Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics

Catherine Fieschi and Paul Heywood

Abstract

The overall focus of this paper is on developing a framework to explain support for alternative politics of a populist type. It has often been argued that the increasing focus on scandals and corruption has done much to alienate voters from traditional politics and that this alienation has, in turn, been reflected in what might be termed a 'soap-operatisation' of politics, with an attendant diminution of trust in political institutions. We contend that, while reducing political events to variants of soap-operas (with the demystification and banalisation of politics to which this gives rise) has had profound effects on the public perception of the political and political institutions, the result may not be simply a lack of, or diminution of, trust in politicians and political institutions, but rather a parallel growth in cynicism. The paper argues that while cynicism is often assumed to be a component of the decline in trust in institutions the two are, in fact, different and can give rise to different manifestations. We address the difference between the two concepts and develop a hypothesis which contends that supporters of populist alternatives can be located within two attitudinal clusters. We argue that, with respect to populist politicians and populist political parties, a cynical view of politics and political institutions will tend to produce individuals who support what we term 'political entrepreneurs', while a real distrust in institutions will translate into support for a more traditional populism of the radical right.

Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics
Catherine Fieschi and Paul Heywood

The conventional explanation of the rise of populist parties in Western Europe is premised on the pivotal role of popular disillusionment with mainstream political parties. Amongst the principal reasons adduced for such disillusionment is the perceived rise of corruption, which is believed to be particularly damaging for democratic legitimacy:

> One of the dangers of political scandals is that they can help to produce an attitude of deep distrust among some sectors of the population, leading to diminishing levels of interest and participation. (…) And a society in which significant sectors of the population have effectively given up their stake in the political process, turning their backs on a political system they judge to be irredeemably flawed or corrupt, is not a society with a strong and vibrant democracy.[1]

The argument we seek to develop in this paper is that such an understanding fails to capture a much more complex set of relationships between corruption, trust and the rise of populism. Rather than an argument in which corruption is identified as the primary trigger for alienation from mainstream politics, we argue instead that:

   a. trust in the public institutions which comprise what we term 'political space' (political parties, government departments, the media, etc.) is dependent on a clear understanding of their role and where their legitimate boundaries lie;

   b. corruption scandals, and the way they are instrumentalised and mediated through the press and television have a key impact on the perceived boundaries of public institutions, either reinforcing or blurring traditional lines of demarcation between the political class, the media, the judiciary and corporate interests;

   c. if these lines of demarcation are reinforced, then disillusionment with mainstream politics is likely to lead to what we term traditional alienated populism, whereas a blurring of these lines creates opportunities for the emergence of what we term entrepreneurial populism;

   d. where trust in public institutions remains relatively high, even in spite of corruption scandals, populist alternatives of either type are unlikely to prosper.

Our argument therefore seeks to do two things: first, to begin to unravel the complex links and processes between trust, institutions and populist mobilisation; second, to account for the

emergence of two very different types of populism in western Europe. More broadly, this paper is concerned with the conditions that favour the emergence of populist parties and the type of voter attitude and attendant populist mobilisation to which different political contexts give rise.

The paper is structured in five sections. In the first, we outline the distinction between lack of trust and cynicism, building on Sartori's analysis of anti-system parties. The second section looks in more detail at the issue of trust and its relationship to institutions, while in the third section we discuss the political instrumentalisation of scandals and the crucial role of the media in creating a climate in which populist parties may prosper . Section four discusses in greater depth different forms of populism, and in the final section we present evidence derived from data provided in the third wave European Values Study 1999/2000 and the first two waves of the World Values Survey. The data analysis represents a preliminary attempt to provide empirical support for our argument, and at this stage we draw only broad conclusions from it. Our contention, however, is that there does appear to be some basis for arguing that entrepreneurial populism on the one hand, and more traditional right-wing populism on the other, draw their support from voters with different attitudinal and value profiles.

If trust plays a crucial role in the structuring of the relationship between individuals and institutions, and institutions in turn structure individuals' relationships to the world of politics and to political choice,[2] then our understanding of support for populism must incorporate recent work on the concept of trust.[3] This is important because it points to what remains a rather grey area in studies of ideological and political support, namely the role of emotions. Politics is not just about what people think--it is also about what they believe and what they feel; indeed, populism relies, above all else, on an emotional appeal. It plays on a variety of emotions: anger, outrage, disgust, a sense of betrayal, a sense of loyalty. Whilst the same may be true of other mobilisational devices, populism does so in a manner that is more direct and thus more strident. It appeals to what some Americans would call 'gut' politics, and does so unashamedly. In fact, populism defines itself in part by accepting this emotional, non-intellectual characterisation which helps it remain on the outside of mainstream politics. What we seek to do in this paper, therefore, is to provide the basis of a potential research agenda.

1. Lack of trust versus cynicism: why being 'anti' is only half the story

Much of the literature on right-wing populism (be it on the extremes of the right or not), refers to populist parties as 'anti-system'.[4] The concept of an 'anti-system party' goes back to Sartori's classic taxonomy, but the label fails fully to capture the complexity of the populist

phenomenon.[5] Although it correctly points to the de-legitimising impact of populist parties, the categorisation does not adequately address the variety of populist parties and the differing nature of the support they mobilise. For Sartori, an anti-system party is – logically enough – a party that is opposed to the system. These parties, writes Sartori, cover a wide range of attitudes 'ranging from alienation and total refusal to "protest"'.[6] What these different types of anti-system parties have in common is their 'de-legitimising impact': all of these parties 'share the property of questioning a regime and of undermining its base of support. Accordingly, a party can be defined as anti-system whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes. (…) the political system faces a crisis of legitimacy.'[7] Sartori further goes on to distinguish between an opposition to issues and an opposition of principle. Anti-system parties, according to this schema, fall squarely under the second heading.

However, we argue that whilst traditional populist parties such as the French *Front National* or the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) fall into this category of 'principled opposition', parties such as *Forza Italia* draw their strength from a rather different type of opposition, which does not really fit Sartori's categorisation: the opposition represented by *Forza Italia* is not to the concept of the Italian Republic (unlike in France, where the FN opposes the founding values of French Republicanism), but rather to the workings of a specific instance of Italian Republicanism. It is therefore neither principled opposition, nor merely an opposition to issues. It is not anti-system, insofar as it does not seek to de-legitimise it, but rather to exploit its weakened functioning, its inefficiencies. The opposition is of a particular type because, rather than oppose the system, the strategy is to 'play it'. In contrast to Sartori's framework, therefore, we seek to identify two very different anti-system approaches, at least one of which has not been adequately categorised in the existing literature. Our argument is that the anti-system parties of the *Forza Italia* type represent a new phenomenon which we term 'entrepreneurial populism', based on a re-assessed relationship between individuals and institutions, which is in turn largely structured by the media.

