIR PARTY AFFILIATIONS AND LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONS								
DELEGATE	MS	MSTATE	NATIONAL PARTY	GROUP	LEFT	RIGHT	FACTORS LEFT-RIGHT	SCORE PARTY-FAM
Lichtenberger	A	Austria	ÖGr	GREENS	1,67	1,04	,72999	1
voggenhuber	A	Austria	ÖGr	GREENS	1,60	1,47	,21588	1
berger	A	Austria	SPÖ	PES	1,76	1,05	,82349	3
einem	A	Austria	SPÖ	PES	1,58	1,19	,48422	3
b_sch	A	Austria	FPÖ	NA	,51	1,43	-,91254	4
kurzmann	A	Austria	FPÖ	NA	,56	.	.	4
mainoni	A	Austria	FPÖ	NA	,59	,09	,54007	4
farnleitner	A	Austria	ÖVP	EPP	,80	1,41	-,58279	5
rack	A	Austria	ÖVP	EPP	,99	1,83	-,80245	5
tusek	A	Austria	ÖVP	EPP	,50	1,58	-1,08741	5
michel	B	Belgium	MR	ELDR	1,12	,76	,43195	4
pieters	B	Belgium	Spirit	GREENS	2,23	,69	1,69584	1
nagy	B	Belgium	Ecolo	GREENS	1,37	1,02	,43763	1
van_lancker	B	Belgium	SPA	PES	1,86	,90	1,08010	3
di_rupo	B	Belgium	PS	PES	1,23	,84	,46886	3
chevalier	B	Belgium	VLD	ELDR	1,23	,82	,48317	4
de_gucht	B	Belgium	VLD	ELDR	1,02	,63	,45797	4
arabadjiev	BG	Bulgaria	ODS	PES	,61	,56	,07987	3
kuneva	BG	Bulgaria	NDST	NA	,94	,56	,44372	.
kutskova	BG	Bulgaria	NDST	NA	,74	2,24	-1,49667	.
mladenov	BG	Bulgaria	ODS	EPP	,67	1,98	-1,30506	6
uzun	BG	Bulgaria	DPS	ELDR	,73	1,26	-,50489	4
valtchev	BG	Bulgaria	NDST	NA	,59	,22	,41207	.
attalides	CYP	Cyprus	tech	NA	1,38	,80	,66233	.
demetriou	CYP	Cyprus	DISI	EPP	,74	2,08	-1,33908	4
matsakis	CYP	Cyprus	DIKO	ELDR	,73	1,26	-,50489	4
mavrou	CYP	Cyprus	AKEL	GUE	.	.	.	2
theophilou	CYP	Cyprus	tech	NA
vassiliou	CYP	Cyprus	EDI	ELDR	,78	1,23	-,41766	.
kavan	CZ	Czech Re	CSSD	PES	1,23	4,20	-2,97910	3
kohout	CZ	Czech Re	CSSD	PES	,77	,73	,07625	3
kroupa	CZ	Czech Re	KDU-CSL	EPP	1,12	1,67	-,50793	5
ne_as	CZ	Czech Re	ODS	EPP	,58	,82	-,21560	.
rovna	CZ	Czech Re	CSSD	PES	.	.	.	2
zahradil	CZ	Czech Re	ODS	EPP	2,19	,62	1,72840	5
zieleniec	CZ	Czech Re	Ind	NA	,60	1,75	-1,14657	.
bonde	DK	Denmark	JB	EDD	1,33	,76	,65093	.
dalgaard	DK	Denmark	DF	UEN	2,84	,70	2,35489	.
skaarup	DK	Denmark	DF	UEN	2,27	,78	1,65338	7
