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CONTENTS

PHILOSOPHY

***EMPLOYING JOHN STUART MILL'S UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AS A CATALYST TO AFRICA'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 7**

Emmanuel Kelechi Iwuagwu,
Bonaventure Ikechukwu Ozoigbo,
Gabriel Akwaji Agabi

***ENVIRONMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF DEHUMANIZED FUTURE* 28**

Philip Osarobu Isanbor,
Philip Akporduado Edema

***THE EXPERIENCE OF PHILOSOPHIZING IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS: SPECIFICS AND PERSPECTIVES* 44**

Inna Kovalenko,
Yuliia Meliakova,
Eduard Kalnytskyi,
Ksenia Nesterenko

POLITICAL SCIENCES, ECONOMICS AND LAW

***"DEMOCRACY: A STATE OF DEMOS OR AN OLIGARCH'S PARTY STATE? AN INTERPRETATION OF MODERNITY'S NOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN GREEK STATE"* 63**

Dionysis Tsirigotis

***RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN HEGEMONY* 85**

Murat Güneylioglu

***RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES TOWARDS THE NEAR ABROAD* 103**

Stephen Adi Odey,
Andi Octamaya Tenri Awaru,
Oduora Okpokam Asuo

***ASEAN AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*123**

Lita Limpo,
Beauty Beauty

SOCIAL INSTABILITY AS A GLOBAL TREND OF THE MODERN WORLD 141

Oleg Danilyan,
Oleksandr Dzeban,
Yurii Kalynovskyi

FACTORS DETERMINING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY OF SONE BEEL, ASSAM, INDIA.....162

Kanchan Baran Singha,
N.B. Singh,
K. Gyanendra Singh

THE PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES, AND LEGAL ISSUES OF DIGITAL BANKING IN NIGERIA 186

Paul Atagamen Aidonojie,
Oluwaseye Oluwayomi Ikubanni,
Nosakhare Okuonghae

THE MOMENT OF CONSUMMATION OF AN OFFENCE RELATING TO THE MANIPULATION OF AN EVENT: UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 210

Gheorghe Reniță,
Sergiu Brînza

FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

MANIPULATIVE ARGUMENTATION IN ANTI-UKRAINIAN DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN POLITICIANS: INTEGRATION OF DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL AND CLASSICAL RHETORICAL APPROACHES 224

Nataliia Kravchenko

SEMANTIC PHENOMENA IN ENGLISH CLINICAL TERMINOLOGY OF VETERINARY MEDICINE 247

Olena Syrotina,
Yurii Rozhkov

TYOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF ILLOCUTIONARY SPEECH ACTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE..... 266

Oleksandra Tuhai

EMPLOYING JOHN STUART MILL'S UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AS A CATALYST TO AFRICA'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract: *This work examines the significance of Mill's Utilitarian philosophy of economics in addressing the challenges confronting the social and economic development of Africa. Africa, the second largest continent both by land mass and population, is yet to replicate its size with socio-economic greatness. The continent is still riddled with myriads of socio-political and economic problems begging for solutions. These problems, as the work identifies, range from poor productive capacity, unmotivated labour force, poor capital base, bad foreign market policies, corruption, defective economic policies, bad leadership and lack of political will. This work employing the philosophical tools of textual critical analysis, exposition and evaluation argues that some aspects of J.S. Mill's utilitarian philosophy of economics can be used as a catalyst to trigger the long overdue social and economic development of Africa. The aspects which the work employed include Mill's views on production, labour, capital, exchange and international trade.*

Keywords: *J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Philosophy of Economics, Africa, Social and Economic Development, Production, Capital, International Trade.*

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Introduction

It is generally agreed that the African continent, which is only second to Asia both in land mass and population, has not lived up to its potentials in spite of its abundant human and material resources. Africa which is considered the cradle of civilization is today lagging far behind when compared with other continents in terms human capital development and economic progress. The continent is yet to take off socially, politically, and economically and is still largely dependent on other developed continents for its survival.

Socially, the continent is riddled with myriads of social ills ranging from poverty, illiteracy, out of school children, armed robbery, kidnapping, cultism, drug abuse, human trafficking, prostitution, ritual murder, gender based violence such as rape, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, etc., as well as youth restiveness caused by massive unemployment which in turn ferments all forms of social ills and criminality¹.

Economically, though Africa boasts of abundant human and material resources, it is yet to develop these capacities to its advantage. This failure to take off economically is consequent upon many factors among which are: corruption, wrong economic policies, lack of political will to execute the proper economic policies, inability to harness the abundant human and natural resources, lack of investable capital, huge infrastructural deficit, defective foreign trade policies, improper motivation of its huge labour force which has led to massive brain drain and its weak taxation policies.

Some contemporary scholars, such as Ikegbu², Iwuagwu³, Ozoigbo⁴ and Enyimba⁵, have tried to proffer solutions to address these problems to save Africa from being the weeping continent. These scholarly recommendations have in no small measure enhanced some noticeable progress though the goal is yet to be achieved. It is on this note that this work brings on board John Stuart Mill's utilitarian philosophy of

¹ E.K. Iwuagwu, 'John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism: A Panacea to Nigeria's Socio-Political Quagmire,' *Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2021, p. 67.

² E.A. Ikegbu, 'African Socialism: Metaphors for Political Freedom and Economic Prosperity in the 21st Century,' *Journal of Integrative Humanism*, vol.3, no. 1, 2013, pp. 37-50.

³ E.K. Iwuagwu, 'Employing the Principles of Subsidiarity and Participation as Veritable Catalyst for Africa's Socio-Political and Economic Development,' *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Science*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2016, pp. 138-151.

⁴ B.I. Ozoigbo, 'African Theories of Development and the Reality of Underdevelopment,' *International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability*, vol. 4, no. 4, 2016, pp. 12-19.

⁵ M. Enyimba, 'Sustainable-Inclusive Development Through Conversational Thinking: The Case for Africa-China Relations,' *Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1-20.

economics to serve as another catalyst to spur Africa's social and economic development. Mill's utilitarianism is a vibrant socio-ethical philosophy which assesses the success of any government based on its capacity to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of its citizens⁶. It is a people-centered philosophy that highlights the primary purpose of government which consists in securing the wellbeing of its citizens. In accord with Bentham's definition of utility Mill defines utilitarianism as:

the creed which accepts the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure⁷.

With the socio-ethical foundation of Africa reformed with the utilitarian mindset, the relevant aspects of J.S. Mill's philosophy of economics will then be introduced to spur economic growth.

Some contemporary scholars consider some classical economic theories as obsolete and only marginally relevant (if at all) in addressing our present day economic realities. The economic theories of great and influential economists such as Adam Smith, Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, J.S. Mill and others are unfairly put in this class. It is argued by this school of thought that the present economic realities enhanced by industrial revolution and mostly by globalization has rendered these classical economic theories ineffectual and redundant. This work disagrees with this line of thinking and rather holds that though some aspects of the classical economic theories may have been overcome by historical course of events and contemporary socio-economic realities, the classical economic theories continue to provide the foundation upon which present day political economy stands. Contemporary political economy still relies heavily on some classical economic theories. According to James Bonar, 'more has been left of John Stuart Mill the economist than John Stuart Mill the philosopher'⁸.

⁶ S. Nathanson, 'Editor's Introduction' to John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.

⁷ J.S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, New York, Floating Press, 2009, p. 14.

⁸ J. Bonar, 'The Economics of John Stuart Mill.' *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 19, no. 9, 1911, p. 718.

J.S. Mill's masterpiece, *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), not only became the 19th century English economics handbook but was also widely consulted across Europe for many years because it answered most questions in economics. Mill's economic views emphasizing the historical, social, and cultural factors that determine the level of productivity in a society have been ignored by many contemporary economists with dire consequences. According to Nathanson,

While Mill emphasizes the many political, social and cultural underpinnings of successful economies, later economic policy makers seem to have taken literally the equation of a market economy with a policy of "laissez-faire." This has led to the notion that all one has to do in order to produce a successful economy is to leave things alone. Mill would not have made that mistake, and his views on this and many other matters are still relevant to economics and economic policy-making⁹.

His views on economic matters are very rich resource materials for many economic, social and political problems which have remained pressing issues even in our own contemporary time. The twin perennial problems of creating productive economies and that of designing viable institutions to ensure a just distribution of the fruits of economic productivity addressed by Mill are still confronting our contemporary economic policy makers. The proper role of government in production and trade are still contentious issues in our time, so also are the socio-economic problems of poverty, poverty alleviation, just wages, access to capital, international trade and efficient taxation system¹⁰. These teething problems are still very much unresolved in Africa and are stalling its social and economic development.

Considering the fact that in his utilitarian project Mill approached socio-economic problems believing that social progress could only be made if people embrace the relevant facts and embrace correct and useful principles for evaluating institutions and policies, one cannot dismiss Mill's insight with a wave of hand. Mill, according to Nathanson,

combines an attempt to explain how economic systems work with a search for the right principles to use in evaluating economic and social policies. There is much to be learned from his discussion of particular problems, principles, and policies and

⁹ S. Nathanson, *op. cit.*, p. x.

¹⁰ S. Nathanson, *op. cit.*

from the methods that he uses for trying to understand social issues in a serious way¹¹.

This work believes that since there is a lot to learn from Mill's utilitarian philosophy of economics with regard to the many socio-economic challenges still confronting Africa, and with the widespread clamor for applying philosophical ideas to practical realities, the time is ripe for Mill's philosophical ideas to receive the attention it deserves especially in applying it to solving the problem of social and economic development of Africa.

This work being a research in philosophy is a qualitative research rather than a quantitative enterprise. It is rationalistic, speculative and normative in approach rather than empirical and descriptive. In its method of approach, the work also employs the philosophical tools of exposition, critical analysis, textual and contextual analysis and evaluation.

In conclusion the work agreed that though the present socio-economic realities confronting Africa may be very daunting, employing J.S. Mill's utilitarian philosophy of economics to address them will serve as a catalyst to spur social and economic development which Africa urgently needs to assure its match to greatness.

Africa's Social and Economic Backwardness: A cursory Look at its Contributory Factors and Suggested Remedies.

The issue of Africa's socio-economic underdevelopment has been a subject of discussion in many academic and nonacademic forums. Many contemporary scholars have identified some factors militating against Africa's social and economic development and also proffered some solutions. Gemedede decried Africa's backwardness with regard to human development and other measures of economic development caused by poor policy environment which cannot sustain economic growth. Such alien policies cannot translate into welfare improvements or sustainable development. He recommends a new socio-economic development approach/model that is informed by an African economic renaissance paradigm¹². Iwuagwu E. K. identified over-centralization as a major cog in the wheel of Africa's social and economic development. He recommends subsidiarity and participation at all levels of governance as a major catalyst to Africa's development¹³. For Ozoigbo, the problem is dependence index. He warned that no country or continent ever developed by majorly

¹¹ S. Nathanson, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

¹² V. Gumedede, 'Towards a Better Socio-Economic Development Approach for African Renewal,' *Africa Insight*, vol. 46, no. 1, 2016, pp. 89-105.

¹³ E.K. Iwuagwu, *op. cit.*, 2016, pp. 138-151.

depending on others. He insists that the key to development is real 'independence'¹⁴. Amtaika's *Socio-Economic Development in Africa: Challenges and Dimensions* (a collection of essays that discussed the historical, political, social and economic ramifications of development policies in Africa) blamed unfriendly policies for Africa's woes and recommends policies that consider the African peculiarities¹⁵. Igwe, P. et al explored five main factors affecting investment and productivity in Africa as: education of the labour force, access to infrastructure, access to finance, size of firms and business climate variables such as insecurity, bribery and corruption, ease of doing business and poor power availability¹⁶. Verter investigates the dynamics of trade in food products and food security in Nigeria, the giant of Africa, he reveals adverse trade imbalance between her imports and exports. He identifies the causes of the country's food insecurity and inadequate production capacity as: infrastructural deficit, population growth, poverty, corruption, insecurity and inadequate government support to farmers¹⁷. Ferreira and Steenkamp blamed Africa's socio-economic woes on poor regional trade integration among African countries caused by high trade cost, poor infrastructure and insufficient market information. They insist that enhanced trade has the potential to drive Africa's development through greater productivity, industrialization, innovation and job creation¹⁸. Enyimba identifies the challenges militating against Africa's development in the dearth of constructive and balanced relationships. He recommends using the conversational technique in forging a development that is constructive¹⁹. Ikegbu, E. et al blamed Africa's stagnation on poor leadership, inappropriate policies and pursuit of personal drives. They argued that leadership ineptitude, political and financial rascality, corruption and high-level ethnic and religious profligacy are obstacles to Africa's social and economic development²⁰.

¹⁴ B.I. Ozoigbo, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ A. Amtaika, *Socio-Economic Development in Africa: Challenges and Dimensions*, Austin Texas, Pan African University Press, 2017.

¹⁶ P. Igwe, P. Amaugo, A. Ogundana, O. Egere, and J. Anigbo, 'Factors Affecting the Investment Climate, SMEs Productivity and Entrepreneurship in Nigeria,' *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, vol. 7 no. 1, 2018, pp. 182-200.

¹⁷ N. Verter, 'Food Security and Trade in Food Products in Nigeria,' *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2019, pp. 527-542.

¹⁸ L. Ferreira and E. Steenkamp, 'Promoting Sustainable and Inclusive Trade by Exploring Untapped Intra-regional Trade Opportunities in Africa,' *Africa Insight*, vol. 49, no. 4, 2020, pp. 72-87.

¹⁹ M. Enyimba, *op. cit.*

²⁰ E.A. Ikegbu, G.C.S. Iwuchukwu, S.A. Ekanem, and C.K. Ariche, 'Poverty Leadership, Coronavirus and Sustainable Development in Nigeria,' *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, vol. 9, no. 4, 2020, pp. 351-363.

From the above background it can be said that the factors militating against Africa's Social and economic development include poor production output consequent upon unmotivated labour force, infrastructural deficit, poor and unfriendly socio-economic policies, corruption, insecurity, over-centralization and lack of political will to implement viable policies. Other factors include inadequate investable capital to drive growth. This is seen in lack of modern machinery in agriculture and other industrial equipments, inadequate finance to establish large scale business outfits and stringent conditions in accessing credit facilities. Finally, there is imbalance in trade resulting in huge trade deficit because of excessive importation without commensurate export capacity.

Some of these issues are what this work wants to address employing J.S. Mill's utilitarian philosophy of economics. With his principle of utility providing the social background, Mill's views on production, labour, capital and international trade will be applied in finding a solution to Africa's social and economic underdevelopment.

Background of Mill's Utilitarian Philosophy of Economics and its Significance to Social, Political and Economic Reforms

The nineteenth century British social philosophy witnessed a continuity of empiricism in two new significant phases namely: philosophical radicalism championed by Jeremy Bentham and Benthamism as modified and developed by J.S. Mill. These two new phases fall under utilitarianism. Hence utilitarianism is considered the first phase of nineteenth century empiricism²¹. Utilitarianism as championed by Bentham and James Mill though individualistic in outlook is aimed at the welfare of the society.

Adam Smith's classical and encyclopedic masterpiece *Wealth of Nations* (1776) bequeathed to the nineteenth century British utilitarians a new discipline of political economy. In this work Smith viewed 'the obvious and simple system of natural liberty' as the best guide to social policy. For him, that system is the base for achieving the wealth of the nations. He also identified the expansion of that wealth with the general prosperity of the population at large²². The utilitarians bought this idea of Smith and brought into it a more sharply defined principle of justice: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The utilitarians were impressed by Smith's system of natural liberty which met their standard. Consequently a system of *laissez-faire* capitalism brought about by the

²¹ F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy. Volume VIII: Modern Philosophy*, New York, Doubleday, 1994.

²² A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976. pp. 687-688, 696.

progress of liberty and built on free markets, private property and the wage relationship serves the utilitarian purpose of giving happiness to the majority.

Though this classical liberal position pervaded much of the early nineteenth century utilitarianism, J.S. Mill developed a set of increasingly radical themes based on an egalitarian psychology. These themes include: land reforms, the extension of the franchise, restrictions on inheritance, access to education, granting of civil rights to minorities, blacks and women and most importantly the possibility of reorganizing production in cooperative enterprises²³. All these reforms are aimed at sharing the benefits of increasing productivity more widely. Mill was convinced that *laissez-faire* capitalism is only transitory and that the economy that will replace it will both expand its material base as well as make possible meaningful personal growth for the largest share of the population²⁴.

Mill grew up in an environment in which social reform and the utilitarian ethic of Jeremy Bentham were pervasive influences. His father James Mill was a diehard promoter of Benthamism, an idea which he and Bentham tried to apply in every facet of life, be it in legal, social, political or economic issues²⁵. The basic idea of Benthamism as a utilitarian philosophy is that the goal of all social, political or individual actions or decisions should be the promotion of the greatest amount of happiness or wellbeing. Hence all government or individual actions, laws and policies are adjudged right or wrong based on its tendency to promote the greatest happiness²⁶. This basic idea was what spurred Bentham, James Mill and other utilitarians to seek radical reforms in the laws and practices of their time in order to enhance social and economic wellbeing of their citizens.

John Stuart Mill may have revised some of the views of Bentham and his father on how social and political reforms could best be achieved, all the same he remained faithful to the basic project of utilitarianism and distinguished himself as an astute promoter of social, political and economic reforms geared towards the betterment of people's lives and their utmost happiness. Hence Mill's utmost goal in all his writings was the utilitarian goal of bringing about what Bentham called 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.'

²³ J. Persky, *The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 4.

²⁴ J. Persky, *op. cit.*

²⁵ J.S. Mill, *Autobiography*. Edited with an Introduction by John M. Robson, New York, Penguin Books, 1989.

²⁶ J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Kitchene, Batoche Books, 2000.

Mill's Philosophy of Economics

In his philosophy of economics J. S. Mill is in the same class with Adam Smith, David Ricardo and other classical economists. Mill's Philosophy of Economics was very influential in shaping the economic policies in England of his time. His enormous contributions to the quantity theory are still very relevant. For Mill economics is an inexact and separate science which employs the deductive method in its analysis²⁷. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* combined the disciplines of philosophy and economics and advocated that population limits and slow economic growth would be beneficial to the environment and increase public goods²⁸. His work when viewed within the context of his agitation for social and economic progress is considered one of the most important contributions made by classical economists. Mill, according to Rudi Verburg,

characterized his economics with his theory of (individual) development, which explained how people could be induced to change patterns of behavior that prevented progress, enabling a 'tendency towards a better and happier state'. Mapping out how to overcome man's material and moral improvement, Mill brought economics into action as an instrument for progress²⁹.

Mill strongly advocated for the use of philosophical thought and economic theory to influence political decision making. He expanded the ideas of Adam Smith and Ricardo, developing the ideas of economies of scale, opportunity cost and comparative advantage in trade. Mill divided the main body of this his *magnum opus* into five 'books' which treated the following topics: production, distribution, exchange, influence of the progress of society on production and distribution and the influence of government.

Among the many areas Mill philosophy of economics dwelt on which will be beneficial to our subject of discussion include: production, capital and international trade.

John Stuart Mill on Production

Mill regards production as very central and crucial to economics. For him production has two arms: labour and appropriate natural objects. Mill

²⁷ D.M. Hausman, 'John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Economics,' *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 48, no. 3, 1981, pp. 363-385.

²⁸ J. Kagan, *John Stuart Mill*, Investopedia, 2019.

²⁹ R. Verburg, 'John Stuart Mill's Political Economy: Educational Means to Moral Progress,' *Review of Social Economy*, vol.64, no. 2, 2006, p. 225.

argued that every economic theory or assertion is aimed at increasing productivity so as to better the lives of the people. For him the provisions of nature are enormous but man must labour to utilize these vast resources provided by nature to his benefit. For Mill, ‘Labour is either bodily or mental; or, to express the distinction more comprehensively, either muscular or nervous’³⁰ He used an array of imagery to demonstrate how human labour and ingenuity enhances production of valuable goods: from the sewing of cloth to the turning of wheels and the creation of steam³¹.

Mill argued that without adequate labour, productivity would be difficult to ascertain. It is Mills’ argument that there can be no development without sufficient labour. For every product utilized by man there are chains of production where different types of labour are employed. Hence, though the labour of the plowman who prepared the ground for planting of the seed may be considered minimal in the production of the bread, it is very significant in the value chain of production.

For Mill there are productive and unproductive labours. While productive labours enhance productivity for the good of man, unproductive labours hinders productivity and are mostly detrimental to humanity because it does not promote the common good³². Mill regards anyone who contributes nothing directly or indirectly to production as an unproductive consumer.

Mill also acknowledged the necessity of the second requisite of production, appropriate natural agents without which labour will be nonexistent or inconsequential. Hence, man is surrounded by abundant natural resources consisting of land, trees, shelters, water, animals, fishes, and numerous forms of natural resources as well as natural strength and skills to exploit the generous gifts of nature³³.

John Stuart Mill on Capital

In his discussion on economic and social development J.S. Mill argued that apart from the primary and universal requisites of production, labour and natural agents, there is another crucial element which is capital. Of this Mill says,

there is another requisite without which no productive operations, beyond the rude and scanty beginnings of primitive industry, are possible:

³⁰ J.S Mill, *Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy*, Ed. S. Nathanson, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2004, p, 19.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

³² *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

³³ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

namely, a stock, previously accumulated, of the products of former labour. This accumulated stock of the produce of labour is termed Capital...What capital does for production is to afford the shelter, protection, tools, and materials which the work requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the labourers during the process³⁴.

Mills argued that the distinction between Capital and Not-capital does not lie in the kind of commodities involved, but in the mind of the capitalist, that is to say, in the capitalists' will to employ them for one purpose rather than another and all property, however, ill adapted in itself for the use of labourers is a part of capital³⁵.

Capital like labor is very indispensable in every production process. Though labour is fundamental to production but without capital labour cannot be employed. Capital makes possible the provision of shelter, protection, tools, and materials which the work requires as well as to feed and maintain the labourers during the production process. Hence one can infer from the above that building up capital, avoidance of wastages of capital and proper reinvestment of capital is key to every economic growth.

According to Fawcett, since the labourer must be fed by previously accumulated food, some of the results of past labours are required to be set aside to sustain the labourers while producing. Capital is not confined to the food which feeds the labourers but includes machinery, buildings and in fact every product due to man's labour which can be applied to assist his industry³⁶.

Henry George corroborates this view of capital by regarding it as that part of man's stock which he expects to yield him revenue³⁷. Thus capital consists of that part of man's or an entrepreneur's possession; whatever it might be which he desire to employ in carrying on fresh production.

Mill further distinguished between Circulating and Fixed Capitals. While circulating capitals are those capitals that are used once and cannot be repeated such as materials used during production, wages and capitals consumed by the producer, fixed capitals 'consists of instruments of production of a more or less permanent character....To this class belong buildings, machinery, and all or most things known by the name of implements or tools'³⁸.

³⁴ J. S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

³⁶ P. Fawcett, *Manual of Political Economy*, London, Marshall, 1993, p. 11.

³⁷ H. George, *Progress and Poverty*, New York, Knox Publishers, 2009, p. 41.

³⁸ J. S. Mill, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 34.

With his utilitarian background Mill recommends that the welfare of the workers must never be sacrificed in the name of expanding production. Hence fixed and circulating capitals must be proportionally increased to avoid industrial unrest and promote economic growth.

John Stuart Mill on International Trade

J.S. Mill disagreed with that aspect of David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, which states that the gains of trade are evenly distributed. For Mill international trade benefits the country whose demand for goods is most elastic. He criticized the kind of international trade which serves as an instrument of exploitation of the weaker economies by the stronger ones.

In this regard he propounded his theory of reciprocal demand or the law of international values to argue what actually determines the equilibrium terms of trade. For him a stable ratio of exchange will be determined at a level where the value of imports and exports of each country is in equilibrium³⁹. Mill's theory provided the actual determination of equilibrium terms of trade which are determined by the equation of reciprocal demand. By reciprocal demand Mill means the relative strength and elasticity of demand of the two trading countries for each other's products in terms of their own product. Mill believes that the actual ratio at which goods are traded will depend on the strength and elasticity of each country's demand for the other country's product, or upon reciprocal demand. The ratio will be stable when the value of each country's export is just enough to pay for its import⁴⁰. He holds that a country that dwells wholly on importation of goods and services will definitely enter into financial crisis and end up in debt.

According to Mill there are some things that are physically impossible to produce in certain geographical locations because of some particular natural circumstances of climate. There are also many things which though they could be produced at home without difficulty and in any quantity are yet imported from a distance. This may be explained by the huge cost of producing them at home which makes it cheaper to import them than to produce them. Hence Mill encourages nations to concentrate on the production of things where they have comparative advantage both for their internal use and for exports while they should import items that can be produced at home at a higher cost.

While Mill encouraged international trade, he argued that it could be used as a means of exploitation where the more advantaged countries

³⁹ P. Choudhary, *Mill's Theory of Reciprocal Demand: Formula, Graphs and Criticism*, 2021, www.microeconomicsnotes.com.

⁴⁰ J.S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*

suppress and marginalize the less advantaged ones. He warned against its being hijacked by the capitalist in their agenda to continually render the smaller and developing countries financially dependent. The disadvantages of international trade notwithstanding Mill argued for other benefits of it which among other things includes: a country obtaining things which it either could not have produced at all, or which it must have produced at a greater expense; consumers buying items at a cheaper price because of reduced cost of production; spurring untapped productive capacities of countries whose goods are in high demand in the international market which may have remained dormant if not for trade, etc.⁴¹

Mill and the other classical liberals bought into *laissez-faire* capitalism, a mode of production which permits private firms to hire workers in a labour market and seek profit both domestically and internationally in largely unregulated markets. It is believed that Mill's conviction that the *laissez-faire* capitalism of his day, while playing an immensely useful role in spurring accumulation, would ultimately be replaced by an economy built on a more cooperative base⁴². For Mill, *laissez-faire* capitalism was only an efficient and necessary stage. He anticipated that the economy was moving toward a state capable of supporting a far more egalitarian society which will achieve the utilitarian goal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This stage, Mill argued, can only be achieved by the collective effort of all to push for fundamental institutional reforms.

Employing Mill's Utilitarian Philosophy of Economics as a Catalyst to Africa's Social and Economic Development

As has been identified above, among the myriads of the socio-economic problems militating against Africa's social and economic development include: poor production output consequent upon unmotivated labour force, infrastructural deficit, poor and unfriendly socio-economic policies, corruption, insecurity, over-centralization and lack of political will to implement viable policies. Other factors include inadequate investable capital to drive growth as well as stringent conditions in accessing credit facilities. Finally, there is imbalance in trade resulting in huge trade deficit because of excessive importation without commensurate export capacity. This work believes that with J.S. Mill's utilitarian mindset driving the socio-ethical, political and economic life of Africa, it will be spurred towards sustainable social and economic development.

⁴¹ J. S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-175.

⁴² J. Persky, *op. cit.*

With regard to Mill's view production, it is true that Africa is blessed with abundant natural resources and a huge population, its productive capacity is below average in world ranking because of inadequate human capital development, poor infrastructure, unmotivated workforce and insufficient capital base. For J.S. Mill, the gifts of nature must be tapped through labour to provide for human needs⁴³. To enhance productivity, African economies must invest on human capital development to produce skilled productive labour force instead of unemployable and non-productive graduates. The workers must be well motivated to increase productivity and to put a halt to the massive brain drain that is been witnessed currently through emigration to Western countries in search of greener pasture. To enhance productivity there must be infrastructural upgrade through provision of constant power supply, good roads, modern industrial equipments and agricultural machinery, improved service delivery and good transportation facilities. Labour which is key to production can also be improved by providing adequate security to the workforce which is lacking in so many African countries because the activities of bandits, terrorists, kidnappers and armed robbers. Security is key to any meaningful economic development. As Iwuagwu observed, insecurity 'is a great deterrent to any serious investor because no investor will stake his hard earned money where his business will go up in flames at the least provocation'⁴⁴. If African countries will pay particular attention to its labour force through the measures highlighted above, there will be a massive growth in productivity which will in turn spur economic growth.

With regard to capital, J.S. Mill did acknowledge that labour will achieve very little without investable capital. Most African economies lack strong capital base that can enable them drive economic growth. According to Mill capital consists of accumulated stock of the products of previous labour which will be invested to promote future production⁴⁵. Most African economies can be regarded as consumerist economies with recurrent expenditures far surpassing capital expenditures. Hence with most of the fruits of its low production consumed, its stock of investable capital cannot provide what is needed to drive economic growth. African economies must heed Mill's advice and avoid unproductive labour which hinders economic growth. This can be done by avoiding wastages through corruption and unnecessary pleasure expenses which drain investable capital rather than increase it. African countries must exercise fiscal discipline and learn to reinvest the products of previous labour and the

⁴³ J.S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁴⁴ E.K. Iwuagwu, 'Nigeria's Ethno-Religious Crises and its Socio-Political and Economic Underdevelopment', *Cogito*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2022, p. 130.

⁴⁵ J.S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

enormous natural resources in human capital development, development of critical infrastructure, provision of adequate security, provision of 'fixed capitals', and proper remuneration of its abundant human resources. None of the above can be achieved in an atmosphere of financial rascality. With solid capital base, African economies can provide the enabling environment as well as credit facilities to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), human capital development and proper remuneration of its workforce.

Another driver of economic growth discussed by J.S. Mill is strong presence and ability to compete in the international market through international trade. African countries do not compete strongly in foreign trade because of its very low productive capacity in industrial goods. Most African countries are suppliers of raw materials in the international market. These natural products include: crude oil, unrefined gold, diamond, copper, zinc, and unprocessed agricultural products such as cocoa, palm oil, coffee, cassava, pharmaceutical raw materials, etc. The unfortunate thing is that in most instances the prices of these products are not determined by the sellers but by the buyers. The developed economies will afterwards refine or process these products and then sale them back to the Africans at their own exorbitant prices. This brings about an unacceptable imbalance in trade relations which leaves the African economies exploited.

J.S. Mill, though a strong advocate of international trade which he says benefits the country whose demands for goods is more elastic, frowned at the use of international trade as an instrument of exploitation of the weaker economies. This is why he propounded his theory of reciprocal demand or law of international values to establish what should actually determine the equilibrium terms of trade. Mill holds that a stable ratio of exchange will be determined when the value of imports and exports of each country is in equilibrium.

In line with Mill's theory of reciprocal demand, African countries and their trade partners should maintain a good ratio of import and export in their trade relation. The movement of goods should be a two-way process between the trading partners. The situation whereby mighty ships and cargo planes regularly deliver millions of tons of goods to African countries while returning to Europe, America and Asia empty or stuffed with sand in order not to be swept off by ocean waves is unacceptable. The situation where processed and completed goods are imported to Africa while only raw materials and unfinished products are exported does not portray any equilibrium in trade. A sad example of this imbalance in trade is seen in Nigeria's foreign trade between January 2017 and March 2021 where it imported manufactured goods worth 40.94 trillion Naira while exporting

goods worth a meager 4 trillion Naira⁴⁶. Surely it is because of this kind of unjust and exploitative imbalance in trade that Mill rejected Ricardo's view that the gains of trade are evenly distributed. African countries should strongly advocate for a fair value of their goods at the international market and not allow the importers to determine the prices.

In line with the law of comparative advantage which Mill accepted, African countries, with their abundant material and human resources, should insist on the refining and processing of their raw materials in Africa where it will be cheaper to do so. As Mill stated that there will be economic prosperity and less labour if goods are produced where there is the greatest absolute facility for its production⁴⁷, African countries with their huge population and natural resources only need infrastructure and machinery to produce most of the goods they are currently importing. To avoid the enormous task of transporting cargoes of raw materials to Europe, America and Asia to be refined and processed, and thereafter transporting them back to Africa, what Africa needs is to site these processing or refining industries where these raw materials are located. If this is done, with the teeming population at hand providing cheap labour, Africa will surely pick up. Doing so will improve Africa's production capacity in industrial goods and minimize its avoidable excessive imports.

African economies should also explore untapped intra-regional trade opportunities that exist among themselves, as suggested by Ferreira and Steenkamp, which can drive economic growth through greater productivity, industrialization, innovation and job creation rather than depending on the Western world to do business with⁴⁸. This can be facilitated by infrastructural upgrade, improving the ease of doing business and providing adequate market information. African regional trade bodies such as: African Economic Community (AEC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), East African Community (EAC), and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should be encouraged to promote free movement of goods and services among member states without difficulty. Also African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) created in 2018 by the African Continental Free Trade Agreement among 54 members of the African Union should be fully implemented. This agreement will create a single continent-wide market for goods and services and promote free movement of capital and labour. It will eliminate tariffs on intra-African

⁴⁶ Punch Newspaper, *Manufactured Imports Rise to N40.94tn, Nigeria Exports N4tn Goods*, 13th July, 2021.

⁴⁷ J.S. Mill, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁴⁸ L. Ferreira and E. Steenkamp, *op. cit.*

trade as well as eliminate non-tariff obstacles to trade. According to Lin, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that this agreement if fully implemented will boost intra-Africa trade by 52.3% once import duties and non-tariff barriers are eliminated⁴⁹.

The AFCFTA agreement is in line with J.S. Mill's soft and conditional approval of *laissez-faire* trade relations among nations as well as his believe in free trade or open market economy. Mill rejected over-regulation of the economy and believes in deregulation of some aspects of the economy to promote public and private sector partnership in growing an economy. African countries should also key into the current trend in contemporary economic drive which favors a deregulated market in order to promote private sector investment in an economy. African governments should encourage private sector participation by deregulation and privatization in order to boost a private sector driven economy as is witnessed in the developed economies where government involvement is very minimal.

Inasmuch as free market and deregulation are encouraged, member African countries should be discouraged from making their countries distribution channels or routes for imported goods from the West. The situation where African countries will import goods from Europe, America and Asia and then enjoy free movement and tariff-free sales of such goods to fellow African countries should be totally rejected or else Africa will become a dumping ground for foreign goods. Africans should also appreciate home-made goods and avoid crave for foreign goods and services⁵⁰. In approving deregulation of the economy the interest of the common man must also be put into consideration bearing in mind Mill's utilitarian project of providing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Deregulation and privatization should not lead to further exploitation and impoverishment of the ordinary citizen and the unjust maximization of profit by the capitalist which is against Mill's intention.

To enhance sustainable economic growth through international trade, which is highly recommended by J.S. Mill, African countries must invest massively in infrastructural development especially in the areas of transportation and communication as well improved security by sea, land and air. There should be in place a good road network, efficient railway system, safe maritime system, efficient port system that enables speedy clearance of goods, efficient immigration services, efficient digital banking

⁴⁹ M. Lin, 'The benefits of the AFCFTA for the African Economy', 2021, <http://borgenproject.org/the-afcfta>

⁵⁰ E.K. Iwuagwu, 'Socio-Cultural Globalization and the Death of African Socio-Cultural Values and Identity,' *European journal of Scientific Research*, vol. 126, no. 3, 2014, pp. 321-330.

system, functional communication infrastructures and functional passenger and cargo airports. All these will facilitate the free and less cumbersome movement of goods and services across Africa and also promote trade and investment.

In addition to the provision of the much needed critical infrastructure in Africa to enhance international trade, there should be adequate training of personnel, removal of unnecessary duties and tariffs, improving the ease of doing business and minimizing corruption. With adequate provision of infrastructure, human capital development and elimination of other barriers identified above, Africa will overcome its import-dependent status and achieve a commendable ratio in its import and export balance. This will in turn enhance productivity, grow the capital base of its economies, halt brain drain of workers and create economic prosperity for all, thereby fulfilling the utilitarian project of providing the greatest happiness for the greater number of citizens.

Conclusion

The driving force behind J.S. Mill's lifelong project of social, political and economic reforms is the principle of utility as is expounded in his own version of utilitarianism. According to him, 'the creed which accepts the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness'⁵¹. J.S. Mill together with Jeremy Bentham and his father James Mill bought the idea of Adam Smith who identified the expansion of the wealth of the nations with the general prosperity of the population at large and infused into it a more sharply defined principle of justice: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Hence at the heart of the utilitarian philosophy is that the goal of every social, economic, political or individual action or decisions should be the promotion of the greatest amount of happiness or wellbeing. Consequently all individual or government actions, laws and policies are adjudged right or wrong based on its tendency to promote the greatest happiness⁵².

Considering the undeniable significant of J.S. Mill's philosophy of economics which is the greatest expression of his utilitarian project and considering the poor state of Africa's social and economic development, this work has argued that employing some relevant aspects of Mill's philosophy of economics will go a long way in improving Africa's social and economic development. The work agreeing with Mill's views on production, labour, capital and international trade holds that increased

⁵¹ J.S. Mill, *op. cit.*, 2009, p. 14.

⁵² E.K. Iwuagwu, *op. cit.*, 2021, p. 78.

productive capacity, motivated labor force, solid capital base and vibrant international trade arrangement will greatly enhance sustainable social and economic development of Africa. This, the work argues, can come about through human capital development, provision of the critical infrastructure, improved security, removal of unnecessary barriers militating against a vibrant intra-regional trade, easy access to credit facilities, improved ease of doing business, minimization of corruption and implementation of viable economic policies.

In conclusion the work maintains that if Mill's utilitarian philosophy of economics is employed in addressing the deficiencies identified as militating against Africa's socio-economic growth, sustainable social and economic development of Africa will be a reality and Mill's utilitarian goal of bringing about the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be achieved.

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ENVIRONMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF DEHUMANIZED FUTURE

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Abstract: *The imposing faces of contemporary human values in relations to the sustained ontological and cosmological contents of global eco-stewardship, project clear and indispensable needs for ethical regulations of human actions in our scientifically and technologically driven world. That we need the courses of eco-stewardship is clear to all due to the increasing rate of environmental pollution and degradation to the detriment of the future of the human persons. As first imperative, the human person needs to reflect on the effects of an increasing military and nuclear engagements and explorations and the emerging robotic and trans-humanistic anthropology through the employment of trans-biology, trans-humanistic technology and all forms of artificial intelligence. It projects the philosophy of living that contemporary human persons must thus reject the idea of “negation of the world” and become “world affirmers of values”, understanding that ethics requires the solution of our problems in “here and now” by adopting the courses of global eco-stewardship as foundational consciousness and value for achieving integral humanism. Employing phenomenological method of analysis, the essay concludes that the tasks for the care of the environment by every individual, civil society or government should be intensified in monitoring human actions for the sake of saving the human person from self-annihilation, self-alienation, and possible self-extinction.*

Keywords: *Human Persons, Human Actions, Eco-Stewardship, Environment, Integral Humanism, Lived Experiences*

Introduction

The existential and pragmatic conceptualization of human lived experiences from the Buddhist philosophical assertion: “If you want to

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know the past (cause), look at your present life (effect). If you want to know the future (effect), look at your present (cause)” shows the some level of indispensable relations and commonness of the human persons with their responsive actions in achieving integral humanism, especially in most of our contemporary societies that have been beclouded with conflicting moral and developmental interests and ideologies.¹ The human actions fashion histories from the epistemological, socio-morphological, political and religious organizations and valuations of lived experiences, and then direct the societal values of socialization and the general consciousness for development. It is through human actions that the values of the environment which houses the human persons are determined.