A lack of trust in institutions has been blamed for both voter apathy and populist mobilisation. It has also become widely accepted that generalised trust leads to a variety of social and individual benefits and that declining levels of trust lead, correspondingly, to a loosening of the social and political fabric. Explanations of the rise of right-wing populism - both in academic debate and in the press - have made much of this, and rely increasingly on mantra-like statements about the lack of trust in politicians caused by scandals and corruption, the public's disaffection with traditional representative institutions, and the role of populist parties as receptacles for resentment and alienation in the face of untrustworthy institutions.[8]

While much of this may well be accurate, two things are striking. The first is that the populist politics to which we refer can look very different from one place to another. A leader such as Silvio Berlusconi, for instance, has little to do with one such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, and their voters differ radically. Also, the similarities between a Pym Fortuyn and a Jorg Haider are tenuous. These politicians share enough so that the label 'populist' fits, if not like a glove, then certainly like a useful pair of loose overalls, but what separates them is almost as significant as what draws them together. We can discern at least two types of populism here: one a 'traditional populism', led by anti-intellectual strong men with direct links to the very robust right. The other, which we refer to as 'entrepreneurial populism', is also a right-wing populism with leaders who may have a common touch, but in this case the leaders have been highly successful in fields other than politics (often in business) and their rhetoric is far removed from the strident anti-immigrant and xenophobic tenor of the traditional populists. The second striking aspect of the contexts in which these parties arise is that, while voters may be alienated from the institutions of democracy, some of them obviously still bother to vote and, when polled, a large majority of them do trust their government to be democratic and a democratic system to be the best form of political organisation.[9]

Given this, we hypothesise that there are two types of reaction at play: lack of trust (or, in Sartori's terms, alienation) leading to traditional populism, on the one hand, and, cynicism leading to entrepreneurial populism on the other. We contend that, while it may be a question of degree rather than quality, the two give rise to very different politics. Lack of trust can be summarised as an unwillingness to rely on, or make yourself vulnerable to, a particular party. A lack of interpersonal trust would lead to a reluctance to place oneself in a vulnerable position, one of potential loss or danger, with respect to another party: we do not trust that this person will look out for our best interests and fear that they may disregard them or our safety. A lack of generalised trust refers to our sense that relying upon groups of individuals who are not personally known to us, or upon institutions, makes little sense and, again, places us in a position in which our vulnerability might be exploited, or disregarded. In other words, lack of trust leads to fear of being taken advantage of or instrumentalised--and ultimately to an unwillingness to take any risks whatsoever. Eventually this leads to a declining spiral of engagement with that particular individual or group of individuals and, finally to withdrawal and, in the worst case, alienation.

Cynicism, however, presents different characteristics. Where lack of trust signals an unwillingness to engage for fear of being 'taken advantage of', cynicism signifies a willingness to engage, but with lower expectations. As cynics we expect to be disappointed, we hold few hopes that our engagement will be rewarded to the extent or in the manner in

which we are promised it will be. So, I may not trust the institutions that structure political life but I am willing to act as if I did because there is something to be gained from that engagement - even if that gain is a perverse by-product of the system's malfunctioning or untrustworthiness. Cynicism is thus much stronger than the 'healthy scepticism' of the 'knowing' voter, who has a realistic sense of what can and cannot be achieved by politicians, and happily subscribes to the Churchillian notion that democracy is the worst of all political systems, except for all the others. Unlike the cynical voter, who has low expectations but seeks some trade-off from participation, the healthy sceptic is more tolerant of the imperfections of the democratic system and therefore more ready to abide by its face-value rules and to accept its inevitable shortcomings. In order to explore these arguments, we have focused mainly on the following European democracies: France and Austria, where 'traditional populism' has seen some success in the shape of Le Pen and Haider; Italy, where 'entrepreneurial populism' has prospered under Berlusconi; and Germany, Spain and the UK, where neither traditional nor entrepreneurial populism has gained a strong foothold. Of course, one could add other cases to each of these categories, and we make reference to developments in the USA, but our principal concern is to test the plausibility of the hypothesis and its potential for further research.

2. Trust and institutions

In studies of contemporary politics, trust is increasingly seen as playing a pivotal role - both as the glue that holds functioning political and social communities together, as well as the element which is held to minimise costly and painful conflict. A renewed focus on institutions has led scholars to posit trust as a crucial variable when it comes to explaining the workings and problems of different institutional contexts. Putnam's seminal analysis and the rise of social capital theory made trust the life-blood of society and its presence has come to be seen as a *sine qua non* for healthy and productive exchanges, and flourishing and stable economies.[10] But, to relate trust to institutions is problematic because trust is something that we experience primarily on an inter-personal level. Hardin for example, goes as far as to argue that it makes no sense to trust a specific institution or set of institutions because we do not have sufficient knowledge of them to base our trust on anything significant.[11]

It appears that there are at least two different types of trust at play: one type is rooted in Hardin's notion that we can only trust someone if we have reason to think that they will act in our interest or 'as our agent', as Hardin puts it, on a specific matter. This is the case of particularized trust. The other type of trust, however, which affects cooperative behaviour in the larger society, is in fact based on the very opposite of Hardin's premise, namely on the assumption that an institution will be no one's agent and will not act on behalf of particular

interests.[12] We place our trust in institutions precisely because we 'trust' that they will act impartially. And this trust stems from the fact that while the outcome of an institutional process may not be 'in our favour', the process itself was impartial. The nature of the *process* therefore, is what in great part legitimates trust in an institution. For this trust in the process to exist that process must be publicly debated, agreed upon and transparent throughout. Part of the trust stems from our having been (however remotely) engaged in the process of deciding upon the nature of the legitimate process to be adopted from now on.

As polities apparently became increasingly mired in corruption scandals, it seemed logical to posit that the lower the trust in institutions, the higher the likely rate of abstention (as seemingly evidenced by declining levels of electoral participation in many western democracies). From this, it was but a small step to go on to posit that the lower the level of trust in institutions, the higher the likelihood of a protest vote (for an anti-system party, for example) against mainstream parties and politicians – and thus, in turn, the higher the likelihood of the emergence and success of political options on the fringes of the system. Dwindling levels of trust in institutions (as well as declining levels of inter-personal trust) should logically account for the levels of populist mobilisation.