kristensen	DK	Denmark	S	PES	1,14	,84	,36437	3
thorning-schmidt	DK	Denmark	S	PES	1,78	1,32	,56727	3
dybkjaer	DK	Denmark	RV	ELDR	1,21	,99	,28716	4
petersen	DK	Denmark	RV	ELDR	,44	1,04	-,59844	4
christophersen	DK	Denmark	V	ELDR	1,09	1,12	,02248	4
schluter	DK	Denmark	KF	EPP	,92	1,55	-,59411	6
h_nni	EE	Estonia	M	PES	.	.	.	3
hololei	EE	Estonia	M	PES	,79	1,55	-,74176	3
kelam	EE	Estonia	PPU	EPP	,62	1,95	-1,33811	5
kreitzberg	EE	Estonia	K	ELDR	,80	1,19	-,36190	4
lang	EE	Estonia	ER	ELDR	1,05	,96	,14980	4
meri	EE	Estonia	Ind	NA	,45	,38	,09733	.
reinsalu	EE	Estonia	RP	EPP	,32	1,26	-,93775	5
t_rno	EE	Estonia	K	ELDR	.	.	.	4
tonisson	EE	Estonia	K	ELDR	,47	4,06	-3,65742	4
helle	FIN	Finland	VAS	GUE	1,26	1,62	-,30416	2
sepp_nen	FIN	Finland	VAS	GUE	3,03	,56	2,70227	2
kiljunen	FIN	Finland	SDP	PES	1,00	1,58	-,53858	3
tiilikainen	FIN	Finland	SDP	PES	,81	1,43	-,59550	3
kauppi	FIN	Finland	KOK	EPP	1,08	1,90	-,79041	6
korhonen	FIN	Finland	KOK	EPP	,72	1,72	-,98729	6
peltom_ki	FIN	Finland	KOK	EPP	,78	1,49	-,68135	6
vilen	FIN	Finland	KOK	EPP	,91	1,89	-,94879	6
takkula	FIN	Finland	KESK	EPP	,97	1,72	-,72464	8
vanhanen	FIN	Finland	KESK	ELDR	,82	1,37	-,51951	8
andreani	F	France	tech	NA	4,11	,37	4,06329	.
badinter	F	France	PS	PES	1,23	,95	,35585	3
ber_s	F	France	PS	PES	2,04	,89	1,28639	3
duhamel	F	France	PS	PES	2,14	,96	1,32552	3
floch	F	France	PS	PES	1,79	,97	,94101	3
moscovici	F	France	PS	PES	2,62	,42	2,39769	3
de_villepin	F	France	UMP	EPP	1,01	1,27	-,21209	6
haenel	F	France	UMP	EPP	1,14	,61	,59981	6
lamassoure	F	France	UDF	EPP	,92	,83	,13899	6
lequiller	F	France	UMP	EPP	1,16	1,09	,12990	6
abitbol	F	France	RPF	EDD	1,82	,94	1,00430	6
pleuger	D	Germany		
fischer	D	Germany	Gr	GREENS	,59	1,53	-,92747	1
kaufmann	D	Germany	PDS	GUE	1,38	1,44	,00828	2
bury	D	Germany	SPD	PES	.	.	.	3
gerhards	D	Germany	SPD	PES	.	.	.	3
glotz	D	Germany	SPD	PES	1,04	,61	,50212	3
h_nsch	D	Germany	SPD	PES	2,85	,61	2,45845	3
meyer	D	Germany	SPD	PES	1,39	,82	,65865	3
senff	D	Germany	SPD	PES	2,05	1,61	,56121	3