The sociological and theological/religious concerns for global institutionalization of eco-stewardship are indispensably linked with the cosmological creative and innovative valuations of the human persons in the midst of global ecological crises and exploitation. As we will agree with Jude Onebunne and Success Ikechukwu, we existentially recognised that; “the world is on the brink of an unprecedented growth-related ecological crisis that threatens the sustainability of the human person and the society. An ecological crisis occurs when changes to the environment of a species or population destabilizes its continued survival and existence. The human person engages in different activities to the detriment of his or her environment which in return endangers his or her life”². These concerns of development demand the potent exercises of the power of human self-participation and self-dynamism to be expressed in true and authentic freedom, in realising global order and justice; otherwise, there will be global alienation, subjugation and suppression of the human person due to environmental-health endemics, pandemics and disasters.

Hence, the range of development associated with environmental pollution and degradation is leading to climate change, global warming, species extinction, and radical life threatening on the earth.³ Therefore, there are needs to reevaluate environmental values in relationship with the human values and freedom in order to overcome these environmental fallouts.⁴ This concerns the operation of global eco-solidarity as a collective

¹ Cf, P.O. Isanbor, Ensuring Integral Ecological Sustainability for Integral Human Development in Francis’ Laudato Si. *Nigerian Journal of Religion and Society*, 10, 2020, p. 117.

² J.I. Onebunne and S. Ikechukwu, “African Ecological Crisis and Education.” In I. A. Kanu (ed). *African Eco-Philosophy: Cosmology, Consciousness and the Environment*. Maryland: APAS, 2021, p. 233.

³ See, J.I. Onebunne and S. Ikechukwu, “African Ecological Crisis and Education”, pp. 233-234.

⁴ See, G.T. Miller and S. Spoolman, *Environmental Science: Problems, Concepts and Solutions*. 12th Edition. Belmont: Cengage Learning, 2008, p. 15.

action for common survival, and as what Pope John Paul II referred to as the exercises of the morality of human *beingness* of the wholeness of creation as the “personalism of truth” through active consciousness for transcendental values; for Pope Benedict XVI as the proper contextualization of the *Mission of Theology* in “charity in truth” for integral humanism; and currently, for Pope Francis as the “integral ecology of consciences” through global consciousness of the environment as a common home and heritage.⁵

In addition, with some sense of contemporary fading values for common living and sustenance, “the defence of life is a problem of pressing relevance, if one considers the constant aggression on life that we witness today. Life about to be born (abortion), life that is already consolidated (violence, terrorism, war), life that is on the decline (euthanasia), one immediately appreciates that we are dealing with a subject of utmost importance.”⁶ In actual sense, no society develops beyond what it can offer to itself, for development is the recognition of one’s capability and capacity to change his or her world through the creation and utilization of knowledge and the projection of global closeness with some loss of values of the human person as a subject of lived experiences. For “globalization is not only part of nature; it is the mode of being for human beings. It expresses our internal state. In an ontological sense, it is the category of our expressive existentiality. It is the name we give to the invisible force that is propelling reality forward with incredible velocity.”⁷ Outside this consideration of development, the human persons are bound to live in a conflicting and chaotic society, worst still, an exploited and deteriorated environment with a high risk for the loss of the sense of integral humanism.

As contemporarily observed, with global trending nature of consumerist and hedonistic development, “we are becoming ever more consumes of the dangers and antagonisms that arise when technological and economic processes are left to their own nature, laws and our political and social control systems break down: dying cities, ruined environments, population explosions, chaotic information channels, an increasingly aggressive and vicious intensification of the North-South conflict, leading possibly to a new outcome of the East-West power struggle, and so on.”⁸ We are being driven to the absorption of some particularistic moralities

⁵ Cf, P.O. Isanbor, 2020, p. 118.

⁶ M. Monge, *Ethical Practices in Health and Disease*. Manila: Sinag-Tala, 1994, p. 45, as quoted in P. Iroegbu, “What is Life: Body, Mind and Soul?” In P. Iroegbu and A. Echekwube (eds.). *Kpim of Morality*. Ibadan: Heinemann, 2005, p. 437.

⁷ J.N. Agbo, “Is globalisation a process or a product?” In A. B.C. Chiegboka, et al. (eds.). *The Humanities and Globalization in the Third Millennium*. Nigeria: Rex Charles & Patrick, 2010, p. 36.

⁸ J.B. Metz, *Faith in history and society*. New York: The Seabury, 1980, p. 100.

under the guise of common human socialization and civilization of values and interests, away from the universalistic conception of the human person as a subject of morality. All struggles of particularistic relevance are leading to the rat-race possession of the less available healthy and safe environment by the powerful and more influential who call it their own home, to the detriment of poorest of the society who originally possess it.

Contemporary Framework of Integral Humanism in the Fate of Environmental Fallouts

Contemporarily recognised, the care of any reality is mainly dependent on the socio-cultural sentiments and language used in qualifying or classifying its values in the midst of other realities and its currencies of integral humanism.⁹ For instance, the use of language in expressing human values may be limited or utopic, opaque or obscure, but the intentional meaning of the language by the expressor remains reasonable and purposeful, and then, the knowledge of the human person. This is because, it is the human persons that need to qualify or classify themselves, especially as beings of development and as a subject of lived experiences. With modern drive for development, the use of language differentiates the “what-ness of meaning” from the “worth-ness of meaning” through human new scientific and technological capacities and resources.

What then is integral humanism? It is existentially about the development of the human person in the wholeness of his or her created values (that is the wholeness of his or her ontological and cosmological values in all human and societal developmental affairs and policies), in referencing to his or her transcendental ending.¹⁰ The philosophy of integral humanism in relation of the environment becomes an existential progressive rendition of hope and care for better human and non-human future (recurring the principle of intergenerational equity) and for the safety of the whole world through proper and responsible environmental friendliness. It is envisaged, only, on the indispensable existence of the human family, through the embrace of faith and reason. It is meant for the environmental to be safeguarded by the application of the inseparability of the fundamental relevance of faith and reason. Therefore, it projects the social embraces of the ethics of integral human development which

⁹ Cf, Peter Egbe, “Harnessing our Resources for the Formation of Seminarians to the Priesthood in the Post –Modern Age.” In G. Ogbenika and F. Ikhianosime (eds). *Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century*. Ekpoma: SAS/Floreat System, Benin City, 2021, p. 149.

¹⁰ See, Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009, no. 21.

demands that the human family must be conscious to safeguard and protect her very self in relation to the environment.

From all indications, away from the global consciousness of integral humanism, “there is also the danger of the loss of one’s individual identity, the danger of getting submerged in the anonymity of the crowd being pulled along by the force of globalization.” This social and organisational pull of interests make the human person to be lost in the valleys of relativistic and hedonistic values, where the human persons are objects of anything the society throws at them. Hence, the result of such development is in-authenticity, where the human persons as subjects of lived experiences and as developers of history who have allowed what they produces to overpowered them, having lost their self-identity by submerging themselves into the anonymous crowd of globalization, begins to live an inauthentic life. The human persons is no longer themselves but a product of their own mechanised future, been driven away from ethics of conscience. The human persons are no longer the one living globally; rather, it is globalization living in them. They have become a globalization robot, and being carried along or throw around by imperialistic global values.¹¹ It is a culture of relativistic, consumerist and popularist globalism, a mechanised and computerised mentality of civilization and socialization, leading to robotic anthropology where the human essence will be greatly undermined, and the human creative and innovative ingenuity and intelligibility will be ethically un-regularised.

It is only in true freedom and reason through solidarity of interests and values can the intrinsic values of the environment as our common home and heritage be sustained, as it is based on the innate and immutable quality of the human person to sustain the courses of his or her existence in relation of common human living, that is, being-with-others.¹² With the indispensable nature of being-with-others in achieving integral and authentic development, “we urgent need a humanism capable of bringing together the different the different fields of knowledge, including economics, in the service of a more integral and integrating vision.”¹³

Nevertheless, globalization as a way of common societal development especially through the instrumentality of information and communication remains a product of human knowledge.¹⁴ It is developmental

¹¹ J. Omoregbe, *Social-Political Philosophy and International Relation*. Lagos: JERP, 2007, p. 156.

¹² Cf, Justin C. Anyarogbu, *Ibid*.

¹³ Pope Francis, *Laudato Si*, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015, no. 141.

¹⁴ Cf, F.O. Olatunji and P.O. Ujomu, Understanding Import of Knowledge in Rene Descartes’ Philosophy to Development Narratives for Africa. *Albertine Journal of Philosophy*, 5, 2021, pp. 1-2., H. Ugwu, “Trans-biology and Biospheric Modification.” In I.

consciousness resulting from human creative and innovative power, and it has become what we cannot avoid to influence us of what we do to ourselves and for ourselves through industrialization, commerce, medicine, tourism, security, socialization, education, transportation, information and communication especially. What are becoming of us are products of our knowledge and what our future will be are still products of our knowledge.¹⁵ The contemporary persons have the knowledge of some pragmatic ideologies hinged on scientific and technological prowess and efficiency to rule the world, but such knowledge can also destroy the same world when they are not ethically guided to promote the courses of integral humanism. With pragmatic ideologies to rule the world, “it is essential then, to forge a cultural paradigm through ‘a global pact on education for and with future generations, one that commits families, communities, schools, universities, institutions, religions, governments, and the entire human families to the training of mature men and women.’”¹⁶ Such sense of commitment demands that true freedom is being exercised by matured persons who know the values of common good and survival, for this is social and transcendental compact for the sustainability of the environment as a common home, and “that can promote education in integral ecology, according to a cultural model of peace, development and sustainability centred on fraternity and the covenant between human being and the environment”.¹⁷

As existentially recognised, no one sustains his or her life without reference to the values of the environment, and the humanness of the individual as an agent of development is known by the values he or she truly invests on the environment. For Pope Francis, “human beings too are creatures of this world, enjoying a right to life and happiness, and endowed with unique dignity. So we cannot fail to consider the effects on people’s lives of environmental deterioration, current models of development and the throwaway culture”¹⁸ These are contemporarily occasioned by the world of imposing demands for urbanization and industrialization that is under our watch of indifference and relativistic mentality, propelling the flames of individualism and populism, and recognising whatever interest such promote, one will necessarily imagine the present developmental dynamics that cannot serve by the wages of populism. But, we religiously look forward for the indispensable influences

A. Kanu (ed). *African Eco-Philosophy: Cosmology, Consciousness and the Environment*. USA, Maryland: APAS, 2021, p. 353.

¹⁵ Cf, P.O. Isanbor, 2021^a, p. 58.

¹⁶ Pope Francis, *Message for the World Day of Peace*, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2022, no. 3.

¹⁷ Pope Francis, *Message for the World Day of Peace*, no. 3.

¹⁸ Pope Francis, *Laudato Si*, no. 43.

of true growth and development engineered by the social and pragmatic values of integral humanism.¹⁹

In communal valuation of actions for the realization of integral humanism, it is not only one voice of choices and decisions that can be heard. It is about conversion of people- on a conversation of voices of trust and justice which are dependent on the values of common good and solidarity. It is a language that classifies or convenes the true meaning of human living over the spans of lived experiences, that is, the rationality of development based on the values of thinking of, knowing about and being conscious of the existence of oneself in relations to the other persons in the same environment that sustain them all. The contents of the language we use in expressing our values, existence and essence should determine the level of our development, for no one develops above or beyond his or her very self, and the such consciousness of ourselves shows the level of religiosity and relationship with our ourselves, our environment and our God.²⁰ For the knowledge of oneself leads to the knowledge of the other selves, and this indicates the level of one's thinking and creative ability, since, it shows the propensity of one's consciousness- self-dynamism, self-participation and self-responsibility, leading to one's values for his or her authenticity and subjectivity.

Integral Humanism and the Environment in Global Conflicting Values

Commonly considered, the environment refers to the conditions and circumstances surrounding and affecting a particular group of living creatures. From this conceptualization of the environment as conditions of living, we understand that the anthropology of development is always hinged on the values of human actions, and these are basically exercised on the same environment as a cosmological commodity. For instance, we understand that the drives to satisfy needs and make life more comfortable have been propelling widespread industrial development majorly in the urban areas of human habitations. These concerns are occasioning the emergent industries and urban cities been characterised with large human population and concentration of infrastructure in the urban centres, and all of these are constantly and heavily translating into too many environmental problems and challenges. These concerns for modern development have been informing our thinking, and projecting the

¹⁹ Peter Egbe, p. 159.

²⁰ See, Stan-Williams Ede, Thomistic Animus, Cartesian Cogito, and Neuroscience: Triplets of an Authentic Human Identity. *West African Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 8, 2005, pp. 15-32, cf, p. 30.

directedness of science and technology in the pursuit of materialistic-driven and lopsided development.²¹

Such consciousness of the environment projects the understanding of lived experiences that no human creative and innovation in advancing the society is outside the consideration of the human valued choices and actions.²² Conscious to the fact, each human person is to be certain of his or her actions and pride of place as the subject of development, and making the pragmatic statement of importance not to reduce his or her essence in the midst of technological advancements and breakthroughs in Artificial Intelligence researches, for they are themselves of intrinsic values the products of human' ingenuity and immanent intelligence.²³ What the individuals produced determined the content of the minds, and it suggests the directedness of our thinking. The same consciousness of the humanity informs the values of the environment. That which is very desirable for the attainment of integral humanism is the adequate and authentic ethical reflection on human scientific and technological engagements which should go in search of cogent, well-reasoned theories about the values of human person particularly in view of the radical steps forward made by bio-science and military engineering especially. Thereby, it is highly implausible that there would be an artificiality created life that would stimulate exactly the characteristics, mental qualities and uniqueness of the human person. In all, the human person must be self-assertive that 'he is' and that he or she is a person with a unique identity and not a mechanism.²⁴ As such, the social and ethical responsibilities in sustaining human culture, politics, economics and other aspects of development are informed by the currencies of environmental anthropology, a call for common environmental and global survival.

For we live in a world of conflicting values and interests, sometimes, away from the dictates of natural law and away from common human morality that define clearly our humanness.²⁵ These are commonly associated with actions that are supposed to promote and respect our *beingness* as persons with common authenticity and subjectivity, but we misplaced our common priority for common existence and happiness on the sanctuary of greed and selfishness. By the exercises of faith and reason, we long for the solution to the problems we caused by our very selves by

²¹ See, M.A. Izibili, "Environmental Ethics: An Urgent Imperative." In P. Iroegbu and A. Echekwube (eds.). *Kpim of Morality*. Ibadan: Heinemann Books, 2005, p. 388.

²² F. Nwaigbo, "Trinity and Ecology for a Sustainable Christian Community." In F. Nwaigbo, et al (eds). *Theology for Sustainable Ecology in Africa*. Port Harcourt: CIWA Publ., 2011.

²³ Cf, Stan-Williams Ede, p. 31.

²⁴ Cf, Stan-Williams Ede, p. 31.

²⁵ See, A.I. Kanu, 2021, p. xi.

mismanaging our freedom on the pavilion of misguided creativities and innovations. We long for the solution to the problems that seem to be endless due to the imposing global agitation for the right to the freedom to do anything our relativistic and hedonistic culture of development is presenting to us. We are at the mercies of our own doings as beings who love to be free with moral or ethical restraints and commitment that should exact some level of moral or ethical responsibilities on us for the purpose of sustaining the environment, and then sustaining our future generations.

Environment and the Longing for Common Survival

The thrust of lived experiences is hinged on the values of the peace or war or other forms of conflicts. Both happen on the environment. Individuals, peoples, communities, nations and states all over the world talk of the *Culture of Peace*, rather than the *Culture of War*.²⁶ For instances, Socrates, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and some other contemporary thinkers, like Douglas Roche, John Kusumalayam, John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Pope Francis, call for the *Culture of Peace* through the valuation of human life and relationship, especially for the respect for ecological justice, stewardship and solidarity. All these are in affirmation of the values of the subjectivity of the human person and an essential orientation towards communion with God and with another person.²⁷ They also reveal and advance the truth about the human person, freedom and the indispensability of the communion of persons. They generally call for the articulation of reasons for the emergence of society and the quest for the *Culture of Peace* for the sustainability of human existence.

From lived experiences, the human community readily knows what these new aspects of scientific and technological engagements are to the environment, in order to save itself from self-alienation, self-abnegation, and ultimately, from self-extinction.²⁸ The socio-philosophical conceptualization of the quests for global eco-solidarity demands the every individual sustains reasonably the love of oneself in relations to respect of public politics and social justice, to recognised that, “the political and economic projections for the possibilities of the *Culture of Peace* have been challenged by some imperialistic, hedonistic and consumerist

²⁶ See Maduabuchi Dukor, “National and World Peace: An Ethical Imperative for our Times.” In P. Iroegbu and A. Echekwube (eds.). *Kpim of Morality*. Ibadan: Heinemann Books, 2005, p. 156.

²⁷ See, Paul Oredipe, “Integral Humanism: An Ethical Challenge in Faith and Reason”, p. 63.

²⁸ A.I. Kanu, “Introduction: African Eco-Philosophy and the Environment.” In I. A. Kanu (ed). *African Eco-Philosophy: Cosmology, Consciousness and the Environment*. Maryland: APAS, 2021, p. x.

developmental cultures or policies. They are mainly hinged on the values of global conflicts and violence which have been generating the nefariousness of environmental pollution and degradation, and sustaining the fears of global warming and the rapidity of climate change....”²⁹ But, such conceptualization of human actions directs our consciousness at what values we have on ourselves as persons in relation to the wholeness of creation, and with the projections that, through our developmental values and ideologies based on the existential operation of love, trust, equity, justice and sincerity of purposes and common good, there have been some socio-political and religious longings for the *Culture of Peace* as against the *Culture of War*. These become very dominant in the minds of many people as they civilize along the values of science and technology which impose more fears of ecological crises rather than the courses of global eco-solidarity. This is a global concern breeding the culture of global disorderliness and disintegration as a result of some mismanagement of freedom and creativities.³⁰

Through the cosmological valuations of lived experiences, we were once a child in some period of our history before we became adults of circumstances. The products of adulthood are as a result of what we were as a child. So, such social consciousness for integral humanism demand that we must be truthful to what we give to our children in every generation we find ourselves. This is because, such sincerity of purpose in regard to the nature of the development we seek or desire must be the kind of disposition we have towards the recognition of the indispensable interconnectedness of generations. No generation is an isolated one, because there are always links that are necessarily indispensable. A child of yesterday is the adult of tomorrow, who is the adolescent of today. With the indispensable nexus of the past, the present and the future of human existence and living, we also seem the enduring needs of the philosophy of the environment where human actions are examined in order to avoid human self-annihilation, self-alienation and even the emergence of possible self-extinction. This is where indispensability of the irreplaceable tools of philosophy comes in as it will help in no small measure in sharpening the belief system of the human person and his or her lifestyles.

With metaphysical conceptualization of human self-authenticity and self-participation based on the indispensability of lived experiences, we understand that life is about the trend of virtue and virtue ethics, and when virtue is lost, benevolence appears. When benevolence is lost, right

²⁹ P.O. Isanbor, 2021^a, p. 44.

³⁰ P.O. Isanbor, 2021^a, p. 44.

conduct appears.³¹ When right conduct is lost, experience appears, establishes itself indispensably in regulating the affairs of the same life, for then, experience is an inevitable shadow that exists between right and wrong actions. With actions, there are necessarily price the human persons must pay in order to redeem themselves from the shackles of destruction they have put themselves due to less disposition of the workability of being truthful to the natural law and principles the govern the human existence toward the developmental employment of their self-actualisation and self-liberation.

The futuristic achievement of integral humanism is more negatively challenges in the faces of imposing effects of the employment of the tools of science and technology on the environment, mostly built on the falsehood of the indispensability of the *Culture of War* in human existence due to human freedom.³² Lack of peace in the communities and nations is attributed to the lack of truth in human affairs. Where there is no truth, the *Culture of War* and other forms of dehumanization abound, resulting to environmental, social and political violence and break down of law and order.³³ With an imposing *Culture of War*, we readily recognise the socio-developmental facts that we have been at war with the contents of our consciences in relation to the influence of what we produce scientifically and technologically, and the interests we have develop with them to the detriment of some of their values.³⁴ The human person has seen to have been enslaved by some unguided promises of the global politics in the employment of the tools of science and technology over what the consciences can posit in directing our actions towards overcoming the weights of social, economical, political and ecological injustices. Our actions speak volume, especially in our quest for hedonistic and relativistic values and consumerist orientations, where the contents of the good are neglected or less preferred over the bad, because, a very sizeable numbers of modern and contemporary persons have been embracing the emotivistic doctrine in valuing what is good or bad, what is right or wrong.

Nevertheless, the sense of common survival and development demands a common knowledge about our existence and the reasons to sustaining it.³⁵ We know always that “knowledge contributes to

³¹ C.S. Ifeakor and E.R. Chinedu, “Between Environmental Conservation and Development: An African Perspective.” In I.A. Kanu (ed). *African Eco-Philosophy: Cosmology, Consciousness and the Environment*. USA, Maryland: APAS, 2021, p. 101.

³² Cf, Pope Francis, *Laudato Si*, no. 144.

³³ See M. Dukor, “National and World Peace: An Ethical Imperative for our Times”, p. 159.

³⁴ See, C.N. Ogbujah, The Culture of Death and the Crisis of Modernity. *Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 2020, p. 124.

³⁵ P.O. Isanbor, 2021^b, p. 322.

development in several different ways: as a productive resource; as an essential input for education, scientific research and industrial technology; as an catalyst for social change and economic development in Marxian language; and as a basis for civilization and cultural values that promote social integrity and harmony, which is the essential foundation for integral humanism.”³⁶ With this sense of globalization, one of the truisms of human experiences in relation to their existential relevance of integral humanism has remained the imposing and indispensable sociality of human self-recognition and self-importance, away from the moral effects of secularism/relativism, consumerism and imperialism in promoting throwaway culture and mentality. With these factors of subjugated development, “the modern is a subject of the Western Cultural Revolution, which has not only practically edged God out of the stage of reality, but has also, in His place, declared science, technology, freedom and pleasure as new gods.”³⁷ These are not naturally suited within the values of true community of persons and for the promotion of organised living, not simply for the actualization of integral humanism. Rather, the realization of integral humanism is mainly through ethical management of our freedom in the exercises of our creativity and innovations. The social conceptualization and sustainability of the human family best situates the valuations of global social order for common survival and development.³⁸

The consideration of the true contents of human conscience necessarily brings us to the culture where science and technology undermines the values of integral humanism, by the enthronement of slavery of conscience.³⁹ This is by modern quest for easy, erotic and erroneous sources and avenues of human pleasures rather than happiness derived to the detriment of human work and its values. The economic concerns for the development values in some artificial intelligence that have remained an effort to erect a machine model of the human persons will have their childhood, learn language as children do, gain their knowledge of things around them by perceiving the world through their sensory organs and ultimately to contemplate the whole domain of human thought in order to develop the environment and make it remains a world of positive experiences possibly.⁴⁰ The products of intelligence an innovation cannot or never to take over the real and true human values. The human persons are product of their rationality and intelligibility. They

³⁶ F.O. Olatunji and P.O. Ujomu, p. 2.

³⁷A.G. Nnamani, “Faith, Formation, and Vocation: Any Link?” In G. Ogbenika and F. Ikhianosime (eds). *Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century*, p. 122.

³⁸ See, P.O. Isanbor, 2020, p. 117.

³⁹ Cf, C.N. Ogbujah, *The Culture of Death and the Crisis of Modernity*, p. 126.

⁴⁰ J. Weizenbaum, *Computer Power and Human Reason*. SF: W.H. Fredman, 1976, pp. 202-203.

remain who they are for themselves and their community, as they determine what happen in their future from the nature of the actions in the present and that of the inherited past.

Conclusion

We necessarily and indispensably need to lay a metaphysical foundation for ethical decision-making concerning the human person in the relation to the environmental sustainability.⁴¹ This will be exponentially possible with collective adoption of the operation of eco-stewardship, and globally ensures the institutionalization of the *Culture of Peace*. Such global concern for sustainable *Culture of Peace* conjures the social and political commitment of “one’s obligation to future generations with respect to the environment,”⁴² indispensably and humanistically considering the effects of one’s present actions on the same environment. Hence, there should be “the urgent need for the elaboration of a philosophical view of the human person which forms the foundation of our contemporary life and thought. The viewpoints of science and faith in the exercise of freedom need not be in conflict in a coherent vision of the human person.”⁴³ This should be based on the human quest for self-integration, self-authenticity, self-participation and self-dynamism that guarantee the interconnectedness of past, present and future values of development. This concern recognises that no generation is independently and wholly free from the actions of other generations. That, human generations are one as far as they are interdependently connected and bounded together by existing, enduring and unavoidable environment that houses them.

For the sake of common human survival, the exercise of true freedom is to be natural and humane, recognising that the natural law that defines human existence beyond the imposing influences of science and technology, even as they are to be employed to modify and explore the nature, not to exploit it. When we engage ourselves in actions and responsibilities, the values of the human person should remain the measure of our philosophical and developmental ideologies, creativities and innovations. Hence, for more secured and sustained future, in right freedom, we necessarily and indispensably need to seek eco-friendly technologies and industrialization. Outside these convictions; there are

⁴¹ See, Paul Oredipe, “Integral Humanism: An Ethical Challenge in Faith and Reason”, p. 62.

⁴² A.B. Ojo, Ethical Response to Ecological Challenges: A Call of Responsible Stewardship. *Nigerian Journal of Religion and Society*, Vol. 10, 2020, p. 99.

⁴³ Paul Oredipe, “Integral Humanism: An Ethical Challenge in Faith and Reason”, p. 62.

about the aberrations of the values of the human person, and his or her environment will continually suffers the heats of exploitation and deterioration. But, when freedom is duly exercised by the recognition of the divine nature of the environment and the phenomenological ethics of *otherness*, all elements and recourses of the environment are sustained in order to keep our communal living, from generations to generations.

Therefore, with the enduring nature of creation, the presence of the environment continually guarantees life. Only with human life can the environment be classified with meaning, characterised with created values, and sustained with the consciousness of sustaining human future. This is an ecological reality that determines what the present holds for the future indispensably. As a generic heritage for any existing generation shows the indispensable connectedness of our past, present and future, and it beholds on us to sustain what belong not to anyone but for everyone, since everyone will also die to leave the same environment in existence and or the existing, as the environment is existence itself, so the existence is God Himself who never dies or ends. With the sense of stewardship of the human person that is associated with our created nature, we are encouraged not to abuse the environment in order not to abuse God supposedly. This means that; when God is seen through the environment as His presence in the active development of the humanity and society, there are possibilities to totally eliminate all forms and avenues of its pollution and degradation.

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THE EXPERIENCE OF PHILOSOPHIZING IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS: SPECIFICS AND PERSPECTIVES

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"If the health crisis calls into question several of the foundations of our societies, then philosophy helps us to move forward by stimulating critical reflection on problems that are already present but which the pandemic is pushing to the limit"

Audrey Azule, Director-General of UNESCO, message on the occasion of World Philosophy Day

Abstract: *The protracted COVID-19 epidemic is unique not only because it has changed the familiar life on a global scale. The distant way of social life, the emergence of new social standards, the intensification of existential risks have become a challenge and for philosophy itself, its ability to expand the horizons of reflection of new reality. The article discusses the specifics of individual and social life in the context of the theory of viral modernity and the problems of*

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global digital control. In addition, the methodological possibilities of phenomenology allow us to comprehend the modern pandemic as an extraordinary event that, in contrast to the temporality of ordinary experience, radically changes the perception of time in the conditions of COVID everyday life.

Keywords: modern philosophy, post-COVID world, digital control, temporality.

Introduction

Georg Hegel's Preface to Elements of the *Philosophy of Right* contains a canonical passage on the purpose of philosophy, which arises only after the completion of the formation of reality: "When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood"¹. This passage ends with the famous mention of the owl Minerva, which spreads its wings only with the coming of the dusk. Indeed, philosophizing anticipates the maturation of history and spirit. In addition, in an effort to impartially "read" the reality, philosophy appears as a slow, systematic and balanced reasoning, removed from the dominance of empirical facts.

Martin Heidegger also noted that philosophy cannot provide an immediate effect that can change the current state of affairs. There is also an Eastern tradition that gives philosophy the mission of awakening human consciousness: the Indian concepts of *darśana* and *bodhi* mean not so much love to wisdom and knowledge but the vision of truth and awakening to it by creating emptiness in oneself and distancing oneself from everyday worries. With this understanding, one should expect from the philosopher not an unappealable position on current events, but rather a deep reflection on what characterizes a certain state of human spirit.

However, in contrast to the traditional understanding of the philosopher as a person who *raises* issues, the modern philosopher is primarily a professor, academician, expert, who is expected to make final judgments on topical issues. Today such issues are the protection of the principles of justice, in-depth study of crisis situations, the creation of new conceptual tools for comprehension of present and future, taking into account global capitalism, biopolitics, digitalization and other phenomena that, in Hegel's sense, determine the "configuration of nations".

The main challenge for modern philosophy was the COVID-19 pandemic, which suddenly plunged humanity into fear, death, isolation

¹ W.F.G. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Available at:

<https://hscif.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Hegel-Phil-of-Right.pdf>.

and loneliness, forcing modern thinkers to actively respond to this event and critically rethink the role of philosophy in the context of radical socio-cultural transformations.

What should philosophy be during a pandemic? What tasks can it solve? What kind of consequences of a pandemic could be for civilization and philosophy as such? Modern philosophy comprehends the pandemic at the same time as it takes place, thus emphasizing its relevance, as well as the status of the thinking mind and consciousness of its time, which is understood in concepts.

Theoretical basis

The experience of understanding the COVID-19 pandemic was embodied in a significant body of philosophical essays of analytical, reflective and critical nature. Rejecting the clichés of conservatism and intellectual isolation, professional thinkers study COVID reality, looking for orderly methodologies and categorical schemes that allow us to move from reality to concepts, from facts to their principles.

In attempts to philosophically understand the global pandemic situation, representatives of various research areas, regardless of their own horizons of understanding, refer primarily to the works of Michel Foucault, in which disciplinary mechanisms of power, biopolitics and peculiarities of private life regulation in the conditions of globalization are conceptualized².

Giorgio Agamben, thinking about the political and ethical consequences of the pandemic, marks the current situation as “*bare life*”, where survival becomes the main value and the community becomes a weak-willed biomass³. A significant problem, according to the philosopher, is the gradual transition of life to the online mode, which threatens the formation of a state of machines, not people. The author also expresses serious concern over the possible transformation of the “*state of exception*” into a permanent attribute of relations between the state and citizens, namely, total control and surveillance as a paradigm of biopolitical power under theological cover.

Jean-Luc Nancy, criticizing the position of G. Agamben, emphasizes that the experience that humanity is currently going through is not a

² M. Foucault, *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon, 1980; M. Foucault, *Omnes et Singulatim: Vers Une Critique de la Raison Politique*. Dits et Écrit. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, Vol. IV, pp. 134-161; M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*, trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003.

³ G. Agamben, *A Che Punto Siamo? L'epidemia Come Politica*. Roma: Quodlibet, 2020.

political and legal, but primarily an epidemic state of emergency⁴. The enormous danger of the COVID-19 virus justifies appropriate actions by the governments. Besides, according to the philosopher, the virus spreads the discourses of the ostentatious defiance because “showing that you are not fooled, is more important than avoiding contagion– which amounts to being doubly fooled ...”⁵. As a product of globalization, the pandemic accelerates the destruction of culture in favour of a system of indistinguishable and militant technical, economic, authoritarian and other forces. In such conditions, Pascal's formula of man who infinitely surpasses man gives way to the loading of man in “humanity, overwhelmed by the events and situations it has produced”. J.-L. Nancy compares the virus to a magnifying glass, which “enlarges the characteristics of our contradictions and of our limitations”, and, in particular, questions the adequacy of the term *biopolitics*, because “life and politics challenge us together”⁶.

For Roberto Esposito, the widespread deployment of biopolitics is an obvious fact: the connection between politics and biological control has been around for a long time, and all “current political conflicts are related to politics and biological life”⁷. The researcher describes the trend of medicalization of politics and politicalization of medicine, which distorts the classic “portrait” of politics, in particular, towards segmenting the population by somatic, age, gender and even ethnicity features. In addition, R. Esposito differentiates Fukoldian discourse and specific situations in certain countries. In his opinion, tough anti-virus measures do not indicate a totalitarian seizure of power, but rather the weakness of existing state powers and the risk of losing the balance of power.

Slavoj Žižek tries to avoid thinking about COVID-19 in terms of monitoring and control and focuses on the effectiveness of measures and consequences of the pandemic in the context of global economic development. The philosopher believes that radical social change is the only way to prevent future economic megacrisis. “The impossible happened, the author notes, “our world has stopped”⁸. Accordingly, “our reaction to it should also be to do the impossible - what appears impossible

⁴ J.-L. Nancy, *Eccezione Virale*. Antinomie, 2020. Available at: <https://antinomie.it/index.php/2020/02/27/eccezione-virale/>.

⁵ J.-L. Nancy, *A Much Too Human Virus*, 2020. Available at: <https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/a-much-human-virus/>.

⁶ J.-L. Nancy, *op. cit.*

⁷ R. Esposito, *Curati a oltranza*. Antinomie, 2020. Available at: <https://antinomie.it/index.php/2020/02/28/curati-a-oltranza/>.

⁸ S. Žižek, *Is Barbarism with a Human Face Our Fate?* In the Moment, 2020. Available at: <https://critinq.wordpress.com/2020/03/18/is-barbarism-with-a-human-face-our-fate/>.

within the coordinates of the existing world order”⁹. Sl. Žižek believes that one of the significant threats of an anthropological nature is barbarism with a human face – “ruthless survivalist measures enforced with regret and even sympathy but legitimized by expert opinions”, which will inevitably reduce “the premise of our social ethics: the care of the old and weak”¹⁰.

Disagreeing with the opinion of G. Agamben about the centrifugal consequences of belief in “naked life”, Sl. Žižek¹¹ sees in this guideline a unifying perspective: “to maintain a corporeal distance is to show respect to the other...”¹², which contributes to the positive results of forced alienation and emphasizes personal responsibility. However, the emphasis on individual responsibility, according to the philosopher, should not turn into a solid ideology and replace the issue of systemic socio-economic transformations: the triple nature of the crisis - medical, economic and psychological - encourages the search for new ways of producing and allocating resources. Sl. Žižek hopes for almost communist perspectives: “maybe another and much more beneficent ideological “virus” will spread and hopefully infect us: the virus of thinking of an alternative society, a society beyond the nation state, a society that actualizes itself in the forms of global solidarity and cooperation”¹³.

Bernard-Henri Lévy considers the reaction to coronavirus in two aspects: positive, because “our respect for life has increased and that we want to save lives first of all”, and negative, which embodies collective hysteria and serious danger of potential tracking of citizens through electronic applications¹⁴. Also B.-H. Lévy is concerned about the disappearance of major events on television and “mental screens”¹⁵; he considers the very eschatological rhetoric of rethinking the world during a pandemic to be excessive and dangerous.

Analyzing the socio-economic aspects of the fight against the pandemic, Noam Chomsky focuses on the critique of the manifestations of *savage capitalism*, which hinders the establishment of an effective health

⁹ S. Žižek, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ S. Žižek, *op. cit.*

¹¹ S. Žižek, *op. cit.*; S. Žižek, *Coronavirus is ‘Kill Bill’-esque blow to capitalism and could lead to reinvention of communism*, 2020. Available at: <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/481831-coronavirus-kill-bill-capitalism-communism/>; S. Žižek, *Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020.

¹² S. Žižek, *Is Barbarism with a Human Face...*

¹³ S. Žižek, *Coronavirus is ‘Kill Bill’-esque blow...*

¹⁴ B. Henri-Lévy, *On the good and bad news about coronavirus*, 2020. Available at: <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/Bernard-Henri-Lévy-on-the-good-and-bad-news-about-coronavirus>.

¹⁵ B. Henri-Lévy, *op. cit.*

care system. The philosopher also expresses serious concern about the prospect of “an international of the most reactionary governments in the world, which will later become the basis for the US power”¹⁶.

Sergio Benvenuto places the anthropological consequences of the pandemic in an existential context. Referring to one of the journalists, he emphasizes: “We are not in danger, we are the danger”¹⁷. Accordingly, everyone becomes equally dangerous, which entails seclusion at all levels – “every citizen closes himself for another”¹⁸. Arguing with G. Agamben about the “rigidity of our neighbor”, S. Benvenuto speaks of a positive inversion of certain clichés: “Today I demonstrate my love for my neighbor, keeping him or her at a distance”¹⁹ or “the further others hold on the distance from me, the closer I feel to them”²⁰. Conscious avoidance of communication becomes, according to the philosopher, a biopolitical and, consequently, ethical choice, just as fear, in contrast to frivolous attitude, becomes an act of courage. In the long run, life should become “hearted” or “homeized” - the author proposes to invent appropriate neologisms and predicts that “generalized seclusion will become our usual way of life”²¹.

Among the numerous publications on the COVID-19 pandemic written by prominent researchers the article by Alain Badiou²², where the philosopher opposes those who consider the pandemic something radically new or unprecedented is noted with the the spirit of pragmatic restraint. Such a researcher's position is probably due to the author's standards in understanding the concept of the event.