Two questions however, immediately arise. First, why has there been such a preponderance of mobilisation of the far right or robust right rather than on the opposite side of the spectrum? The discrediting of the Marxist left after the collapse of communism may provide one possible answer (although one that suggests far right supporters have very short or very selective memories, given the resounding discrediting of the far right after the Second World War). A more convincing explanation may be that supporters of far-left parties still display higher levels of trust (both generalised and interpersonal). To be sure, these levels of trust are slightly lower than for mainstream voters, but higher nevertheless than far right supporters.

But, the more compelling question and the one that this paper seeks to address is how, given the assertion that levels of trust do affect the nature of participation, can we explain the emergence of different types of populism with the single dichotomous variable of trust/mistrust? The argument we seek to develop here is that political cynicism gives rise to a particular type of hybrid (democratic-cynical) trust. As we shall see, in the context of a lack of trust in particular institutions, and the broader context of trust in democracy as the best possible system, the media play a particular role in creating the necessary illusion that the populist entrepreneur is both untrustworthy and yet well known enough to be trusted precisely insofar as he known to be untrustworthy.

3. Corruption, mistrust and cynicism: the political instrumentalisation of scandal

> '…[M[edia interviews where the interviewer sets out to entrap and draw blood do nothing to enlarge public understanding – but that is because the listener and viewer collude in seeing the Minister, MP or official in the same way as the media. That is, not as legitimate representatives of a public realm that can only be sustained in the last resort if we respect it; rather, as somebody we want to see discomfited or commit a gaffe. Public life has become a kind of soap opera in which issues are less important than the private foibles, wobbles and passions of the actors in the drama.'[13]

It is both natural and logical to assume that scandals related to political corruption in particular will have a damaging impact on the perceived credibility and trustworthiness of politicians. In fact, corruption is potentially more damaging to democratic legitimacy than other perceived shortcomings, such as policy failure or poor management of the economy: it can undermine the very roots of the system. Democracies set themselves apart from non-democracies on the basis of their claim to exercise power in a disinterested manner: citizens are entitled to expect the political class and its administrative support structure will operate in a transparent and accountable manner. In regard to interactions with civil servants or other public sector officials (tax officials, local government offices, national health systems, and so forth), citizens are entitled to expect parity of treatment, regardless of their status or income. It is this predictability and lack of arbitrariness in terms of *process* which underpins the differentiation of democracies from non-democracies. Democratic states are *Rechtsstaats*, which operate according to the 'rule of law', ensuring that outcomes are seen as legitimate on the basis of the *nature* of decision-making, rather than the decisions themselves (which may indeed favour particularistic interests). Thus, activities by public officials – most especially politicians and bureaucrats – which are seen to be corrupt can hit at the heart of a democratic system's claim to legitimacy. The likely consequences for trust are easy to deduce.

However, as is the case with the relationship between social capital and trust or between trust and institutions, the nature of the impact of corruption scandals on perceptions of the political class is in practice complex and multi-faceted. It is helpful to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, what may be termed the *political instrumentalisation* of corruption scandals and, on the other, the *impact* of such scandals (and their interpretation) on the voting public. Although the two are in practice linked, there is an important conceptual distinction to be drawn in terms of the central question of perception: the objective circumstances of corruption in a given state may not be accurately reflected in its representation in the public domain. The

challenge, therefore, is to understand how and why incidents of corruption lead to scandals in the first place, before turning to assess the way such scandals influence trust and voting behaviour.

A string of significant scandals in west European democracies since the early 1990s, involving both the financial and especially the political worlds, has resulted in close attention being paid to how we explain and combat what to some looks like an inexorable rise in corruption. Indeed, the much acclaimed triumph of capitalism over communism following the collapse of the Soviet bloc regimes at the end of the 1980s was tainted in much of Western Europe by the subsequent revelation of corruption scandals involving leading political figures. The most dramatic of these occurred in Italy, following the so-called '*Mani Pulite*' investigations into bribery in Milan, which in turn exposed a major network of corruption involving politicians at the highest level.[14] Further scandals were revealed in France, notably the so-called Elf Aquitaine affair which led to the imprisonment of a former government minister;[15] in Germany, where a linked investigation revealed that long-term Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had set up a secret political slush fund to channel funds to the ruling CDU;[16] in Belgium, where the Augusta-Dassault defence contract scandal led to the conviction of former deputy premier and NATO secretary-general, Willy Claes; in Spain, where a series of high-profile scandals resulted in several ministerial resignations and the discrediting of the Socialist government of Felipe González.[17] Even in the United Kingdom, long seen as free of high-level political corruption, accusations of sleaze in government led to the creation of a Committee on Standards in Public Life.

But have these countries really seen a dramatic increase in instances of corruption since the early 1990s, or is it rather that there has been a growth in the reporting of 'scandals' (not necessarily the same thing)? Pujas and Rhodes[18] have argued that one explanation for the wave of scandals which seemed to sweep quite suddenly through southern Europe in the 1990s was the changing relationship between political parties on the one hand, and between political and other social actors on the other. The critical point in this argument is that the traditional arrangements which have characterised the organisation of political space in the post-war era began to break down. One way in which corruption has become politicised, or instrumentalised, is that parties which previously competed for votes on the basis of ideology, yet colluded in corrupt activities, have altered their tactics. The policy platforms which used to characterise and distinguish left and right have increasingly converged, whilst the pressure to demonstrate governmental effectiveness in an increasingly interdependent policy environment has led to an emphasis on technocratic, rather than ideological, solutions.[19] The grounds of political competition have therefore moved, and in place of increasingly otiose

ideological disputes, parties have resorted to throwing corruption-related accusations at each other. Indeed, as 'clean government' has increasingly been presented as a positive good, so parties have sought to occupy the moral high ground and thereby attract the support of the ever greater number of floating and ideologically disoriented voters: it is striking how many election campaigns in western Europe (and the USA) over the last decade have featured candidates' trustworthiness as a key theme.

If clean government is presented as a positive good, then mainstream parties engulfed by accusations and scandals represent a very real opportunity for non-mainstream parties to pose as the 'clean' alternative. As mainstream politicians on the left and right appear to be equally corrupt, parts of the far right can present themselves as credible alternatives untouched by scandal - if not in practice untouched by corruption. The name of the game becomes either to appear 'clean', or, in the case of a Berlusconi, to appear to know how to skirt scandal, play the system and remain afloat.

