Paul Burgess

Paul Burgess
University College London | UCL · School of Law

LLM (Legal Theory), JD, BSc

About

9
Publications
888
Reads
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51
Citations
Additional affiliations
September 2018 - present
University College London
Position
  • Fellow
August 2015 - August 2018
The University of Edinburgh
Position
  • PhD Student
Education
August 2014 - May 2015
New York University
Field of study
  • Law
February 2005 - December 2009
August 1993 - May 1996
Aberystwyth University
Field of study
  • Geography

Publications

Publications (9)
Article
Full-text available
In this short paper I provide a justificatory argument for the importance of the endeavour exemplified by the papers that comprise the remainder of this special issue. I suggest that consideration and assessment of the origins of the concept of the Rule of Law not only matters, but also that it is a practice that is often neglected. Further, I sugg...
Article
Full-text available
In this brief note I question, in part, the justification for thinking that the US Supreme Court should – in a recent Opinion – consider the Rule of Law. I further consider whether it did in fact fail to do so. I take an introspective approach to this question and explore the validity of us – Rule of Law-people – taking a Rule of Law-centric view o...
Article
(A Review of A. Tomkins & P. Scott (eds.), Entick v. Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015 - Review Published in Jus Politicum 16 – Juillet 2016  Martin Loughlin’s Foundations of Public Law. A Critical Review) Full review available at: http://juspoliticum.com/article/Should-Entick-v-Carrington-be-on-our-Rule-of-L...
Article
Full-text available
In this article, I identify a number of commonly accepted assumptions from the literature associated with the Rule of Law and suggest that—whilst the assumptions are accepted as part of the conceptual narrative of the concept—the cogency of the assumptions falters when they are considered collectively. This article represents, in many respects, bot...
Article
The content of the international Rule of Law is frequently debated. In this debate, domestic Rule of Law conceptions are frequently—if only indirectly or implicitly—used to derive the international concept. I argue this derivation, and the debate regarding the form of any derivation, is unnecessary because the domestic conceptions frequently used a...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper, we identify the way in which various forms of legal personhood can be differentiated from one another by comparing these entities with a—not too farfetched—hypothetical situation in which intelligence spontaneously evolves (i.e. without human design) within the internet: spontaneous intelligence (“SI”). In these terms, we consider th...
Article
In assessing compliance with the Rule of Law, the contested nature of the concept renders the use of a single theorist’s conception or, alternatively, the adoption of a hybrid conception open to criticism. There is no settled and practical way to determine Rule of Law non-compliance. It is argued that by looking behind the concept’s contestedness,...
Article
Available at: http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/82223/20100312-0000/www.law.uq.edu.au/documents/qlsr/recent-issues/vol3/issue1/Burgess_2010_vol3_i1.pdf This article proposes a new scheme for identifying accepted sources from which a judge can take judicial notice after inquiry. The characteristics of sources that have previously been utilised for jud...

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Projects

Projects (2)
Archived project
This stems from a workshop hosted at the University of Edinburgh in May 2016, relating to the operation and applications of the Rule of Law through history. The papers, Burgess, Canevaro, McKnight, Møller and Sempill, can be found here: https://link.springer.com/journal/40803/onlineFirst/page/1
Project
In this project, I explore three conceptions of the Rule of Law in three periods of societal revolution (the English Civil War; the Glorious Revolution; and the US Revolutionary War) in order to identify and explore the nature of, and influences on, the change in the conceptions over time. Through exploring the writings of the pamphleteers, I identify the Rule of Law-problem that leads to the canonical Rule of Law-solution, in each period. Through this process, I highlight the conceptions' change as being either conceptual revolutions or conceptual evolutions.