Instead, Toby Ord's philosophical research is marked by an expressive style of disaster and contains certain methodological explorations. The author, in particular, examines the concepts of “existential risk” and “existential catastrophe”. The first one is defined as “... a risk that threatens ... the long-term potential of humanity”²³. The second is defined as “the destruction of the long-term potential of humanity”²⁴. According to T. Ord, an existential catastrophe threatens either the complete

¹⁶ Interview: Noam Chomsky on How Bosses Are Making Coronavirus ‘Worse, for Their Benefit’, 2002. Available at: <https://labornotes.org/2020/04/interview-noam-chomsky-how-bosses-are-making-coronavirus-worse-their-benefit>.

¹⁷ S. Benvenuto, *Welcome to Seclusion*. Antinomie, 2020. Available at: https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers/#_edn3.

¹⁸ S. Benvenuto, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ S. Benvenuto, *op. cit.*

²⁰ S. Benvenuto, *op. cit.*

²¹ S. Benvenuto, *op. cit.*

²² A. Badiou, *On the Epidemic Situation*, 2020. Available at:

<https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4608-on-the-epidemic-situation>.

²³ T. Ord, *The Precipice. Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity*. London: Bloomsbury, 2020, p. 37.

²⁴ T. Ord, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

disappearance of humanity, or existence in much less favourable conditions. Such conditions, in turn, are either the result of the final collapse or the affirmation of an irreparable dystopia. The difference between them is determined only by the time frame in the interval between the suddenness and the process of gradual degradation.

In general, modern thinkers proposed many ideas expressed not only in highly specialized language, but also intended for non-academic audiences. On the other hand, as some experts point out, academic philosophizing, with its metaphysical insights, ethical and aesthetic achievements, and even metapolitical discursive explorations, has no decisive effect even in less tumultuous times: “Many philosophical discussions look like sports on a square inch playing field, with very few players and even fewer spectators”²⁵. The radical difference between philosophical knowledge and scientific knowledge is explained by the following argumentation: philosophical knowledge is too specialized to be always relevant, while scientific knowledge is relevant (though not always successful) precisely because it is very specialized²⁶.

It should also be mentioned that there are significant differences among philosophers, even on fundamental issues. In particular, one in five philosophers challenges the existence of an external world that is independent of the human mind²⁷ which indicates, in particular, the significant contradictions between personal views and group norms of academic publications. In addition, the traditional “Achilles' heel” of most philosophical statements is the inability to empirically confirm or refute linguistically expressed arguments.

However, we should hardly agree with the opinion that in times of crisis, public philosophy is useless. On the contrary, the philosophers' indication to the uncertainty during a pandemic may reveal the constructive potential of epistemological restraint, so that, according to the Swedish philosopher Erik Angner, a viral pandemic is not accompanied by a “pandemic of overconfidence”²⁸.

In general, differences in the perception of COVID-19 reach an a priori worldview understanding of essential issues, in particular, human existence and its place in the world: progressives saw the pandemic as a catastrophic event that requires harsh measures; conservatives

²⁵ L. Lauwaert, A. Block, *Beware of the Philosophical Expert*. *Philosophy Today*, 2020, 64 (4), p. 872.

²⁶ L. Lauwaert, *op. cit.*, p. 872.

²⁷ D. Bourget, D.J. Chalmers, *What Do Philosophers Believe?* *Philosophical Studies*, 2014, 170(3), pp.465-500.

²⁸ E. Angner, *Epistemic Humility: Knowing Your Limits in a Pandemic*. *Behavioral Scientist*, 2020, Available at: <https://behavioralscientist.org/epistemic-humility-coronavirus-knowing-your-limits-in-a-pandemic/>.

emphasized the exaggeration of risk, which is unlikely to justify the devastating consequences for human existence. For progressives, there is a strong causal link between harsh anti-epidemic measures (quarantine, wearing masks, mass vaccinations) and slowing the spread of the virus; conservatives attribute this dynamic to natural fluctuations in the virus's "behavior". Progressives say the virus has changed the world forever, and conservatives hope to return to the status quo after the pandemic. In such an almost polar situation, "it is philosophers who could help bring these worlds by unearthing the underlying conditions, unarticulated 'pictures and metaphors', a priori conceptions of the thing and of the place of human in the world"²⁹.

The philosophy of the pandemic era has a range of specific ontological, epistemological, ethical-anthropological and other issues that need comprehension today. The purpose of the article is to study the specifics of the philosophical understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic as an event that causes radical transformations at the social and personal-existential levels, as well as determines the context of global digital culture.

Results and Discussion

We would like to begin our presentation of the main material with the philosophical problem that G. Agamben, in connection with the emergency caused by the COVID-19 virus, expressed as follows: "A *che punto siamo?*"³⁰. In Italian, this phrase literally means "Where are we now?" or "What's happening to us now?" The author believes that humanity is now in a *state of exception* and that later this stage in history (Italian, in particular) will be "one of the most shameful..., and rulers and leaders will look irresponsible and unscrupulous"³¹.

Such emotional statements convincingly show that the author understands the pandemic primarily as a biopolitical event. However, it is no less obvious that the stage which is still underway is waiting for a fundamental understanding: humanity is directly in an event which it attaches a great importance and which, in turn, has a decisive impact on humanity. Thus, the pandemic itself has become a reality, the understanding of which requires a different way than the usual diagnosis and prediction.

The pandemic, covering the whole world (that is, all (*pan*) people (*demos*)), questioned globalization, forced the local to fight for its ability to act on a global scale. The virus has spread everywhere not only through dynamic global communication, it has transformed globalization itself into

²⁹ Y. Adler, *A Political a priori?* Philosophy Today, 2020, 64 (4), p. 819.

³⁰ G. Agamben, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³¹ G. Agamben, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

a “pandemic virus” operating at the biological, socio-economic, political, cultural and other levels.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the concept of *viral modernity*, which is based on a stable parallel between viral forms in biology and information - two powerful forces driving cultural evolution. Bioinformationalist logic assumes that the basic characteristics of digital information (exponential magnification, high-precision replication, infinite recombination, and artificial intelligence expression) are comparable to key evolutionary innovations in storing and replicating biosphere information (RNA, DNA, multicellularity, and language as cognitive systems)³². Accordingly, the potential symbiosis between biological and digital information can reach a critical point where these codes could compete via natural selection. Alternatively, this fusion could create a higher-level superorganism employing a low-conflict division of labour in performing informational tasks³³.

The methodological potential of the concept of viral modernity contributes to the philosophical understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic, bringing together complex topics such as biopolitics, posthumanity, quarantine, post-truth, conspiracy thinking. It should also be taken into account that modern reality “does not have absolute knowledge, but in principle is built as a communicative or narrative, as an exchange of descriptions and evidence of reality itself...”³⁴. The facts show that the topic of COVID-19 was often placed in the post-truth landscape and used by politicians to strengthen power (in particular, Donald Trump's statement about COVID-19 as fake news), which, in turn, showed disrespect for science and expert assessments. Such manipulations can cause the epidemic of disinformation – “*integral accident*”³⁵, which is inherent in technology and is essentially a *farmakon* in the Derridian sense - drugs that can harm the patient*. Globalization itself, therefore, becomes a “virus of inequality, injustice, racism, extermination, hunger, destruction. What is manifested in a pandemic is the virulence of all virulence, the virotic itself as a mode of how virulence contaminates”³⁶.

³² M.A. Peters, T. Besley, *Pandemic Education and Viral Politics*. London: Routledge, 2020.

³³ M.R. Gillings, M. Hilbert, D.J. Kemp, *Information in the biosphere: Biological and digital worlds*. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 2016, 31(3), p. 180.

³⁴ I. Kovalenko, Y. Meliakova, E. Kalnytskyi, K. Nesterenko, *On conspiracy thinking in the phenomenology of modern culture*, Cogito, 2021, 13(3), p. 75.

³⁵ P. Virilio, *The original accident*. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

* It is also worth mentioning that in Latin the word *virus* means *poison*.

³⁶ M. Sá Cavalcante Schuback, *To Think in the Eye of the Storm*. Philosophy Today, 2020, 64 (4), p. 908.

The virus of globalization is transmitted in a virtual way and encourages thinking about the virulence of globalization by analogy with the biological, eliminating the differences between digital and molecular. One finger touch is enough to be contaminated with the virus - such words are true for digital and political infection³⁷. Thus, politics, actively using the capabilities of social networks and the extraordinary power of digital technologies in all dimensions of human existence, infects with viruses of numbers, activities and strategies. Increased political influence in social networks, regardless of ideological content, exacerbates feelings up to their devastation, leads to dis-socialization: the individual finds him/herself isolated in his/her cell-screen, separated from the common space. Thus, under the guise of virtual socialization and justified isolation, dissocializing of society is going on.

From an epidemiological point of view, the effect of the virus is described as a barrier that prevents the body from being inside itself. Similarly, isolation, eliminating physical contact, prevents the body from being itself, closes it, cuts it off not only from other bodies but also from itself, deprives *between-being*: “what is effaced is not only contact, but also the co-occurrence of the accidental: the rain that dampens, the sun that burns, the body that bumps, threatens, surprises, it is not only the cut of the elasticity of living: inside, outside; us, them, but it is a cut from the pulse of between-being. More than the other, what disappears is the between”³⁸.

In addition, the cult of speed combined with the rapid development of communication technologies has led to the phenomenon of *world compression*³⁹. The increase in the speed of information transfer has significantly affected even the use of language, which is less and less fulfilling its fundamental role - the expression of opinions in dialogue. In this regard, isolation can play a beneficial role, as many people are forced to change their lifestyle.

Difficult epidemiological situation around the world not only affects the physical or mental state of man, transforming the healthy into the sick one, but also causes global changes that are steadily transforming into new social standards. Thus, in the practice of social life, wearing masks, maintaining social distance, disinfecting hands, increasing the share of work and online learning are firmly fixed. In the conditions of constant existential expectation of the next waves of the pandemic, new patterns of social action are formed: the medical mask has become the norm of social

³⁷ M. Sá Cavalcante Schuback, *op. cit.*, p. 909.

³⁸ M. Sá Cavalcante Schuback, *op. cit.*, p. 909.

³⁹ P. Virilio, *Vitesse et Politique. Essai de dromologie*, Paris: Galilée, 1977.

behavior, while its absence is equated to deviations; social distance and mobility restrictions are firmly entrenched in everyday life.

The effectiveness of such measures is ensured, in particular, by constant digital control, the idea of which has received a powerful new impetus during the pandemic. Indeed, forced self-isolation has accelerated the process of digitalization of society, placing humanity in new ontological conditions, determined primarily by the level of development of digital technologies and the degree of human mastery.

On the one hand, the coronavirus pandemic has become a good opportunity to diversify knowledge and master new professions on the Internet. Forced isolation has been a catalyst for the digital economy, the flexible combination of digital labour, digital education and digital leisure. Partial restoration of nature because of declining man-made activity can be considered another positive consequence of the global epidemic.

On the other hand, one of the main risks of total informatization is related to the idea of digital control. It consists primarily in tracking potential carriers of the coronavirus, introducing QR passes, monitoring activity in the educational and information space, increasing the number of face recognition cameras and 5G communication stations.

Indeed, it is widely believed that an effective way to the epidemic containment is to track contacts with mobile phone data and surveillance cameras, although this is often seen as the authoritarian. Such an accusation, in our opinion, is wrong at least because the tools of digital surveillance are widely used by modern political regimes - from liberal-democratic to authoritarian. In the post-panoptic digital reality, any political power becomes dispersed and is realized through the micro-practices of surveillance. In this regard, profiling technology is actively used, which, transforming human bodies into streams of information, "provides opportunities for categorization, social sorting, remote control of mobility, etc."⁴⁰.

Based on the above, we can assume that the digital turn as a theoretical problem, together with the ecological turn, decisively determines the future form of philosophy, in particular, the ontology of interconnection between human biological life with new digital technologies and further transformation of humanity as part of larger bio- and technological systems.

In addition, in the current pandemic, the contradictions between the personal (private) and the public are sharply exacerbated, which leads to

⁴⁰ I. Kovalenko, Y. Meliakova, E. Kalnytskyi, *Postpanopticum: metamorphoses of culture control in a digital society*. The Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University. Series: Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology, 2021, 3 (50), p. 47.

solving the problem not by protecting the private or public at any cost, but through a complex search for compromise between them. In particular, isolation has called into question individualism, which is a fundamental characteristic of Western society, where the values of autonomy and self-interest prevail - in contrast to traditional societies, where the individual is inseparable from the group to which he or she belongs.

Isolation reaffirmed Heidegger's emphasis on connection between *Dasein* and *being-others*, which helped to restore solidarity and mutual assistance. Today, most people are deeply aware that isolation, as well as wearing masks and the practice of remote gestures are aimed at both the protection of others and personal protection. It has also contributed to the re-evaluation of those professions that are usually considered secondary and primarily service-related, from hospital staff to housekeepers and garbage collectors, without which no human society could exist.

There is an inverse relationship between the event and its participants ("We"): "We" is formalized in the events that happen to "We", just as the event has a decisive influence on "We". The COVID-19 pandemic dramatized the gap between two forms of multiplicity, populism (nationalism) and solidarity. Accordingly, one of the challenges of the pandemic as for philosophy is to take into account the nature of the differences between these two forms.

In this regard, the complex relationship between the non-discriminatory nature of the virus and the loci of initial discrimination based on the actions of different levels of government should be taken into account. In such conditions, "We" moves between the individualized "I" and its generalization as "We". If in the structure of populism "I" is a part of "We" to the extent that they are both homogeneous objects (when the remnants of initial inequality and discrimination are removed for the sake of homogeneous "We", and in COVID reality pandemic is denied as a biopolitical event), then solidarity as a structure of thought and a form of activity presupposes in "We" the necessity of honour and dignity as obligatory predicates of human nature. Solidarity manifests itself as a common feeling, a co-feeling, compassion whose significance, as Hannah Arendt clearly showed⁴¹, is that, despite the imbalance of power, it is a rational political judgment. The situation with COVID-19 shows that the philosophical understanding of life cannot be separated from the forms of solidarity caused by constant attempts to actualize human dignity.

New temporality in the conditions of pandemic. In post-classical philosophical discourse, temporality is understood as a sequence of changes, as the duration of existence in the human world, which is

⁴¹ H. Arendt, *On Revolution*. New York: Viking, 1963.

inevitably associated with personal assessments, values, preferences, contradictory and therefore unstable structures of the social subject.

The present is perceived not only as a fleeting boundary between what has happened and what has not yet happened, but also as an essential dimension that contains all the past and predicts all the future. Edmund Husserl called this dimension “living real”, in contrast to the “dead” present, reduced to the atom-moment, abstractly drawn on the timeline⁴².

In addition, a full sense of the present implies the openness of the situation in which the subject found himself, and, as Martin Heidegger once pointed out, a strong desire to take control of it⁴³. A similar view is expressed in Buddhist philosophy: the reflection of instability (*anytia*) through meditative efforts helps to experience the experience of complete identity over time. With this understanding, the temporality of ordinary experience becomes more predictable, programmatic and self-affirming, however, it should be borne in mind that, according to the specifics of human existence, such experience is based on world stability and remains open to events.

The temporality of ordinary experience differs significantly from the event, usually associated with the phenomenon of surprise^{**}. As Françoise Dastur points out, an event is in fact “always a suddenness, something that fascinates us in an unpredictable way, without warning and that leads us to an unpredictable future. The event that arises in the formation is somewhat irreparably excessive in comparison with the usual notion of time as a flow. This manifests itself as something that shifts time and gives it a new form, something that brings the flow of time out of balance and changes its direction”⁴⁴.

In such words, it is emphasized that the event unbalances and radically changes the usual style of existence. Moreover, it “does not happen in the world... it is, on the contrary, like a *new world* that opens up because of what is happening. The event is a critical moment of temporality - a critical moment, which, however, implies the continuity of time”⁴⁵.

Thus, an event is not just an accidental situation that can happen in anyone's life. Implicit knowledge of the possibility of an event is an integral

⁴² E. Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

⁴³ M. Heidegger, *The Temporality of Disclosedness in General. Being and Time*. Trans. by J. Stambaugh. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.

^{**} In the context of our research, the appearance of the new coronavirus in 2019 is not considered as a virological event that occurred outside the limits of human consciousness, but primarily as a humanitarian disaster caused by the spread of this virus

⁴⁴ F. Dastur, *Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise*. Hypatia, 2000, 15(4), p. 182.

⁴⁵ F. Dastur, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

part of temporality and a necessary component of life experience. An event cannot be perceived immediately; it is understood only as post facto and, finally, personally - as what has *happened* to the subject, but not what he has *done*. According to Fr. Dastur's exact phrase, in such a situation we experience our inability to experience.

Thus, because the event is unplanned and destroys the ordinary world, its understanding is possible only after it takes place, and only then can we understand how a new world emerges. If ordinary experience presupposes an initial belief in the stability of the world and has the same "style", then the violation of such coherence leads to the inability to remain open to the event, and later to integrate it. Fr. Dastur describes such a disposition as "psychosis"⁴⁶.

In the current pandemic context, this and the above characteristics of the event are, in our opinion, the most accurate: the pandemic has taken over the human world, confused, changed the understanding of the future and brought the flow of time out of control. Thus, whole worlds changed instantly: office workers were forced to work at home and, being in small rooms for a long time, at the same time they had to provide and control the distance learning of their children; another category of workers (librarians, service staff) fell under mass dismissals, while their concerns grew as the pace of slowing life.

The transformation of many of the routines of daily life (gym attendance, regular shopping, daily appearance at work, etc.) was also accompanied by the emergence of sudden "necessary" activities (food vendors, couriers, hospital cleaners and caregivers) against the background of intentional indifference to health risks, staff turnover and unpredictable changes. In particular, there were striking details about the relentless and desperate work of doctors and nurses, who have also been faced with fundamental ethical issues, especially in intensive care units.

In general, isolation has "forced" people to experience a new period of time as a temporality that is no longer rapid and fragmentary. At first, time was perceived as too slow, but later there was a feeling of accelerating time, even in conditions of monotony, which was not interrupted by the usual pleasant vacation or traditional recreational activities. Therefore, it is not surprising from a phenomenological point of view that the beginning of the epidemic was the event. Suddenly the world turned upside down, and a radically new and uncertain future shattered the usual sense of time.

Under such conditions, the constant phenomenological possibility of a sudden event is combined with a sense of crisis. Time of emergency, lockdown, self-isolation - this is also the time of the event. We put ourselves to trying to make time work according to the usual pattern: we

⁴⁶ F. Dastur, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

self-critically recall the pandemic warnings of public health experts and imagine a world where we can plan effectively; we review charts showing the dynamics of morbidity, mortality and recovery, trying to build a timeline from the past to the future; we look for news about the effectiveness of vaccines and possible dates for their appearance.

Such actions demonstrate rational attempts to analyze the successes and failures of management, as well as attempts to gain epistemic flexibility in future events. However, given the almost complete futility of ordinary citizens to decisively influence the situation, such intentions should be understood rather as existential attempts to overcome (eradicate) a particularly long event, thus recreating the usual temporality to make human experience our own again.

Analyzing the political processes at the end of the XVIII century, Michel Foucault noted that the newly born biopower faced an endemic problem and had to take into account that “the form, nature, extension, duration and intensity of the illnesses are prevalent in a population... They were permanent factors which sapped the population's strength, shortened the working week, wasted energy and cost money both because they led to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive. Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life - as in epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, constantly gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it”⁴⁷.

In turn, Lauren Berlant used the phrase “slow death”⁴⁸ to describe the quiet background of late capitalism in the form of continuous depletion of the population. Slow death is a form of life that takes form of endemic. In our opinion, such a shift is not solely a function of the actual impact of deaths and diseases. This is primarily due to the instability of the event as a gap in life experience, as COVID-19, in particular, reflects the inability of political and economic systems to perform their tasks and, ultimately, leads to a transition from pandemic to endemic.

Such a dominant temporality becomes, in the words of Jasbir K. Puar, a temporality of weakness, not health or disability, chronic, not acute – “not non-normative, not exclusive, not that one that can occur or can be avoided, but a banal feature everyday existence, which already determines the unreliability of such existence”⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*, trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003, pp. 243–244.

⁴⁸ L. Berlant, *Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency)*. *Critical Inquiry*, 2007, 33(4), pp. 754–780.

⁴⁹ J.K. Puar, *The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017, p. 16.

Some mass deaths, especially as a result of terrorist attacks or other special crises, are considered catastrophic, always sudden, even if foreseen, and injure not only their victims but the general public, while catalyzing radical changes in security and control. Almost a million deaths from COVID-19 quickly became a feature of the social landscape, slow deaths entered normal life, becoming a sign primarily of personal tragedy with frequent silence by politicians.

In our opinion, comparing epidemic and endemic with event and duration helps to explain the state of consciousness of patients with so-called “long-term COVID” - such an understudied syndrome is found in survivors of COVID and in which the acute phase of viral infection changes to periodic recurrence self-awareness⁵⁰. As the incidence of disease and medical knowledge increases, the ontology of experience with the disease will increase. However, the refusal to recognize a nonlinear, cyclical, stable time of post-viral life is also an existential reaction to the “psychosis” of a long event and the need for more “normal” temporality.

Conclusions. Philosophizing today is, above all, a resolute statement, devoid of a state of detachment and balance. Attentive to the achievements of natural, medical and social sciences, the philosophy of the COVID era is aimed at specific ontological, epistemological, ethical and political studies and, in fact, has no right to miss the present time in anticipation of comfortable “twilight”. Right now, in the face of a global emergency, philosophy is able to show its maximum strength - through rigorous and systematic thinking to discover the *arche* of the new world reality and identify its determinants.

The philosophy of the pandemic is a reflection of the specific social reality generated by the distance way of social life and digital technologies, new stereotypes about the relationship between individual and collective, new readings of the issues on personal and collective responsibility.

It is likely that in human society, COVID-19 itself may be one of the meso-institutions, manifesting itself as a serious seasonal disease, and thus provoking phenomena that could have happened in any case, albeit less quickly and decisively. The fact that COVID-19 did not cause a political revolution does not make it just another mediocre event that does not change anything. Instead, like all important events, the pandemic is likely to shuffle the mechanisms of various key human institutions, and all attention will be focused on the most important of those it destroys or causes.

Pandemic isolation was an event that caused a specific time gap in the formation of life experience. In addition, it is gradually showing its productive potential, encouraging people to rethink and change their way of

⁵⁰ F. Callard, *Very, Very Mild: COVID-19 Symptoms and Illness Classification*. Somatosphere, 2020. Available at: <http://somatosphere.net/2020/mild-covid.html/>.

life alone. In fact, a new horizon opens up in the development of mankind - the so-called trans-modernity, marked not so much by the transhumanist vector (towards overcoming human artificial intelligence), but by open and solitary neohumanism, combining values of science and technology with conscious care for themselves and others in the shared space.

Conclusion

Philosophizing today is, above all, a resolute statement, devoid of a state of detachment and balance. Attentive to the achievements of natural, medical and social sciences, the philosophy of the COVID era is aimed at specific ontological, epistemological, ethical and political studies and, in fact, has no right to miss the present time in anticipation of comfortable “twilight”. Right now, in the face of a global emergency, philosophy is able to show its maximum strength - through rigorous and systematic thinking to discover the *arche* of the new world reality and identify its determinants.

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“DEMOCRACY: A STATE OF DEMOS OR AN OLIGARCH’S PARTY STATE? AN INTERPRETATION OF MODERNITY’S NOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN GREEK STATE”

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Abstract: *The key objective of this study is to clarify the actual use of democracy in current era. Taking as a case study the Modern Greek state we are trying to explain and understand the key figures of its political system in terms of democracy notion. Starting from George Contogeorgis’s assumption that the modern political system is neither democratic nor representative, we try to examine the internal sociopolitical structure of Modern’s Greek State. The main working assumption is whether democracy is the foundation of politics, i.e. the state of demos, or is the core instrument of political parties so as to occupy the executive branch and establish an oligarch political regime. We will show, how the development and understanding of democracy in Western Europe and Greece in particular, is totally different from its classical conception. The analytical starting point is the assumption that the political system of western democracy presented as an indirect representation creates a gap between society and policy, which disables the latter from its physical role as a mandator of the government. By extending the above- mentioned syllogism into the Modern Greek State, in accordance with George Contogeorgis’s assumption that the modern political system is neither democratic nor representative, can be described the roots of current sociopolitical and economic impasse in Greece.*

Keywords: *Greece, Democracy, Politics, Western Europe, Society*

Introduction

The modern literature on democracy tends to equate it with the existence and operation of a parliamentary system as a measure of democratic status. These studies have shown that political parties are the main instruments of politics in the current political system due to the principle of representation. As David Robertson notes, “to talk, today, about democracy, is to talk about a system of competitive political parties”.¹

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¹ Kaare Strom, “Parties at the core of government”, in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), *Parties Without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial*

So the key objective of this study is to clarify the actual use of democracy in the current era. Taking the Modern Greek state as a case study, we are trying to explain and understand the key figures of its political system in terms of what they mean to democracy. Starting with George Contogeorgis' assumption that the modern political system is neither democratic nor representative,² we try to examine the internal sociopolitical structure of the modern Greek State. The main question is whether democracy is the foundation of politics, i.e. the state of demos, or merely a core instrument of political parties so as to occupy the executive branch and establish an oligarchic political regime. On the one side, the stripping of democracy of its foundational component is morphing it into a democracy without demos. On the other side, "the transformation of party leaders into holders of public office promotes the de-democratization of political decision-making, that is, it increasingly delegitimizes lawmaking".³

In this context, the core questions to be considered are the following:

How is democracy defined in the modern era?

What is the relationship between political system (democracy) and civil society/citizens?

How can we explain/interpret the dispute of the political function with its society?

Defining and explaining democracy in the modern era.

The concept of democracy was born and nourished in ancient Athens in the 4th century BC based on the principle of people governing themselves,⁴ as has been thoroughly described and analyzed by classical philosophical scholars.⁵ Democracy in its original meaning gave Rule to Demos, i.e. "the body of citizens collectively", and was comprised of three main pillars: the Assembly of the Demos, the Council of 500 as a legislative

Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 180. David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition*, London: John Wiley, 1976.

² George Contogeorgis, *Η Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία (Democracy as Freedom)*, Athens: Patakis, 2007. Idem, *Οι Ολιγάρχες, (The Oligarchs)*, Athens: Patakis, 2013.

³ Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴ See Christopher W. Blackwell "Athenian Democracy: an overview", in Blackwell C., (ed.) *Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy*, The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities, 2003, p. 2.

⁵ See indicatively Aristotle's, *Politics*, Blackwell, "Athenian Democracy". George Contogeorgis, *Το Ελληνικό Κοσμοσύστημα (The Hellenic Cosmosystem)*, vol.1 Athens: Sideris, 2006, pp. 225-247. Geoffrey De Ste Croix, *Athenian democratic origins and other essays*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Ober Josiah, "The Nature of Athenian Democracy" (review article: Hansen, Athenian Assembly), *Classical Philology* 84 no. 4 (October 1989).

branch and the People's Court, the judiciary branch.⁶ “The Greek word *dēmokratia* conjoins *kratos*, a term for power, and *dēmos*, a term for “the people.” Thus, Greek democracy is typically and rightly seen as differing from the “modern form” of democracy in its emphasis on the relevance of the direct participation of ordinary people in collective self-governance”.⁷

More precisely, the narrative defines democracy as freedom, the full version of which refers to the constraints that nature imposes on man as well as to the sociopolitical compulsions that concern the latter.⁸ Freedom has a unique value for Greeks' sociopolitical organization and is defined as the repetitive equivalent of autonomy. It also has three dimensions - individual, social and political.⁹ Firstly, the personal freedom covers man's private/public life within society. It is not placed at odds with society, but as a constitutive parameter of it. Secondly, the social freedom focuses on the area of social life where individuals make contracts with social (sub-) systems (institutions or other individuals), which bind their will or alter their social position. For example, the contract that was concluded between a man and his employer so as to exchange his labor for a payment is a deprivation of his (social) freedom. Lastly, political freedom refers to the position of the individual in the political state system. The key issue here is the establishment of a relationship between society and politics in which the person is autonomous and free to define himself. Stated differently, political freedom dictates that the people/citizens not be subject to anyone else's authority. It concerns the position of the overall society of citizens within the political system. The political system, however, is combined with another aspect of freedom that has to do with the polysemy (cultural, geographical, etc.) of society and, by extension, with the natural tendency of groups to self-manage their social, political and economic issues.

In response to the questions at the heart of this article and in conjunction with the aforementioned analysis of the core features of democracy, we argue that modernity's concept of democracy¹⁰ focuses on the personal level of freedom, i.e. the institutional status of people in terms of autonomy. There is neither social nor political freedom, only certain

⁶ Cristopher W. Blackwell, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁷ Josiah Ober, “What the Greeks can tell us about democracy”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (June 2008), p. 69.

⁸ Contogeorgis Contogeorgis, *Η Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία*, *op. cit.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

¹⁰ Robert A. Dahl Robert, *Democracy, Liberty, and Equality*, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986. David Held, *Models of Democracy* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. Paul Hirst, “Representative Democracy and its limits”, *The Political Quarterly* 59 no. 2 (1988), pp. 199-213. Paul E. Gottfried, *After liberalism: Mass democracy in the managerial state*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 30-36.

social rights to prevent the infringement of individual freedom and to preserve citizens' dependence contract with government. Accordingly, the fundamental problem of modernity is the adaption of the democratic ideal in a pre-political system such as post-feudal Europe. Thus, democracy is equated with individual rights and freedom,¹¹ something which is totally different to the basic logic of democracy as highlighted by Aristotle work. Subsequently, the political system of modernity, by the introduction of the parliamentary system in Western Europe and especially in the United Kingdom, became representative.¹² The principle of representation defines the measure of internal legitimacy, meaning that this is achieved through the "transformation of the political will from the individual level to the collective level. It holds that a group of people- today an electoral district- can elect a representative. They will represent the will of their constituency in the assembly of the other representatives – today in parliaments".¹³ On deeper investigation, the equation of democracy with parliamentarianism in the beginning of the 20th century and the undisputable role of parties as "the most important vehicles of mass democracy"¹⁴ in the implementation process of the policy reflects their leading position in the political system. This development may be interpreted under the light of the special position that the Western political system grants to political parties at all the levels of politics/state operation, for example in parliament, in government, in the local administration etc.¹⁵

Following the abovementioned syllogism, we can conclude that the transition from society to government of each political party leads to a

¹¹ Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in idem, *Liberty*, ed. Henri Hardy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969 [2002]). Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, p. 1. Michael Ignatieff, *The Rights Revolution*, Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2007. David Meskill, Concepts and consequences of Liberty: From Smith and Mill to Libertarian Paternalism, *Critical Review* 25 no. 1 (September 2013), pp. 89-91. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty." In idem, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1859 [1991].

¹² Arendt Lijphart, *Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1999 ch.2. Gustav S. Mahler, "The 'Westminster Model' Away from Westminster: Is It Always the Most Appropriate Model?" in Baaklini Abdo I. and Desfosses Helen (ed.), *Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 35-51.

¹³ Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁴ Kaare Strom, "Parties at the core of government", *op. cit.*, p.181.

¹⁵ Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Russell J Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, "Unthinkable democracy. Political change in advanced industrial democracies", in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), *Parties Without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.5-10. Kaare Strom, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

merger among them.¹⁶ The ruling party undermines the public body, since the main source of revenue is the public treasury, assisted by the legislative and a regulatory act of government. The result of this conjunction is not only the removal/separation of the ruling party from its society, but foremost the transformation of the party from a representative to an authoritarian institution. The domination of the party is reflected by its need to conquer the executive branch for the implementation of its policy, i.e. already defined internal checks with the already stated practices. Hence, the acquirement of governmental status by the ruling political party ends with the absorption of the political system and state politics by the ruling party.

A critical issue that inevitably arises from the above analysis is whether the civil society is on the inside or outside of political function and whether it exercises its primary role as a ruler and ruled of politics. This is the issue to which we now turn.

The function of politics in the modern nation state. An explanation and interpretation of party-society relationship

If we accepted that “parties have become agencies that govern ... rather than represent; they bring order rather than give voice”,¹⁷ then the major issue we have to explore is how to illustrate the actual role of civil society in the political system.

As we observed, the modern notion of democracy, by acknowledging political parties as the “most important organizations in modern politics”,¹⁸ deprives civil society of its principal role as an exclusive agent of formulation/implementation of politics and dissociates it from the political system. In other words, it leads to the rehabilitation of society, and “it is part of the process by which parties and their leaders separate themselves from the”¹⁹ latter. This dichotomization between society and politics indicates that the former upholds in all fields of intra-state structure the role of the private. As a result, politics coincides with the existence and operation of political parties by distorting the meaning/function of classical democracy.

This is an important point since it illustrates the core difference between the classical and the modern concept of democracy, which is crystallized in the question of whether and to what extent civil society is located within or outside the state system. For modernity, the assignment of democratic and representative authority in the executive branch is not

¹⁶ Dalton and Wattenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

¹⁷ Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁸ Kaare Strom, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁹ Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

only possible, but also necessary due to the principle of functional differentiation established at state level. The result of this procedure is the eviction of society from the formatting process/implementation of politics, thereby turning it into a status of individual.

In order to analyze this issue and the central working assumption of our study, and so as to shed light on the exclusion of society from the formation/implementation of intra-state politics, we use the methodological framework of George Contogeorgis' analysis concerning political system categorization. This utilizes a typology of distinctive historical sequences (phases) consistent with the anthropocentric progress/evolution of Greek society, which demarcate and determine the political systems in three categories – pro-representatives, representatives and democratic.²⁰ In the former, society is the state's own estate. The state embodies the political system and society retains the role of the individual without any participation or say in policy formation. Conversely, the political staff decides on and sets the course of political process from beginning to end entirely assuming possession of the political system. In particular, and insofar as the current pre-representative Greek political system operates under the direction of the party system, the society's relationship with politics is strictly limited to a patron-client system.

In the latter, (i.e. Kleisthenis political system)²¹ the municipality holds the universal political competence. It is the master of the political system and the society is not only the mandator expressing the political will, but also a mandatee who implements its political decisions. Hence, in the intermediary phase of political growth, (Solon) society is constituted in municipality, namely in a perpetual political body, where it becomes the principal of the political staff through representation.²²

Therefore, the basic difference between a democratic and a representative political system can be detected in the abolishment of the mandator-mandatee (rulers and ruled) relationship that is established in the latter. Both in representative and democratic political systems, the political staff is controlled and held accountable by the municipality for its acts. It is subject to justice and punished for any wrong or harm done to the community decision.²³ However, even if we assume that modernity's notion of democracy is familiar with representation, we have to check its domestic institutional array. For instance, in representation, the political

²⁰ Contogeorgis Contogeorgis, *Η Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-3. Idem, *Οι Ολιγάρχες*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²¹ Aristotle notes the motive of Cleisthenes at 1319B21. See, John J. Kearney, *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia: Observation and Explanation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 22.

²² Kearney, *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²³ Contogeorgis Contogeorgis, *Οι Ολιγάρχες*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

system is shared between society (that is also established on institution/municipality) and the political power/state. The society takes on the responsibilities of the mandator (specifies the policies that will be exercised, controls, divests the politicians of office etc.), while the political staff assumes the responsibilities of the mandatee. In this sense, representation as a political system is positioned in the middle of a democracy pendulum.²⁴ Similarly, in terms of essential features, the political system of representation requires, firstly, the establishment of civil society in a constant municipality, so as to be able to bear the responsibility of a daily consultation on issues and manifestation of its volition, and secondly, a clear outline of what it needs to deliver as a mandator of the executive branch:²⁵

- the design/dictation of the basic guidelines of politics practiced by the authorized representative,

- the decision on the key issues it considers important for it,

- the demand of its representative to disprove or take back decisions that diverted from the constitutional framework,

- the explicit prohibition of government action in cases where it would try to alter the institution of political power, to alter the followed policies without the express consent of municipality,

- and further, the control and revoking of the mandate at any time which it deems appropriate via accountability and bringing to justice.

The transition to a representative state presupposes the emergence of the concept of civil society in a distinct political category via its institutionalization as a constant and organic part of the state and political system. In this way, the function of representation, like democracy, requires the transformation of civil society into demos-municipality. Though, in representation, the political jurisdiction does not accrue entirely to the municipality of society. The municipality takes on only the competences pertaining to the property of the principal, while the powers belonging to the carrier's agent remain with the political power of the state (Contogeorgis 2011).²⁶

Consequently, the parliamentary political system of modernity is pre-representative and differs entirely from the classical notion of democracy. It leaves the configuration of the political, social and economic fields beyond the grasp of the State. Take as a given, that the latter does not get

²⁴ Idem, *Η Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33.

²⁵ Idem, "What is democracy", in *Cosmosysteme-Cosmosystem-Κοσμοσύστημα*, October 1, accessed January 3, 2015, <http://contogeorgis.blogspot.gr/2011/10/blog-post.html>.

²⁶ Contogeorgis Contogeorgis, *op. cit.*

involved in the formation of social correlations and, indeed, this is left entirely to ex-institutional agents, such as political parties.

Discerning modernity's political triangle-state, peoples and parties

To be more precise, we have to mention the false division that took place in modernity's political literature between direct democracy and indirect representation and which indicates the abstention of civil society from policy. The former takes plebiscites as a basic form to introduce civil society into state policy formation/implementation and to also curb the power of governmental parties. Although the main aim of referenda is to lower "partyism of policy-making"²⁷ by expanding the decision-making process via the inclusion of citizens in political practice, empirically it is used as an inverse measure to strengthen party government. More precisely, "if parties can" frame and administer the referendum's process, "if (referendums) [...] are held only when the parties desire them, and if the voters predictably take their cues from party leaders, then it is not clear that government parties have anything to lose through such mechanisms of decision-making".²⁸ There are several examples of countries where their political parties have manipulated and controlled referenda. In Italy, "after the referendum mechanism came into use in the 1970s, it was exploited extensively by the Radical Party, and even occasionally by the Christian Democrats".²⁹ Likewise, "the use of direct democracy under French President de Gaulle"³⁰ was "a deliberate attempt by the President himself to strengthen his party and his own grip on French politics".³¹

Respectively, the indirect representation, either in parliamentary or in functional form, dominated as the central control mechanisms of political power through the role of parties. In particular the former (parliamentary representation) is embodied by the existence and functioning of political parties that occupy government, while the most characteristic form of the latter (functional) is corporatism.³² In both cases, the actual role of society

²⁷ Kaare Strom, *op. cit.*, p.186.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁰ Henry W. Ehrmann, "Direct Democracy in France", *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 4, (December 1963), pp. 883–901.