The US presidential election campaign of 2000 arguably went even further: George W Bush made much play of how, in contrast to his opponent, he trusted 'the people' rather than 'the government'. The logic of the argument, as Mark Warren points out, is that individuals and organisations should keep control over their own resources rather than delegate them to government, thereby obviating the need to engage in the risky business of trusting in government to use them appropriately. However, as Warren goes on to outline, the argument has a sub-text that government cannot be trusted because the institutions and agencies that comprise it are not to be trusted: even though their rhetoric is one of disinterested public service, the people who work in government, politicians and other public officials may covertly be serving their own interests. Thus, 'Bush's rhetoric shades into the charge that "government" is not to be trusted because it is corrupt'.[20] In turn, this reflects a shift away from an emphasis on the democratic choice between party political platforms over competing visions towards an anti-democratic form of populism. In line with the wider trend discussed above, Bush's appeal to voters was to trust in him *personally*, rather than the institutions of democracy. This 'politics of personal trust', as Warren terms it, has become a feature of many democratic elections in recent times. It is all the more effective, as well as all the more easy to use as a resource, in the case of populist parties that have been too marginalised to be seriously tainted by scandal and that make a fetish of strong, personal leadership.

Party activities and competition, though, also have to be seen within a wider context. It should be noted that the dramatic wave of scandals which came to light in southern Europe during the 1990s was usually instigated by headline-grabbing investigating magistrates.[21] Moreover,

these 'crusading' magistrates often worked in close collaboration with the mass communications media, especially the press, which had started to intervene more actively and directly in politics and was less trammelled than in the past by the demands of political parties or proprietors or by the constraints of a more 'corporatist' post-authoritarian era. In a much more fluid political space, which is no longer the effective monopoly of the political class, the media and other interests have increasingly started to compete with politicians to influence public opinion. The boundaries between the political, commercial, judicial and reporting world have in turn become more porous, with increasing numbers of high profile figures moving between several of these spheres. For instance, as major media proprietors have become increasingly influential political figures, so politicians have developed closer links with business, giving rise to the emergence of what Della Porta and Pizzorno[22] have termed 'business politicians', closely linked to the growing professionalisation of political parties. Meanwhile, leading magistrates such as Baltasar Garzón in Spain and Antonio di Pietro in Italy have also moved between the judiciary and high elected office.

Even if we accept this analysis, it only answers a part of the puzzle since not all polities in which major corruption scandals occurred have thrown up populist parties of the right, and not all populist parties of the right are alike. And whilst scandals have been prominent in polities where populist parties emerge, corruption and scandals seem to shape voter attitudes differently to the extent that in some cases voters seem to lack trust while in others they simply seem to have become cynical. Pujas and Rhodes[23] describe the generation of scandal as a process of 'competitive elite mobilisation', which evolves over a number of phases: first, the revelation of typically small-scale corruption by a relatively minor actor; second, the denunciation and 'criminalisation' of that and other associated activity by judges; finally, the escalation of public outrage via a press campaign fed less by investigative journalism than by strategic leaks from the legal investigation. Once public opinion has been 'scandalised', the media is able to mobilise a public sense of indignation against the political class, whilst encouraging magistrates to continue exposing and indicting corrupt activity. In essence, this is how the *tangentopoli* scandals emerged in Italy during the 1990s. What is being described, then, is effectively a 'cycle of contestation' in which, as elites rotate in power, public attention is drawn to (and then often tires of) media exposure of their shortcomings. However, one key part of this cycle may be the 'demobilisation' of public and political concern over the issue of corruption: as reports into scandals peter out (as they must), the public loses interest, the media moves onto other issues, and judges tire in their pursuit of prosecutions: scandals have diminishing returns.

In the case of Italy, for example, the protest and media attention which reverberated around the world in the early 1990s has been replaced a decade later by acquiescence or even apathy over the issue of political corruption. Indeed, the election to the premiership in 2001 of Silvio Berlusconi – who had denounced the 'hero judges' of the anti-corruption crusades as politically motivated 'reds' – might suggest that the political catharsis created by the 1990s scandals has largely exhausted the appetite of the public (and politicians) for further upheavals. The 'cycle of contestation' offers a potentially revealing insight into how corruption scandals are instrumentalised. However, the precise manner in which such a cycle emerges and is played out will depend to a crucial extent on how much 'blurring' of traditional lines of demarcation between the political and other spheres actually takes place. It is our argument that the greater the extent of such blurring, the more likely that 'new' actors will be able to enter the electoral arena: these are the 'entrepreneurial populists' who are able to play on the sense of cynicism that corruption scandals induce amongst significant elements of the electorate. If the system is rotten, so the argument goes, electors may as well support someone who has demonstrated their ability to 'play' the system and prosper within it. This is a variation on Mark Warren's argument about the 'personalisation of trust', which gives rise to a new form of clientelism and deflects attention away from institutional reform:

> When people seek out personal trust relations with politicians, they are, in effect, seeking protection against a corrupt system while hoping for influence that circumvents public institutions. The new clientelism appeals to cynics: 'government' is beyond rehabilitation.[24]

On the other hand, where the cycle of contestation has not managed to break down the traditional lines of demarcation, the response amongst the electorate may simply be a growing sense of disillusionment and alienation: the system is rotten and will remain so whilst the current structures remain in place. In these cases, the terrain is likely to be more fertile for a more traditional form of populist 'anti-politics', alongside growing levels of abstention.

Our argument is that such a broad process can be identified in most European democracies – although, clearly, the extent to which the a 'cycle of contestation' follows the particular pattern indicated above in any given country will be crucially influenced by such factors as the nature of media ownership, the structure of the judiciary, the professionalisation of the political class and the inter-penetration between business and political interests. Moreover, whilst the 'cycle of contestation' may provide an aggregate level indication as to how and why scandals emerge and are politicised, the argument we wish to investigate here is that the impact of scandals varies according to different groups of voters. It would of course be impossible to outline the whole range of potential responses to corruption-related scandals by the voting public. Instead, what we seek to do here is to highlight the kinds of response which

may contribute to the rise in support for entrepreneurial populism on the one hand, and more traditional populism on the other.