altmaier	D	Germany	CDU	EPP	1,10	1,79	-,64287	5
brok	D	Germany	CDU	EPP	1,32	1,59	-,21456	5
teufel	D	Germany	CDU	EPP	1,08	1,38	-,25101	5
wuermeling	D	Germany	CSU	EPP	1,08	1,53	-,40550	5
constantopoulos	GR	Greece	Syn	GUE	.	.	.	2
avgerinos	GR	Greece	PASOK	PES	1,13	1,09	,09594	3
ioakimidis	GR	Greece	PASOK	PES	1,52	1,12	,49101	3
katiforis	GR	Greece	PASOK	PES	2,09	1,22	1,00742	3
papandreou	GR	Greece	PASOK	PES	,57	,85	-,26169	3
giannakou- koutsikou	GR	Greece	ND	EPP	,96	2,17	-1,18638	5
stlianidis	GR	Greece	ND	EPP	.	.	.	5
bal_zs	M	Hungary	tech	NA	,83	,70	,17745	.
gottfried	M	Hungary	tech	NA	2,34	2,34	,12873	.
kelemen	M	Hungary	MDF	EPP	,68	1,99	-1,30326	5
martonyi	M	Hungary			1,26	,37	,97753	.
sz_jer	M	Hungary	Fidesz	EPP	1,47	1,64	-,09416	4
szent-iv_nyi	M	Hungary	SZDS	ELDR	,69	1,11	-,40080	4
vastagh	M	Hungary	MSZP	PES	1,22	1,60	-,31689	3
macsharry	IRL	Ireland		UEN	1,00	,17	,90522	.
mcdonagh	IRL	Ireland	tech	NA	,62	3,35	-2,76574	.
gormley	IRL	Ireland	GP	GREENS	1,94	,54	1,54497	1
de_rossa	IRL	Ireland	Lab	PES	2,36	1,02	1,50217	3
bruton	IRL	Ireland	FG	EPP	,97	1,21	-,19315	5
cushnahan	IRL	Ireland	FG	EPP	1,03	1,94	-,88448	5
carey	IRL	Ireland	FF	UEN	1,50	1,80	-,23033	6
roche	IRL	Ireland	FF	UEN	,77	1,64	-,84673	6
dini	I	Italy	Marg	ELDR	,80	1,17	-,34023	4
paciotti	I	Italy	DS	PES	1,69	,95	,85194	3
spini	I	Italy	DS	PES	1,60	,81	,89318	3
follini	I	Italy	UDC	EPP	,66	,71	-,01120	5
basile	I	Italy	FI	EPP	,79	1,40	-,58398	6
tajani	I	Italy	FI	EPP	1,21	1,49	-,23008	6
fini	I	Italy	AN	UEN	,40	1,34	-,93680	7
muscardini	I	Italy	AN	UEN	,56	1,49	-,91551	7
speroni	I	Italy	LN	NA	,57	1,31	-,72722	7
birzniece	LV	Latvia	LC		1,59	,27	1,44743	6
inkens	LV	Latvia	LC		.	,17	.	6
kalniete	LV	Latvia	JL	EPP	,68	,59	,12103	5
karins	LV	Latvia	JL	EPP	,56	,88	-,29875	5
krasts	LV	Latvia	TB/LNNK	UEN	,62	1,57	-,94219	7
liepina	LV	Latvia	JL	EPP	,71	1,49	-,76511	5
piks	LV	Latvia	TP	EPP	,61	1,73	-1,11516	5
sprind_uks	LV	Latvia	People's Party	EPP	.	.	.	5
zile	LV	Latvia	TP	EPP	,81	1,96	-1,13990	5
andriukaitis	LT	Lituania	LSDP	PES	1,12	,84	,34504	3
gricius	LT	Lituania	NS	ELDR	,68	1,03	-,32046	4
jusys	LT	Lituania	NS	ELDR	2,05	,51	1,68993	4
kutraite- giedraitien	LT	Lituania			,37	,49	-,10649	.
maldeikis	LT	Lituania	LLS	ELDR	,83	1,42	-,56082	4
martikonis	LT	Lituania	LSDP	PES	,78	,53	,28862	3
medalinskas	LT	Lituania		
pavilionis	LT	Lituania		
sivickas	LT	Lituania	NS	ELDR	,87	1,43	-,52914	4
giberyen	L	Luxumbou	ADR	NA
schmit	L	Luxumbou	tech	NA	,84	,91	-,02317	.
wagener	L	Luxumbou	Greng	GREENS	1,35	1,46	-,03985	1
fayot	L	Luxumbou	POSL	PES	1,48	,89	,68785	3
helminger	L	Luxumbou	PD	ELDR	1,01	1,05	,01259	4
santer	L	Luxumbou	PCS	EPP	,91	1,54	-,59360	5
cristina	ML	Malta	NP	EPP	3,41	,74	2,92614	6
frendo	ML	Malta	NP	EPP	,88	1,90	-,98928	6
inguanez	ML	Malta	tech	NA	1,31	1,28	,10726	.
sant	ML	Malta	MLP	PES	,97	1,49	-,48615	3
serracino-inglott	ML	Malta	NP	EPP	1,48	,35	1,24150	6
vella	ML	Malta	MLP	PES	1,78	,46	1,45410	3
de_bruijn	NL	Netherla	tech	NA	1,23	1,61	-,32703	.
timmermans	NL	Netherla	PvdA	PES	1,16	,93	,30309	3
van_mierlo	NL	Netherla	D66	ELDR	1,53	,42	1,21582	3
de_vries	NL	Netherla	VVD	ELDR	1,10	1,48	-,33280	4
van_baalen	NL	Netherla	VVD	ELDR	.	.	.	4
van_eekele	NL	Netherla	VVD	ELDR	,69	1,02	-,29834	4
mai_j-weggen	NL	Netherla	CDA	EPP	1,23	1,72	-,43505	5
van_der_linden	NL	Netherla	CDA	EPP	,99	1,73	-,69868	5
van_dijk	NL	Netherla	CDA	EPP	,69	1,89	-1,18680	5
fogler	PL	Poland	PO	EPP	,61	1,72	-1,10506	.
grabowska	PL	Poland	SLD	PES	,50	,21	,32506	3
h_bner	PL	Poland	SLD	PES	,98	1,37	-,35150	3
oleksy	PL	Poland	SLD	PES	,86	,71	,19929	3
trzci_ski	PL	Poland	SLD	PES	1,33	,08	1,35178	3
wittbrodt	PL	Poland	SB	EPP	,67	1,67	-,98717	5
antunes	P	Portugal	tech	PES	,77	,71	,10213	.
de_vallera	P	Portugal		PES	,67	,55	,16027	.
costa	P	Portugal	PS	PES	,83	,66	,22157	3
d_oliveira_martins	P	Portugal	PS	PES	,93	,61	,37934	3