³¹ Kaare Strom, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

³² *Ibidem.*, p. 184, In Schmitter's words, "Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their election of leaders and articulation of demands and

is to legitimize, through its vote, the political staff. This also means that a close relationship between parties, government and state exists, leading to an “unhealthy symbiosis between those who represent (the party or parties) and those who rule (government and public service)”.³³ A profound result of this process is the ‘invasion’ of the state by parties, referred to as *partitocracy*. It is a situation in which the political parties dominate the state and ‘colonize’ important segments of its institutions and society, like public administration (at all levels), public enterprises, education, the media, etc.³⁴ As Puhle notes: “The privileges and the services of the *Parteienstaat* (Partitocracy) [...], go to *all* significant parties, including the opposition—a mechanism that has been further intensified in Germany by federalism, in Austria by the long-standing practice of Great Coalitions, and in Italy by the broad *arco costituzionale*, the antifascist consensus, and a long tradition (until 1993) of an almost equal distribution of the local and regional strongholds between the two major parties. [...] One of the most prominent features of these practices since the late 1950s has been the financing of parties out of the state budget. Public financing of parties has usually favoured the parliamentary group of the party, and currently covers about half of the budgets of the major parties in most European countries (with the exception of the Netherlands)”.³⁵

At the broadest level, the privileges are distributed by party officials who are “placed alongside ministers in the government” and ensure that it (privileges distribution) “takes the form which the party approves of”. Under these conditions, patronage is a permanent and a large-scale phenomenon occurring in Westminster-type parliamentary systems. “This was the case in Belgium, Austria, and pre-1992 Italy”.³⁶

supports”. Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the century of corporatism?” *The Review of politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974), pp. 93-94.

³³ Jean Blondel, “Party Government, Patronage and Party Decline in Western Europe”, in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, Juan Linz (ed.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 235.

³⁴ Klaus von Beyme, *Die politische Klasse in Parteienstaat*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993). Christos Lyrantzis, “Greek politics in the era of economic crisis: reassessing causes and effects”, Hellenic Observatory papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, GreeSE paper no. 45 (March 2011). The Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2011, p.: 5. Available at

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33826/1/GreeSE_No45.pdf. Hans J. Puhle, 'Still the age of catch-allism? Volksparteien and Parteienstaat in crisis and re-equilibration', in Richard Gunther, Ramon Jose Montero, Juan J. Linz (ed.), *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 70.

³⁵ Hans J. Puhle, *op. cit.*, p.71.

³⁶ Blondel, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

A logical consequence of these processes is a structurally interwoven relationship between parties and state. The parties (represented by the party elites) are no longer representing societal interests. Instead, they form a part of the state, primarily representing themselves as a power elite or ‘political class’. It is in this context that the formation of party government takes place. We refer only to situations when “a single, cohesive party gains control of the policy-making apparatus through elections and formulates policy that is then faithfully executed”.³⁷ This has made it necessary for societal interests to be represented by different groups and organizations, like intermediaries³⁸ –political parties,³⁹ interest associations (unions and guilds) and social movements, which, in turn, approach the parties in their function as representatives of the state.⁴⁰

The relationship between society and politics in modern Greece. From the state of demos to the party state

Our ultimate objective in this section is to analyze whether the “withdrawal of party leadership from the realm of civil society into that of government and the state, leads to an amalgamation between parties and government”.⁴¹

We might start by investigating the actual role of political parties in the modern Greek state, from the establishment of the parliamentary system and the introduction of the catholic vote in 1843, long before it was introduced in the so-called classic parliamentary countries, e.g. Great Britain,⁴² in the current era. Actually, the introduction of a parliamentary system in Greece was to be the core means of resolving the conflict

³⁷ Kaare Strom, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

³⁸ The basic functions, of intermediaries’ institutions are:

a) to link the preferences of persons, families, and firms to various agents and agencies of government;

b) to aggregate the individual preferences of their members or categories into collective demands;

c) to protect formal political rights of assembly and petition in democracies.

³⁹ In a democratic regime, political parties are the principal mediators between the voters and their interests, on the one hand, and the institutions of decision-making, on the other. See, *Philippe C. Schmitter*, “Parties are not what they once were”, in *Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 70.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Peter Mair, “Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western Democracy;” *New Left Review* 42, (November 2006), p. 12., <https://newleftreview.org/II/42/peter-mair-rulingthe-void>). *Tillmann C. Lauk, op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴² *Nikos Alivizatos, An introduction to the Greek constitutional history* Athens: Sakoulas, 1981). *Dimitrios Charalambis, Patronage relations and populism*, Athens: Exantas, 1989. *Paul Petridis, Political force and constitutional institutions in Modern Greece, 1844-1936*, Salonica: Sakoulas, 1984.

"between central and local power" and, subsequently, the vehicle (via the introduction of universal suffrage) of the political elites/dignitaries to impose their political will and to occupy the state apparatus.⁴³ As Panayiotis Kondylis analyzed, the founding of the parliamentary monarchy in the Otto period gave to the party system the possibility of appropriation of the state apparatus and converting it into a party state.⁴⁴ This is because, from then on, the exercise of political power was not a way to promote/defend the common interest, but a struggle for conquest and appropriation of public wealth, so as to take up and retain government power. The ownership of the state apparatus has been facilitated by the fundamental needs of social groups, since both the rural population and landless people turned to the state to solve their problems, at least until the beginning of the 20th century. The former attempted to channel its labor surplus into the state market and the latter struggled for the distribution of national land.⁴⁵ From the moment that the Greek state acted as central employer, it was easy for its main agencies to use it as an instrument for its expansion and consolidation of their political influence. This process was embedded in a patron-client network, which was developed by the transfer of the patronage relationship from society to the political structure or via the use of political institutions to strengthen "interpersonal dependency relations at the level of the local community".⁴⁶ E.g. the farmer expects a share of state benefits, which may be achieved through voting, thereby entitling the patron to ownership of the political system-state apparatus. In this manner, "the parliamentary party leader [...] requires from their people obedience, [...] but at the same time undertakes to "act on their own affairs", i.e. he helps them to "arrange", and ensures through his influence, comparative advantages in their competition with fans of other parties".⁴⁷ In other words, the ruling party becomes a possessor of public wealth so as to fulfill the selfish needs of private individuals. Also, we should not overlook the extensive autonomy of the political party game of patron-client relationships between politicians and voters, in which each voter provides support in return for protection, while a politician sells off the state to voters in exchange for staying in office. A politician establishes his power on the ability to distribute lucrative posts and positions. This procession of the autonomy

⁴³ Dimitrios Charalambis, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁴ Panayiotis Kondylis, *The decline of urban civilization. From the modern to the postmodern era of and from liberalism to mass democracy*, Athens: Themelio, 1991, pp. 51, 56.

⁴⁵ George Contogeorgis, *Political system and policy*, Athens: Polytypo, 1985, p. 95. Konstantinos Tsoukalas, *Social growth and statem* Athens: Themelio, 1999.

⁴⁶ Idem, p. 95.

⁴⁷ Panayiotis Kondylis, *The decline of urban civilization, op. cit.*, p. 20.

of the political party game leads to the abolishment of ideological contrasts by making them minor or merely pre-textual.⁴⁸ In particular insofar as the current pre-representative Greek political system operates under the direction of the party system, the relationship of society with politics is strictly limited to the patron-client context. By using the parliamentary political system as a vehicle to promote patronage interest and practices under the auspices of a patronage network, the governing party has occupied the whole political system and diminished the Greek society. This was accomplished by the total exclusion of society from the constitution and the conduct of politics, thereby turning its status into that of a private individual –“idiot” in ancient Greek.⁴⁹ The de-collection of the Greek society, as a logical consequence of the de-construction of its historical acquis upon entering into the modern era,⁵⁰ leads to the citizen’s personal dependency on the politician.⁵¹ Especially in the Greek political system, the relation between society and politics is intermediate due to the absence of a representative authority. The principle of the mandator and the meaning of politics do not belong to society, so as to be able to control the linkage between society and politics. As G. Contogeorgis mentions, “the principle of the originator belongs exclusively to the agent-state, whereas the meaning of policy refers to the “nation” or to the “public interest” and not to the will of society or its interest”.⁵² The state –government represents the nation and not the society. The final result of this process is the weakening “of formal civil society,⁵³ which has been characterized as

⁴⁸ Dimitrios Charalambis, *Patronage relations and populism*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ George Contogeorgis, “Political Culture in Greece”, *op. cit.*

<http://contogeorgis.blogspot.gr/2008/02/political-science-in-greece.html>

⁵⁰ For this issue see, Anthony Giddens, *The consequences of modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. Panayiotis Kondylis, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-67. Alberto Martinelli, *Global Modernization. Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, London: Sage, 2005, p. 8. Timothy Mitchell (ed.), *Questions of modernity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Humbert and Kenneth Thompson (ed.), *Modernity: an introduction to modern societies*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The roads to modernity: the British, French and American enlightenments*, New York: Vintage books, 2005. Robin W. Winks and Joan Neuberger, *Europe and the making of Modernity: 1815-1914*, USA: Oxford University Press, 2005.

⁵¹ George Contogeorgis, *Partitocrazia and dynastic state. An interpretation of the Greek stalemate*, Athens, Patakis, 2012.

⁵² Idem, *Η Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία*, *op. cit.*, p. 749.

⁵³ George Mavrogordatos, “From traditional clientelism to machine politics: the impact of PASOK populism in Greece”, *South European Society and Politics* 2, no. 3 (Winter 1997), pp. 1–26. George Mavrogordatos, “Civil society under populism”, in Richard Clogg (ed.) *The Populist Decade*, London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993, pp. 47–64. Nikos Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, London: Macmillan, 1978.

relatively underdeveloped, poorly organized, with few weak civil society organizations and dominated by a powerful government.⁵⁴

The dispute of the political function of democracy from society

In the aforementioned analysis, we stressed that the essence of modernity's approach to political function lies in the essential dichotomy between society and politics, making policy an exclusive operation of the state and being expressed in terms of sovereignty. In detail, it has not approached the society as a coherent political entity, and it has not recognized society's position in the political system or its role in the political process due to the fact that it has not considered the capability or the maturity of civil society to take part in the political function.⁵⁵ Throughout this discussion, the central question is why "public doubts about politicians, political parties, and political institutions are spreading across almost all advanced industrial democracies".⁵⁶ A formal answer confirms the internal democratic deficit, due to the divide between society and policy, as a primary cause of delegitimation of public policies. Although the mainstream view of public policies' legitimacy puts emphasis on "the link between institutions and their polities (their degree of societal embeddedness), on the link between policies and institutions (the effectiveness of the electoral process) and on the link between policies and their social and economic effects (output-orientation)",⁵⁷ in reality, the primary tie between society and public policy-making is a necessary fiction. As Verdun & Christiansen describes, a basic dictum of liberal democracy is the determination of public policy by citizens' preferences. But "in modern state this only rarely occurs. Instead, the institutions of

⁵⁴ Nikoleta Jones, Chrisovaladis Malesios, Theodoros Iosifides and Costas M. Sophoulis, "Social capital in Greece: measurement and comparative perspectives", *South European Society and Politics* 13, no. 2 (Autumn 2008), pp. 175-193. Dimitris Sotiropoulos and Evika Karamagioli, *The Greek civil society: the road to maturity*, 2006. Available at http://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Greece_Executive_Summary.pdf, (accessed 23 May 2015). Yannis Theocharis and Jan W. van Deth, "A Modern Tragedy? Institutional Causes and Democratic Consequences of the Greek Crisis", *Representation* 51, no. 1 (Winter 2015), p. 65.

⁵⁵ George Contogeorgis, *Modernity and Progress. The Greek Paradigm*, Athens: Cactus, 2001, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁶ Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 3.

⁵⁷ Amy Verdun and Thomas Christiansen, "Policies, Institutions and the Euro: Dilemmas of Legitimacy and Democratic Control", in Colin Crouch (ed.), *After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of European Monetary Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 174.

representative democracy ensure that elected governments fulfill the demands of ‘most people, most of the time’.⁵⁸ It is in this context that we now encounter the actual role of the modern state as the sole institution to carry out politics, i.e. legislative, judiciary and executive, and the only voice of the national interest. Especially modern democracies are facing an endogenous challenge from their own citizens “who have grown distrustful of politicians, skeptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions”. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with their government has increased because the gap between reality and expectations has widened. It is not so much that governments produce less, but that citizens expect more. The existing literature contains the assumption “that citizens’ expectations are the source of eroding faith in government (for example, Huntington 1981)”. I.e. people expect governments to “be responsible both for promoting the economy and for promoting a large array of non-economic issues that have entered the government’s policy agenda. The crucial factor, however, is [...] *the expanding diversity of policy goals* may create a dynamic in which dissatisfaction easily develops”.⁵⁹

The events that took place in many European countries and Greece in particular in recent years of sociopolitical and economic crisis showed an “unbridgeable chasm” between the rulers and the ruled and an unconvincing claim by the political elites that they represent public interest. In the case of Greece, “the financial crisis, the numerous political scandals and the solutions proposed by the ruling party – in line with the IMF-EU recommendations – have led many people to believe that the social contract is up for renegotiation”.⁶⁰ Large sections of the population,

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 172.

⁵⁹ Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, op. cit., p. 152.

⁶⁰ Harrys Mylonas, “Is Greece a Failing Developed State? Causes and Socio-economic Consequences of the Financial Crisis”, In Konstantina E. Botsiou and Antonis Klapsis (ed.), *The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2011: The Global Economic Crisis and the Case of Greece*, Athens: Springer, 2011, pp. 82-83. The electorate’s disappointment by the political system is constantly rising. On behalf of Kathimerini newspaper, the political Barometer of the Public Issue pollster records the electorate’s growing frustration and alienation from the political system; eight out of ten (78%) citizens are disappointed by the government’s work and nine out of ten (89%) are disappointed by the opposition. The stance of the citizens towards the parties is also deteriorating: political parties and their leaders –except for Mrs. Aleka Papariga- see their popularity decrease, a tendency towards depoliticization is rising and one third of the citizens chose to abstain from voting. At the same time, Prime Minister George Papandreou’s and PASOK’s image is deteriorating, despite their leading in percentage rates. “Expands the frustration of voters from the political system”, *Kathimerini*, Oct. 10, 2010, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_10/10/2010_418257 (accessed Dec.17, 2011).

traditionally voting for the two ruling parties, are increasingly detached from the political system. Some PASOK MPs and many trade unionists broke away from the government and participate in the escalating campaigns. Social repulsion for the political elites is changing from passive disengagement into active force. These deficit and legitimacy crises are spreading on the EU institutional level and are crystallized in the absence of citizens from the process of shaping and implementing basic political, economic and social measures.⁶¹

On a global level, we also came across a social uprising against the core problem of modernity as well as a request for a complete and utter reformulation of politics in a way that lets society actively participate in it, as the worldwide demonstrations on 15 October 2011 have shown. So the main questions are: What are the basic claims of the indignant peoples around the globe?⁶² What are the alternative policy proposals that would get us out of this political and economic impasse?

The basic claims of the indignant peoples come down to the fulfillment of their basic needs: employment, health, education and social policy. All people want to actively participate in the management of the main political and social problems of their countries so as to decide on the best available economic-political system that would help them to leave the current worldwide social, political and economic impasse behind. In this reading,

⁶¹ As Guardian notes: "Eurozone policymakers too often treat democratic accountability as a luxury rather than a necessity, as shall be made amply clear this week when Brussels will force the Athens parliament to pass a raft of sharp spending cuts, tax hikes and privatisations – despite the hostility of Greek voters". Quoted in *The Democratic Deficit in Europe and the Crisis in the Periphery*, 29 June 2011. <http://www.macrosilience.com/2011/06/29/the-democratic-deficit-in-europe-and-the-crisis-in-the-periphery/> (accessed May 11, 2012).

⁶² Here, we refer to the Global demonstrations held on October 15th in more than 950 cities in 82 countries around the world, October 15th: Dreaming of a "new global citizen power", *Periodismo Humano* (Human Journalism), Oct. 12, 2011,

<http://english.periodismohumano.com/2011/10/12/october-15th-dreaming-of-a-%E2%80%9Cnew-global-citizen-power%E2%80%9D/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

See, "Indignant' protests to go global on Saturday", France 24, Oct. 15, 2011. Article quotes: "Protesters will take to the streets worldwide on Saturday, inspired by the 'Occupy Wall Street' and 'Indignants' movements, to vent their anger against alleged corporate greed and government cutbacks. The organisers, relying heavily on Facebook and Twitter, say demonstrations will be held in 951 cities across 82 countries in Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa." <http://www.france24.com/en/20111015-indignant-protests-go-global-saturday> (accessed May 3, 2012).

"Indignant' protests across Asia", *Bangkok Post*, Oct. 15, 2011. Article quote: "Protesters across the Asia-Pacific region Saturday joined worldwide demonstrations inspired by the 'Occupy Wall Street' and 'Indignants' movements." <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/261525/indignant-protests-across-asia> (accessed May 3, 2012).

we now confront the question of the Greek society's abstention from the voting procedure as a comprehensible revulsion with the political parties. This event is highlighted and confirmed by the highest rates (44.1%) of Greek citizens' abstention from the latest polls. Abstention as a political act challenges both the nature of the political system as a pre-representative one and also the civilian staff itself as being inconsistent in its physical role of mandatee of the society. Especially in the Greek case, the main reason for the high levels of abstention is the institutional separation between society and policy. As a result, society seeks a discrete status in politics so as to be able to operate as a mandator and not as a private individual.

Conclusion

By summing up the key points of the foregoing analysis, we are getting to the fundamental assumption underlying the misuse of the democracy notion in the era of modernity as an instrument of political parties to check civil society, occupy the state apparatus and establish an oligarchic political regime.

The implications of the declining relationship between citizens and government as well as the challenges to the confidence in government are far-reaching in "Trilateral democracies—Japan, North America, and Europe- [...]. Citizens are cynical about their representative institutions, political parties, and, most of all, their politicians. Trust or confidence in these institutions is almost everywhere low (with more than half the public cynical or distrusting) and it has been steadily declining" (Diamond & Gunther 2001: ix). Also, the impact upon the formation and implementation of politics, as a result of the pre-representative relation between society and the executive branch, is profound. The problem of misappropriation of the political practice or the crisis of politics is crystallized exclusively in that executive power is proving capable to ensure or enforce policy at odds with the social structure and dynamic, and this can be discerned on three levels of intrastate politics:⁶³

- at the level of political institutions,
- at the level of the electoral base of the party, [...]
- at the level of intra-party operation of democracy, which implies essentially equal and decisive involvement of all actors in the shaping of real-life party ideology and the political program.

What is happening right now in European countries and Greece in particular is the creation of an "unbridgeable chasm" between the rulers and the ruled and an unconvincing claim by the political elites that they represent public interest.

⁶³ Contogeorgis Contogeorgis, *Political system and policy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

Following the conclusion of Mair, we assert that: “all over Western Europe, and in all likelihood all over the advanced democracies, citizens are heading for the exits of the national political arena . . . As citizens exit the national political arena, they inevitably weaken the major actors who survive there – the parties. [...] Just as voters retreat to their own particularized spheres of interest, so too have political and party leaders withdrawn into the closed world of the governing institutions”.⁶⁴

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⁶⁴ Peter Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (London, Verso, 2013). Quoted in Tillmann C. Lauk, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

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RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN HEGEMONY

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Abstract: *Realists such as Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer have viewed the escalation of the Ukraine crisis as detrimental to the US strategic interests on the assumption that it would push Russia further towards rising China. This paper proposes an alternative account that the dual containment of Russia and China is an inevitable choice for the US to ensure its predominance in the world and the Ukraine war could contribute to the success of such a strategy. It does not only consider traditional geopolitics based on military means but also the current era geoeconomics that relies on economic instruments and plays an increasingly crucial factor in reshaping the global balance of power. The Ukraine crisis could boost geopolitical threat perceptions from authoritarian and revisionist powers and produce centripetal forces in international politics. The increasing leverage of Washington on its traditional allies throughout the world may remove the greatest handicap of the US strategic rebalance to Asia and consolidate the American political, economic, and military influence both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. However, the success of the American dual containment strategy also depends on how China will react to the crisis and how Beijing's behavior in its neighborhood will be affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war.*

Keywords: *Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, the Russian-Ukrainian war, the United States, China*

Introduction

Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer who are the most prominent realist scholars of the contemporary era view the Ukraine crisis as harmful to American strategic interests as it would push Russia further to rising China, the next peer competitor of the United States. Below is an alternative account that the dual containment of Russia and China is an inevitable choice for the US to ensure its predominance in the world and the Ukraine war might contribute to the success of such a strategy. It does not only consider traditional geopolitics that is based on military means but also the current era geoeconomics that relies on economic instruments to project power. This separation is analytically important because the rise of

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geopolitical or geoeconomic power competition between great powers stimulates diverging dynamics in international politics. As suggested by Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, geoeconomics produces low or medium threat perceptions, underbalancing behavior, and “centrifugal forces.” In contrast, geopolitics creates high-level threat perceptions, counterbalancing or bandwagoning behavior, and therefore, “centripetal forces” in the international system.¹

The Ukraine crisis has again increased geopolitical threat perceptions from authoritarian powers with revisionist aspirations and triggered centripetal forces in international politics. Under these conditions, American traditional allies in Europe would likely commit themselves more to balance resurgent Russia and call the US to provide greater support in that respect. The increasing leverage of Washington on its Europe allies could remove the greatest handicap of the US strategic rebalance to Asia. While counterbalancing China in its neighborhood together with the United Kingdom and its Asia-Pacific allies, the United States would enjoy a continuing strategic influence over Europe through re-consolidated NATO and bilateral defense ties with European countries. The rising threat perceptions from Russia and its quasi-ally China may also push European states to take the side of Washington in the latter’s growing disputes with Moscow and Beijing in different areas such as economy, trade, technology, and energy. This would provide great advantages to the United States in the rising geoeconomic power competition between great powers, which plays an increasingly crucial role in shaping the future of the global balance of power.

This paper is structured as follows. The first section examines the Ukraine crisis from the mainstream international relations perspectives. Besides the realist theory, it also touches upon the liberal perspective towards the crisis, as the US containment strategy towards both Russia and China is championed on idealist grounds such as the need to defend the liberal order against rising authoritarian powers. The second section deals with the argument on the decline of the US hegemony considering the geopolitical and geoeconomic developments. It emphasizes the US’s enduring comparative advantages vis-à-vis all other great powers in geopolitical terms such as its preponderant military capabilities and its far-reaching alliance network that facilitates American military power projections in different parts of the globe. Yet, it also underlines how geoeconomic power projections by Russia and China could easily penetrate the US traditional spheres of influence and undermine Washington’s political, economic, and security interests in those regions. The third

¹ M. Wigell and A. Vihma, Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s Geostrategy and its Effects on the EU, *International Affairs*, 92(3), 2016, p. 605.

section examines how Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to the rise of geopolitical threat perceptions which might again reinforce centripetal forces concerning the relationship between the US and its traditional military allies. The fourth section elaborates the future prospects concerning the implications of the Ukraine war for great power politics. Those prospects would be dependent on China's reaction to the ongoing security crisis in Europe and how its behavior in its neighborhood will be affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The Ukraine Crisis from the Liberal and Realist Perspectives

It is a widely held argument that the issue of NATO enlargement has played a major factor in the emergence of the Ukraine crisis. The liberal perspective on the NATO enlargement views it as a key instrument to promote liberal and democratic values in Eastern Europe and to expand the zone of stability, peace, and prosperity towards this region.² According to this account, NATO does not pose any threat to Russia and the Kremlin's resistance to the enlargement has no legitimate basis. The problem is that Russia has an authoritarian regime with revisionist and expansionist aspirations towards its neighborhood. Democratic states do not fight with each other but they must retain their deterrent capability against such authoritarian powers to ensure international peace and stability and the independence of smaller liberal countries as well. The making of concessions to the threats by authoritarian powers would be self-defeating as it would only encourage them to more aggression.³

Realists such as Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer have always been critical to the NATO expansion towards the Russian borders. They have considered that it would provoke Russian threat perceptions and move it into a more aggressive path, and more critically, towards rising China. Both Walt and Mearsheimer view the Ukraine crisis as a classic example of a security dilemma between two nuclear-armed great powers, the United States and Russia. Geopolitics 101 suggests that Russia would not permit Ukraine to become a Western military bulwark on its borders

² See S. Lucarelli, Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link the EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities, *Research project funded by the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Individual Research Fellowships – 2000-2002 Programme*, 2002. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli's.pdf> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); D. Zagorcheva, NATO Enlargement and Security in the Balkans, *Journal of Regional Security*, 7(1), 2012, pp. 7-31.

³ I. Bond, Why The West Should Deter A Russian Attack On Ukraine, *CER Insight*, Centre for European Reform, November 30, 2021. Available at:

https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_IB_ukraine_30.11.21.pdf (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

and fight against this possibility with all its might.⁴ The liberal illusions in the United States have disabled the decision-makers from seeing this reality despite the clear position taken by Moscow since the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008 declaring Ukraine's and Georgia's future memberships.⁵ Both Walt and Mearsheimer have opposed the arming of Kyiv against Russian forces and separatists in Donbas. They advocated Ukraine's "neutrality" as the best solution for the crisis, which was rejected by the West during the last peace negotiations before the Russian invasion.⁶ Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer view the renewed war in Ukraine as detrimental to the US strategic interest as it would move Washington's central focus to Eastern Europe from the Asia-Pacific region.⁷ Given that rising China is the next peer competitor of the US, Washington's approach towards the Ukraine crisis would lead to self-defeating consequences concerning the future of the American preponderance in the international system.

Reconsidering the US Hegemony: The Geopolitical and Goeconomic Aspects

A critical review of Walt's and Mearsheimer's arguments summarized above requires a reconsideration of the American hegemony from geopolitical and goeconomic standpoints. Indeed, the contemporary discussions on the decline of the US hegemony are not based on any shift in the military balance of power between great powers. Still, the United States has the strongest army with the greatest power projection capabilities, which is supported by a huge military budget that is far

⁴ J.J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin, *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 2014, pp. 77-89.

⁵ Ibid.; S.M. Walt, Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis, *Foreign Policy*, January 19, 2022. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/19/ukraine-russia-nato-crisis-liberal-illusions/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁶ S.M. Walt, Why Arming Kiev Is a Really, Really Bad Idea, *Foreign Policy*, February 9, 2015. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/how-not-to-save-ukraine-arming-kiev-is-a-bad-idea/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); J.J. Mearsheimer, Don't Arm Ukraine, *New York Times*, February 8, 2015. Available at: https://46.4.108.76/2015/02/09/opinion/dont-arm-ukraine.html?__cpo=aHRocHM6Ly93d3cubnloaW1lcy5jb20 (Accessed: March 22, 2022).

⁷ See S.M. Walt, The West is sleepwalking into war in Ukraine, *Foreign Policy*, February 23, 2022. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/united-states-europe-war-russia-ukraine-sleepwalking/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); I. Chotiner, Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine, *The New Yorker*, March 1, 2022. Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

greater than that of China and Russia combined.⁸ Furthermore, the United States has by far the most comprehensive and established network of military alliances, which extends from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region and dates back to the Cold War years.⁹ This alliance structure continues to serve Washington's strategic interests, as it manages its rivals by discouraging expansionist threats and providing grounds for American military power projection in offshore regions.¹⁰

The most significant reason for questioning the US hegemony is that Washington has been losing its leverage on its traditional allies which have been increasingly inclined to cooperate with the American strategic rivals such as China and Russia mainly in the areas of the economy, technology, transportation, and energy.¹¹ During the last decade, the US has not been successful enough in convincing its European allies that both authoritarian powers pose a major threat to international stability and the liberal world order. This situation is closely related to the rise of geoeconomic power competition that relies on economic instruments vis-à-vis traditional geopolitics driving on military means. The rise of geoeconomics in the contemporary world has influenced significant dynamics of international power politics, which is yet to be acknowledged by realists. As Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma put it, traditional geopolitics creates high-level threat perceptions, counterbalancing or bandwagoning behavior, and therefore, centripetal forces in the international system. By contrast, geoeconomics produces low or medium threat perceptions, underbalancing behavior, and centrifugal forces in international politics.¹²

Geoeconomics is a variant of realist power politics conducted through economic means including trade policy, investment policy, commodity and

⁸ See D.L. da Silva, N. Tian, and A. Marksteiner, A., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, April 2021. Available at: https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_o.pdf (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁹ B. Tertrais, The Changing Nature of Military Alliances, *Washington Quarterly*, 27(2), 2004, pp. 136-137.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹¹ See D. Twining, China's Trans-Atlantic Wedge, *Foreign Policy*, March 25, 2015. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/23/chinas-transatlantic-wedge/> (Accessed: December 25, 2021); D. Voelsen, 5G and the US-China Tech Rivalry – A Test for Europe's Future in the Digital Age, *SWP Comment* No 29, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019. Available at: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C29/> (Accessed: March 22, 2022); and S. Lohmann and K. Westphal, US-Russia Policy Hits European Energy Supply: The Consequences of Unilateral Sanctions and Growing Market Competition, *SWP Comment* No. 6, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February, 2019. Available at:

https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2019C06_lom_wep.pdf (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

¹² M. Wigell and A. Vihma, *Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics*, p. 605.

energy policies, and financial assistance. The declaration of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China in 2013 has been a crucial factor that transformed the global and regional power competition into an economic exercise rather than a military activity.¹³ This project supports Chinese geostrategic goals such as asserting control over trade and energy routes connecting Europe and Asia, advancing its comparative advantages in trade, and accelerating its rise as a great power.¹⁴ While pursuing such objectives China avoids confrontation associated with geopolitics. Following the operational logic of geoeconomics, Beijing appeals to selective accommodation of economic interests of individual countries including the US military allies.¹⁵ The promotion of economic interdependence and the manipulation of economic ties discourage those states from completely joining the anti-China coalition led by the United States.¹⁶

On the other side, Russia contributes to Beijing's wedge strategies towards NATO and the European Union. Energy pricing policy, pipeline politics, and trade restrictions have all played significant roles in the Russian geoeconomic strategy towards Europe, while Moscow has also appealed to more direct tactics such as supporting anti-EU political parties in different member countries. All those moves aim at expanding the Russian influence in Europe and keeping the EU too weak and disunited to oppose Russia.¹⁷ A divided Europe that could not resist even Russia's geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions would be much more unwilling to support the United States in its efforts to build a worldwide counterbalancing coalition against rising China.

Those developments in Europe represent the biggest handicap of the US strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific which is sought since the Obama years. The US should move its geopolitical focus to the region to deal with rising China but it could not just leave the "back door" open for Chinese

¹³ See M. Beeson, *Geoeconomics with Chinese Characteristics: the BRI and China's Evolving Grand Strategy*, *Economic and Political Studies*, 6(3), 2018, pp. 240-244; and R. D. Blackwill and J. M. Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 10, 93.

¹⁴ See G. Gertz and M. M. Evers, *Geoeconomic Competition: Will State Capitalism Win?*, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43(2), 2020, p. 122; M. Leonard, Introduction, In *Geo-economics with Chinese characteristics: How China's economic might is reshaping world politics*, *The World Economic Forum*, January 2016. Available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Geoeconomics_with_Chinese_Characteristics.pdf (Accessed: December 25, 2021); and S. Shen and W. Chan, *A Comparative Study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan*, *Palgrave Communications*, 4(1), 2018, pp. 1-11.

¹⁵ M. Wigell and A. Vihma, *Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics*, p. 605.

¹⁶ See S. Shen and W. Chan, *A comparative study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall plan*, p. 9.

¹⁷ M. Wigell and A. Vihma, *Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics*, pp. 605-627.

and Russian geoeconomic initiatives seeking to drive a wedge both in NATO and the European Union. Realists consider that the abandoning of NATO's "open-door" policy would ease Russia's threat perceptions and make Moscow more prone to cooperate with the West to balance Chinese influence expanding towards its near abroad. However it is also likely that Russia would go on attempting to break up a less threatening NATO and the European Union as well, even Brussels also declares that it would not enlarge further eastwards. Russia's economic, energy, diplomatic, and security interests all favor dealing with European countries one by one and playing with their conflicts of interest with each other. Therefore, Russia would likely continue to support anti-EU and anti-NATO movements and to accommodate the interests of individual European countries which seek more strategic autonomy. Furthermore, the weakening of NATO and the EU by such moves of Russia would make Europe much more vulnerable to China's wedge strategies and geoeconomic power projections. Today, the EU combined is the second-largest economy in the world, whose total GDP remains behind that of the US and ahead of China's.¹⁸ The growing interdependence between Europe and Washington's main strategic rivals such as resurgent Russia and rising China could undermine the American hegemony and the US power preponderance in the longer term.

Those facts render the dual containment policy towards Russia and China an inevitable choice for the United States. NATO could not be mobilized against China in recent years due to the factor of geography and the low-level perceptions by Europeans. Therefore, the US has to cooperate with its regional allies Asia-Pacific and the United Kingdom, its staunch strategic partner, in rebalancing towards China's neighborhood. At the same time, Russia's invasion of Ukraine might eliminate the greatest handicap of the US rebalance strategy by mobilizing NATO and European countries against the Russian threat. It has already flared up high-level geopolitical threat perceptions and reinforced "centripetal forces" in Europe reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Russia's Aggression towards Ukraine and the Resurgence of Geopolitics

Realists have tended to empathize with Russia's threat perceptions that have increased since the 2000s due to the US offshore military interventions into Eurasia and NATO's enlargement towards Eastern Europe and the Baltics. They view Russia as a declining great power, which seeks just to defend the military balance and status quo in its close

¹⁸ Data from the World Bank. Available at

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US-EU-CN>
(Accessed: March 12, 2022).

neighborhood and falls short of posing a revisionist threat towards European security. During the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the leading European powers such as France and Germany showed some signals that they were not very distanced from such a perspective. However, Putin's adaptation of a revisionist historical narrative in his televised address on Ukraine, which he used partly to legitimize Russia's recognition of the self-proclaimed republics led to the questioning of that viewpoint.¹⁹ It was widely interpreted that Putin denies the legitimacy of Ukraine's sovereignty, as he views it "artificial" country created by the founders of the Soviet Union, which had been once ruled by the Russian empire. Furthermore, unlike Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008, the Russian military forces moved beyond the breakaway republics in Ukraine with the objectives of changing the regime in Kyiv, the demilitarization, and the neutralization of the country. It was responded to by an unexpected level of resistance by the Ukrainian side, which might return the Russian invasion into a prolonged interstate war inside of Europe with serious civilian casualties and critical repercussions for the European security.

On February 28, Putin announced that he was putting Russia's nuclear forces in a "high alert" position, presumably to deter a Western military involvement in support of Kyiv.²⁰ Yet, this development might well be perceived that Putin ceased to be a rational actor as the realities on the ground were evolving into a direction not anticipated by the Kremlin.²¹ The perceived threat of Russian aggression and expansionism managed to unite NATO to an unprecedented level since the Cold War years,²² which had been designated as "obsolete" by Donald Trump and a "brain-dead"

¹⁹ The Kremlin website, Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2022. Available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²⁰ J. Shapiro, Russia's Nuclear Alert Means NATO Must Tread Carefully, *Financial Times*, March 4, 2022. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/b6bfd338-f2e0-43c2-96f2-ocd918303ea2> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²¹ For example see M. McFaul, Opinion: Putin is Menacing The World. Here's How Biden Should Respond to His Nuclear Threats, *Washington Post*, March 3, 2022. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/03/how-biden-should-respond-to-putin-nuclear-threats/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); and T.L. Friedman, Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me, *New York Times*, March 8, 2022. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/08/opinion/putin-ukraine-russia-war.html> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²² M. Becker et al, United By Danger: How Vladimir Putin Brought the West Together, *Spiegel International*, March 4, 2022. Available at:

<https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/united-by-danger-how-putin-brought-the-west-together-a-f2b871da-500a-41d4-8e13-db7cdd99567c> (Accessed: March 22, 2022).

alliance by Emmanuel Macron in recent years.²³ Germany, which had been repeatedly criticized for failing to reach NATO's objective of spending 2% of GDP on defense, announced that it would devote 100 billion euros to a special fund for its military.²⁴ Denmark, Romania, Latvia, and Poland all followed Berlin to declare their commitment to increase their defense expenditure over 2% of their GDP.²⁵ Germany also removed its ban on arms supplies to Ukraine and joined the US to provide Kyiv with anti-tank weapons and surface-to-air missiles against the Russian forces.²⁶ The Ukraine war underlined the role of NATO for European security which literally draws the red line for any possible Russian aggression further towards the west. Two long-standing neutral countries of Europe, Sweden and Finland, also participated in the emergency meetings of NATO where they have shown an interest in expanding their cooperation with the Alliance. In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry threatened that Moscow would be pushed to take retaliatory steps if those two states move to join NATO.²⁷

The resurgence of geopolitical threats and conflicts would inevitably increase the United States' strategic significance for the European security, as the only great power with actual nuclear deterrent capability against Russia. This might provide Washington with significant leverage on its NATO allies on many issues including those related to geoeconomics. As suggested by Edward Luttwak, the geopolitical threats of the Cold-War era mitigated economic disagreements and trade quarrels between the US and

²³ W. Michnik, Why NATO is not Brain Dead, *New Eastern Europe*, November 12., 2019. Available at: <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/11/12/why-nato-is-not-brain-dead/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²⁴ R. Casert, One Putin Move and Behold: West's Unity Tightens Overnight, *Associated Press News*, March 1, 2022. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-west-eu-nato-f810a6d94524b804730a9704ad4foa87> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²⁵ A.D.H. Scheffer and G. Weber, Russia's War on Ukraine: the EU's Geopolitical Awakening, *German Marshall Fund of United States* March 8, 2022. Available at: <https://www.gmfus.org/news/russias-war-ukraine-eus-geopolitical-awakening> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²⁶ Deutsche Welle, Germany Reverses Ban on Weapon Sales to Ukraine — as It Happened, February 26, 2022. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reverses-ban-on-weapon-sales-to-ukraine-as-it-happened/a-60924798> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); D.E. Sanger et al, Arming Ukraine: 17,000 Anti-Tank Weapons in 6 Days and a Clandestine Cybercorps, *New York Times*, March 6, 2022. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

²⁷ A. Brzozowski, Finland, Sweden to Receive Enhanced Access to NATO Intel over Ukraine, *Euractiv*, February 26, 2022. Available at:

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/finland-sweden-to-receive-enhanced-access-to-nato-intel-over-ukraine/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

its smaller allies such as European countries and Japan.²⁸ Since its inception, Washington has attempted to block the Nord Stream 2 project through diplomatic efforts including sanction acts enacted by the US Congress such as “the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017.”²⁹ After resisting the US pressure for several years, Germany finally suspended the project on February 22, in response to Putin’s declaration of the recognition of the breakaway republics in Donbas.³⁰ The Russian invasion of Ukraine was soon reacted by concerted sanctions by the US and the EU on Russia in the areas of energy, technology, transport, trade, and finance.³¹ Those heavy measurements, making Russia the most sanctioned nation ever in the world,³² would not likely end Russia’s aggression immediately but they have the potential to isolate Russia from Europe in a foreseeable future. It would be a serious blow to Russia’s attempts to drive a wedge in the EU and transatlantic solidarity. However, we are yet to see whether the US increasing leverage on the EU countries could convince Europeans to take the side of Washington also in its growing economic disputes with China in the future.