The media clearly plays a pivotal role in the political instrumentalisation of corruption. In the literature on scandal and its consequences for the political process, a number of theories can be identified.[25] For our purposes, the most interesting are the so-called 'trivialisation' and the 'subversion' theories respectively. According to the 'trivialisation theory', the media has undermined the political class through its obsession with scandal and with pricking the bubble of authority: reporting of news has declined in comparison to the reporting of scandal, and news has become dominated by 'soft journalism' and 'infotainment'. The media increasingly specialise in the sensational and the emotive, placing ever more emphasis on discourse which is primarily visually determined and turning the routine reporting of politics into soap opera: research by Thomas Patterson[26] found that between the early 1980s and 2000, soft news has increased dramatically. In that period, news stories with no public policy content rose from 35 per cent to 50 per cent of all reporting; stories with some degree of sensationalism from 25 per cent to 40 per cent; and human interest-focused news reporting jumped from 11 per cent to more than 26 per cent. The so-called 'tabloidisation' of the media (including television) goes alongside a 'privatisation' of the public sphere, as public figures lose any sense of mystery or aura: the most intimate personal details of politicians are revealed and debate tends to become focused on the trivial (do politicians get their hair dyed, what are their sexual propensities, drinking habits, why do they sweat in public, and so forth). Voters are able to entertain the notion that they 'know' their representatives, based on how they *appear* in countless televised performances and photo-opportunities. But this, of course, is a two-way street: the media's shift to a more personalised content is reflected in politicians themselves seeking to use the media to bypass more conventional party-based channels of communication with the electorate.[27] Political broadcasts have increasingly become focused on the 'character' of leaders, rather than the public policies they would seek to promote.

The danger of this form of 'trivialisation', following Warren's argument, is that it depoliticises political judgement: 'when the trustworthiness of the candidate overrides agreement on the issues, the vote does not reflect a judgement about public affairs, but is something more like a defensive reaction against a system that has, for all practical purposes, been written off as captured by other interests'.[28] Warren refers to this development as a form of 'new clientelism', which 'expresses a cynicism about the domain of collective action.' What we end up with is a situation in which the appeal to personalised trust claimed by politicians – grounded on character-based rather than skills-based attributes – actually reinforces a disengagement from the more conventional democratic political process, in which

debate is driven by arguments over the most appropriate distribution of resources. As we argue in more detail below, responses to what might be termed the focus on froth rather than substance will lead some voters to become wholly disillusioned with the conventional democratic options on offer and look for anti-system alternatives, whilst others will favour supporting the 'political entrepreneurs' who can 'play the system' effectively.

According to 'subversion theory', there is a divide between 'popular news' (the tabloids) and 'official news' (the broadsheets or serious press): the claimed authority and objectivity of the official news – that which political class would like to see reported – is subverted by challenges of the popular news, which in turn cultivates scepticism and disbelief. Popular news invites readers and viewers to laugh at the pompous claims of political class, whose power depends on being taken seriously. But in reality, according to the popular news, the political class is characterised by incompetents who are unable even to do what they set out to do – that is, manage the economy and enact policy effectively. The fact that the policy milieu has become increasingly complex in an ever more inter-connected global environment cuts little ice: politicians are constrained to make promises about what they will achieve, even though there is little chance of their being able realise those promises. Therefore, one seemingly logical response is for voters to become increasingly cynical about the political class and to look instead to those with proven track record of achievement in the kind of dirty world that should fit them well for doing what politicians have proved themselves incapable of – that is, in particular, being successful in their own (non-politics) sphere, whether that is in the corporate or even the entertainment world.

4. Two types of populism

In line with the most widely accepted definitions of populism,[29] we can argue that all the movements we examine present the following traits attributable to populist parties or movements: they claim to represent the 'common man', the average voter whose voice has long been lost; they claim to be able to return to a golden, more innocent age of politics during which politics and political decisions rested in the hands of those who contribute most significantly to the everyday life of the nation by their labour; they claim to have identified a gap between the leader and the led and that political power has been usurped by an undeserving, spoilt and corrupt elite whose aim is to govern for its own benefit while reaping and withholding the political, social and economic rewards which rightly belong to the people; above all, they abhor what they regard as the gratuitous professionalisation and intellectualisation of the political realm which has led to its corruption and the subsequent exclusion from it of those it claims to represent.

It is noteworthy that all types of populism are not only dependent on a democratic framework, but in fact very supportive of a type of democracy. As Canovan[30] has argued, therefore, populism can actually be understood to be a 'pathology of democracy' (what she refers to as 'a shadow cast by democracy') – hence the support for democracy and a democratic system which we find in all countries where populism is successful. However, as we have argued above, there will emerge two very different types of populism depending on whether we are dealing predominantly with alienation or cynicism. The former generates a traditional, right-wing anti-system type of populism; the latter, a form of 'entrepreneurial populism'. We discuss these two types of populism in more detail below.

4.1. Traditional, right-wing populism

Leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen or Jorg Haider draw their support from their relentless refusal to endorse the system in which they operate—yet all the while trying to infiltrate it in rather conventional ways. They thrive on the notion that, against all odds and despite the abdication of incompetent professional politicians, they alone will maintain a commitment to genuine democratic ideals and principles. The appeal is to voters whose profile is mixed, but generally encompasses two broad types.[31] Both the FN and the FPÖ initially drew their (timid) support from the traditional right; their supporters were mostly male (this has remained a constant), in late-middle age or nearing retirement, often drawn from the small bourgeoisie (local doctors, successful small businessmen and entrepreneurs). Further, they were drawn from specific regions: in France, the South and the East (mainly Alsace); in Austria, Carinthia and Styria.

This support remains significant, but electoral success for both parties has coincided with the rise in a different type of support, that of younger, more disaffected voters (the FPÖ has become the strongest party by far among the members of younger generations of voters with a share of 35 percent), of lower socio-economic status (only 35 percent of the blue-collar voters opted for the Social Democratic Party, while 60 percent voted for centre-right parties, of which the FPÖ managed to attract 47 percent) and with lower levels of education. Thus to their initial regional strongholds in the comfortably off provinces, the parties shave added the more modest suburbs of large capitals and the industrially decimated zones of France and Austria. This vote is no longer strictly the domain of the provinces.