marinho	P	Portugal	PS	PES	1,11	1,05	,12476	3
almeida_garrett	P	Portugal	PSD	EPP	1,28	1,98	-,65292	3
azevedo	P	Portugal	PSD	EPP	,71	1,71	-,98769	3
lopes	P	Portugal	PSD	EPP	1,04	,68	,41989	3
nazar_pereira	P	Portugal	PSD	EPP	,68	1,64	-,94935	3
queir_	P	Portugal	PP	UEN	,54	,46	,11053	3
athanasiu	RO	Romania	PSD	PES	,58	,82	-,21560	3
eckstein-kovacs	RO	Romania	UDMR	EPP	,79	1,26	-,43840	6
ene	RO	Romania	tech	NA	1,11	,94	,23449	.
hasotti	RO	Romania	PNL	NA	,72	1,20	-,44699	4
jinga	RO	Romania		
maior	RO	Romania	PSD	PES	.	.	.	3
puwak	RO	Romania	PSD	PES	2,25	2,17	,20597	3
severin	RO	Romania	PSD	PES	1,09	1,04	,10745	3
_ebej	SK	Slovakia		
belohorsk_	SK	Slovakia	HZDS	NA	1,48	2,14	-,59306	3
figel	SK	Slovakia	KDH	EPP	1,18	1,64	-,41273	5
hamzik	SK	Slovakia			,63	2,57	-1,96301	.
kelto_ov_	SK	Slovakia		
korcok	SK	Slovakia	tech	NA	,95	,85	,14735	.
martinak	SK	Slovakia	SDKU	EPP	2,45	,72	1,90491	5
miga_	SK	Slovakia	tech	NA	1,03	,75	,34081	.
zala	SK	Slovakia	Smer	PES	,74	2,51	-1,77769	3
brejic	SL	Slovenia	SDS	EPP	,77	1,79	-1,00287	3
gaber	SL	Slovenia			,57	,57	,02993	.
horvat	SL	Slovenia	ZLDS	PES	1,70	1,17	,63652	3
kacin	SL	Slovenia	LDS	ELDR	,78	1,02	-,20623	4
lenar_i_	SL	Slovenia	tech	NA	1,17	1,01	,21996	.
nahtigal	SL	Slovenia			2,07	,89	1,33141	.
peterle	SL	Slovenia	Nsi	EPP	1,69	,61	1,20983	5
rupel	SL	Slovenia	LDS	ELDR	1,30	,98	,39599	4
sim_i_	SL	Slovenia	ZLDS	PES	.	.	.	3
borrell_fontelles	E	Spain	PSOE	PES	1,83	1,05	,89672	3
carnero_gonz_lez	E	Spain	PSOE	PES	1,77	1,05	,84082	3
l_pez_garrido	E	Spain	PSOE	PES	2,01	1,31	,82615	3
cisneros_laborda	E	Spain	PP	EPP	1,40	,59	,90557	6
dastis	E	Spain	PP	EPP	2,83	,49	2,55418	6
m_ndez_de_vigo	E	Spain	PP	EPP	.	.	.	6
mu_oz_alonso	E	Spain	PP	EPP	.	.	.	6
palacio	E	Spain	PP	EPP	1,10	1,05	,10874	6
hallengren	S	Sweden		PES
petersson	S	Sweden	tech	NA	,95	1,61	-,62962	.
kvist	S	Sweden	VP	GUE	,90	1,54	-,60500	2
hjelms-wall_n	S	Sweden	SAP	PES	1,15	1,59	-,39138	3
lekberg	S	Sweden	SAP	PES	,93	1,29	-,32720	3
svensson	S	Sweden	KDS	EPP	,97	1,51	-,50206	5
lennmarker	S	Sweden	Mod	EPP	1,03	1,75	-,67434	6
akcam	TU	Turkey	AKP	NA	,76	1,58	-,80421	6
akyol	TU	Turkey			,82	1,43	-,58511	.
budak	TU	Turkey	CHP	PES	.	.	.	3
dem_ralp	TU	Turkey		
demiralp	TU	Turkey	tech	NA	1,37	,94	,52026	.
dervis	TU	Turkey	CHP	PES	1,07	,21	,93598	3
eser	TU	Turkey	MHP	
gul	TU	Turkey	AKP	NA	,56	1,40	-,82976	6
kocao_lu	TU	Turkey	ANAP		.	.	.	6
ozal	TU	Turkey	AKP	NA	,73	1,26	-,50489	6
tekin	TU	Turkey	DSP		1,45	,66	,89680	3
yilmaz_ayfer	TU	Turkey	DYP		1,55	1,55	,08488	6
yilmaz_mesut	TU	Turkey		
maccormick	GB	UK	SNP	GREENS	1,30	1,13	,24463	1
hain	GB	UK	Lab	PES	,90	1,49	-,55530	3
mcavan	GB	UK	Lab	PES	1,70	,91	,91021	3
scotland	GB	UK	Lab	PES	,58	3,47	-2,93482	3
stuart	GB	UK	Lab	PES	,36	,19	,18689	3
tomlinson	GB	UK	Lab	PES	,67	1,30	-,61334	3
duff	GB	UK	LibDem	ELDR	1,08	,98	,16074	4
maclennan	GB	UK	LibDem	ELDR	,79	1,09	-,26159	4
heathcoat-amory	GB	UK	Cons	NA	1,31	,81	,58544	6
kirkhope	GB	UK	Cons	EPP	,99	1,65	-,62282	6
stockton	GB	UK	Cons	EPP	,89	1,44	-,51483	6