The Future Prospects: Will Dual Containment of Russia and China Work?

Since the Wilsonian era, the US initiatives to reshape the international order have always been championed on idealist grounds, though those plans have been also driven by realist objectives not to mention ensuring the American predominance. The dual containment of Russia and China by the US is also based on the liberal assumption that those authoritarian powers inherently threaten the liberal world order that could only ensure

²⁸ E.N. Luttwak, From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce, *The National Interest*, (20), 1990, pp. 17-23.

²⁹ Congressional Research Service, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Halted, *CRS Reports*, Version 19, Updated: March 10, 2022. Available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11138> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³⁰ S. Marsh and M. Chambers, Germany Freezes Nord Stream 2 Gas Project as Ukraine Crisis Deepens, *Reuters*, February 22, 2022. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-2022-02-22/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³¹ See V. Pop, US, EU Discuss Latest Russia Sanctions, as Some Call for More, *Financial Times*, March 4, 2022. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/344dodd2-e82a-4e3a-a622-b4ee43166e2d> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); and European Council, Infographic - EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, Last reviewed: March 15, 2022. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³² T. Bella, Putin Turns Russia into the World’s Most-Sanctioned Country, Dwarfing Iran and North Korea, *Washington Post*, March 8, 2022. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/08/russia-most-sanctions-putin-ukraine/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

the maintenance of peace and stability. This logic also drives President Joe Biden's diplomatic efforts to forge a global alliance of democracies including the Summit for Democracy of 2021. Russia's aggression represents a convincing example for the supporters of such a view that an authoritarian great power ruled by a strong and reckless leader could readily take a decision to attack its smaller neighbors to fulfill their geopolitical expansionist ambitions.³³ The fact that Japan, South Korea, and Australia supported the West's sanctions on Russia³⁴ shows that those states do not view the war in Ukraine just as "a fire burning on the other shore," but rather a crisis that requires a firm commitment from US allies from all over the world against such aggressive moves taken by an authoritarian and revisionist power.³⁵

Against this backdrop, the rise of such geopolitical threats could mobilize American allies from Europe to the Asia Pacific under the leadership of Washington which is committed to protecting the liberal world order. Yet, the success of the American strategy also depends on how China's behavior in its neighborhood will be affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war and how Beijing will react to Russia concerning its actions towards Ukraine. The US shifting focus to the war in Eastern Europe and its reluctance for military involvement not to risk a direct conflict with Russia may encourage China to intervene in Taiwan. Such an aggressive move following Russia would acknowledge that China is an authoritarian power alike, which might also risk a nuclear war for its national goals and geopolitical aspirations in Asia-Pacific. Still, China accepts the Russian narrative on the crisis based on Moscow's security concerns and blames the West for the escalation of the war.³⁶ It is believed that China's resistance to joining the international sanctions on Russia and its ongoing energy cooperation with Moscow would undermine the efficiency of those measurements leaving Europeans with a more powerful Russian threat.³⁷

³³ S. Hamid, There Are Many Things Worse Than American Power, *The Atlantic*, March 6, 2022. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-kremlin-imperialism-ukraine-american-power/624180/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³⁴ S.R. Anderson, What Sanctions Has the World Put on Russia? *Lawfare*, March 4, 2022. Available at: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-sanctions-has-world-put-russia> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³⁵ M. Becker et al, United by Danger.

³⁶ C.F. Marques, China's Ukraine Doublespeak is Becoming Unsustainable, *The Japan Times*, March 4, 2022. Available at: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/03/04/commentary/world-commentary/china-ukraine-doublespeak/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³⁷ S.-J. Wei, Can Sanctions on Russia Work Without China?, *Project Syndicate*, March 9, 2022. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-and-extending-economic-sanctions-against-russia-by-shang-jin-wei-2022-03> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

Some also argue that China's flagrant violation of the US sanctions would risk Beijing's access to the international financial system denominated in US dollars.³⁸ Therefore, Beijing's unconditional support to Russia might both increase American allies' threat perceptions from China and jeopardize its peaceful rise based on the logic of economic interdependence with its neighbors and European countries.

There is a second possibility that China would take the lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian war seriously and induce itself to self-restraint. Immediately after Russia's assault, Beijing adopted a more threatening language towards Taiwan but toned down its discourse shortly following the Western united response supported by unprecedented sanctions.³⁹ Since then, China began to shift towards a more neutral position from its earlier pro-Russian stance probably to avoid the risk of making a lot more adversaries for the sake of supporting Putin.⁴⁰ Despite Beijing's statement that it disagrees with the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, China has taken steps to comply with some of them, including the restriction of Chinese funding of certain transactions with Russia.⁴¹ Some commentators in the West consider that only China can stop Russia's aggression towards Ukraine by joining the economic embargo and demanding Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine.⁴² China could also use its huge economic leverage on an internationally isolated Russia to negotiate a quick end to the crisis in Europe.⁴³ On March 8, French President Macron, German

³⁸ J.Li and M. Hui, How China Can Help Russia Survive Economic Sanctions, *Quartz*, February 28, 2022. Available at: <https://qz.com/2134620/how-china-can-help-russia-survive-swift-sanctions/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

³⁹ Bloomberg, *Putin's War on Ukraine Shows Xi the Dangers of Attacking Taiwan*, March 8, 2022. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-03-07/what-china-s-xi-is-learning-about-taiwan-from-putin-s-war-in-ukraine> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴⁰ K.B. Richburg, Opinion: China Faces a New, Uneasy Balancing Act on Russia and Ukraine, *Washington Post*, March 5, 2022. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/05/china-russia-ukraine-uneasy-balancing-act/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴¹ J. Huang, China's Moment of Decision, *The Japan Times*, March 11, 2022. Available at: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/03/11/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-decision-moment/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴² S.S. Roach, Only China Can Stop Russia, *Project Syndicate*, March 7, 2022. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-russia-cooperation-agreement-under-ukraine-pressure-by-stephen-s-roach-2022-03> (Accessed: March 12, 2022); T. L. Friedman, The Cancellation of Mother Russia Is Underway, *New York Times*, March 6, 2022. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/opinion/putin-ukraine-china.html> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴³ D. Von Drehle, Opinion: The Xi-Putin Bromance is Surely on the Rocks, *Washington Post*, March 8, 2022. Available at:

Chancellor Scholz, and Chinese President Xi Jinping joined a video conference together, which raised the prospect of such a diplomatic imitative.⁴⁴ Some even claim that an active role played by China for the settlement of the crisis would “cement its great power status”⁴⁵ and make it “a true global leader.”⁴⁶ Therefore, China could also choose to adopt a conciliatory approach towards the Ukraine crisis and begin to distance itself from Russia. In this case, Beijing’s ongoing relations with Europe and its growing leverage on Russia might complicate the US dual containment policy that is based on the dichotomy between the authoritarian and democratic powers.

Conclusion

The two different prospects described above run contrary to the realist assumption that if Russia and China get closer it will be detrimental to the American strategic interests. A closer alignment between Moscow and Beijing following such a great security crisis would increase geopolitical threat perceptions and reinforce centripetal forces in international politics which would unite the US traditional allies in Europe and the Asia Pacific together under Washington’s leadership. A reconsolidated NATO would be much stronger against Beijing’s wedge strategies towards Europe through geoeconomic power projections. If China provides Russia with substantial economic and even military support, it could alienate itself from European countries. Those states would be more inclined to support Washington in its geopolitical and geoeconomic competition with Beijing on the assumption that a China that is more powerful than the United States might put the international peace and stability at serious risk.

Conversely, Beijing may distance itself from Russia, contribute to international efforts to build peace, and avoid military provocations in its neighborhood. Such an alternative path taken by China could decrease threat perceptions of European and Asia-Pacific countries from Beijing and make many of them more prone to cooperation with China despite the US opposition. While struggling with the negative repercussions of the sanctions imposed on Russia, European countries would not be willing to bear the costs of delimiting their economic cooperation with China, though their relationship with Russia and China matters in different economic sectors. As a result, Beijing could continue its geoeconomic power

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/08/china-russia-xi-jinping-rethinking-putin-bromance/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴⁴ D. Goldman, Could China Mediate the Ukraine War?, *Asia Times*, March 9, 2022. Available at: <https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/could-china-mediate-the-ukraine-war/> (Accessed: March 12, 2022).

⁴⁵ S.S. Roach, *Only China can stop Russia*.

⁴⁶ T.L. Friedman, *The Cancellation of Mother Russia Is Underway*.

projections extending from Asia to Europe which produce underbalancing behavior and centrifugal forces in international politics. This would lead to further questioning the American hegemony and the future of its power preponderance in the international system.

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RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES TOWARDS THE NEAR ABROAD

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Abstract: *Since the Soviet Union's (USSR) collapse, Russia's domestic and foreign policies have changed. With the loss of "superpower" status, Russians struggled to define their "national identity," which influenced the country's new foreign policy. This struggle affected Russia's ties with its sovereign neighbours, the former Soviet states termed the "Near Abroad" (blizhnee zarubezhe). The struggle specifically led to a series of territorial, leadership, economic, diaspora, and military conflicts with some countries in the Near-Abroad. The question of the legitimacy of territories and borders in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Trans-Dniester area (Moldova), and Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk areas of Ukraine is largely a result of the struggle. This paper discusses the factors affecting Russian domestic and foreign policy towards the Near-Abroad nations, which have influenced Russia's behaviour in contemporary international politics. Firstly, this essay analysed Russia's identity crisis and foreign strategy. The effect of Marxism-Leninism on Soviet foreign policy and the new Russian State was also discussed. This paper also analysed Vladimir Putin's pragmatic strategy in the Near-Abroad, focusing on Ukraine. This paper submits that Russia's determination to see the Near-Abroad states as largely within its sphere of influence and geopolitical interests hinders the establishment of equal ties with these countries.*

Keywords: *Soviet Union, Russia, Russian foreign policy, Realpolitik, Ukraine.*

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Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was one of the most dramatic, unexpected, and defining political events of the 20th century. The Soviet Union, formally known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was a socialist state in Eurasia from 1922 until 1991. From 1945 until its dissolution in 1991, it was one of the world's two superpowers along with the United States. The Soviet Union was created and expanded as a union of Soviet republics built on the land of the Russian Empire, which was overthrown by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Russian Civil War of 1918–1920¹. The political borders of the Soviet Union changed over time, but after the last major territorial annexations of eastern Poland, Finnish Karelia, the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and some other territories during World War II, the borders roughly matched those of late Imperial Russia from 1945 until it broke up, except for Poland and Finland². By 1956, there were 15 union republics that comprised the USSR. However, the end of an era in international relations was marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 sovereign, independent republics at the end of 1991³. As the legal successor to the former Soviet Union's status, the Russian Federation, under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin, inherited all of the Soviet Union's international rights, privileges, and obligations. More crucially, though, for policymakers, it inherited a vastly different geopolitical framework than the Tsarist and Soviet rulers had to deal with. Not only had the exterior environment moved beyond the knowledge of the Russian political elite, but also had the domestic picture. And, like his predecessors—from the Tsars to Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and M. Gorbachev—Boris Yeltsin was required to adjust to changing situations, especially when it came to foreign policy, which had to take both internal and external pressures into consideration.

Russia was never a nation-state but rather a multinational empire with messianic ambitions throughout both the Tsarist and Soviet eras⁴. Russian identity is divided between the ethnic Russian (*russskiy*) group and the *rossiyskiy*, which refers to all Russians regardless of nationality or religion. Both terms are translated as Russian, but there is a significant difference between *russskaya zemlya* (Russian land) and *Rossiyskaya Federatsiya* (Russian Federation) because *russskiy* “describes something

¹ G. Suny, *The baku commune, 1917-1918: class and nationality in the russian revolution*, Princeton University Press, 2019, p. 51.

² S. Bridger, Sue, and P. Frances, *Surviving post-socialism: Local strategies and regional responses in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*. Routledge, 2013, p. 22.

³ R. Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the breakup of the Soviet Union*, Hoover Press, 2020, p. 64.

⁴ P. Tsygankov, *The strong state in Russia: Development and crisis*. Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 101.

that belongs to the Russian ethnos” and *rossiyskiy* “describes something that belongs to the Russian state”⁵. The term *rossiyane*, on the other hand, refers to all Russian nationals.

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a “vacuum” in the new Russian Federation’s foreign policy, which raised the issue of Russia’s national identity⁶. No precedent existed to follow. Besides psychologically, the residue of being a global superpower was too powerful to ignore. Moreover, both Russia’s internal and foreign settings were radically altered because of the security issues it faces. These new security concerns of the new Russian state were at the core of Moscow’s strategic considerations. Externally, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include the former allies of the Soviet Union was seen as the greatest security danger to Russia. Even after more than a decade, NATO expansion is still seen as a significant danger to Russia’s security. However, the most complicated difficulty that Russia faced immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union was its relationship with its newly independent neighbours, the former Soviet republics, which is termed the “near abroad” (*blizhnee zarube-zhnye*). In its dealings with the nations of the near abroad, the new Russian state had to confront the historical legacies of Imperial Soviet Union—polities in which Russia had often played a dominant and repressive role in non-Russian territories.

After the Soviet Union’s breakup, countries in the near abroad were engaged in various conflicts that influenced Russian foreign policy. Russia and its neighbours (near abroad) have had some territorial, economic, diaspora, and military clashes. The territorial issues include Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Trans-Dniester area (Moldova), Crimea (Ukraine), and the invading of Ukraine in February, 2022. There have also been military confrontations over former Soviet military assets, including the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear weapons, stations, and bases, as well as the surrounding Russian military. A second major source of tension between Russia and countries in the near abroad is the status and the future of the 25 million Russian ethnic minorities who live in these countries.

The crisis of Russian identity

During the early years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been grappling with the loss of its identity. More than half a century of

⁵ O. Fridman, Ofer, *Strategiya: The Foundations of the Russian Art of Strategy*. Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 21.

⁶ A. Odey, and S. A. Bassey. “Ukrainian Foreign Policy Toward Russia Between 1991 And 2004: The Start of The Conflict.” *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2022, p. 346.

superpower status has left some permanent psychological impressions on the minds of the Russian people. The political elite had to cater to this craving for a new identity among the people – at least subtly, if not overtly. Though there have been some Russian leaders who have insisted on retaining the “superpower” status. Instead, most policy documents have tried to deliberately and strongly reinforce the position of Russia as a “regional power”, deserving its rightful place in international politics⁷. The Russian Federation’s vacillation in foreign policy stems in large part from the difficulties Russians have encountered in defining their national identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This search for a new identity had played a significant role in determining the course of Russian foreign policy, at least in the first few years of the post-USSR period. While all other former Soviet Republics benefited from the Soviet Union’s demise, Russia has suffered overall. Moscow has lost an empire and all the benefits that apparently go with it. The collapse has been a setback for the pride of the Russians. The new realities and the degraded status have been hard to digest.

The obvious reliance on Western financial aid had hurt the sentiments of the Russians, especially the patriotic lot. One of the cardinal questions of Russian national identity is whether “Russia as a civilization embraces only the Russian Federation or [whether] it also includes Ukraine and Belarus”⁸. For many Russians, the Soviet Union rather than the Russian FSSR was their homeland, the more so that the latter was purely formal rather than actual polity, the non-existence of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RFSSR) being the best example. It is not surprising that it has been difficult in the post-Soviet era to limit the Russian national consciousness to the boundaries of the Russian Federation. In fact, opinion polls in Russia have consistently shown that a majority of Russians do not see Ukrainians and Belarusians as separate ethnic groups, but as somehow Russian. This fact stems from the traditional Russian terminology, in which adjective *ruskiy* applies both to Russia and (Kievan) Rus’. These considerations have influenced Russian foreign policy toward the near abroad.

The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy

The Russian Federation was confronted with enormous domestic and foreign crises at the end of December 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen sovereign states. The rise of Russian foreign policy

⁷ J. Mankoff, *Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, p. 53.

⁸ K. Wolczuk, “History, Europe and the “national idea”: The “official” narrative of national identity in Ukraine.” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2000, p. 672.

must be understood in this context. These difficulties and problems would form the basis of Russia's new foreign strategy. The historical turning point in foreign policy thought was the shift from the imperial and ideological paradigms of the Leonid Brezhnev period to the New Thinking paradigms of the Gorbachev era. Externally, in the international arena, Gorbachev initiated in the late 1980s a trend in which the Soviet Union voluntarily lowered its responsibilities to the rest of the world, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America⁹. In addition, the Soviet Union had begun to reduce its influence in East Central Europe by disbanding the Warsaw Pact and removing its soldiers from those nations¹⁰. Despite the fact that a great deal of the motivation for these momentous choices sprang from the internal realities of the Soviet Union, particularly the economic collapse, this had a significant effect on the USSR, which lost its status as a global powerhouse. Boris Yeltsin's new Russian Federation had to take into account how the world had changed when it set up its foreign policy paradigm and framework.

The end of the cold war and the seeming ideological reunion with the West (notably the United States) was the second significant external event. Gorbachev referred to Europe as "our common home"; his *perestroika* and *glasnost* reflected the reconciliation of two formerly opposing philosophies. It was evident that Gorbachev's Soviet Union had begun to seek the West for socioeconomic and political growth inspiration. As Boris Yeltsin's first foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, subsequently acknowledged, "The last decade (i.e., 1982–1992) was not a time of eclipse, but rather a period of fight against the cruel communist system"¹¹. The inevitable outcome of this conflict would be Russia's merger with the West¹². However, the ideological differences between the West and the new Russian Federation had vanished by the time Moscow formulated its new foreign policy. It was now a matter of how quickly Moscow would accept the new ideology as the fundamental paradigm of its new foreign policy.

The Role of Ideology in Soviet Union Foreign Policy

For more than seven decades, the USSR was one of the two pillars of the bipolar world, the other being the United States of America (USA). It was the most prominent player in the cold war that dominated most of the twentieth-century international politics. Most countries during the Soviet

⁹ R. Strayer, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical Change: Understanding Historical Change*. Routledge, 2016, p. 52.

¹⁰ S. Mason, *Revolution and transition in east-central Europe*. Routledge, 2018, p. 73.

¹¹ M. Dembińska, and M. Frédéric, *Cooperation and Conflict Between Europe and Russia*. Routledge, 2021, p. 93.

¹² C. Lynch, "The evolution of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s." *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2002, p. 161.

era were either pro-USSR or anti-USSR. One either looked up to the Soviet ideology with great reverence or looked down on it with greater contempt. Indeed, both political thinkers and Soviet practitioners were drawn to the ideological component of the Soviet polity. Ideology has been considered the cornerstone of the former Soviet Union. Only during the Soviet period was the prevailing idea encompassed in an official ideology, Marxism-Leninism. According to Stephen White “there has been general agreement that official ideology plays a central role in Soviet politics”¹³. Hunt explains that the foreign policy attitudes of the Soviet leadership “are not simply based on Marxist-Leninist ideas in some abstract sense – they are soaked into its bones”¹⁴.

One major example is that the influence of Karl Marx’s internationalist theme on the thoughts and actions of the Soviet Union could be clearly seen during the First World War. Karl Marx stated that “workingmen have no country”¹⁵. In other words, Marx replaced “national loyalty” with the “common interest” of the international working class. Vladimir Lenin’s theory of imperialism also states that the task of a world socialist revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning the “imperialist world war” into a series of civil wars. Thus, Marxist thought extended by Lenin’s doctrine of imperialism provided the theoretical justification for the conclusion that the most effective course of action for the proletariat from the Marxist point of view during the First World War would be to turn weapons against its own government rather than support this government by fighting fellow proletarians from other countries. As V. Lenin summarised this position, “A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its own government”¹⁶.

This tactical conclusion had a theoretical grounding in European Marxism, but only Russian Marxists, especially Bolsheviks, followed its premises. In September 1914, the Bolshevik-controlled Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party produced a “manifesto against the war” claiming that socialism’s duty was to convert the conflict into a civil war. The Manifesto urged socialists in each country to defeat their own bourgeoisie and turn the conflict into a civil war¹⁷. The assumption was based on the Soviet political elite’s verbal communications

¹³ S. White, “Ideology and Soviet politics.” *Ideology and Soviet Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1988, p. 1.

¹⁴ C. Hunt, “The importance of doctrine.” *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*. Columbia University Press, 1960, p. 107.

¹⁵ K. Marx, and E. Friedrich. “The communist manifesto, 1848.” London: Penguin, 1967, p. 97.

¹⁶ A. Erdogan. *A. Lenin on Anti-Imperialist Wars*. Durham: Lulu Press, 2020, p. 90.

¹⁷ E. Marcobelli, “Commitment Against War.” *Internationalism Toward Diplomatic Crisis*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021, p. 229.

concerning foreign policy aims, tools, and execution. Thus, foreign policy was founded on Soviet leaders' claims to follow Marxism-Leninism ideology. This was the Soviet Union's principal motivation for almost sixty years.

Revolutionary movements necessitate revolutionary ideologies. Soviet intellectuals, lawmakers, and officials have repeatedly said their foreign policy was Marxist-Leninist. The Marxist-Leninist ideology ruled. In the Soviet Union, doctrine and practise were never criticised. This tight control of ideology by the Communist Party led to terrible policy rigidity, which helped bring about the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1900s¹⁸. Many scholars had expressed doubts about the Soviet Union's philosophy. Some scholars argue that Soviet politics was more about power than philosophy. It never existed for them. If it did, it was out of convenience, not ideology. Others contend that Soviet foreign policy was more pragmatic than ideological. Soviet philosophy, however, did not distinguish between theory and practise. This ideology-based viewpoint backs it up.

Truth resides between the extremes. Foreign policy in the Soviet Union was undoubtedly ideological. *Perestroika* (the policy of restructuring or reforming the economic and political system) and *glasnost* (the policy practise of a more open, consultative government and wider dissemination of information) ushered in a radical transformation in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. For the first time in socialist empire history, Marxist-Leninist foreign policy was questioned. *Perestroika* was Gorbachev's effort to rethink national security¹⁹. He wished to improve the image of the USSR by promoting democracy and market reforms. Mikhail Gorbachev used democracy as a vital component both externally and globally.

Vladimir Lenin and Self-Determination

Though Vladimir Lenin was not immune to the drive toward national self-determination in the early twentieth century, he was a statesman capable of adapting the right to self-determination to Russian reality. In the view of Vladimir Lenin, self-determination included making a temporary concession to nationalist feelings in return for political support for socialism. Lenin developed a concept of national self-determination that allowed national groups to join the Bolshevik ranks voluntarily and freely²⁰. The party rapidly seized the "right" to command and control their national destiny after accepting the offer. Therefore, the right to self-

¹⁸ L.R. James, *World revolution, 1917–1936: The rise and fall of the Communist International*. Duke University Press, 2017, p. 634.

¹⁹ D. Nordlander, "Khrushchev's Image in the Light of Glasnost and Perestroika." *The Soviet Union*. Routledge, 2018, p. 359.

²⁰ S.W. Page, "Lenin and self-determination," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 1950, p. 344.

determination became a one-time option rather than an ongoing legal right to self-government. If you granted them autonomy, they would not exercise it; if you denied them autonomy, they would demand it. According to Lenin, national autonomy included the right to self-determination and secession; the establishment of separate administrations for national groupings; and the complete legal, political, and economic equality of all nationalities in the fields of social and political life of the country²¹. Lenin believed that the establishment of a single party as the organisation of the proletariat and the idea of “democratic centralism” inside the party would keep nationalist impulses under control. In his last days, he saw that his administration was encouraging the forcible integration of other ethnicities into the Soviet Union, as opposed to the gradual, natural absorption he had envisaged. Stalin’s attempt to consolidate economic commissariats in Moscow in the wake of the Treaty of the Soviet Union of 1922 was thwarted in what may have been his last effort to repress deviations and implement his views²². Lenin compelled Stalin to alter the text, but by the time it was to be implemented, Lenin had passed away.

On the foundation of Lenin’s nationalities policy, successive Moscow Republic partnerships were constructed. The peripheral nations often used Lenin’s programme to deny greater rights and also as a shield against the center’s oppressive measures. According to Critchlow, it has been customary for advocates of minority rights to use Leninist references “to bolster every case for national rights”²³. On the other hand, national rights opponents have long maintained that Lenin was essentially an integrationist. They claimed national integration was Lenin’s goal in handling nationality relations. Marxist communism was in opposition to the property-based and territorial foundations of political organisation. Such an ideological justification facilitated the Bolsheviks’ denial of individual rights, localist parties’ rights, and territorial governments’ rights. Thus, ideology once again came to Moscow’s aid and was employed to tie the distant republics to the centre. However, the Soviet officials could not dismiss nationalist feelings entirely. By combining nationalist feelings with the weakened political structures of the territorial federation, they tried to harness the existing political dynamics. This became the main compromise of the Soviet Socialist Federation, which was a mix of nationalist and territorial ideas.

²¹ I. Levkov, “Self-Determination in Soviet Politics.” *Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions*. Routledge, 2019, p. 136.

²² R. Elsie, *Historical dictionary of Albania*, Vol. 75, Scarecrow Press, 2010, p. 33.

²³ G. Amato, et al., *The history of the European Union: Constructing utopia*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019, p. 128.

New Approaches to the Russian Foreign Policy

During the Mikhail Gorbachev regime, the dominating Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which had been the cornerstone of Moscow's foreign policy for more than seven decades, began to lose favour. In all practical terms, it ceased to exist following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the monopolistic, all-encompassing socialist ideology spawned a number of competing conceptions in Russian foreign policy. Like true neophytes, just about anyone and everyone proposed a viable and effective model of dealing with the new situation. While some argued for a clean rupture with the past, others refused to accept the Soviet Union's disintegration. Others, on the other hand, supported a middle ground that acknowledged the new circumstances but advocated modest future improvement. In the post-Soviet era, the contradictory conceptions and techniques of Russian foreign policy revealed a true challenge for policymakers—first recognising new national interests and then building the mechanisms to attain and safeguard them. In short, Russia's foreign policy in the first few years after the Soviet Union broke up was based on three main ideas, which will be discussed in more depth below.

The Atlanticists, Eurasianists and Russian nationalists

The Atlanticists, or Westerners, championed one of the first and most influential ideas. It was centred on the notion that Russia would completely sever ties with Soviet foreign policy, which was mostly motivated by ideological considerations²⁴. They wanted to connect Russia's foreign policy to the country's aspiration to become a normal capitalist nation with a position in Europe. The Atlanticists promoted a blatantly pro-Western stance intending to become members of the liberal, democratic West. This group was led by the first foreign minister of independent Russia, A. Kozyrev, a young professional diplomat who had spent sixteen years in the Department of International Organizations at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs²⁵. He had grown to appreciate and embrace M. Gorbachev's "new thinking" after serving under him for an extended time. Not unexpectedly, he strongly favoured Russia's membership in international organisations. He intended to wean Russia from its decades-long dependence on military means and build foreign policy concepts centred on the promotion of human rights and universal principles of global economic, environmental, and nuclear security, to be realised through a community of democratic nations. Throughout the first

²⁴ A. Wivel, and C. Matthew, "Punching above their weight, but why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the transatlantic relationship." *Journal of transatlantic studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2019, p. 397.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 398.

few months of 1992, Yeltsin and Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar, who were pushing Russia's dramatic economic changes, regularly expressed these "liberal" westernising views of Russia's national interests. For them, Western democracies constituted the perfect model and ally for Russia²⁶. The Atlanticists were criticised for unquestioningly adhering to the United States' position on economic assistance. They were singled out for their support of the United States on matters of weapons control and the Bosnian war. As a consequence of the subsequent discussions and critiques, the Russian government began to consider other options in the spring and summer of 1992. The voice of the Pragmatic Nationalists, or Eurasianists, was the loudest among them.

Eurasianists promoted continuity with Soviet history without hostility or confrontation with the United States or the West in general. Eurasianists were antagonistic to NATO and felt Russia's main interests should lie in its ties with its neighbours. As opposed to the Atlanticists, they believed that Russia was genuinely unique and apart from the West. Sergei Stankevich, an adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, was among the most ardent proponents of this strategy²⁷. Even though it was more important to focus on the East than the West, this school of thought didn't reject the West. Instead, it called for a balanced approach. In addition, they demanded harder negotiations to protect the Russian people and their Russian history in other ex-Soviet countries. As a Russian version of the United States Monroe Doctrine, one of B. Yeltsin's advisers, A. Migranian, argued in August 1992: "Russia should announce to the world that the whole geopolitical region of the former Soviet Union is a sphere of its vital interests"²⁸. The Eurasialists did not call for the forced redrawing of the borders of the Russian Federation. They disagreed with A. Kozyrev and Y. Gaidar argued that Russia needed to develop deeper ties with the republics of the former Soviet Union, which were Russia's newest neighbors.

The strategy espoused by Russian nationalists was the third option that gained widespread support. The proponents of this strategy denied the end of the Soviet Union. They argued that the fall of the Soviet Union was a mistake and saw the resurgence of the Soviet Union as inevitable. Zhirinovskiy, the head of the deceptively named Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—a neo-fascist party whose performance in the December 1993 parliamentary elections shocked everyone—obtained the top spot in this

²⁶ R. Legvold, "Russian Foreign Policy During Periods of Great State Transformation." *Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century and the shadow of the past*. Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 79.

²⁷ M. McFaul, "Yeltsin's Legacy." *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), Vol. 24, No. 2, 2000, p. 58.

²⁸ H. Donaldson, and N. Vidya, *The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests*. Routledge, 2018, p. 119.

category²⁹. A. Ziuganov, the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation; A. Prokhanov, the editor of the extremist newspaper “Den,” and Colonel V. Alksnis, the head of the conservative Soyuz party in the Congress of Deputies, were also in favor³⁰.

This organisation was intended to reestablish the Soviet Union by whatever means necessary. They were openly anti-Western and opposed the integration of the Russian economy into the international economy. They were the successors of the Slavophiles in the twentieth century, deriding with disdain anyone who believed Western culture or political systems were worthy of imitation and hailing Russian civilization as unique and superior. Even though their programmes ultimately proved to be more empty talk than reality, the Russian Nationalists did garner widespread sympathy among the disillusioned and disgraced Russian people.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s Russia and the near abroad

On May 7, 2000, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was sworn in as the second president of Russia, although he had been serving as acting president since January of that year. Yeltsin left Vladimir Putin with a peculiar combination of success and failure in international policy. B. Yeltsin was successful in resolving several very complicated situations, such as the settlement of many disputes with Ukraine and the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russian territory. He endeavoured to reassure the nations of Russia’s near abroad of their independence, a major cause of annoyance and mistrust in Russia’s relations with these nations. However, he was unable to create confidence with the majority of former Soviet states. His attitude to the situation overseas was, at best, random. His changing foreign ministers demonstrated a lack of confidence in his approach to the former Soviet Union. In addition to the legacy he inherited from Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power was marked by three important events that would later have a big impact on how he dealt with the rest of the world.

The NATO push to the east was followed by the Kosovo War³¹. In the eyes of Russians, these actions exemplified the US-led campaign to isolate Russia and disregard her genuine security concerns. The second marked the beginning of another conflict in Chechnya. This time, the battle was stated to be a struggle against Islamic extremists and worldwide terrorism

²⁹ A. Umland, “Zhirinovskii as a Fascist: palingenetic ultra-nationalism and the emergence of the Liberal-Democratic party of Russia in 1992-93.” *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen-und Zeitgeschichte*. Vol. 14. No. 2. De Gruyter, 2010, p. 99.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 106.

³¹ A. Cottey, “The Kosovo war in perspective.” *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2009, p. 593.

as opposed to just a separatist movement. In 1998, the third occurrence was the financial collapse of the ruble³². Despite the currency collapse, there was little assistance available from the world community through the Foreign Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international lenders who were pouring billions of Russian rubles into Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and other nations. Putin and the political elite internalised the harsh reality that the international community could not be relied upon to help Russia rebuild its economy, provide security assurances, or support Moscow's efforts to counter the rise of Muslim extremism. To put it another way, Russia was seen as fundamentally isolated. The Russians had adopted ruthless and unromantic practicality. No longer would the energy-starved countries of the former Soviet Union receive "free lunches." Furthermore, more emphasis should be placed on bilateral relations rather than seeking group consensus through mechanisms such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Therefore, Russia must pursue its own interests and define its allies based on "what's in it for Russia."

During the March 2000 presidential election campaign, Vladimir Putin refused to outline his policy programme in detail or engage in a debate with other candidates, but he did take positions on some issues. He advocated for a strong and stable Russia that fought crime and maintained order (exemplified by fighting Chechen terrorists as convenient scapegoats). He emphasised that "the stronger the state, the greater the individual's freedom"³³, attempting to equate security and liberty. Additionally, he argued that a strong state is "written into Russia's genetic code". These statements provided ample indications of where Vladimir Putin wished to lead Russia and the image he wished to cultivate for the nation in the new millennium, despite their lack of clarity. Putin gave assurances that Russia's foreign policy would not change after he became acting president. Soon, however, a debate on Russia's foreign policy course began, encompassing such traditional topics as whether Russia should be oriented toward the West or the East, should embrace "globalism" that emphasises ties with the West or "multipolarity" that emphasises equality in foreign relations and reliance on multilateral institutions. While Vladimir Putin focused primarily on domestic issues during his election campaign, he appeared to reject an anti-Western foreign policy. In a letter to the Russian people, Vladimir Putin wrote, "Russian foreign policy should serve national interests" (Light 2015: 17). The actions of Russian diplomats should be determined solely by the actual, especially economic,

³² M. Goldman, "The Russian ruble and why it collapsed." *Challenge*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1998, p. 13.

³³ H. Donaldson, and N. Vidya, *The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests*. Routledge, 2018, p. 78.

interests of the nation. This focus on the economy became a big part of the vast majority of Vladimir Putin's policy decisions after that, especially when it came to the countries in near abroad.

Pragmatism: the cornerstone of Vladimir Putin's policy

Putin began readjusting Russian foreign policy while he was still serving as acting president. The objectives were to preserve Russian interests to the greatest degree possible, strengthen the country and its people, and revitalise the economy. However, the new Russian president's guiding principle was pragmatism. Given the emphasis on pragmatism, Vladimir Putin was willing to try again with the West despite the recent deterioration in ties. He realised that Russia could not afford to forego the financial assistance necessary for its economic revival for at least the next decade. Because he was focused on Russia's economic interests, he was willing to overlook the West's apathy, as shown by NATO's actions. In an attempt to persuade the West, particularly the United States, of his intentions, Putin pressed the Duma to swiftly approve START II. Russia pursued friendships with European nations aggressively. Putin summoned the foreign ministers of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy to Russia for discussions on bilateral and global issues. On April 16, 2003, he defied precedent by travelling to Britain on the night of his inauguration as president, where he met with Prime Minister Tony Blair and business executives. This not only indicated that Putin was willing to embrace a flexible approach to Russian diplomacy, but it also revealed that Putin's pragmatism was centred on economic concerns. He was willing to forget past mistakes if he thought it would help Russia become economically successful and free.

This adaptability was most evident in Vladimir Putin's attitude to NATO. In an interview with the BBC, Putin said he wanted closer ties with the West and more say in NATO matters. This was in line with his decision to fix some of the broken ties between Russia and NATO during the Kosovo war. "We feel we can discuss more integration with NATO, but only if Russia is viewed as an equal partner," he said³⁴. Putin said that Russia's opposition to the eastern expansion of NATO was due to Moscow's exclusion from the issue's debate, but this does not imply that Russians would close themselves off from the rest of the world. Isolationism is not a viable choice. When G. Robertson went to Russia in March 2000, V. Putin talked with him and decided to make up with NATO and get relations back on track. As acting president, he did not even rule

³⁴ A. Gülnur, and M. Rebecca, *NATO: in search of a vision*. Georgetown University Press, 2010, p. 108.

out “the idea of Russia joining NATO”³⁵. As long as NATO paid attention to Russian interests and saw Russia as an equal partner. The reaction of the west to Vladimir Putin’s signals was quick. The western creditors agreed to a package of postponements, principal and interest rate reductions, and a 30-year repayment extension.

As soon as Putin was proclaimed acting president, Russia’s foreign policy toward the West underwent a dramatic transformation. Not surprisingly, his pro-Western foreign policy caused a lot of talk and even some worry among Russian academics and people in the West who study Russia. According to one school of thought, Vladimir Putin has shown near-visionary qualities by rejecting the instinctive anti-Americanism of his country’s political elite and directing foreign policy unambiguously toward the west³⁶. For some proponents of this perspective, Putin’s progress in this direction has been heroic, considering the opposition from Russia’s foreign policy, military, and security agencies, as well as the Russian parliament³⁷. The alternative, more cynical interpretation of Putin’s foreign policy change said that it was intended to gain Western approval for Russia’s restrictions on press freedom, vote-rigging, and human rights abuses. The supporters of this school also stated that Kremlin propagandists were purposefully stoking nationalistic opposition to Putin’s foreign policy to persuade the West that he is surrounded by “nationalistic and anti-Western wolves”, and therefore merits more support. However, such scepticism has received little backing from others³⁸.

Putin endorsed a new foreign policy theory in July of 2000 that emphasised economic interests, the rights of Russians abroad, and information gathering. Before his victory in May, V. Putin also approved a document issued by the Russian Security Council on March 24, 2000. According to many news sources reporting on the V. Putin doctrine, the foreign ministry’s first objective would be to safeguard Russian economic interests overseas³⁹. The declaration also addressed the status of Russians residing in the 14 other countries of the former Soviet Union. The alleged discriminatory treatment of Russian communities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine was of particular concern. The element of pragmatism in the new ideology, however, seemed to capture everyone’s attention. Igor Ivanov, the foreign minister, was cited as stating, “The

³⁵ T. Forsberg and H. Graeme, “Russia and NATO: From windows of opportunities to closed doors.” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23.1 (2015)41-57.