The electoral data show[32] that this new form of support is characterized either by first-time voters with little or no previous political experience, or by voters who, given their socio-economic backgrounds might have been expected to support a left-wing party. This is noteworthy because it demonstrates the somewhat non-partisan nature of the choice for what

is a significant proportion of the parties' voters. While these parties are clearly right-wing, it makes more sense in light of these results to assume that while some of their supporters endorse their robust partisanship, their recent electoral support comes from voters who are less swayed by the left/right dimension and more so by their message of reform of a political process from which they feel utterly disconnected.

What is of importance for the argument we develop here is the power exerted not by a left/right policy driven discourse, but rather by reform driven rhetoric. This takes us to the heart of the politics of populism, where the operative distinctions in analytical terms are not so much left/right but status quo versus opposition or infiltration. The operative question for the our argument, therefore, is how that reform is conceived, either through an anti-system attitude or through a cynical attitude.

4.2 Entrepreneurial populism

The entrepreneurial populism to which we refer is that of politicians who have made a mark through their success in spheres outside mainstream politics. A representative example is Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (others might include Christoph Blocher, Ross Perot, or Arnold Schwarzenegger). Berlusconi has all the hallmarks of the populist leader, but can nevertheless not be classified alongside Jean Marie Le Pen or Jorg Haider. Nor can he appear alongside Jacques Chirac or Tony Blair. While the latter have adopted a populist style in some instances, theirs' is precisely that: a populist style, rather than populist politics.[33]

Figures such as Berlusconi on the other hand present a very particular type of profile. While striving to be perceived as a non-professional politician (something common to all populist leaders), Berlusconi's credentials as a successful businessman who is seen to have 'done well by the system' and ready to apply his brand of motivation, work and analysis to what is perceived as an inefficient and corrupt political system are key to his success. The reasoning behind a vote for the entrepreneurial populist might work as follows: although the system may be corrupt, the appropriate response is to vote for someone who can play this system to the mutual advantage of voter and candidate. In populist terms, the person for whom the vote is cast needs to present a certain set of characteristic that are in line with populist traits. The person needs to be seen as successful in the 'real world'. In other words, they must appear to be in politics as an outsider and a non-professional who has proven his worth in another 'more real' sphere of life. Here people like Berlusconi or Blocher in Switzerland fit the type as successful businessmen. The argument is consistent with Thompson's emphasis in his 'social theory of scandal' in which scandals are seen as struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake.[34] (Thompson, 2000: 245). As Thompson argues,

reputation can be character-based (as in the appeal increasingly being made by mainstream politicians) or skills-based (as in the appeal made by entrepreneurial populists). The growing emphasis on personal trustworthiness that we have seen in democratic elections over recent years relies on leaders both distancing themselves from allegedly scandal-prone opponents and presenting themselves as honest and morally upright citizens of good character. But the reputation claim of entrepreneurial populists follows an entirely different logic: their appeal is on the basis of what they have achieved, not their personal integrity, and their take on scandals is that they represent the endemic corruption of *all* mainstream politicians.

The paradox in this sort of support for entrepreneurial populism is that the person does not necessarily have to be seen as trustworthy or moral. In fact, in most cases, their moral credentials are somewhat weak. But this is taken to mean that they can beat politicians at their own game: professional politicians are no less corrupt, but the fact that they are less successful or effective gives the populist entrepreneur the upper hand. They have what the Italians call '*furbizzia*' (street-smarts). The reasoning here is that if politicians are going to behave as badly, or as inefficiently, as they do, it makes more sense to elect someone about whom you have no illusions in terms of morality or trustworthiness, but whose street smarts can be relied upon. Where the populist calculation comes in, however, is that while the person may not be trustworthy, there is sufficient trust in both their being one of us (hence the importance of the person being perceived as the local lad who's done well) and the enduring faith in democratic institutions which will allow for a trickle down effect to the ordinary people.

The trust here represents a set of constructed paradoxes:
   a. the entrepreneurial populist is trusted because they do not claim to be trustworthy and nor are they perceived as being so;
   b. the system is seen as generally corrupt enough that it deserves to be 'played' rather than respected;
   c. but, simultaneously, the democratic system is still trusted enough to deliver some of the benefits down to ordinary people despite the populist leader's aim to play the system for himself.

We thus find ourselves faced with a new type of trust, a trust placed in an untrustworthy individual in order to play a system whose institutions one does not trust but whose ideals and intentions are still trusted.

In the context of the debate on the possibility of generalized versus interpersonal trust this is striking. Neither Hardin's account whereby trust in institutions is impossible (what we want

is someone in our corner), nor Rothstein's model of generalized trust (the democratic system acts in a disinterested manner), captures this voter choice. The trust in the politician can be interpreted as a perverted type of interpersonal trust (I trust him [to get the job done] because I know he is not really trustworthy). The trust in the system as a whole – democracy – is a version of generalized trust (the system will deliver some of the goods), but there is no intermediary trust in existing democratic institutions, and these can therefore be bypassed in favour of a populist leader. Hence the two types of populism we have identified – traditional and entrepreneurial – respond to very different logics in terms of the appeal they make and the kind of support they are able to mobilise.

5. Evidence from the European and World Values Surveys

Is there any evidence to support the argument we have developed here? In order to answer this question, we have looked at data from the third wave European Values Survey (1999/2000) and the first two waves of the World Values Survey. Of course, the questions in these surveys are not tailored precisely to the variables we are seeking to investigate, and therefore the findings we are able to present are necessarily preliminary rather than definitive – but we believe they offer some support for our hypothesis about the relationship between the blurring of institutional lines, levels of trust, and the emergence of distinct forms of populism in Europe.

We anticipated that where there is a blurring of the lines of demarcation regarding the role of institutions, this should make the democratic system more open to entrepreneurial populists, and participation is therefore likely to be higher than in polities where the lines are not so blurred. This assumption seems borne out by recent figures that clearly show a higher rate of abstention in France (a polity susceptible to traditional alienated populism), the UK and Germany (where we find neither type of populism) compared to Italy (where we find the clearest case of entrepreneurial populism).

We also sought to identify trends reflecting the impact of cynicism versus lack of trust on party political outcomes. In the first instance we contrasted those polities exhibiting a form of populism (either traditional or entrepreneurial) with those polities in which populist parties of any sort are absent. We anticipated that where populist parties do well there should be stronger evidence of a generalised lack of trust or cynicism than where populist parties are unsuccessful or absent. Given our understanding of populism, we would expect those inclined to support a populist party to:

    a. experience lower levels of confidence in political institutions;

    b.   feel a commitment to democracy coupled with a heightened sense of betrayal;

    c.   believe more strongly in the importance of strong leadership;

    d.   display lower levels of political involvement/interest.