NOTES

¹ In accordance with the Laeken Declaration a Convention was organised in order to prepare for the IGC in 2003 which involves representatives from national governments and parliaments in the Member States and candidate countries and representatives from the European Parliament and the Commission. The Laeken Declaration provides for the candidate States to take a full part in the proceedings without, however, being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge among the Member States. Its inaugural session was held on 28 February 2002 and work came to an end after 17 months of discussions. The Convention was composed of:

15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State);

13 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the candidate States (1 per candidate State),
30 representatives of the national parliaments of the Member States (two from each Member State),
26 representatives of the national parliaments of the candidate States (two from each candidate State),
16 members of the European Parliament,
2 representatives of the European Commission.

Appendix @@ gives a detailed overview of all actors which also included alternates and replaced members (which explains the different number of actors).

² http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm.

³ We have collected these documents and the corresponding meta-information from the following website: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm. This website was receiving regular information on the Convention's proceedings and has made available documents submitted to the Convention mostly by supranational and national actors, but also by civil society.

A total of 275 individuals have submitted documents to the Convention. For each individual our table includes several common spelling and character-set variations, as well as different conventions of writing/abbreviating names. Without accounting for these variations the errors could have potentially been quite large since we found that there were 1018 uniquely spelled actors. We were able to assign at least one actor to each document by dictionary-matching against the above actor table. For the 7379 documents at least one actor was assigned in 6819 cases, or 92 percent of all cases. The vast majority of remaining documents are timetables, summaries, agendas of meetings and reports of working groups, and as such do not have a unique actor associated with them. As the following table shows, most documents are proposed amendments:

Number of Documents by Type	
Contributions	387
Documents	504
Press And Information	140
Proposed Amendments	6071
Related Documents	9
Speeches	262
Youth Convention	6
TOTAL	7379

The processing of these documents has been facilitated by the fact that most of them are in English. The number of documents per Language is: English: 5123; Spanish: 78 ; EL: 5; French: 1207; Italian: 180; Dutch 3; Portuguese: 149; German: 652.

⁴ However, we stress that 'social security' is not a commonly used phrase during the Convention so that this problem seems more threatening than it really is.

⁵ The pair-wise count may produce biased results if the number of co-authors differs per document. In that case documents with many co-authors have more impact than documents with no or few co-authors. Since most documents are co-authored and often have a similar number of co-authors, the distribution across party families is expected to be the same.