³⁶ S. Werning, and B. James, “Understanding the sources of anti-Americanism in the Russian elite.” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 5-6, 2019, p. 392.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 380.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 382.

³⁹ K. Abushov, “Policing the near abroad: Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2009, p. 189.

unique aspect of this new idea is that it is more practical than the one authorised in 1993.”⁴⁰ The new foreign policy doctrine was tied to a new Russian security doctrine established by the Kremlin earlier in the same year, in which Russia tightened its stance on the use of its nuclear weapons. The new defence plan went further than the 1997 doctrine, which said that Russia could launch the first nuclear attack in response to a military attack that seemed to threaten the survival of the Russian Federation⁴¹. Russia may use all troops and measures at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if all other options for resolving a crisis have failed or been exhausted. Observers have said that Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a form of security shows that it can’t deal with threats in other ways.

The development of a free economic zone among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members had proven elusive for over a decade before Vladimir Putin’s inauguration as president of Russia. After Russia’s economic crisis in August 1998, many CIS nations began trade wars⁴². In general, if Russian goods were competitive, they were subject to customs taxes, while the CIS member states pleaded with Moscow to maintain the supply of inexpensive petroleum. When Russia complied, it quickly learned that even subsidised gasoline was often not reimbursed; the CIS member states were much more preoccupied with clearing their international obligations to Western financial institutions and governments than with erasing their debts to Moscow. Putin was enraged by the fact that certain CIS members while retaining the appearance of the CIS, were engaging in other geopolitical games that were detrimental to Russia. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Central Asian Union of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to oppose Russia’s military actions in the area while extracting maximum financial aid from the Kremlin. The formation of the GUUAM, which comprises Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, was much more important. These nations planned to construct their free trade zones without taking Russia’s interests into account. Putin responded in the way that has become his signature. Moscow revoked its visa-free travel policy for all of these nations. There were suggestions that Vladimir Putin would take the extreme step of destroying the CIS entirely and replacing it with the bullying of major former Soviet nations. The classic Russian tools are oil supplies and the military. Putin is keen to alter Russia’s near-abroad policy despite

⁴⁰ Ibid, 200.

⁴¹ A.L. Fink, and O. Olga, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More.” *Daedalus*, Vol. 149, No. 2, 2020, No. 39.

⁴² M. Dabrowski, “Currency crises in post-Soviet economies—a never ending story?.” *Russian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016, p. 306.

opposition from several governments. Moscow's message inside the Commonwealth of Independent States is no longer rhetoric or paper institutions, but rather raw dominance and aggression. From a different perspective, Vladimir Putin is deploying a "carrot and stick" strategy in the near abroad. His new approach is an illustration of his new approach. By visiting Kiev as the Russian president's first stop, Putin has shown enormous regard for Ukraine. However, Putin also informed the Ukrainians that if they cannot pay their gas bills, Russia will take a portion of Ukraine's oil pipelines as payment. Ukraine will lose a portion of its independence if Russia ends up officially owning the pipelines.

Vladimir Putin and Ukraine

Ukraine is undoubtedly the clearest illustration of Vladimir Putin's new pragmatic approach to the near abroad. Due to protectionism on both sides, Russian-Ukrainian economic ties were deteriorating when Vladimir Putin became president of Russia. In terms of public debt and energy, however, Russia remains Ukraine's major economic provider. When Putin took over the Russian presidency, Ukraine's energy debt had reached a staggering \$3.5 billion⁴³. Utilizing its near monopoly on Russian gas transportation, Ukraine has postponed repayments and syphoned about two to three billion cubic metres of gas. Several debt payback schemes were never implemented. However, because of how weak its economy was, Russia could no longer afford to give Ukraine money. Putin, seeing the necessity to exert pressure on Ukraine, adopted a "no more free lunches" approach as opposed to his prior fraternal dispositions towards Ukraine. The donor-recipient paradigm of economic ties between Russia and Ukraine was dismantled, principally by diminishing Russia's reliance on Ukrainian transit. Alternative ways to move gas, like through Belarus and Poland, were planned and put into place. Russian manufacturers who had not been paid ceased supplying nuclear power reactors in Ukraine with energy and fuel. At the beginning of December 1999, Russia placed an oil and energy embargo on Ukraine to discourage it from stealing gas from pipelines. In addition, Russia frequently attempted to promote a business-related agenda during loan discussions. This was different from the past, when all negotiations ended with Ukraine agreeing to pay later and Russia agreeing to take (almost) any form of payment.

Furthermore, since Vladimir Putin's ascension to power, Russian policy toward Ukraine has been increasingly economically motivated and geared toward advancing Russian commercial as well as political interests in Ukraine. It is evident in Vladimir Putin's numerous increasing pressures

⁴³ K.E. Stoner, *Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order*. Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 63.

on Ukraine. Russia exerted pressure on Kuchma in 2000 to dismiss the pro-Western Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Tarasyuk, and Prime Minister Yushchenko in 2001. Moscow and Kiev signed a 52-clause secret military pact in January 2001, giving Russia significant influence over Ukrainian military strategy due to its numerous debts to the former⁴⁴. This move may be intended to quietly alienate Ukraine from NATO. On the economic front, however, Russian companies were on a buying spree to take control of Ukraine's power grids, oil and gas pipelines, and aluminium refineries. This made it easier for Ukraine to do business with Russia. Russian corporations paid hundreds of billions of dollars to buy these assets during this period. As expected, Kiev moved closer to Moscow in June 2001 when it signed important agreements with other governments. Some of these agreements were for 15 years and had to do with gas transit, military science, steel, and shipbuilding⁴⁵.

Furthermore, since early in Vladimir Putin's presidency, Moscow has maintained a policy toward Ukraine based on the premise that both nations' national identities are fabricated. Putin often uses the ideas of the theorists who emphasised the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its peoples, especially its Slavic and Orthodox core, in a way that Snyder calls the "politics of eternity"⁴⁶. This is the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The speech delivered by Vladimir Putin on February 21, 2022, confirmed the above. Putin has long maintained that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" and that their common history necessitates a shared political future. During a 2008 meeting with the then-president of the United States, Vladimir Putin reportedly said, "Ukraine is not even a country"⁴⁷. Even in his March 2014 address to the Russian parliament announcing the annexation of Crimea, he also referred to Russians and Ukrainians as "one people." He has returned to the theme in subsequent years, most notably in a 6,000-word article titled "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians" published in July 2021⁴⁸. In his speech before the invasion, Vladimir Putin said that the current Ukrainian state was made by the Soviet

⁴⁴ K. Davenport, "States Review Nuclear Security Treaty." *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 52, No. 4 2022, p. 35.

⁴⁵ O. Melnyk, "Ukraine's cold war legacy 12 years on: a burden from the past, a problem for the future." *Relics of Cold War: Europe's Challenge, Ukraine's Experience by Policy Paper* 6, 2003, p. 48.

⁴⁶ R.B. Snyder, *The Politics of Propaganda in Putin's Russia: A Study on the Treatment of Alexei Navalny*. Diss. 2022.

⁴⁷ E.W. Merry, "The Origins of Russia's War in Ukraine." *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*. Columbia University Press, 2015, p. 50.

⁴⁸ E.P. Sauvageot, "Between Russia as producer and Ukraine as a transit country: EU dilemma of interdependence and energy security." *Energy Policy*, 145, 2020, p. 145.

Union and that it should be renamed after the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin, who he said was its “founder and architect.”

In the last 30 years, Ukrainian civic identity has become much stronger. This is especially true after the “Revolution of Dignity” in 2014 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Donbas. This Ukrainian civic country comprises not just Ukrainian speakers in the west but also a substantial portion of the Russian-speaking, but increasingly bilingual, eastern region. A generation has come of age in an independent Ukraine that, despite its flaws, has maintained a robust democracy and is growing more pro-European (in part due to Russia’s active participation), while Vladimir Putin’s Russia remains preoccupied with quasi-imperial great-power fantasies. The ongoing crisis has reinforced ties among Ukrainians of all areas including dialects, and faiths. It has also widened the gap between Ukrainian and Russian identities.

Conclusion

The establishment of equal relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics is greatly hindered by the Russian desire to continue to see these countries as exclusively within the Russian sphere of influence and geopolitical interests. On many occasions, Russia has not hesitated to use military force to protect the Russian-speaking populations in the countries of the near abroad, just like in the recent invasion of Ukraine. In fact, the military doctrine approved by the Russian Federation Security Council in 1993 specifically mentioned this right to defend Russian minorities. This doctrine has been executed by Russia on several occasions, as seen in the cases of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Near Abroad states have often criticised Russia for interfering in their internal affairs.

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ASEAN AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Abstract: *Until date, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has managed disputes with significant success. This is not an easy task for a body composed of multiethnic nations with very different colonial histories and social, economic, and political difficulties. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was able to escape complete submersion despite the long-standing competition between the world's super powers, which utilized local issues as pretexts to intervene in regional affairs. ASEAN has been successful in establishing a regional identity that has brought neighboring nations closer together and allowed them to take a stand on significant regional issues. Unexpected were the political cohesion, regional collaboration, and diplomatic successes of ASEAN. Despite several obstacles, ASEAN has attained a remarkable global standing, particularly in comparison to other regional organizations. The purpose of this research is to investigate ASEAN's unique and relatively successful role in settling conflicts and maintaining regional peace and stability. This article also explores the dynamic character of ASEAN as a regional organization.*

Keywords: *Conflict Management, ASEAN, the Cambodian crisis, The Sabah Dispute, The Spratly Dispute.*

Introduction

Internal and external security constraints have shaped the history of Southeast Asian regionalism¹. The region endured communism, inter-state

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¹ S.A. Odey and S.A. Bassey, "Ukrainian Foreign Policy toward Russia between 1991 and 2004: The Start of the Conflict." *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 8, 2, 2022, p. 346.

incursions, boundary conflicts, limited democracy, frequent riots, lack of political leadership, and financial instability². ASEAN have become Southeast Asia's lowest common denominator. Each country's choice to join ASEAN was unique. Indonesia, the region's biggest country, supported regional cooperation via ASEAN when it realized regional events affected its national growth³. Thailand wanted a robust regional organization to balance its United States relationship. Malaysia sought regional backing as Britain left Southeast Asia. Singapore desired to stabilize its regional economic importance, while the Philippines aspired to reinforce its Asian character⁴. Despite widespread scepticism and a limited mission, ASEAN has become a functioning regional organisation engaged in managing crises and fostering peace in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

In this study, the detailed ASEAN conflict management method will be explained. This conflict management method called the "ASEAN Way" It involves consensus building, non-binding discourse, and non-interference in member nations' domestic affairs. The strategy fosters confidence among political leaders and enables discussion and conflict settlement feasible away from media scrutiny, which combative posturing and formal decision making processes in western international talks typically fail to do.

ASEAN's Evolving Conflict Management Mechanism: Structures and Norms

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one of the most successful regional organizations in the developing world, particularly in Asia⁵. It is known for resolving disputes and maintaining peace in Southeast Asia. Since ASEAN's inception, its members have not engaged in open conflict. This remarkable achievement may be ascribed to "The ASEAN Way" and conflict management.

ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration in order to foster economic cooperation and the prosperity of its members (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines⁶. Southeast Asia was a tumultuous area at the time ASEAN was founded. The region

² D.M. Jones and R. S. Michael, *ASEAN and East Asian international relations: Regional delusion*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006.

³ R. Djalante, et al. "COVID-19 and ASEAN responses: Comparative policy analysis." *Progress in Disaster Science*, 8, 2020, p. 100129.

⁴ S. Narine, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 64.

⁵ H.S. Nesadurai, "The association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN)." *New political economy*, 13, 2, 2008, p. 239.

⁶ M.F. Keling, et al. "The development of ASEAN from historical approach," *Asian Social Science*, 7, 7, 2011, 169-189.

was characterised by poverty, instability, and underdevelopment⁷. The region was recovering from the effects of colonialism. The British colonised Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, while the Dutch colonised Indonesia⁸. On the one hand, the development of regional organisations was hindered by various colonial histories, cultural legacies, and religious beliefs. As each nation's pioneering leaders concentrated on constructing the economies of the new countries. Mutual mistrust and hostility, as well as shaky regional ties, characterised the region's nations⁹. In contrast, a variety of challenges necessitated the establishment of a regional organisation to enhance collaboration. As colonial powers receded, Southeast Asian nations were also concerned that a power vacuum might invite "rogue states" seeking political advantage¹⁰.

The Association of South East Asia (ASA), the first regional organisation, was plagued by internal strife from the start¹¹. The Philippines' claim to North Borneo (now Sabah) strained ties between Malaya and the Philippines, impeding ASA's growth. Indonesia's absence from the ASA also hurt its ambitions¹². As Thailand and the Philippines were members of the anticommunist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ASA was seen as anticommunist, hence deepening the ideological chasm. ASA was replaced by MAPHILINDO (The Greater Malayan Confederation). MAPHILINDO was established in 1962 in order to unify Malaysia's borders¹³. Also unsuccessful. The independence of Malaysia was challenged by President Sukarno of Indonesia on September 16, 1963. Indonesia opposed Sabah and Sarawak joining Malaysia, triggering "Konfrontasf" (confrontation). Indonesia considered the proposed federation as anti-Borneo and neocolonialist. Member disagreements prevented MAPHILINDO from ever achieving more than a

⁷ C. Renshaw, "Indonesia, Australia and ASEAN." *Strangers Next Door?: Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century*, 2018, p. 169.

⁸ L. Lim, "14 Standards of English in South-East Asia," *Standards of English: Codified varieties around the world*, 2012, p. 274.

⁹ C.S. Hau, *The Chinese question: Ethnicity, nation, and region in and beyond the Philippines*. Nus Press, 2014.

¹⁰ D.J. Lang, Daniel et al., "Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science: practice, principles, and challenges." *Sustainability science*, 7, 1, 2012, p. 29.

¹¹ M. Caballero-Anthony, ed. *Regional security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN way*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

¹² M.C C. Ortuoste, *Internal and external institutional dynamics in member-states and ASEAN: Tracing creation, change and reciprocal influences*. Arizona State University, 2008.

¹³ W.J. Ju, *The rise and fall of the Djakarta-Peking axis, 1949-1966*. Mississippi State University, 1967.

declaratory status¹⁴. In 1966, prior to ASEAN, the United States funded the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)¹⁵. Thailand, South Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, and New Zealand were included. International politics brought down ASPAC. The exclusion of Taiwan and the inclusion of China prevented some council members from sitting together¹⁶. ASPAC disintegrated in 1975 as regional and global politics developed.

Prior to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), few events occurred. In 1966, Suharto assumed power in Indonesia, ushering in the “New Order”. The new Indonesian military leadership under the leadership of Suharto sought stability, prosperity, and a pro-Western, anticommunist position. It was anticipated that a larger body would boost the probability of a permanent settlement of the Malaysia-Indonesia issue¹⁷. The civil war in Vietnam was drawing the attention of foreign powers. Oldfield said that Thailand was being endangered by the Indochina conflict. Myanmar was isolated by socialism. Some countries in the region were also concerned about China’s growing dominance. In summary, the Southeast Asian nations created a “shared sense of vulnerability to the domestic adversary,” notably the Vietnamese and Chinese-funded communist rebellion¹⁸. These events led to the formation of ASEAN.

In 1966, Thai diplomat and politician Thanat Khoman and Malaysian leader Tun Abdul Razak initially explored regional cooperation. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand convened in Bangkok on August 5, 1967, to consider the possibility of forming a regional association. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 established ASEAN¹⁹. The formation of ASEAN regional cooperation was primarily motivated by the desire to develop a peaceful region in order to prevent conflicts and achieve cultural and economic union. They also desired a Southeast Asian

¹⁴ Daud, Mohd Afendi, Mohd Sufiean Hassan, and Abd Aziz A’zmi. “Tunku Abdul Rahman: The Challenge Of Establishing Malaysia.” *Jurnal’Utuan* 6.1 (2021): 127-143.

¹⁵ K. Koga, “ASPAC or ASEAN? Institutional Evolution and Survival in Contemporary Maritime Asia.” *Changing Dynamics and Mechanisms of Maritime Asia in Comparative Perspectives*. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2021, p. 235.

¹⁶ D. Halvorson, Dan. “From Cold War Solidarity to Transactional Engagement: Reinterpreting Australia’s Relations with East Asia, 1950–1974.” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 18, 2, 2016, p. 130.

¹⁷ A. M. Taylor, “Malaysia, Indonesia—and Maphilindo.” *International Journal*, 19, 2, 1964, p. 171.

¹⁸ E.A. Laksmana, “Regional order by other means? examining the rise of defense diplomacy in southeast Asia.” *Asian Security*, 8, 3, 2012, p. 270.

¹⁹ A. Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional organization and order in South-East Asia*. Springer, 2016, p. 54.

Regional Order based on collaboration. Regional and international subjects were discussed.

According to the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN Declaration), the association's goals and objectives were²⁰:

1. To advance the region's economic growth, social progress, and cultural development via joint efforts in the spirit of equality and collaboration to build a successful and peaceful Southeast Asian community;

2. To promote regional peace and security by respect for justice, the rule of law, and the UN Charter;

3. Promote active cooperation and mutual support in economic, social, cultural, technological, scientific, and administrative domains;

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;

5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities, and the raising of their living standards;

6. To encourage the study of Southeast Asia;

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.

In line with the idealistic objectives of their respective peoples, the Declaration also reaffirmed the determination of the five member states to safeguard their stability and security against outside meddling. According to some analysts, the Declaration revealed ASEAN's intention to expand political and security cooperation from the outset²¹. The Bangkok Declaration did not include cooperation on the political and security fronts. The Declaration was limited and ambiguous; it lacked a comprehensive strategy for accomplishing its objectives. Despite the absence of any allusion to political participation in the Declaration. According to Marchi, the matter of cooperation on the political and security fronts was of paramount importance to the founders of ASEAN²².

²⁰ R. Amer, "The Conflict Management Framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)." *Conflict Management and Dispute Settlement in East Asia*. Routledge, 2016, p. 39.

²¹ M.A. Glosny, "Stabilizing the Backyard: Recent Developments in China's Policy Toward Southeast Asia." *China and the Developing World*, 2015, p. 157.

²² R. Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, Routledge, 2012, p. 53.

Evolution of ASEAN's Conflict Management Mechanism during the Cold War Era

ASEAN's conflict-management approach relies on informal conversations and adjustments at prominent political levels rather than formal legal processes and practises. ASEAN has no charter, which reflects its informality²³. The Bangkok Statement effectively remained a joint declaration that did not need approval by the member governments²⁴. ASEAN's informality and low structure benefited its collaboration. As one study states:

One encouraging characteristic of ASEAN was that it was built with the least amount of pain; it was not bogged down with heavy structures in its formative years, but was instituted with the minimum weight necessary for the anticipated functions. This was crucial because the more restrictions at the initial stage, the more difficulties in getting an association accepted by prospective members, especially in a region (historically) crisscrossed by conflicts and mutual suspicions²⁵.

ASEAN was subsequently institutionalised. Such institutional mechanisms established a framework for dialogues, consultations, and debates on matters of mutual interest in order to foster greater mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, and collaboration, and to prevent bilateral misunderstandings and disputes²⁶.

The ASEAN Declaration suggested some procedures. It urged annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings²⁷. Initially, the policy function of Special Meetings was not well defined, but the annual conference of foreign ministers now specifies all Association policy. Since 1976, foreign ministers have met annually in the middle of the year, with the exception of 1970. The Declaration also established a Standing Committee, chaired by the host country's foreign minister or his representative and comprised of accredited ambassadors from other member countries, to carry out the

²³ R. Emmers, and S. S. Tan, "The ASEAN Regional Forum and preventive diplomacy: built to fail?," *Asian Security*, 7, 1, 2011, p. 44.

²⁴ Ibid, p.46.

²⁵ P. Thambipillai, and S. Jayaratnam, "ASEAN Negotiations." In *ASEAN Negotiations*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013, p. 13.

²⁶ A. Acharya, "Culture, Security, Multilateralism: The 'ASEAN Way' and Regional Order." *Culture and Security*. Routledge, 2012, p. 59.

²⁷ S. Kneebone, "ASEAN and the conceptualization of refugee protection in Southeastern Asian states." *Regional Approaches to the Protection of Asylum Seekers*. Routledge, 2016, p. 298.

work of the Association between meetings of foreign ministers, Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects, and a National Secretariat in each member country.

The Cambodian crisis: Vietnamese Intervention and Beyond

With the end of direct U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia and communist triumphs in Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975, many anticipated peace and stability on the peninsula²⁸. Cambodian-Vietnamese border conflicts occurred in the middle of 1975. Both sides laid blame on the other. In 1977, boundary disputes lead to a bigger conflict. Vietnam launched a 15-day blitzkrieg against Cambodia on December 25, 1978, evicting Pol Pot from Phnom Penh and seizing critical cities and communication networks²⁹.

On January 10, 1979, Pol Pot's regime was replaced by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), supported by the Vietnamese government. Within a week, the PRK proclaimed itself to be Cambodia's only legitimate government³⁰. At their first meeting in Phnom Penh, the PRK and Vietnam signed a 25-year peace agreement. The Treaty recognised that the peace and security of both nations are interdependent and must be maintained. Article 2 of the pact required unified defence against imperialist and reactionary forces³¹. Both countries agreed to work together on economic, cultural, educational, public health, scientific, and technological matters. The new People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) administration was recognised by the Soviet Union, communist countries, and other states with ties to Moscow.

The participation of China and the Soviet Union in the Cambodian war made the situation worse. Observers referred to the conflict as a proxy war between communist governments. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has provided Vietnam with a substantial amount of military weaponry³². The pact may have encouraged Vietnam's ambitions to occupy. Cambodia's frequent and large border incursions may have encouraged Vietnamese authorities to depose the Pol Pot regime, which was already unpopular in Cambodia due to its excesses and brutality.

²⁸ K. Mahbubani, and S. Jeffery, *The ASEAN miracle: A catalyst for peace*. NUS Press, 2017.

²⁹ S. Joo, *Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the two Koreas, 1985-1991: Power and the new political thinking*. The Pennsylvania State University, 1993.

³⁰ B. Kiernan, *The Pol Pot regime: Race, power, and genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79*. Yale University Press, 2002.

³¹ T.M. Franck, *Recourse to force: state action against threats and armed attacks*. Vol. 15. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

³² M. Lind, *Vietnam: The necessary war*. Simon and Schuster, 2013.

Some ASEAN nations attempted to prevent Vietnam from consolidating its authority over Cambodia. After the invasion, the ASEAN states used a variety of diplomatic and political measures to compel Hanoi's withdrawal from Cambodia. According to Michael Leifer, Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea divided and united ASEAN³³. Thailand denounced Vietnam's participation in Kampuchea. The Thai government urged Vietnam's quick departure from Cambodia so Cambodians could elect their own government. Indonesia's first response to the invasion was subdued because of its alternate strategic stance. Singapore's strategy resembled Thailand's. At least under Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, Malaysia remained closer to Indonesia's stance despite its closeness to the war and dispute with Vietnam over Spratly Islands sovereignty.

Vietnam's conduct posed a difficulty for the ASEAN government. Though neither Vietnam nor Cambodia were ASEAN members at the time, ASEAN felt obligated to intervene for a variety of reasons. ASEAN's Standing Committee Chairman, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, denounced the Vietnamese action on January 9, 1979³⁴. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers applauded the UN Security Council's decision to address Indochina without delay and encouraged it to restore peace, security, and stability in the region. ASEAN countries rallied around Thailand during the Annual Ministerial Meeting in Bali from June 28–30, 1979³⁵. In the issued communiqué, they criticised Vietnam's actions and held it responsible for ongoing illegal immigration. They also asked Vietnam to show that it is friendly toward Thailand and other member nations by pulling its troops back from the border between Thailand and Kampuchea³⁶. The ministers also emphasised the international community's support for ASEAN's efforts to restore peace and security in the area, particularly the overwhelming majority of UN Security Council members.

ASEAN maintained worldwide interest in the Indochina issue. Its diplomatic actions affected the international debate on Cambodia. Members of ASEAN talked worldwide in unanimity. At the autumn session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, ASEAN countries attempted to put the Cambodia problem on spotlight. According to Joseph Brown, 52 nations participated in a three-day debate on the issue. Outside

³³ A.M. Murphy, "ASEAN's External Policy." *China, The United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia: US-China Relations*, 2, 2017, p. 50.

³⁴ A.C. Guan, *Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict 1978-1991*. NUS Press, 2013, p. 62.

³⁵ D.W.B. Chua and E.M.C. Lim. *ASEAN 50: Regional Security Cooperation through Selected Documents*. World Scientific, 2017, p. 543.

³⁶ M. Brown and J.Z. Joseph, *Cambodia confounds the peacemakers, 1979-1998*. Cornell University Press, 2019.

of the communist bloc and Soviet allies, Vietnam got scant backing for armed war³⁷. Vietnam continued to claim in the General Assembly that it had acted in self-defense and that the Khmer Rouge regime had been overthrown by the Cambodian people themselves, but it also admitted that its forces had helped the Cambodian people overthrow Pol Pot without acknowledging the massive nature of Vietnamese assistance³⁸.

Members of ASEAN emphasised that a state should not military engage in another state, even to prevent breaches of human rights. On November 14, the General Assembly approved, by a vote of 81 to 21, with 29 abstentions, a resolution presented by ASEAN requesting the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia.³⁹ The resolution urged all governments to avoid interfering with Cambodia and its Southeast Asian neighbors. ASEAN, the West, most Latin American nations, and other governments endorsed the resolution. By 1979, ASEAN had won some diplomatic victories against Kampuchea.

The Sabah Dispute

The Sabah conflict predates ASEAN. Malaysia and the Philippines' quarrel contributed to the collapse of ASA (Association of Southeast Asia, created in 1961), the first effort at forming a regional entity in Southeast Asia from which ASEAN evolved⁴⁰. The simmering issue challenged the young ASEAN at a time when it was trying to build regional cohesiveness and develop collaboration among its founding members. Sabah is the second-largest state in Malaysia. In exchange for his assistance in suppressing a Bruneian uprising, the region was ceded to the Sultan of Sulu in 1703 A.D. On January 23, 1878, a second Sabah treaty pertaining to the commerce of arms was signed. Sultan Jamalul Alam leased North Borneo to Gustavus Von Overbeck, the Austro-Hungarian Consul-General in Hong Kong, in exchange for modern weapons to keep the Spanish away from the Sulu Archipelago⁴¹.

In 1946, Sabah became a British province after a brief spell under the British North Borneo Company⁴². Diasdado Macapagal submitted the

³⁷ J.A. Fry, *Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, p. 344.

³⁸ J.A. Tyner, *From rice fields to killing fields: Nature, life, and labor under the Khmer Rouge*. Syracuse University Press, 2017, p. 54.

³⁹ D.E. Weatherbee, "The Diplomacy of Stalemate." *Southeast Asia Divided*. Routledge, 2019, p. 22.

⁴⁰ M. Natalegawa, "Does ASEAN matter?." *Does ASEAN Matter?*. ISEAS Publishing, 2018.

⁴¹ H. Lim, "Regional trade agreements and conflict." *Regional Trade Integration and Conflict Resolution*, 15, 2008, p. 93.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 94.

Philippines' claim to Sabah on June 22, 1962, just before to the formation of Malaysia.⁴³ Since Sabah was formerly part of the Sultanate of Sulu, which joined the Philippines, it was claimed by the Philippines. The national territory of the Philippines encompasses all territories having historical or legal claims to the Philippines, according to the constitution of 1946⁴⁴. The Philippines informed the British Crown that Sabah belonged to them. Malaysia claimed the sovereignty of Sabah. It declared that Sabah belongs to Malaysia according to Baron von Overbeck and Alfred Dent's agreements with the Bruni Sultanate on December 29, 1877 and the Sulu Sultanate on January 23, 1878.

The British Crown had handed Sabah to Malaysia on September 16, 1963, transferring the Sultan of Sulu's lease to Malaysia⁴⁵. Two referenda increased Malaysian authority over Sabah: the first between February and April 1962, sponsored by the UN-backed Cobbold Commission; the second soon before Malaysia's establishment in September 1963. 70% of Sabah's population voted for Malaysia in both referendums. Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo (now Sabah) were joined to peninsular Malaya on September 16, 1963, to become Malaysia. Indonesia criticized the unification of Sarawak and Sabah with Malaysia and began a 'confrontation strategy' The Philippines cut diplomatic connections with Malaysia in 1963 and didn't rebuild them until Ferdinand Marcos's election in 1966⁴⁶.

At the 1971 Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Manila, 12–13 March), ASEAN members were optimistic. Malaysia and the Philippines appeared to realize by then that escalating conflict over Sabah would accomplish little⁴⁷. The organization's effectiveness inspired optimism for a Sabah resolution. President Marcos of the Philippines said during the Second ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977 that he was dropping his country's territorial claim to East Malaysian Sabah⁴⁸. He commended the group's increased coordination and cohesiveness. Following his remarks in Kuala Lumpur, Marcos made a quick visit to Sabah, which was seen as an implicit recognition of

⁴³ Ibid, p. 95.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 96.

⁴⁵ M.Z. M. Kib, "The Philippines' claim over Sabah from the Cold War perspective." *Malaysia and the Cold War Era*. Routledge, 2020, p. 203.

⁴⁶ S.B. Kadam-Kiai, and L.D. Dick, "Revisiting early Political History of Modern Sarawak through the making of Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Sarawak's first Chief Minister." *Journal of Borneo-Kalimantan*, 6,1 2020.

⁴⁷ D.M. Jones and L.S. Mike, "The changing security agenda in Southeast Asia: globalization, new terror, and the delusions of regionalism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 24, 4, 2001, p. 272.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 273.

Malaysian sovereignty in Sabah. Later, in Manila, he expressed his desire to refute the accusation. This was not immediately implemented. Malaysia needed more concrete measures. It demanded a change to the Philippine constitution, which under martial law may be seen as an assertion of sovereignty over Sabah. This would have been a humiliating situation for Marcos. Weakening domestic support hampered Marcos' ability to act.

ASEAN continued to be impacted by the conflict, while Malaysia and the Philippines maintained hostile relations. The worst has passed. Since then, the Sabah dispute has ceased to be a major issue and no longer impedes ASEAN cooperation. Even under extreme pressure, both countries remained committed to moderation, mutual respect, and accountability. The disputants conformed to these norms despite the fact that they were still in the process of developing and had not yet been established in ASEAN. The standoff was resolved by utilising the evolving conflict management approach of ASEAN, which emphasised third-party mediation and informal dialogue. Once the Corregidor incident was disclosed, Malaysia issued a formal diplomatic protest. Despite a military demonstration by Malaysia, with the assistance of its British ally, the Philippines refrained from a military response that may have led to a direct confrontation.

The Philippines' withdrawal of its diplomatic order challenging Malaysia's ability to represent Sabah in ASEAN ministerial sessions was a sign of respect for other members. Respect, which in the context of ASEAN entails giving up uniqueness by seeking advice and ideas, was shown by both states when they agreed to a cooling off period at Indonesia's request and when, before the first ASEAN Summit, the Philippines pledged not to raise the Sabah claim. Both countries have remained dedicated to the concept of "responsibility", i.e., consideration of the interests and sensitivities of other members and awareness of the impact of domestic policy on neighbors. During ethnic unrest in Sabah, the Philippines did not exploit Malaysia's weakness by enforcing the Sabah claim. In the Sabah issue, mediation, a key aspect of ASEAN's conflict management, has been used. The conflict has been managed by Indonesia, avoiding it from damaging ASEAN. The problem in Sabah has also gotten better because politicians and leaders have talked and talked to each other informally.

This case study demonstrates that Malaysia and the Philippines demonstrated restraint in pursuing their claims even in the early days of ASEAN. All ASEAN members benefit from this thriving regional organization, which has ensured peace and security in the region and promoted trade in Southeast Asia. The Philippines considers participation in ASEAN to be its most important foreign policy objective and the foundation of its relations with its neighbours and the Asia-Pacific region.

The unknown is whether the Philippine government will risk it all by reviving the claim, or whether it will continue to give it lip service until circumstances allow it to be dismissed. Because the Philippines is aware of the advantages of being a responsible ASEAN member and has an interest in fostering ties with Malaysia, the second option looks to be the most plausible. In truth, regional cooperation via ASEAN is very important for both states, and ASEAN has indirectly helped to lessen political tensions between them, especially in Sabah.

The Spratly Dispute

The South China Sea spans from Singapore to the Strait of Taiwan, south of China. It borders eight ASEAN countries (excluding Laos and Myanmar), China, and Taiwan. Disputed islands in the South China Sea includes Pratas, Macclesfield Bank, Paracels and the Spratlys. This research addresses the disputed Spratly Islands since it affects some ASEAN countries. The conflicts include Spratly Island sovereignty and maritime boundary delimitation in the southern South China Sea. The Spratly Islands include 400 islands, banks, reefs, shoals, tolls, and cays. A land-based 38% of the South China Sea is covered by these islands. The Spratly Islands are named after Richard Spratly, a British whaler who visited the islands in 1840⁴⁹.

ASEAN countries and China have tried to legitimise their Spraly claims. Malaysia utilised the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Continental Shelf Act of 1966 to justify its claims⁵⁰. The Philippines claims “discovery”, “proximity”, and “national security”. Manila argues that Spratly Islands are vital to the Philippines’ defence⁵¹. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, provides Indonesia with 200-mile EEZ rights⁵². Vietnam’s argument is historical in nature. In May 1975, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry’s Chinese Department declared the Truong Sa Islands (Nansha Islands) had always been Vietnamese territory⁵³.

China lays claim to almost the entire South China Sea⁵⁴. The Chinese think they were the first to discover and utilise these islands. Beijing asserts that Chinese navigators discovered the area in 1292, under the Han

⁴⁹ G.B. Poling, *On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea*. Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 53.

⁵⁰ H.T. Nguyen, “Vietnam’s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims.” *JE Asia*, 5, 2012, p. 165.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 166.

⁵² *Ibid*, p. 167.

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 166.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 168.

dynasty, and that locals had fished and sailed there for generations⁵⁵. In the 1980s and 1990s, China and Vietnam constructed military bases on some of the islands to buttress their claims⁵⁶. Although both have pledged to resolve conflicts peacefully. However, in the 1990s, China agreed to ASEAN's plan to use the natural resources of the Spratly Islands together while increasing its military presence in the area⁵⁷.

ASEAN's attempts to resolve the South China Sea conflict revolve upon "constructive engagement" with China. ASEAN nations were initially apprehensive about China. China's stature, economic might, and military prowess prompted justifiable alarm among ASEAN nations. Moreover, ASEAN's policy towards the South China Sea and Spratly Islands disagree. The first Indonesian workshop on the Spratly Islands issues was conducted in 1990⁵⁸. Its major objective was to divert attention away from sovereignty disputes over the Spratlys and onto other regional concerns. The workshop approach conceived by Indonesian Ambassador Hasjilal Djalal and Ian-Townsend Gault had two goals⁵⁹:

1. To resolve possible disputes, all parties must work together.
2. Manage potential conflicts and employ confidence-building measures, so fostering an environment conducive to settling territorial or jurisdictional concerns.

ASEAN officials and specialists in marine cooperation, security, and resource development on the continent attended the inaugural Indonesian workshop on the Spratly issue. Since the inaugural workshop in 1991, China and Taiwan have often sent representatives. The workshop often adopt the non-confrontational approach of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN procedures matched the Chinese requirements for informality, sovereignty, and international advisory roles. The informality, sovereignty, and advisory roles of the Chinese overseas. ASEAN formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 in order to bolster its role as a mediator in the Asia-Pacific region⁶⁰. The purpose of ARF is to include non-ASEAN Asian states. ASEAN retains its

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 166.

⁵⁶ D.J. Timothy, "Tourism, border disputes and claims to territorial sovereignty." *Tourism and hospitality in conflict-ridden destinations*. Routledge, 2019, p. 27.

⁵⁷ Z. Hong, "The South China sea dispute and China-ASEAN relations." *Asian Affairs*, 44, 1, 2013, p. 28.

⁵⁸ D.M. Lampton, *The three faces of Chinese power: Might, money, and minds*. Univ of California Press, 2008.

⁵⁹ H. Djalal, "The joint development concept in the South China Sea workshop process." *Recent Developments in the South China Sea Dispute*. Routledge, 2014, p. 152.

⁶⁰ D.M. Jones and J. Nicole, "Weak states' regionalism: ASEAN and the limits of security cooperation in Pacific Asia," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 16, 2, 2016, p. 209.

“ASEAN way” for managing conflicts, which is based on consensus. China joined the ARF in July of 1994⁶¹. China initially refused any talks on the Spratlys. In July 1994, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, refused to meet with his Indonesian counterpart⁶². The official position of China then was that sovereignty over the island was not negotiable, but a cooperation to exploit the area’s natural resources was. However, ASEAN members stressed that the regional organisation had achieved a high degree of cohesiveness among its members, which China must respect.

ASEAN has been tenacious in its attempts to absorb China and has succeeded in enticing China into multilateral agreements with ASEAN. The slow but perceptible change in China’s foreign policy is the result of internal pressure, ASEAN’s efforts, and China’s recognition of ASEAN’s rising cohesion and negotiating might. Examples include the 1992 ASEAN Declaration, ZOPFAN, and the Amity and Cooperation Treaty. China’s decision to sign the South China Sea Declaration was ASEAN’s finest accomplishment⁶³. The November 2002 Declaration between ASEAN and China strives to create a peaceful, amicable, and harmonious environment in the South China Sea. Consequently, despite the Spratlys issue, ASEAN has helped avert direct confrontation and large-scale violence.

Conclusion

The Cambodian conflict, Sabah conflict, and South China Sea dispute case studies have shown the positive aspects of ASEAN’s conflict management initiatives. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one of the most successful examples of regionalization in the developing world, with a long history of regional problem-solving. This perspective is shared by regional experts like Amitav Acharya and ASEAN officials. According to Swee-Hock,⁶⁴ “We are delighted to announce that ASEAN is the most successful collection of small and medium-sized developing countries seeking peace, stability, and growth.” ASEAN’s longevity is a sign of its success despite many researchers predicting that ASEAN will die prematurely like its predecessors.