Thus, in places where a populist electorate does exist, we would expect to find lower levels of confidence in political institutions, a high commitment to democracy coupled with a sense of democracy's failure 'to deliver', a greater support for strong leadership, and lower levels of political involvement. [35] Finally, given that our argument is based on the notion that there is a difference between lack of trust and cynicism, and that entrepreneurial populism is based on a cynical view of politics combined with an instrumental view of democracy and institutions, we anticipated that those who vote for entrepreneurial populists should exhibit higher levels of inter-personal trust than generalised trust, coupled with a belief in the soundness of the democratic system. [36]

To conclude, we are able to outline the following preliminary findings about trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics:

A. Levels of confidence in political institutions

The highest levels of trust in the press are to be found in Spain and Germany (no significant populism), whereas figures for France, Italy and Austria confirm that where there is any form of populism, confidence in the press is strikingly lower. It should be noted, however, that the UK (also a non-populist case) is an outlier and displays the lowest levels of trust in the press: 37.3% claim they have 'no trust at all' in the press and only 1.2% claim to have 'a great deal of trust' in the press.

Italy displays the lowest levels of confidence in parliament (with 66% of respondents claiming that have either no trust or not very much trust in parliament), but contrary to expectations, the two second highest measures for lack of trust in parliament are to be found in Britain and Germany, where we might have expected to find higher levels of trust in political institutions. France, predictably, has the lowest numbers of respondents who claim to have 'a great deal of trust in parliament' and offers an interesting profile of an otherwise almost equal distribution between the three other options. Paradoxically, France and Spain have the highest numbers of respondents who claim to have 'quite a lot of trust in parliament'. On this variable, therefore, the results are more mixed than on the press and no discernible profile emerges.

In regard to levels of generalized trust, again the results are mixed: we expected to find a clear distinction between polities in which populist parties had been successful and those

where they had not, but the results are not so clear cut. While Italy, France and Austria display very low levels of generalized trust, more so than Spain and Germany, once again, the UK is an outlier since it displays the second lowest levels of generalized trust.

B. Commitment to democracy and sense of betrayal

We looked at levels of commitment to democracy and respondents' answers to whether democracy is the best political system. Here, as predicted, in countries with populist parties the proportion that 'agree strongly' that democracy is the best political system are higher than where populist parties are absent. However, on the workings of democracy, the picture is more nuanced. Here, as we expected, most respondents found democracy to be somewhat indecisive. The highest level of dissatisfaction on this score is to be found in France where 26.2% and 47.3% respectively of respondents agreed strongly or agreed with the idea that democracy was indecisive. Italy, as predicted, came (a distant) second with 8.6% agreeing strongly and 43.9% agreeing with the statement and Austria, again as predicted, came third (4.8% and 36.5%). Spain and Germany exhibited the highest percentages of disagreement with the statement. These findings were in line with our expectations. But, once again, the UK's profile was unexpected, since it had the second highest agree strongly score (10.6%) but overall came third to Italy when 'agree' and 'agree strongly' figures were combined. The UK and Germany, however, did exhibit the highest levels of respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement that democracy was indecisive.

On the general question as to whether they were 'satisfied with democracy', respondents in both Italy and France have the broadly expected profiles and exhibit the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy. Austria here is an outlier, as the level of satisfaction with democracy is higher than expected – although it is possible the perceived threat to the workings of democracy (in the form of Haider's election) might have heightened the positive evaluation of the system at the time as a form of response.

C. Belief in strong leadership

This is a complex variable because political histories (in the case of Austria, Italy, Germany and Spain) are likely to have a significant impact on what respondents feel able to endorse. However, we are able to distinguish clear support for a strong political leader in France and Italy: not only was positive endorsement of strong leaders highest in these countries, there was also least support for the view that it was a 'very bad idea'.

Having looked at the general results for the electorate at large, we then focused more specifically on supporters of populist parties. We tested the same set of attitudes (attitudes toward generalise and inter-personal trust, strong leadership, democracy, and so forth), but also looked at the correlation between these variables and those voters who might vote for populist parties. We thus ran basic cross-tabulations between the variables listed above and party support/choice. We looked at voting intentions ('who would you vote for in the next election?') as well as the appeal of each political party ('which political party most appeals to you?').

The results were striking: in the first instance, it is quite clear that supporters of traditional right-wing populist parties are the least trusting group of voters: 91.2% of potential Le Pen supporters said that most people could not be trusted. This is 20% less than the next least trusting cohort of voters. In Austria, the same sort of picture emerges: individuals declaring themselves as potential voters for the FPO are also the least trusting of cohorts--although the discrepancy between right wing populist supporters and the others is less striking (and there is only a 10% gap to the next group). Significantly, and as predicted, supporters of Berlusconi score highly on levels of interpersonal trust (38% of them - well above avearage - declare that most people can be trusted). On the whole, what we note is that a vote for populist parties correlates with low levels of trust in institutions, regardless of the type of populism supported,. But, whereas supporters of traditional populism also score poorly on interpersonal trust, this is not the case for those voters who support entrepreneurial populists.

With respect to attitides toward democracy, whilst all supporters of populist parties tend to display high levels of allegiance to democracy as a political system, those who vote for traditional populist parties are more dissatisfied with democracy than those who support entrepreneurial populists (for example le Pen and Haider supporters had the lowest rate of satisfaction with democracy - around 36% not at all satisfied and 33% not very satisfied with democracy in each case). These voters' willingness to follow politics in the media was average, while both lots of traditional populist voters simultaneously felt that politics was not at all important in their lives but were, on average, far more likely to join or belong to a political party or group. The portrait that emerges thus broadly fits with our expected results: the traditional populist supporters feel committed to democracy, betrayed by its workings and institutions, but mobilised none the less (insofar as they vote and may join a political party or movement). They are relatively interested in politics, but also feel disconnected from it insofar as they are able to say that politics is not very important in their lives. The combination of mistrust in institutions and mistrust in other individuals thus completes a portrait of a voter who is not so much apathetic as alienated from the mainstream and whose

sense of betrayal leads him or her to turn to traditional populist options. Voters who support Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* on the other hand, whilst displaying relatively high levels of mistrust in institutions, are far more trusting of other individuals and yet possibly more instrumental in their view of politics: they are not joiners and seem to present only an average profile in terms of support for political movements or parties.

---

[1] J. B Thompson, *Political Scandal. Power and Visibility in the Media Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 258-9

[2] C. Hay, ''Punctuated Evolution' and the Uneven Temporality of Institutional Change: The 'Crisis' of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism in Britain,' Paper presented to the *Eleventh Conference of Europeanists*, (Baltimore, 26-28 February, 1998); see also C. Hay and D. Wincott, 'Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism,' *Political Studies*, 46, 5, (Dec. 1998), pp. 951-957.

[3] M. E. Warren, 'Trust in Democratic Institutions', paper prepared for the *EURESCO conference*, 'Social Capital: Interdisciplinary Perspectives' (University of Exeter, 15-20 September 2001); L. Zucker, 'Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structures, 1840-1920', *Research in Organizational Behaviour*, 8, (1986), pp. 53-111; M. E. Warren, 'Democratic Theory and Trust' in M.E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 310-45 and pp. 346-60; C. Offe, 'How can we trust our fellow citizens?' in M.E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 42-87; N. Luhmann, 'Familiarity, Confidence, Trust. Problems and Alternatives' in D. Gambetta (Ed.), *Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); N. Luhmann, 'Trust: A mechanism for the reduction of social complexity' in *Trust and Power: Two Works by Nikeas Luhmann* (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1979); F. Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995); R. Hardin, 'Trusting persons, trusting institutions' in R. J. Zeckhauser (Ed.), *Strategy and Choice* (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1991); R. Hardin, 'Trustworthiness' *Ethics*, 107, (1996), pp. 26-42.

[4] Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Hans-Georg Betz, 'Introduction.' In Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall, (eds.), *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

[5]Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[6] Sartori, ibid, p. 132.

[7] Sartori, ibid, pp. 132-33.

[8] Explanations of the rise of right-wing populism as part of diaffection Betz etc., Mayer, perrineau.

[9] This is illustrated by the three surveys we have looked at and will be discussed further in the paper.

[10]R. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); R. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: the collapse and revival of American community* (New York, London: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

[11] Hardin, op. cit., Ref. 3.

[12] Bo Rothstein, 'Social capital and institutional Legitimacy', paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (Washington DC.: August 31- September 3 2000).

[13] Will Hutton, *The Observer* (28 March 2004).

[14] Donatella Della Porta, and Alberto Vannucci, *Corrupt Exchanges (*Haythorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter 1999).

[15]Paul Heywood Véronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes, 'Political Corruption, Democracy and Governance in Western Europe', in Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes (Eds.), *Developments in West European Politics 2* (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002)

[16] Ulrich Von Alemann, 'Party Finance, Party Donations and Corruption. The German Case', in D. Della Porta and S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), *Corrupt Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2002).

[17] Paul Heywood, 'Analysing Political Corruption in Western Europe. Spain and the UK in Comparative Perspective' in D. Della Porta and S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), *Corrupt*

Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002).

[18] V. Pujas and M. Rhodes, 'Party Finance and Political Scandal in Italy, Spain and France' in *West European Politics* 22/3 (1999).

[19] Paul Heywood, 'Executive Capacity and Legislative Limits' in Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes (Eds.), *Developments in West European Politics 2 (*Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

[20] Warren, 2001, op. cit., Ref. 3, p.1.

[21] D. Della Porta, 'A Judges' Revolution? Political Corruption and the Judiciary in Italy', *European Journal of Political Research* 39 (2001).

[22] D. Della Porta and A. Pizzorno, 'The Business Politicians: Relfections from a Study of Political Corruption' in M. Levi and D. Nelken (Eds.), *The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996).

[23] V. Pujas and M. Rhodes, op. cit., Ref. 18.

[24] Warren, 2001, op. cit., Ref 20, p. 3.

[25] Thompson, op. cit., Ref. 1.

[26] T. Patterson, 'Doing well and doing good: How soft news and critical journalism are shrinking the news audience and weakening democracy -- And what news outlets can do about it' The Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics, & Public Policy at Harvard University (2001).

[27] See Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[28] Warren, 2001, op. cit., Ref. 20, p.6.

[29] M. Canovan, 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies*, 47, 1, (2000), pp. 2-16; A. Taguieff,. 'Mobilisation national-populiste en France; vote zénophobe et nouvel anti-sémitisme politique,' *Lignes*, (March 1990), pp.91-136; P. A. Taguieff, 'La doctrine du national-populsime en France,' *Etudes*, 364, 1, (1986), pp. 27-46;

C. Fieschi, *Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic: in the shadow of democracy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); P. Taggart, *The New Populism and the New Politics*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); P. A. Taguieff, *L'Illusion Populiste*, (Paris: Berg, 2002).

[30] Canovan, op.cit., Ref. 28.

[31] N. Mayer, 'Du vote lepéniste au vote frontiste,' *Revue française de science politique*, 47, 3-4, (1997), pp. 438-453; N. Mayer, *Ces Français qui votent FN* (Paris: Flammarion, 2003).

[32] N. Mayer, ibid.; F. Plasser, et al., 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl', (Vienna: ZAP 1999), (www.zap.or.at).

[33] Y. Mény and Y. Surel, *Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple*, (Paris: Fayard, 2000); Y. Mény and Y. Surel 'The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism' in Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); P. A. Taguieff, *L'Illusion Populiste*, (Paris: Berg, 2002).

[34] Thompson, *Political Scandal*, p.245.

[35] To test this hypothesis, we focused on the following questions from the EVS:
  ➢ how much confidence do you have in:
    the press V203
    the police V205
    parliament V206
    the justice system V212
  ➢ are you satisfied with democracy? V213
  ➢ view government bad-very good V214
  ➢ democracy is best political system V220
  ➢ democracy is indecisive V222
  ➢ how often do you follow politics in the media? V263
  ➢ how interested are you in politics? O17
  ➢ how important is politics in your life? V5
  ➢ do you belong to political parties or groups? V16
  ➢ political system needs a strong leader? V216
  ➢ political system needs experts making decisions? V217

---

[36] We used the following question to control for an attitude susceptible to yield the sort of cynical trust alluded to above:

> ➢ people can be trusted vs. you can't be too careful V66

Positive appraisal of this statement should be higher where entrepreneurial populism has gained a foothold than in those polities where traditional populism holds more sway. We would expect that levels of interpersonal trust would be higher in those polities too. Where a traditional type of populism is present we should be able to identify a set of attitudes related to lack of trust; where an entrepreneurial populism was present we should be able to identify a set of attitudes related to cynicism.