Tensions in Southeast Asia remain. Unresolved issues continue. Mistrust among nations continues. Since the foundation of ASEAN, there has been no bloodshed among its members. The majority of analysts credit ASEAN with maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia by assisting

⁶¹ T. Yukawa, “The ASEAN way as a symbol: An analysis of discourses on the ASEAN norms.” *The Pacific Review*, 31, 3, 2018, p. 298.

⁶² Ibid, p. 299.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 300.

⁶⁴ S. Swee-Hock, L. Sheng, and K.W. Chin, *ASEAN-China relations: realities and prospects*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

its members in avoiding violence. Southeast Asia's peace and stability enabled the region to achieve unprecedented economic and social growth in the developing world.

ASEAN's distinctive approach to conflict management emphasises informal consultation and consensus-building, networking (via dialogues or constructive relationships with numerous partners), and an independent stance. Given the politics of Southeast Asia, institutional and legal systems would have been ineffectual. The cooperative, but adaptable, approach of ASEAN helps protect independence, sovereignty, and national interests while retaining sufficient cooperation and dedication to succeed. The majority of commentators believe the "ASEAN Way" is indispensable to ASEAN's continued existence and success in maintaining regional peace. According to a prominent ASEAN leader, The ASEAN Way is a dynamic, clever, and adaptive approach that maximises our geopolitical regional strength. Respecting and judiciously adopting ASEAN's core principles, such as consensus and non-interference, is vital to The ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way emphasises that there shouldn't be too many institutions, that there should be continual talks, that participants won't be compelled to agree to difficult choices, and that everyone should be satisfied with the rate of progress.

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SOCIAL INSTABILITY AS A GLOBAL TREND OF THE MODERN WORLD

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Abstract: *The aim of the study is to determine the main indicators of social instability and forms of its manifestation in the modern world. The elements of scientific novelty of this work are that the article comprehensively analyzes the main signs of social instability in global and regional contexts, shows their essential relationship. The research methodology is based on a complex combination of philosophical (dialectical, axiological) and general scientific methods of studying the problem of social instability in the modern world, including synergetic, comparative and concretization methods. Social turbulence has resulted from intensifying geopolitical confrontations and “economic wars” between the world’s leading countries, including the United States and China.*

Keywords: *social instability, socio-economic inequality, global inequality, political conflicts, social policy, migration crisis, social security.*

Introduction

The beginning of the XXI century is characterized by a number of crisis phenomena both at the global and regional levels. Social instability caused by the redistribution of spheres of influence in the world, economic crises, political confrontation, pandemic has affected almost all countries, regardless of their level of socio-economic development. It can be stated that social instability and social turbulence have become trends of our

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time. In such circumstances, states pay special attention to strategic planning, risk predicting, development of computer and mathematical models for forecasting possible hazards and means of neutralizing them. Obviously, countries are forced to develop new algorithms for sustainable development, considering the ephemerality and riskiness of current trends. The purpose of our study is to determine the basic characteristics of social instability and forms of its manifestation in the modern world. To achieve this goal, we plan to analyze the causes of social instability, the peculiarities of the manifestation of social instability in the global and local dimensions, to identify ways to overcome social contradictions and more.

Methodology

The methodology of the study of social instability is based on a complex combination of philosophical methods - dialectical, axiological and general scientific methods - synergetic, comparative and concretization method. The dialectical method made it possible to identify the essential characteristics of social instability and to trace the genesis of this phenomenon. The axiological method became the basis for the analysis of social instability in the value context. Due to the application of this method, it was concluded that one of the causes of social conflicts is the lack of agreement in understanding of values between the ruling elite and citizens, in particular the idea of justice. The comparative method was used to compare the forms of social instability in the modern world. The method of concretization became a continuation of the comparative method as a basis for considering the features of social instability in different countries. The epistemological potential of the synergetic method has found its manifestation for understanding the transition of the social system from a stable state to an unstable one.

Literature review

To analyze social instability, we relied on a number of scientific works of general theoretical and applied nature.

In the theoretical and methodological context for the critical analysis of social processes in the modern world, the ideas contained in the following scientific works were used: "Crisis of political leadership or leadership in crisis scenarios?"¹ by J. Villasmil Espinoza, D. Arbeláez-Campillo, M. Rojas-Bahamon, R. Parra Contreras; "Contributions of

¹ J.J. Villasmil Espinoza, D.F. Arbeláez-Campillo, M.J. Rojas-Bahamón, & R. Parra Contreras, *Crisis del liderazgo político o liderazgo en escenarios de crisis?* Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas 2021, 26, p. 269-292.

critical thinking as a form of participation and political deliberation”² by D. Arbelaes-Campillo, V. Tatsiy, M. Rojas-Bahamon, O. Danilyan; “Notes for the discussion of the categories of universal citizenship, human rights and globalization”³ by D. Arbelaes-Campillo, M. Rojas-Bahamon, T. Arbeláez-Encarnación and others.

In turn, the scientific works of O. Rudenko⁴, O. Litvinenko⁵ became the basis for defining the concept of “social instability” and forms of its manifestation, in particular “quasi-stability”. Based on the scientific achievements of M. Shevchenko, O. Davydenko⁶, L. Klevchik⁷, we identified the preconditions and main causes of social instability. In turn, the research of E. Libanova⁸, V. Opalko⁹, A. Diton¹⁰; Y. Meliakova, I. Kovalenko, E. Kalnytskyi, H. Kovalenko¹¹ were the basis for considering social inequality as one of the basic causes of social instability in the world.

For a comprehensive understanding of global inequality, the scientific works of B. Milanovych¹²; A. Orsini, J.-F. Morin, O. Young¹³, as well as

² D. Arbeláez-Campillo, V. Tatsiy, M. Rojas-Bahamón, & O. Danilyan, *Contributions of critical thinking as a form of participation and political deliberation*. Amazonia Investiga 2020, 9(27), p. 5-12.

³ D.F. Arbeláez-Campillo, M.J. Rojas-Bahamón, & T.F. Arbeláez-Encarnación, *Apuntes para el debate de las categorías ciudadanía universal, derechos humanos y globalización. Notes for the debate of the categories universal citizenship, human rights and globalization*. Cuestiones Políticas 2019, 34(61), p. 139-161.

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⁵ O.V. Lytvynenko, *Special information operations and propaganda campaigns Spetsialni informatsiini operatsii ta propahandystski kampanii* (Kyiv: VKF “Satsanta”, 2000).

⁶ M.M. Shevchenko, O.H. Davydenko, *Concept of “socialand political stability”:* semantic range of public management content. Investments: practice and experience 2016, 14, p. 49-54.

⁷ L. Klevchik, *Social inequality as a basis of disproportionation in society*. Economy and state 2019, 4, p. 48-51.

⁸ *Inequality in Ukraine: scale and opportunities for influence*, za red. E.M. Libanovoi (Kyiv: Instytut demohrafii ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen imeni M.V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy, 2012).

⁹ V.V. Opalko, *Consequences of socio-economic inequality in terms of global instability*. Proceedings of Cherkasy State Technological University, Series: Economic Sciences 2018, 51, p. 41-47.

¹⁰ A. Diton, *The Great Escape. Health, Wealth and the Origin of Inequality*. per. s angl. A. Gus'kova (Moskva: Izd-vo Instituta Gajdara; Fond «Liberal'naja Missija», 2016).

¹¹ Y. Meliakova, I. Kovalenko, E. Kalnytskyi, H. Kovalenko, *Performativity and self-exploitation: body significance in late capitalist era*. Cogito 2021, 13(4), p. 7-29.

¹² B. Milanovich, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*. D. Shestakova (Moskva: Izd-vo Instituta Gajdara, 2017).

¹³ A. Orsini, J.-F. Morin, O. Young, *Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?* Global Governance 2013, 19, p. 27-39.

statistics provided by the international organization “Oxfam”¹⁴, which presents the growth rate of inequality in the world were of particular importance.

In scientific researches of N. Rimashevskaya, V. Galetskyi, A. Ovsyannikov¹⁵; A. Geddes, E. Guild, J. Van Selm¹⁶; O. Malinovska¹⁷; D. Beseda¹⁸ the views on the conflict-generating nature of modern migration processes, which are one of the powerful factors of social instability are presented.

The issue of political factors of social instability is represented in the studies of M. Teleshun¹⁹, A. Liasota²⁰ and in a scientific work entitled “Status and prospects of social security in Ukraine: expert assessments”²¹. Also, in the works of domestic authors, the mental and cultural-historical prerequisites of social instability on the territory of Ukraine are analyzed, in particular in the study «Historical and cultural-mental origins of legal consciousness of the Ukrainian people»²².

A separate block of scientific research is devoted to ways and methods of overcoming social instability, in particular, these are the scientific works

¹⁴ Oxfam Briefing Paper. January, 2017, URL:

https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en.pdf

¹⁵ N.M. Rimashevskaja, V.F. Galeckij, A.A. Ovsjannikov. *Population and globalization* (Moskva: Nauka, 2004).

¹⁶ A. Geddes, E. Guild, J. Van Selm. *Immigration and Welfare State. International migration and security: opportunities and challenges* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).

¹⁷ O.A. Malynovska, *Migration policy: global context and Ukrainian realities, monograph* (Kyiv: NISD, 2018).

¹⁸ D. Beseda, *Migration crisis in the EU and its impact on the security situation in Ukraine*. Entrepreneurship, economy and law 2018, 12, p. 299-303.

¹⁹ S.O. Teleshun, *Human resource management in an unstable institutional environment. world trends and Ukrainian realities*. Bulletin of the National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine. Series: Public Administration 2019, 1, p. 60-66.

²⁰ A. Liasota, *Main factors of political instability of transition systems from the position of comparative regionalism*. Visnyk of the Lviv University. Series philosophical and political studies 2018, 19, p. 145-152.

²¹ *Status and prospects of social security in Ukraine: expert assessments, monograph*, O.F. Novikova, O.H. Sydorchuk, O.V. Pankova (Lvivskiy rehionalnyi instytut derzhavnoho upravlinnia NADU; NAN Ukrainy, Instytut ekonomiky promyslovosti. Kyiv; Lviv: LRIDU NADU, 2018).

²² O.G. Danilyan, O.P. Dzeban, Y.Y. Kalynovskyi, Y.A. Hetman, *Historical and cultural-mental origins of legal consciousness of the ukrainian people*. Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas 2022, Nº 28, p. 346-360.

of N. Dobreeva, E. Borshchuk, T. Koretskaya²³; V. Lagutin²⁴; O. Rudenko²⁵ and others.

In the same way, in the review of scientific articles a section for Latin America is taken into account, in accordance with Rodríguez Pérez²⁶, et al, objective is to understand how disinformation negatively affects the intangible assets (legitimacy, reputation, and trust) of social & political actors, and institutions. The results highlight that the disinformation contents' key drivers were the violence and punishable acts that affected both social actors and the Public Force, particularly the Esmad and the police. These contents delegitimized and discredited both the reasons for the protest and the function of guaranteeing public order and security. Regarding the disinformation linked to political actors, the leader of the left-side was the most affected due to inaccurate content that polarized and proclaimed extreme positions close to subversion. Finally, we discuss the implications of disinformation and how it affects legitimacy, reputation, and trust. Moreover, disinformation imitates media outlet aesthetics as a necessity of a kind of legitimacy and credibility set of news practice in the eye of the beholder. In the same way, in Chile Godinez & Binder²⁷, Social protest takes on new characteristics today, mediated by the use and appropriation of digital technologies. Citizens make use of devices as a central part of the mechanics of the protest, incorporating digital strategies into their repertoire of collective action. One of these uses highlights the centrality of the new screens for the defense of Human Rights, through the recording, publication and spreading the abuses of repressive forces and the montage of fake news through social media. A citizen's capacity to watch over the watcher. Due to its duration and characteristics, the case of the protests that began in October 2019 in Chile is a paradigmatic case from which to study these transformations. In Brazil and Argentina, the

²³ N.F. Dobrieva, Ye.M. Borshchuk, T.K. Koretska, *Conceptual bases for social policy formation under current conditions of functioning of the economic system of Ukraine*. Efficiency of public administration 2015, 44 (2), p. 73-79.

²⁴ V.D. Lahutin, "Institutional nature of social stability in Ukraine". Economic theory and law 1 (32), 2018, p. 23-37.

²⁵ O.M. Rudenko, *General stability in the context of public administration*. Global world: scientific almanac 2015, 1 (1), p. 28-32.

²⁶ C. Rodríguez Pérez, L.S. Ortiz Calderón, & J.P. Esquivel Coronado, *Disinformation in Contexts of Social Polarization: Colombia's National Strike (November 21st, 2019)*. Anagramas Rumbos Y Sentidos De La Comunicación 2021, 19(38), p. 129-156.

²⁷ F. Godinez Galay, & I. Binder, *Las cámaras que nos pusiste van a volver. Redes sociales y denuncia de los abusos de las fuerzas de seguridad en las protestas de Chile 2019-2020*. Revista De La Asociación Española De Investigación De La Comunicación 2021, 8(15), p. 357-387.

paper by Iglesias²⁸ is located, where he states that the main aim of this paper is to identify social protests that took place in Brazil and Argentina during the first 100 days of the Pandemic known as COVID 19 determining the symbols, slogans, and demands of those who lead the collective action. The identity perspective of collective action and a collection of qualitative information allowed to reconstruct its political trajectory and its dynamics. The argument developed in this paper consists in understanding social protest from the dynamic of social polarization. In fact, despite differences in health strategy and presidential leadership styles, the dynamics of social polarization characteristic of the pre-pandemic era, have persisted in terms of collective actions.

Results

To fully disclose the problem of social instability, it should be noted that the social subsystem is part of the social system. A social system is a type of social system based on social connections and relationships. The main components of the social system are the relevant areas of society or administration - conscious, political, economic, social and cultural, which, in turn, can be defined as social subsystems that constantly interact with each other²⁹.

Accordingly, social instability is not a separate phenomenon and is usually caused by crises in economic, political, cultural and other subsystems of society. That is why in our study the concept of “social instability” will be understood in a broad sense and interpreted as synonymous with the concept of “public instability”.

In our opinion, social (or public) instability should be understood as the imbalance of the basic spheres of society, namely economic, political, legal, spiritual. Such imbalance or conflict in these areas can be low (uncritical for the social system), medium (exacerbation of social contradictions with the possibility of resolving them by institutional and legal methods) and high (when there is a danger of disintegration of the social system).

Social instability of different levels can be a permanent state of those social systems that have a transitive or transformational nature, the existence of which is under the influence of powerful internal and external negative factors.

²⁸ E. Iglesias, *Social Protest in Brazil and in Argentina during the First 100 days of COVID 19: the persistence of polarization dynamics*. Espacio Abierto: Cuaderno Venezolano de Sociología 2020, 29(4), p. 70-84.

²⁹ O. Rudenko, *Models-approaches to the analysis of the concept of “social stability”*. Theory and practice of public administration 1 (2009): 3, URL: [http://www.dridu.dp.ua/vidavnictvo/2009/2009-01\(1\)/Rudenko.pdf](http://www.dridu.dp.ua/vidavnictvo/2009/2009-01(1)/Rudenko.pdf)

Describing the above-mentioned state of social formations of unstable type, O. Lytvynenko emphasizes the important fact that under conditions of prolongation of the state of instability in socio-political systems an interesting regularity works. The system adapts to the constant change of the rules of the game, begins to live virtually without rules, more precisely, according to the rules of changing the rules. This state can be called quasi-stable. The phenomenon of quasi-stability is that under conditions of rapid change of the rules of the game at any given time, these rules are stable, i.e. there is an effect of local stability. Moreover, quasi-stability occurs only when the rules of the game are stable at one of the possible levels. These rules may not be universal, informal, unrecognized by the majority, but they are agreed and followed by the main players. Thus, the basis of quasi-stability is a certain social consent (consensus), and because of this – a certain stable base. One can imagine a system that does not have any generally accepted rules of operation at all, but has a generally accepted direction of development and a constant rate of change (a stable first derivative over time). A transitional (post-socialist) society, by the definition proposed above, is fundamentally unstable or, at best, quasi-stable³⁰.

Continuing the logic of the above researcher, we note that transitional societies, transformational societies, conflict-generating social systems are in a state of finding the foundations of stable existence, they can “imitate” stability or show it only on certain grounds and only for a short time. That is why, we propose to use such concepts as “quasi-stability”, “sporadic stability”, “short-term stability”, “relative stability”, “formal stability”, “actual stability”, etc. to determine the form of social stability (instability).

In general, according to experts, the prerequisites for social instability are: unstable economy; the split of the political elite in the matter of establishing the rules of the game; imbalance between the functioning power structures; lack of harmony in society; the spread of corruption and other negative phenomena in public authorities³¹.

As a rule, social instability at the global and local levels is caused by various manifestations of social inequality, which have deepened in recent decades.

The basis of social inequality is socio-cultural and resource differences of individuals (groups) – they structure social reality, forming a structural matrix of societies and a certain social order. Inequality is a major factor in

³⁰ O.V. Lytvynenko, *Special information operations and propaganda campaigns Spetsialni informatsiini operatsii ta propahandystski kampanii* (Kyiv: VKF “Satsanta”, 2000), p. 75.

³¹ M.M. Shevchenko, O.H. Davydenko, *Concept of “socialand political stability”: semantic range of public management content*. Investments: practice and experience 2016, 14, p. 52.

social instability: the higher and more diverse the inequality, the higher the risks of social tension and social conflict. The degree of inequality and its social perception largely reflects the civilizational orientations of the population³².

In a society that seeks to overcome instability, a formal and informal consensus is gradually formed to agree with certain types of inequality, as the complete overcoming of all types of inequality (absolute equality) is impossible and contradicts the competitive nature of social relations. To overcome social instability, it is important to reduce the social distance between the “poles of inequality” (the gap between the poor and the rich, to improve the access of all segments of the population to education, medicine, social services, etc.).

Undoubtedly, the mentality, historical traditions, economic system, legal and political culture of the social community become the basis for the existence of various inequalities that determine social instability now or may cause it in the future.

E. Libanova proposed a classification of forms of social inequality in terms of solving problems of human development, which is as follows: class (differentiation into classes, strata and groups depending on social status, income level, education, etc.); political inequality (lack of equal opportunity to influence political decisions at the level of direct participants in the political process); economic inequality (different levels of material security, income and their social distribution, meeting needs); gender (inequality in guaranteeing and realizing fundamental human rights and freedoms depending on gender); educational (strengthening the social functions of the institute of education, lack of equal access to education through its commercialization); environmental (lack of guarantees of protection against threats of environmental pollution, environmental disasters, etc.); inequality of health security (lack of protection against the risks of disease, inequality in the availability of effective medical care, etc.); cultural inequality (inequality of protection of cultural development from destructive tendencies); information (media involvement, lack of objective channels of information transmission, inequality of access to information)³³.

In our opinion, the above-mentioned types of inequality in a single manifestation and especially in a complex are a specific background for the formation of various forms of social instability in the modern world.

³² L. Klevchik, *Social inequality as a basis of disproportion in society*. Economy and state 2019, 4, p. 49.

³³ *Inequality in Ukraine: scale and opportunities for influence*, za red. E.M. Libanovoi (Kyiv: Instytut demohrafii ta sotsialnykh doslidzhen imeni M.V. Ptukhy NAN Ukrainy, 2012), p. 56.

At the same time, it should be noted that one of the significant causes of social instability is economic inequality, which becomes the basis for the emergence of other conflicting factors, including political and legal.

Inequality on the basis of property affects the inequality of living standards and health, creates discrimination in education and health care, and so on. It is known that the state of health largely depends on access to quality food, that is, above all - on the level of income. In the international context, A. Deaton points out that the redistribution of income from rich to poor countries can improve the average health of the world's population, even if the average income remains unchanged. Inequality increases social tensions, if the level of inequality is significant, excessive (it is clear that in different countries the boundary between normal and excessive levels of inequality is assessed differently), then such social factor as social mobility helps to reduce income inequality. According to P. Sorokin, there is a so-called "saturation limit", beyond which society can not move without the risk of disaster. As society approaches this mark, reforms aimed at redistributing national income through taxes, changes in the economic and political spheres or other actions to curb the pernicious trend begin³⁴.

Many socially responsible politicians, scientists, and public figures are rightly sounding the alarm about the galloping growth of inequality and its consequences. In 2015, the World Economic Forum's annual report called rising income inequality a major challenge for future global development, a component of the broad, complex problem of inequality of opportunity that affects an increasing proportion of the population. The dangers of ignoring the problem of inequality are obvious, the report said. People, especially young people, excluded from the mainstream, eventually feel deprived of their civil rights and more prone to conflict. This, in turn, reduces the sustainability of economic growth, weakens the cohesion and security of society, produces unequal access to public goods, undermines our democracies and destroys our hopes for sustainable development and peaceful societies³⁵.

Socio-economic and political-legal inequality becomes the basis for social instability when citizens consider such inequality unfair. Conversely, when certain forms of inequality are considered natural by ordinary citizens, they will not be the cause of social instability – most citizens consider such inequality fair and do not want to fight for a new legal order.

³⁴ V.V. Opalko, *Consequences of socio-economic inequality in terms of global instability*. Proceedings of Cherkasy State Technological University, Series: Economic Sciences 2018, 51, p. 44.

³⁵ *Outlook on the Global Agenda*, (2015, WEF), URL: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC14/WEF_GAC14_OutlookGlobalAgenda_Report.pdf

A. Deaton, analyzing the problem of income inequality and its impact on the economic life of a particular country, notes that the inequality that exists within the country is in some way related to justice: whether all citizens receive an acceptable reward for compliance with their responsibilities, whether they like them or not, pay taxes, obey the law and follow the policies pursued in the country. Philosopher Ronald Dworkin, in turn, wrote that the political community, which has taken control of its citizens and requires them to be trustworthy and abide by the laws in force, must ensure impartial and objective treatment of all citizens. Of course, people may have different views on the fairness of income distribution and the extent to which significant and growing inequality in the United States is fair in itself. This is a key issue for discussing the problem of income inequality and ways to solve it within the country³⁶.

Thus, the recognition or non-recognition of various forms of inequality as fair or unfair is related to the social values, traditions and social practices of a particular society. Depending on this, social inequality may or may not become a catalyst for social instability.

Nowadays, the issue of global inequality as an important factor of social instability is widely presented in the scientific literature.

According to experts, global inequality is not only and not so much supranational inequality as a symbiosis of asymmetries in the global dimension that exist in the system of “equality/inequality”; it covers inequality both between and within countries. In the near future, the global world expects another large-scale change in income distribution under the influence of the phenomenon of “dynamic Asia” and especially economic growth in China, India and Southeast Asia. Modern global inequality is characterized by a number of new features. We must emphasize that, for the first time two centuries after the beginning of the industrial revolution, global inequality is not only determined by growing differences between countries. Thus, the trend of reducing the income gap between European and most Asian countries is now clearly visible. At the same time, the global trend is growing inequality within countries. If the trend of economic convergence continues, - says Branko Milanovich, - it will not only reduce global inequality, but also indirectly - it will also consolidate inequality within the country. In the next 50 years, we may find ourselves in a situation that existed in the early nineteenth century, when the lion’s share of global inequality was due to differences in income between rich and poor Britons, rich and poor Russians, rich and poor Chinese, rather than the fact that average incomes in the West were higher

³⁶ A. Diton, *The Great Escape. Health, Wealth and the Origin of Inequality*, per. s angl. A. Gus'kova (Moskva: Izd-vo Instituta Gajdara; Fond «Liberal'naja Missija», 2016), p. 292.

than average incomes in Asia. Such a world will be familiar to all who have read Karl Marx, and in general to all who are familiar with the classical European literature of the nineteenth century. But we have not yet returned to this world. Our world today is a world in which the place of birth is of great importance, determining, perhaps, up to two-thirds of income for life. Branko Milanovych calls the advantage of those born in rich countries the “rent for citizenship”³⁷.

The disproportionate development of the world economy leads to increased social instability in some regions and countries where the level of income and social security of the population is extremely low.

According to the international organization “Oxfam” data, inequality in the world has been growing rapidly in recent years. The 2017 Report noted that 82% of the wealth created in 2017 was received by only 1% of the world’s population. The world’s top 42 rich people own the same wealth as the 3.7 billion poorest people. At the same time, the incomes of the world’s poorest people have not increased. The billionaire boom is not a sign of prosperity, but a symptom of the weakening of economic system, says Oxfam International CEO Winnie Bianima. The available statistics show a reduction in the number of super-rich billionaires in the world, an increase in their wealth and a share of their income as a percentage of GDP. For comparison, back in 2010, the wealth, which was owned by the upper half of humanity, was concentrated in the hands of 388 people, and in 2015 the same wealth was owned by 62 people, in 2017 by 42 people³⁸.

The next conflict-causing factor that causes social instability is the gap between incomes and social prospects of agrarian and technologically developed countries, between rural and urban residents, between certain segments of the population.

In particular, in many countries of the world there is a gap in income and quality of life between the rural and urban population, employed mainly in industry (the so-called “dualism of the economy”). This phenomenon is mainly characteristic of resource-intensive, rapidly developing countries and transition economies. For example, China has been actively supporting the development of industry for three decades, while agriculture with its archaic means of production has lagged far behind. J. Studwell notes that despite the reform of the agricultural sector, including in terms of fiscal policy, the incomes of rural residents differ from the incomes of citizens three times, although the growth rate of the

³⁷ B. Milanovich, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*, per. s angl. D. Shestakova (Moskva: Izd-vo Instituta Gajdara, 2017), p. 18-19.

³⁸ OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER. JANUARY, 2017, URL:
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en.pdf

gap and was possible to restrain somehow. The main reason for this situation is the lack of Chinese farmers' right to land and the arbitrariness of local authorities, which seize land plots for sale to foreign holdings. A similar problem exists in Ukraine: large agricultural holdings are pushing smaller farms out of the market, exacerbating poverty in villages. At the same time, the number of so-called "personal peasant farms", which are deprived of state support, do not have sufficient working capital for effective economic activity, do not receive those social benefits, including educational, medical, household services that are available to urban residents. Rural underdevelopment is a significant extractive institution of economic development of the country, as it polarizes society in terms of welfare and hinders the restructuring of the national economy in accordance with the requirements of the information society³⁹.

Obviously, the low socio-economic potential of certain segments of the population and social groups is the cause of growing social turbulence in the modern world. Dissatisfied with their socio-economic status and legal status, citizens are prone to social protests, illegal actions, and, in extreme cases, terrorist acts. At the same time, they are potential migrants to more prosperous countries, which creates a number of problems with the regulation of migration flows, the adaptation of migrants to new conditions. Undoubtedly, the increase in the number of migrants in the world in recent years is an influential factor in increasing social instability.

According to experts, the reasons for the increase in international migration, as well as changes in their essential characteristics, are primarily the result of globalization. Removing obstacles to free trade, increasing political, economic and social interdependence between states, manifested in the formation of transnational business and the international labour market, internationalization of science, education, information, unprecedented development of communications, were crucial for the dynamics and volume of migration. In the context of globalization, international migration acts both as a provocative moment and as a result of global change⁴⁰.

The intensification of migration processes in the context of our study may be both a consequence of social instability and its cause. Illegal migration is a particular threat to the social stability of states.

Researchers A. Geddes, E. Guild, J. van Selm emphasize the ambivalent nature of migration: on the one hand, it carries an additional burden on all

³⁹ V. Adamyk, *Socio-economic inequality in the national and global spotlight: a contemporary view on the issue*. Bulletin of Ternopil National Economic University 2019, 1, p. 108.

⁴⁰ N.M. Rimashevskaja, V.F. Galeckij, A.A. Ovsjannikov, *Population and globalization* (Moskva: Nauka, 2004), p. 278.

subsystems of society, and on the other, it strengthens the human potential of the country. In particular, they emphasize that the dangers of migration are primarily recorded in host societies, which is generally paradoxical, because immigrants replenish their human and intellectual resources, i.e. the main factors of production, which enhance economic security. Nevertheless, the population sometimes has a negative attitude towards migration because of its cost, i.e. an additional burden on the social assistance system, which is often used by migrants, increasing the burden on education, transport and housing. However, as a result, migrants cover these costs and generate additional income for the host country⁴¹.

In the context of the impact of migration on social security, the associated criminal and terrorist threats are of particular concern. The first concerns both the increase in street crime, especially in areas populated by immigrants, and the large-scale phenomenon of transnational organized crime involved in smuggling and trafficking in human beings. According to a number of studies, the crime rate in cities correlates with the share of foreigners living in them. As of September 2009, in Switzerland 69.7% of prisoners were foreigners (4 thousand people), in Austria – 43.6% (3.6 thousand), in Italy – 37.1% (21.7 thousand), in Germany – 26.3% (19.3 thousand), in France – 19.2% (11.4 thousand), in Great Britain – 13.6% (11.4 thousand). At the same time, it is worth paying attention to the characteristics of crimes committed by foreigners. Mostly, these are violations of migration laws that do not belong to serious crimes. On the other hand, migrants more often than the local population appear in criminal statistics not only as criminals but also as victims: up to six times more often, but in fact even more, because due to the legal and social situation and the attitude of law enforcement towards migrants the significant part of crimes against migrants are not reported (according to European researchers, from 57 to 74% of cases). High rates of crime against migrants are partly due to their concentration in disadvantaged areas. This is partly the result of negative phenomena that often accompany modern migration, such as discrimination, human rights violations, overexploitation, human trafficking⁴².

For comparison with previous data, we present statistics and expert assessment of experts in recent years. As it is known, the peak of migration flows to Europe, primarily related to the war in Syria, falls on the years 2015-2016. In this regard, experts say that the increase in migration flows to EU countries in recent years has led to an increase in crime. Thus,

⁴¹ A. Geddes, E. Guild, J. Van Selm, Immigration and Welfare State. *International migration and security: opportunities and challenges* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 161.

⁴² Malynovska, O.A., *Migration policy: global context and Ukrainian realities*, monograph (Kyiv: NISD, 2018), p. 58.

according to the statistics of the Federal Republic of Germany, this growth is 10.4% for the period from 2015 to 2016. In contrast to previous years, in 2017 the policy in this area became stricter: instead of silencing this problem, law enforcement agencies are actively identifying and prosecuting those involved, reports are published in the media indicating the countries of origin of detainees⁴³.

In addition to the above factors of social turbulence, a significant factor causing social instability is political confrontation, especially with the use of manipulative technologies that can incite the population to destructive actions.

According to N. Teleshun, in any society there are conflicts of interest of political actors, when each of them seeks to impose the own discourse, to make it dominant in order to change the social, group and individual consciousness. However, modern information and communication technologies make it possible to transfer this confrontation to another level of intensity, scale and efficiency. Constructing the meaning of information is done by programming to support the position of the author. The constructions and meanings that are laid down by the author in the text of messages and allow to make it a mental technology of influencing the human mind in order to program certain behaviour, they become the main. Manipulation technology in itself is not “good” or “bad”. Determinant is the hidden meaning that is embedded in the message and provokes real action. When manipulating the mass consciousness, complex psychological-linguistic, political, cybernetic and other mechanisms of multilevel influence are usually used. The main task of these mechanisms is: to disable the “ratio” (reduce critical thinking), to cause systemic fear and aggression (create a threat), to mobilize citizens around someone or something to solve the problem (offer a way out), to create an environment of circular guarantee or social dependence (fear of public criticism) and use the state of the “Stockholm syndrome” of the hostage as a means of mass support for the implementation of a particular political course or action⁴⁴.

It is obvious that the level of social instability can be provoked artificially by individual political forces with the use of manipulative technologies and to achieve their own interests, rather than public ones. Also, the political aspects of social instability are manifested at the international level.

⁴³ D. Beseda, *Migration crisis in the EU and its impact on the security situation in Ukraine*. Entrepreneurship, economy and law 2018, 12, p. 300.

⁴⁴ S.O. Teleshun, *Human resource management in an unstable institutional environment. world trends and Ukrainian realities*. Bulletin of the National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine. Series: Public Administration 2019, 1, p. 62.

In general, political and managerial crises, shaky positions of democratic forces, low level of political and legal culture of citizens, etc. have become the causes of social instability in different regions of the world. Thus, political instability in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is explained by the expansion of formal political equality in the absence of actual institutional mechanisms for their implementation. Economic and social transformations (increasing literacy and education levels, urbanization and industrialization, expanding the field of media) contribute to social integration; raising socio-political consciousness; increasing social, economic and political demands, which leads to the expansion of participants in the political process. These transformational processes weaken traditional social and political institutions. If the process of democratic transition is not gradual, not evolutionary, but because of revolutionary upheavals, then there is a short-term dismantling of traditional institutions (in the absence of the prospect of constructing a new effective institutional architecture). Increasing socio-political activity, which is not congruent with the development of political organization, leads to political instability. In the process of transformation of hybrid or authoritarian political regimes, the implemented strategies of economic development can in some way amortize the factors of instability of the political regime. In other cases, economic programs that fundamentally disrupt the economic life of the country (so-called “shock therapy”) can lead to a socio-economic crisis and a crisis of political, social division, polarization of society. In India in the 50s of the twentieth century there was a very low rate of socio-economic development. However, the effective operation of the Indian National Congress contributed to the achievement of an optimal level of political stability. In Venezuela and Argentina, the pace of socio-economic modernization rated higher than in India, but the political leadership of these countries failed to achieve political stability in their own countries. The political regimes of South Korea and Vietnam, Argentina, Syria, and Indonesia were openly autocratic, so despite the institution of elections, they failed to ensure political stability⁴⁵.

Thus, the significant causes of social instability are socio-economic and political crises, failed attempts to reform the political, legal and economic systems, asynchrony of political and economic transformations, destructive external influence on social processes in a certain state.

Considering Ukraine as an example, experts identified a number of reasons that determine social instability and threaten the country’s social security: indifference of government officials to the social needs of the

⁴⁵ A. Liasota, *Main factors of political instability of transition systems from the position of comparative regionalism*. Visnyk of the Lviv University. Series philosophical and political studies 2018, 19, p. 146.

population, lack of balanced interests between government and society; low level of economic development of the country; rising unemployment and poverty in the country; growing level of distrust in society, low level of tolerance and social responsibility; military action in eastern Ukraine, annexation of Crimea; weakness of the national elite; weakness of civil society; growth of social and property stratification; low legal literacy of the population; outflow of human resources outside the country; high conflict potential of society; loss of labour value and employee's value; uncertainty of social policy strategies in the conditions of decentralization; non-regulation of duties and lack of responsibility of national security entities; moral and spiritual degradation of society; underdeveloped social partnership; inefficiency of the state demographic policy⁴⁶.

An analysis of the scientific literature and empirical data has shown that a number of the above causes of social instability are typical of countries in a state of social transformation.

For the states trying to overcome social turbulence, the problem of finding ways out of the crisis is extremely important.

From the point of view of Ukrainian researchers, the strategy of economic development should create the necessary preconditions for solving the most complex and pressing problems of social policy. The main tasks of social policy in this context are: targeted support of socially vulnerable groups; pension reform; ensuring advanced growth of labour costs; orientation of the strategy of economic growth on the creation of new jobs; accelerated development of housing construction, ensuring the availability of housing for different segments of the population; improving the health care system, active demographic policy; increasing the intellectual potential of society, creating equal opportunities for young people in obtaining quality education; strengthening the position of the middle class; eradication of poverty and ensuring dynamic growth of living standards; socialization of structural components of economic policy (investment, price, budget, monetary, tax, etc.); ensuring the conditions for the implementation of social rights and guarantees of the population, as defined by constitutional norms; ensuring social stability and social security in the country⁴⁷.

To overcome the crisis in society, it is necessary to take care not only of the socio-economic sphere, but also of the spiritual, which is based on a

⁴⁶ *Status and prospects of social security in Ukraine: expert assessments*, monograph, O.F. Novikova, O.H. Sydorчук, O.V. Pankova (Lvivskiy rehionalnyi instytut derzhavnoho upravlinnia Nadu; Nan Ukrainy, Instytut ekonomiky promyslovosti. Kyiv; Lviv: Lridu Nadu, 2018), p. 32.

⁴⁷ N.F. Dobrieva, Ye.M. Borshchuk, T.K. Koretska, *Conceptual bases for social policy formation under current conditions of functioning of the economic system of Ukraine*. Efficiency of public administration 2015, 44 (2), p. 78.

system of values. It is the dominant social values that determine the nature of citizens' behaviour, their attitude to certain social processes and phenomena.

According to V. Lagutin, in modern Ukraine it is necessary to form new values that can ensure social stability and development. So far, European values (freedom, humanism, equality, solidarity, honesty, dignity of all people, responsibility, fair justice) have not fully matured in the Ukrainian public consciousness. The revolutionary-accelerated transition to a new system of values in these conditions will not give the necessary results, but will only increase resistance to any ethical influences. The morality of society in these conditions can only decrease⁴⁸.

It should be noted that in societies that are being transformed, values can be understood hypertrophied, in particular, freedom to be perceived as permissiveness, equality and solidarity as a remnant of totalitarianism. In this case, value ambivalence or immaturity can be the cause of social instability. Since a person making the choice seeks to fulfill the desires that come into conflict, the inability to do so is subjectively felt by them as a violation of his or her freedom, which can lead to social conflict⁴⁹.

An important component of overcoming social instability is effective (professional) governance at all levels: from state to local government.

O. Rudenko quite rightly states that in the conditions of a transitive society the importance of the correctly chosen model of management especially increases. The basis of public administration should be consensus (ensuring the sustainable development of all subsystems of society on the basis of a common system of values for all subjects of social governance while maintaining a level of sufficient diversity), reflexive (influence on the system of goals, values and norms on the basis of building the structure of management and creating an adequate object, which provides for reflection of the system-forming mechanisms of the management process) and synergetic (effective combination of self-organization mechanisms and mechanisms of public administration to ensure social stability which contributes to intellectual and innovative self-organization of society) management. In fact, public administration acquires the character of a guide, i.e. it supports effective directions of development and directs its efforts to prevent instability and crises. Management is not a way to achieve a certain goal, but determines the mechanisms for implementing the selected scenario of society by

⁴⁸ V.D. Lahutin, *Institutional nature of social stability in Ukraine*. Economic theory and law 1 (32), 2018, p. 30.

⁴⁹ O.G. Danilyan, A.P. Dzeban, Y.Y. Kalinovskiy, E.A. Kalnytskyi, S.B. Zhdanenko, *Personal information rights and freedoms within the modern society*. Informatologia 2018, 51 (1-2), p. 28.

neutralizing the violation of resilience and, thus, is a way to direct the processes of self-organization in the desired direction of development⁵⁰.

In our opinion, in the conditions of social turbulence, the subjects of public administration should strengthen cooperation with scientific institutions, pay more attention to forecasting social processes to prevent (minimize) various crises.

Conclusions

Social instability in modern conditions has both global and local character. It is caused, first of all, by uneven economic development of separate regions and countries, which creates a global imbalance in the distribution of various resources. Conflicts determined by socio-economic inequality of countries and regions provoke political, geopolitical and financial crises in individual states. Globalization in its current form is in favour of the so-called “golden billion” and creates a basis for social protests, increased migration flows and intensification of the anti-globalization movement. The pandemic has had a negative impact on social processes in recent years.

Social instability also arises as a result of political crises, ineffective reforms and imbalances in the systems of government. Social turbulence can be provoked artificially by separate political forces, which, using chaos in society, try to come to power, to achieve their narrow party goals by such provocative methods.

Thus, at the present stage of global intensification of social instability there is an urgent need to review the foundations of social policy in individual states, increase efficiency in public administration, create a system for predicting social cataclysms at all levels of human existence.

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⁵⁰ O.M. Rudenko, *General stability in the context of public administration*. Global world: scientific almanac 2015, 1 (1), p. 29-30.

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FACTORS DETERMINING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY OF SONE BEEL, ASSAM, INDIA

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Abstract: *The objectives of this study are to estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for the conservation of biodiversity of Sone Beel, the largest wetland of Assam in India and to determine the factors affecting respondents WTP for conservation. A binary logistic regression model is used to determine the factors affecting respondents WTP. The model is well specified with a Likelihood Ratio Chi-square of 187.50 with a p-value of 0.0000 and McFadden's pseudo-R-squared is 0.3850 which indicates that the model is a very good model. The study findings indicate that more than half (70.25%) of the respondents were WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel. In this study, although biodiversity threat is strongly significantly affecting respondent's WTP for conservation biodiversity of Sone Beel, other factors such as distance, marital status, educational level, religion, household size, monthly household income, and father's occupation are also significant. The most significant conclusion of the study is that it establishes that people are actually willing to pay an amount, however small, to assist the conservation of Sone Beel. Further, in this study, it is observed that those people who use the wetland are more willing to participate.*

Keywords: *Sone Beel, Biodiversity, Contingent Valuation method, Willingness to pay, Binary logistic regression model.*

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Introduction

Wetlands are considered as one of the richest and most productive ecosystems on earth¹. Wetlands provide economically valuable products and services to the people living in and around it². Regardless of these significant contributions, wetlands are threatened globally with worldwide declines in their area by 64% from 1978 to 2011³. This trend influences the biodiversity of wetlands and it has been observed with grave concern that the rate of biodiversity loss is more significant⁴. So, wetlands are considered as one of the maximum unexpectedly degrading ecosystems on earth⁵. Even though the surrounding peoples get benefits from the ecosystem services of wetlands for their sustainable livelihood, they use them in such a way that wetlands are wastelands. The prime fact is that the ignorance and misunderstanding of the importance of the values of wetlands often end in the degradation and loss of wetlands⁶. Wetland loss refers to the physical loss in the spatial extent or the loss within the wetland functions. If the biodiversity of wetlands is going to be successfully conserved for the benefit of people, then its values must be incorporated into the decision-making⁷. Important for the conservation of wetlands is an

¹ E.B. Barbier, M.C. Acreman, & D. Knowler, *Economic valuation of wetlands: A guide for policymakers and planners*, 1997, Ramsar Convention Bureau, Gland, Switzerland, p. 3.

² K., Schuyt, & L. Brander, *Living Waters Conserving the source of life, The economic values of the world's wetlands*, Prepared with support from Swiss Agency for the Environment, Forest and Landscape (SAEFL), 2004, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Gland, Switzerland. 10p.

³ R.J. Scholes, L. Montanarella, E. Brainich, E. Brainich, N. Barger, B. Ten Brink, M. Cantele, B. Erasmus, J. Fisher, T. Gardner, T. G. Holland, F. Kohler, S. Kotiaho, G. Von Maltitz, G. Nangendo, R. Pandit, J. Parrotta, M. D. Potts, S. Prince, ... L., (eds.), (2018), *IPBES (2018): Summary for policymakers of the assessment report on land degradation and restoration of the Intergovernmental Science- Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services*, Bonn, Germany, 82p.

⁴ T.P. Moorhouse, & D.W. Macdonald, Are invasives worse in freshwater than terrestrial ecosystems? *WIREs Water*, 2014, Vol.2, No. 1, pp.1–8.

⁵ Nick C. Davidson, How much wetland has the world lost? Long-term and recent trends in global wetland area, *Marine and Freshwater Research*, 2014, Vol. 65, No. 10, pp. 934–941.

⁶ E.B. Barbier, M.C. Acreman, & D. Knowler, *Economic valuation of wetlands: A guide for policymakers and planners*, 1997, Ramsar Convention Bureau, Gland, Switzerland, p. 4.

⁷ S. Díaz, J. Settele, E.S. Brondízio E.S., H.T. Ngo, M. Guèze, J. Agard, A. Arneth, P. Balvanera, K.A. Brauman, S.H.M. Butchart, K.M.A. Chan, L.A. Garibaldi, K. Ichii, J. Liu, S.M. Subramanian, G.F. Midgley, P. Miloslavich, Z. Molnár, D. Obura, A. Pfaff, S. Polasky, A. Purvis, J. Razzaque, B. Reyers, R. Roy Chowdhury, Y.J. Shin, I.J. Visseren-Hamakers, K.J. Willis, and C.N. Zayas (eds.), (2018), *IPBES (2019): Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental*

appreciation by the population of the social value of wetlands. This social valuation is normally conducted by non-market valuation techniques major among them being contingent valuation⁸.

According to the Directory of Asian Wetlands (1989), in India, wetlands occupy 18.4% of the country's area (excluding rivers), of which 70% are under paddy cultivation⁹. Wetlands in India, as somewhere else are in increasing number facing several anthropogenic pressures. Hence, the rapidly expanding human population, large-scale changes in land use or land cover, burgeoning development projects, and improper use of watersheds have all brought about a large decline in wetland resources in the country. The current rate of loss of wetlands in India can lead to serious consequences where 74% of the human population is rural¹⁰ and a lot of these people are natural resource-dependent. Most problems bearing on Indian wetlands are related to the human population¹¹. The loss of one km² of wetlands in India may have a far extra impact than the loss of one km² of wetlands in low population areas of considerable wetlands¹². The loss of wetlands is an economic problem because, with the loss or damage of this, the important values of wetlands are also lost. In this regard, it has been noted that a significant step in determining what has to be done to the environmental damage is to value it (in economic terms), and compare it with the cost of preventing the damage and conserving it¹³.

In India, only 25 wetlands have been designated as Ramsar Sites. However, many other wetlands, which perform potentially valuable

Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany.

⁸ C.A. Pemberton, & K. Mader-Charles, *Factors Determining Willingness to Pay for Wetland Conservation: The Case of the Nariva Swamp in Trinidad and Tobago*, 25th Conference Proceedings—Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environmental Challenges under Emerging Trading Regimes, 2004, Caribbean Agro-Economic Society (CAES), Suriname, pp. 111-121.

⁹ Task Force on Islands, Coral Reefs, Mangroves & wetlands in Environment & Forests, India. *Report of the Task Force on Islands, Coral Reefs, Mangroves & wetlands in Environment & Forests for the Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2012*, 2007, Government of India Planning Commission, New Delhi.

¹⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report, Infrastructure for Development*.1994, Oxford University Press, New York.

¹¹ S.N. Prasad, T.V. Ramacandara, N. Aalya, T. Senupta, A. Kumar, A.K. Tiwari, V.S. Vijayan, & L. Vijayan, Wetland conservation in India: A review, *Tropical Ecology*, 2002, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp.173-186.

¹² A. Lee Foote, Sanjeeva Pandey, & N. T. Krogman, Processes of wetland loss in India, *Environmental Conservation*, 1996, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 45-54.

¹³ A.S. Binilkumar, & A. Ramanathan, *Valuing stakeholder preferences on improved conservation and management of Kol wetland: A contingent valuation study*, 11th BIOECON Conference on Economic Instruments to Enhance the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 2009, Venice, Italy, 27 p.

functions are continued to be ignored in the policy process. As a result, many freshwater wetland ecosystems are threatened and many are already degraded and lost because of urbanization, population growth, and increased economic activities¹⁴. In India, many researchers had worked on the economic valuation of wetlands and estimated both the non-use and use values of the wetlands. Verma (2001) calculated the economic values of the Bhoj wetland only for direct uses. Mamatha (2009) studied Kollure Lake in Andhra Pradesh for its valuation of ecosystem services. The choice of the type of economic valuation process varies depending on the kinds of services, availability of resources, location of interest, time, objectives of the study, and methods of collecting data¹⁵. In Assam, Dutta & Sharma (2020) have conducted a study on the valuation of fishing activity of Deepor Beel wetland, a Ramsar site, and concluded that the wetland is under continual deterioration because of the negligence of its conservation and maintenance. In most cases, the direct uses of marketed products of ecosystems are less complicated to quantify since market products exist and their costs can be adjusted for distortions. The motive of economic valuation is to elicit the actual prices of the usage of scarce environmental assets¹⁶.

The north-eastern region (NER) of India is distinctly concentrated with the natural inland wetlands with significant economic value in providing sustainable livelihood for the surrounding people. There are altogether 18875 numbers of wetlands in NER of India occupying 1,066,777 hectares of land¹⁷. Of these, three wetlands, namely, Deepor Beel of Assam, Loktak Lake of Manipur, and Rudra Sagar of Tripura, are designated as Ramsar sites. In NER, Assam has the highest number of wetlands (11178) occupying 764,372 hectares of land.

The earlier studies are conducted on the most significant wetlands in India as well as in Assam which is enlisted in the Ramsar site. But many equally important wetlands have remained out of the study. The National Wetlands Conservation Programme enlists 115 wetlands as having critical importance. Sone Beel is one of these. In Assam, Sone Beel is considered as the lifeline of the people of South Assam. It is the largest freshwater wetland

¹⁴ N. Bassi, M.D. Kumar, A. Sharma, & P. Parth-Saradhi, Status of wetlands in India: A review of extent, ecosystem benefits, threats, and management strategies, *Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies*, 2014, Vol. 2, pp.1-19.

¹⁵ Research Program on Water, Land, and Ecosystems, (2016), *Nile Ecosystems Valuation for Wise Use*, Working Paper No. 6: Application of the economic methods and tools for ecosystems valuation on the selected case studies and developing tradeoff scenarios, NBCBN-RE, Cairo, Egypt, 23 p.

¹⁶ V. Ramachandra, R. Rajinikanth, & V.G. Ranjini, Economic valuation of wetlands, *Journal of Environmental Biology*, 2005, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.439-447.

¹⁷ National Wetland Atlas, (2011), SAC/EPISA/ABHG/NWIA/ATLAS/34/2011, Space Applications Centre (ISRO), Ahmedabad, India, p.52.

in Assam¹⁸. Fishing, agriculture, water transportation, and tourism are considered economically important resources as the people surrounding the wetland directly or indirectly depend upon the wetland for their livelihood. But the recent condition of the Sone Beel is not in good shape. The entire area has been silted up and reclaimed to a great extent. Winter paddy is widely grown, and that again has threatened the wetland by accelerating reclamation and siltation. Excessive fishing activities disturb the wetland biodiversity¹⁹. Being the second-largest freshwater wetland in Asia, Sone Beel is attracting attention from stakeholders and policymakers for the conservation and sustainable use of the wetland for continuous benefits. But negligence has resulted in continuous degradation of it.

Few studies have been undertaken in India as well as in the world using Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) to determine the factors affecting WTP for the conservation of the wetlands. The factors affecting WTP differ from country to country, region to region, and wetland to wetland based on the socio-economic status of the stakeholders and the level of environmental awareness. The factors affecting WTP for conservation of Sone Beel in North East of India are not yet seriously addressed. Further there is no evidence of previous studies which have determined the factors affecting WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel. Thus, there exists a research gap for the evaluation of Son Beel using CVM and to determine the factors that affect WTP and their impacts. This study is important in view of the fact that the identification of expertise of the elements in figuring out WTP can be used to correctly layout surveys to achieve unbiased estimates of the WTP²⁰.

With the above background, the present paper makes a maiden attempt to determine the factors affecting an individual's WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel using CVM.

Study Area

Sone Beel is in the Karimganj district of Assam in India. It is the largest freshwater wetland in Assam and is located between 24°40'00"

¹⁸ National Wetland Atlas: Assam, (2010), SAC/RESA/AFEG/NWIA/ATLAS/18/2010, Space Applications Centre, (ISRO), Ahmedabad, India, p. 142.

¹⁹ National Wetland Atlas: Assam, (2010), SAC/RESA/AFEG/NWIA/ATLAS/18/2010, Space Applications Centre, (ISRO), Ahmedabad, India, p. 142.

²⁰ C.A. Pemberton, & K. Mader-Charles, *Factors Determining Willingness to Pay for Wetland Conservation: The Case of the Nariva Swamp in Trinidad and Tobago*, 25th Conference Proceedings—Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environmental Challenges under Emerging Trading Regimes, 2004, Caribbean Agro-Economic Society (CAES), Suriname, pp. 114-118.

north latitude and 92°26'10" east longitude. The maximum length and breadth of Sone Beel were surveyed as 12.5 km and 3.9 km respectively at its live storage level (LSL) and it reduces to 4.07 km to 2.22 km respectively at its dead storage level (DSL). The total area is 3458.12 ha at LSL and 409.37 ha at DSL. The shoreline length is 35.4 km. A major inlet and outlet of this wetland is the Singla River²¹.

Sone Beel is famous for its fish and aquatic resources. It is the natural fish breeding and nursery ground for fish. Sone Beel, is a reservoir of 70 species of fish belonging to 49 genera under 24 families that have been recorded. The wetland and its resources offer different economic benefits to the surrounding local people. It is considered as the second wetland in Assam that got the status of a national wetland after Deepor Beel. The Govt. of Assam proposed to announce this rural wetland as a Ramsar site and recognize its national and international importance²² because of its significant role in the entire social, economic, cultural, and ecological lives of the entire region.

²¹ . Kar, A. H. Barbhuiya, & V. Saha, Wetland diversity of Assam: their present status, *Proceedings of taal 2007: the 12th world lake conference*, M. Sengupta, & R. Dalwani, (eds.), 2008, pp. 1844-1857.

²² National Wetland Atlas: Assam, (2010), SAC/RESA/AFEG/NWIA/ATLAS/18/2010, Space Applications Centre, (ISRO), Ahmedabad, India, p. 142.




Figure 1: Sone Beel, Karimganj district, Assam, India Source: National wetland Atlas: Assam

Sone Beel is used for fishing, agriculture, rearing duck, water transport, recreation, etc. The Sone Beel based activity is generally practiced considering the whole year but divided into two seasons, viz., summer and winter. Though fishing and tourism are done throughout the year, most often it is practiced during the summer season. During the summer season, the Sone Beel becomes a huge water body and is used as a

common property of people. In this season, anyone can use Sone Beel for fishing. In the winter season, the water level of wetland decreases, consisting of parts of cultivable land, fisheries, and wetland fisheries. In this season the drying Sone Beel is considered as the private property of some selected stakeholders. In this stipulated period, they claim their rights on them²³. There are eight deeper fishing centers locally called *Bhund's* in Sone Beel²⁴. From a report of Karimganj Zilla Parishad's office, it was seen that about 35,000 families of Sone Beel are engaged in fishing for their livelihood. About 500 families are engaged in the net-making and fish marketing network. About 50 traditional boats ply every day regularly. About 300 households are fully dependent on the income from the boat services for six months.

Materials and methods

Contingent Valuation Method

The non-use values of wetlands are not traded in the market. Due to the absence of an efficient market for the resources, many economic valuation techniques were developed for the valuation of non-marketed goods. Prominent and most widely used among these techniques is the Contingent Valuation Method²⁵. The CVM is a straightforward, simple to understand, and very flexible technique. It is a questionnaire-based approach that directly ask people questions about their choice, rather than observing their actual behavior in the market. In other words, individuals are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay or minimum willingness to accept under a hypothetical market scenario in the changes in environmental quality. Nowadays, this approach is commonly used as one of the standards and flexible approaches in measuring economic values²⁶.

The advantage of CVM is that it not only captures use-value but also it elicits existence values and bequests values. It is also able to overcome the weakness of the Travel Cost Method in valuing trips with multiple purposes or multi-site. Further, the National Oceanic Atmospheric

²³ S. Das, & J. Bhattacharjee, Climate change and livelihood problems of fishing communities who are living in the largest wetland of Assam, *European scientific journal*, June, 2015, Vol. 1, pp.27-36.

²⁴ D. Kar, *Application of GIS for the fish diversity and habitat parameters in the wetland of Barak valley with special emphasis on Sone Beel, the biggest wetland of Assam*, Proceedings of Lake 2014: Conference on conservation and sustainable management of wetland ecosystems in the Western Ghats, 2014, Sirsi, Karnataka, pp. 60-82.

²⁵ W.M. Hanemann, J. Loomis, & B. Kanninen, Statistical efficiency of double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation, *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 1991, Vol.73, No. 4, pp.1255-1263.

²⁶ W.M. Hanemann, Valuing the Environment through Contingent Valuation, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1994, Vol.8, No. 4, pp.19-43.

Administration (NOAA) panel suggested that a dichotomous choice format (DC) and face-to-face interviews should be used in CV studies. DC format is known to reduce strategic bias, design bias, and interview bias. Meanwhile, face-to-face interviews can obtain a large quantity of data in which quality is guaranteed. However, CVM is a widely applicable and widely applied monetary evaluation method.

Data collection and study methods

The questionnaire survey was conducted in the adjacent area of Sone Beel. Sone Beel is comprised of 38 villages with a total of about 4920 households. After consulting and discussing with the stakeholders of the wetland, we made eight number of clusters. According to the Village Panchayet official report (2021), the total number of households in these eight villages is 1964. From each cluster area, one village has been selected randomly for the sample study. From each village 50 households have selected by using systematic random sampling. The total sample household size is 400.

A CVM was employed following NOAA guidelines along with standard CV format i.e. including a well-constructed questionnaire, hypothetical market scenario, and a face-to-face interview. Before finalizing the design of the CV questionnaire focus group discussions were conducted. A pilot survey was also conducted comprising 50 respondents and four focus group discussions for pre-testing the questionnaire and designing bid prices. Thereafter, modifying the questionnaire, the final survey was carried out²⁷ between April 2021 to February 2022.

The CV questionnaire was comprised of three sections. The first section included questions related to the respondent's environmental awareness, attitudes, and knowledge about Sone Beel. The second section dealt with CV questions. In this section, a hypothetical market scenario was developed and proposed a fund for the conservation of Sone Beel, namely, Sone Beel Development fund (SBDF), with a focus on conservation instead of infrastructural development. The proposed fund will be controlled by the local stakeholders and representatives of the State govt. To estimate the respondent's WTP, we used dichotomous choice questions followed by an open-ended question for estimating the respondent's maximum WTP²⁸. For doing this, six bid prices were offered

²⁷ K.J. Arrow, R. Solow, P.R. Portney, E.E. Leamer, R. Radner, & H. Schuman, *Report on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation*, 1993, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington DC, pp.29-35.

²⁸ H. Amirnejad, S. Khalilian, M.H. Assareh, & M. Ahmadian, Estimating the existence value of north forests of Iran by using a contingent valuation method, *Ecological Economics*, 2006, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 665-675.

to the respondents, and were asked to state their WTP in INR. 'X' (X=50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600). This method was used to minimize the non-responses²⁹.

Finally, they were also asked to specify exactly how much they would be WTP in order to reveal the true value. Reasons for not WTP offered bid prices were asked for the respondent to understand the reasons behind it. The third section of the questionnaire was about the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents which include; age, gender, marital status, household size, family status, educational level, occupation, income, and other variables that may have influenced their WTP response.

Estimation of WTP

In the DC format of CVM, the WTP value is in the form of binary choice dependent variable, either 1 for a 'Yes' response or 0 for a 'No' response. Also, the bid amount is varied across respondents and the only information obtained from each individual is that what his /her maximum WTP is.

In order to find the various determinants of WTP, for the conservation of Sone Beel, we have employed a binary logistic regression model. The model is used when the dependent variable is binary in nature i.e. 0 and 1.

Following Hanemann (1984), the logistic regression model is used to estimate WTP. Considering the WTP estimation in the logistic distribution function, the probability of accepting the offered bid is estimated as:

$$P = \frac{e^{-Z}}{1 + e^{-Z}} \quad (1)$$

$$Z = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \dots + b_iX_i + e_i$$

Where P is the probability of accepting the price, Z is a vector of explanatory variables, Xi includes bid offered, socio-economic variables, and potential motivation variables, bi is the intercept, b0 is the coefficient of the estimated parameters and ei is the random error.

The list of the independent variables and also the descriptions of the variables are presented in Table 1. The parameters of the logit model were estimated, by the 'maximum likelihood estimation method' using the STATA-13 version.

Econometric specification

We have investigated the various determinants of WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel on the basis of the various variables presented in Table 1.

²⁹ K.J. Arrow, R. Solow, P.R. Portney, E.E. Leamer, R. Radner, & H. Schuman, *Report on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation*, 1993, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington DC.

Table 1: Description of variables of the binomial logistic model of WTP for biodiversity conservation of Sone Beel, Assam

| Variable | Variable description | Modalities |
|------------------------------|--|---|
| Dependent Variables | | |
| WTP | Refers to the respondent's WTP for the conservation of the biodiversity of Sone Beel i.e. how much they WTP for the conservation of biodiversity of Sone Beel. | 1=Yes |
| | | 0=No |
| Independent Variables | | |
| Distance | Shows the distance of the household of the respondents from Sone Beel in km. | Numeric |
| Age | Shows the age of the respondents | Quantitative |
| Sex | Refers to the gender of the respondents | 1=Male |
| | | 0=Female |
| Marital Status | Shows the marital status of the respondents, whether he/she is married, unmarried, or widows. | 0=Unmarried |
| | | 1= Married |
| | | 2=Widow |
| Educational level | Shows the educational qualification of the respondents | 0=Illiterate 1=LP 2=UP 3=High School 4=Higher Secondary 5=Graduation 6=PG 7=Others |
| Religion | Shows the religion of the respondent | 1=Hindu |
| | | 0=Muslim |
| Caste | Shows the caste of the respondents | 0=General 1=MOBC/OBC 2=SC 3=ST |
| Household size | Shows the number of members of the household of the respondent | Numeric |
| Family Status | Shows the status of the household of the respondents whether the household | 1=APL |

| | | |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| | economic status belongs to APL or BPL. | 0=BPL |
| Household landholding size | Shows the landholding area of the household in the wetland area in acres. | Numeric |
| Living Period | Shows the living period of the household of the respondent in that area. | 1=45 years above |
| | | 0=45 years below |
| Main Occupation | Shows the main occupation of the household of the respondent | 1=Govt. Job |
| | | 2=Private Job |
| | | 3=Remittance (including Pension) |
| | | 4=Fishing |
| | | 5=Fish Trading |
| | | 6=Business (Tea stall, Hotel, and others) |
| | | 7=Boatman (including Boat owner) |
| | | 8=Day labour (including driver and others) |
| | | 9=Paddy Cultivator |
| | | 10=Duck Rearer |
| Monthly household income | Shows the overall monthly income of the household including wetland-based income also. | Numeric |
| Father's occupation | Shows the occupation of the father of the respondent. | 1=Fishing |
| | | 0=Non fishing |
| Relation to the Head | Shows the relationship of the respondents with the head of the household. | 1=Self |
| | | 0=Other household member |
| Biodiversity under threat | Shows the opinion of the respondents about the biodiversity condition of the wetland. | 1=Yes |
| | | 0=No |
| Social participation | Shows the participation of the respondent in social organizations, NGOs, or any social club which is working in that wetland area. | 1=Yes |
| | | 0=No |

Source: Author's own specification based on primary data

Results and discussion

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Households

In order to find out the factors affecting the WTP for conservation of Sone Beel, we have considered a binary logistic regression model. The

detailed discussion of the binary dependent variable and the list of the independent variables used for regression are presented in the earlier part of this paper. Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

| Variables | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Observation |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| Distance | 2.75 | 1.48 | 1 | 5 | 400 |
| Age | 46.18 | 14.42 | 17 | 81 | 400 |
| monthly household Income | 15197 | 11346.68 | 500 | 60000 | 400 |
| Household size | 7.12 | 2.76 | 1 | 16 | 400 |
| Landholding size | 0.71 | 1.05 | 0 | 6.61 | 400 |
| WTP | | | | | |
| | Willingness to pay= 70.25% | | | | |
| | Not willingness to pay= 29.75% | | | | |
| Relationship to the head | | | | | |
| | Head of the household= 79.25% | | | | |
| | Others=20.75% (Other household members of the head) | | | | |
| Sex | | | | | |
| | Male= 88.75% | | | | |
| | Female=11.25% | | | | |
| Marital Status | | | | | |
| | Unmarried= 15.75% | | | | |
| | Married=79.75% | | | | |
| | Widowed=4.5% | | | | |
| Education | | | | | |
| | Illiterate= 3.5% | | | | |
| | LP=6.5% | | | | |
| | UP=28.25% | | | | |
| | HS=30% | | | | |
| | HSS=19.75% | | | | |
| | Graduation=9.75% | | | | |
| | PG=1.75% | | | | |
| | Others=0.5% | | | | |
| Religion | | | | | |
| | Hindu= 86% | | | | |
| | Muslim=14% | | | | |
| Family Status | | | | | |
| | APL=43% | | | | |
| | BPL=57% | | | | |
| Caste | | | | | |
| | General=3.5% | | | | |
| | MOBC/OBC=17.75% | | | | |
| | SC=78.75% | | | | |
| | ST=0% | | | | |
| Living period | | | | | |
| | Living in the area more than 45 years=85% | | | | |
| | Living in the area less than 45 years=15% | | | | |
| Occupation | | | | | |
| | Govt. Job=8% | | | | |
| | Private Job=3.75% | | | | |
| | Remittance (including pension)=10.5% | | | | |
| | Fishing=17.25% | | | | |
| | Fish Trading=11.25% | | | | |

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| | Business (including tea stalls, hotels and others)=13% Boatman=8% Day labour (including driver and others)=13.5% Paddy cultivator=12.25% Duck rearer=2.25% |
| Father's occupation | Fishing=75.25% Non-fishing=24.75% |
| Biodiversity under threat | Yes= 87.5% No=12.5% |
| Social participation | Member of an organization related to Sone Beel=72.5% No any membership=27.5% |

Source: Author's own calculation based on primary data

For this study, primary data were collected from 400 randomly sampled household heads. About 85% of the sampled household heads were living more than 45 years and 15% were living less than 45 years in the area. In addition, 88.75% of the sample respondents were male and 11.25% were female respondents. Besides, 70.25% were willing to pay and 29.75% were not willing to pay for the conservation of Sone Beel. Regarding continuous variables, the result indicated that the mean age of the household respondents was 46.18 years, with a maximum of 81 and a minimum of 17 years, respectively. In addition, the household size ranges from 1 to 16 members with a mean household size of 7.12. Furthermore, the findings of the study pointed out that the monthly household income was INR 15197 which ranges from INR 500 to INR 60000. Moreover, the mean landholding size of the households in terms of acres was 0.71, with the maximum and minimum being 0 acres to 6.61 acres respectively. Besides the result reveals that the mean distance of the household from Sone Beel was about 2.75 km, with the minimum and maximum distance being 1 km and 5km, respectively (Table 2).

Estimating the willingness to pay

In this section, we have made an attempt to understand the willingness to pay of the respondents for the conservation of Sone Beel. For this purpose, respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario and asked to them if they were willing to pay an annual voluntary contribution to the fund. The following table 3 shows the rate of the respondent's WTP.

Table 3: Distribution of Sex-wise respondents for WTP in percentage

| WTP | Male | | Female | | Total | |
|-----|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|
| | Number | Percentage of total | Number | Percentage of total | Number | Percentage of total |
| | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|-----|-------|----|-------|-----|-------|
| Yes | 256 | 64 | 25 | 6.25 | 281 | 70.25 |
| No | 99 | 24.75 | 20 | 5 | 119 | 29.75 |
| Total | 355 | 88.75 | 45 | 11.25 | 400 | 100 |

Source: Author’s own calculation

In this study, out of 400 sample respondents, 281 respondents were WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel, and the rest 119 sample respondents were not WTP. It is also calculated that 70.25% of the households were found to be WTP and the rest (29.75%) of the households were not WTP. It indicates that more than half of the households were WTP, and it was attributed to the fact that, the households were ready to participate in the conservation program. After understanding the overall willingness to pay for the conservation of Sone Beel, further, we have calculated the offered bid prices for the respondents. Here we have considered six bid prices such as INR 50, INR 100, INR 200, INR 400, INR 800, and INR 1600. The willingness to pay for different bid prices is shown in the following pie diagram.




Figure 2

Source: Author’s own calculation based on primary data

Figure 2 showed that 59.07% of respondents were willing to pay the bid amount of INR 50, which got the highest ‘yes’ responses among the bid prices presented for the conservation of Sone Beel. Accordingly, 23.49%, 11.03%, 3.56%, and 2.14% of respondents were willing to pay the bid amount of INR 100, INR 200, INR 400, and INR 800, respectively. From the study, it is revealed that most of the respondents who express their WTP had given the ‘yes’ response to the initial bid amount and no single

respondent had given 'yes' for the highest bid amount. The reason behind this may be because of the lower income of the respondent's household, lower education level, and lack of knowledge about biodiversity loss.

Determinants of WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel

The data collected through the Contingent Valuation (CV) survey has been analyzed to determine the factors influencing an individual's WTP. The sample data were analyzed using the statistical package Stata 13. The estimated result of the present study is shown in Table 4 which documents the parameter of the variables expected to affect WTP. Nine out of sixteen variables were found significantly associated with WTP. Table 4 presents the variables of the best-fit model, in which WTP is the dependent variable, and the Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents as independent variables, and then uses the binary logistic regression model to test the relationship between them. We first investigate whether there is a relationship between willingness to pay and various socio-economic characteristics.

The result of the binary logistic regression model is presented in Table 4. The top part of the table presents the iteration log. The model is said to have "converged" when the difference among successive iterations becomes very small and accordingly iteration stops. The model is well specified with a Likelihood Ratio Chi-square of 187.50 with a p-value of 0.0000 and McFadden's pseudo-R-squared is 0.3850 which indicates that it is considered a very good model fit. Next, we consider the analysis of the estimated parameters.

Table 4: Results of binomial logit model for conservation of biodiversity of Sone Beel, Assam.

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Iteration Log | Iteration 0: log likelihood=-243.49246 | | | | |
| | Iteration 1: log likelihood=-159.72155 | | | | |
| | Iteration 2: log likelihood=-150.73526 | | | | |
| | Iteration 3: log likelihood=-149.74697 | | | | |
| | Iteration 4: log likelihood=-149.74099 | | | | |
| | Iteration 5: log likelihood=-149.74099 | | | | |
| Model Summery | Logistic regression Log likelihood=-149.74099 | Number of observations=400 | | | |
| | | LR chi ² (16)=187.50 | | | |
| | | Prob.>chi ² =0.0000 | | | |
| | | Pseudo R ² =0.3850 | | | |
| Parameter Estimates | | | | | |
| Willing to pay | Independent variables | Coefficient | S.E | z | P> z |
| | Distance from Sone Beel | -0.4059962** | 0.2116416 | -1.92 | 0.055 |
| | Age | 0.0140245 | 0.0174142 | 0.81 | 0.421 |
| | Sex | -0.289364 | 0.4483467 | -0.65 | 0.519 |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Marital status | -1.292316*** | 0.4920541 | -2.63 | 0.009 |
| Educational level | 0.3014215* | 0.1846976 | 1.63 | 0.103 |
| Religion | -1.402303*** | 0.6586006 | -2.13 | 0.033 |
| Caste | -0.2719401 | 0.6586006 | -0.42 | 0.677 |
| Household size | 0.0887901* | 0.05162 | 1.72 | 0.101 |
| Family Status | 0.3786725 | 0.3981204 | 0.95 | 0.342 |
| Landholding size in Sone Beel | 0.6250752** | 0.3495915 | 1.79 | 0.074 |
| Living Period | -0.0532483 | 0.4020307 | -0.13 | 0.895 |
| Occupation | 0.0003073 | 0.0448062 | 0.01 | 0.995 |
| Monthly household income | 0.0000937*** | 0.0000294 | 3.19 | 0.001 |
| Father's occupation | 0.9449671*** | 0.4546622 | 2.08 | 0.038 |
| Biodiversity threat | 1.867896 | 0.4799716 | 3.89 | 0 |
| Social participation | -0.1134428 | 0.2160549 | -0.53 | 0.6 |
| Constant | -1.517351 | 2.234491 | -0.68 | 0.497 |

Source: Author's own calculation based on primary data

Note: ***, **, and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively.

The binary logit regression model shows that the coefficient of the distance from Sone Beel has a negative sign upon WTP and is statistically significant at a 5% level. This can be interpreted as the distance increases the respondents are less likely willing to pay. Numerous studies by other researchers who have used CV have found similar results. For example, the distance of the house of the respondent from the wetland was significant in Siew et al. (2015) study conducted by Binilkumar & Ramanathan (2009).

The coefficient of marital status has a negative influence according to the result. This result is not supported by the study taken by Rodgers Makurija (2022).

Educational level is significant at a 10% confidence level and positive coefficient sign. It implies that respondents with higher education are more likely to WTP for conservation than the less educated respondents. This finding is the same as the studies by Boxall (2012), Sara Kaffash (2011), Abdullahi Adamu (2015), and M. Younis Bhat (2021).

The sign of religion is negative but significant at a 1% level. This implies that religion has an inverse relationship with WTP i.e., we find that the respondents who belongs to Hindu religion are more likely WTP for conservation than the respondents who belongs to Muslim religion. However, the study did not find any evidence about the effect of this variable in previous literature.

The coefficient of household size has also a positive relationship with WTP. The willingness to pay increases with the increase in household size. It implies that a higher number of members of the respondent household

are more likely WTP than a less number of members of the respondent household. The result is supported by previous studies such as M. Younis Bhat (2021).

The coefficient of land holding size in Sone Beel is positively related to the WTP. The households with the increase in land holding size are more likely WTP than the households with less land holding size and the coefficient is statistically significant.

The coefficient of monthly household income has a positive relation with WTP as the sign is positive. It interprets as the respondent with higher monthly household income is likely WTP than the respondent with less monthly household income. This finding is similar to the studies such as Zambrano-Monserrate (2020), Bhat & Sofi. (2021), Kontogiannai (2012), Siew et al. (2015), and Boxall (2012).

Furthermore, the father's occupation and biodiversity under threat have also a positive relationship with WTP. It implies that the respondent whose father's occupation is fishing is likely more WTP than the respondents whose father's occupation is not fishing. Additionally, the other variable biodiversity under threat is strongly significant and has a direct relation with the response WTP. It implies that the respondent who opined wetland biodiversity is under threat are likely WTP more for its improvement.

Meanwhile, this model appears good with variables; distance, marital status, educational level, religion, household size, landholding size in Sone Beel, monthly household income, father's occupation, and biodiversity under threat as predictors, it significantly improves the fit of the model. It is noted that although the coefficient values of Age, Sex, Caste, Family Status, and Occupation have the expected signs, they are not significant. Therefore, this indicates that these variables have no influence in determining WTP.

Estimating the reason for not willingness to pay

Table 5: Distribution of percentage of the respondent against reason for not WTP

| <i>Reason for not WTP</i> | <i>Number</i> | <i>Percentage</i> |
|---|---------------|-------------------|
| Don't think that the wetlands are to be conserved | 1 | 0.84 |
| It is the government's responsibility to conserve the wetland | 61 | 51.26 |
| Not interest | 7 | 5.88 |
| Those who are using the wetland should pay | 5 | 4.20 |
| Cannot afford/Limited income restricts my ability to pay | 3 | 2.52 |
| I don't believe that my payment will help in | 4 | 3.36 |

| | | |
|---|----|-------|
| stopping the degradation of the wetland | | |
| No trust on such fund | 38 | 31.93 |

Source: Author’s own calculation based on primary data

Out of 29.75% of respondents who expressed their not WTP towards the proposed Sone Beel Development Fund (SBDF) to be created for conserving the biodiversity of Sone Beel is shown in table 5. Here, 51.26% of the respondents opines the most important reason for not WTP is that it is the sole responsibility of the government to conserve the Sone Beel. Furthermore, 32.77% of the respondents opines that they have no trust in such a fund. 6.72% of respondents opines that they have no interest in conserving the wetland. 5.04% opines that the individuals who are using the wetland should pay. 3.36% of respondents opines that they no longer trust that their payment will help in preventing the degradation of the wetland. Only 2.52% of respondents opine that they cannot afford the money for the fund because of their limited income. And finally, 0.84 % of the respondents believe that the wetlands are not to be conserved. From the study, it is revealed that half of the sample respondents are aware of the conservation programs of wetlands and the present status of the management of the wetland. The above discussion demonstrates that people still keep in mind biodiversity as a government’s responsibility, at the same time a negligible portion of people don’t think much about the need for conservation of Sone Beel. The reason behind the nonresponsive mindset of people could be lack of awareness and education about the need for biodiversity attributes and because of their low income. Thus, it may be suggested that more awareness programs need to be prolonged for people to know about the benefit of biodiversity to peoples. This could help in sustaining the wetland resources. The following figure 3 shows the percentage of the respondents who expressed their reason for not WTP.




Figure 3

Conclusion

Conservation of biodiversity of wetlands has been a chronic and challenging problem while dealing with the majority of the Indian wetland ecosystems. Conservation is threatened all over the world. To reverse the situation, various studies recommended that conservation strategies that need to be put into effect can play a key role. This paper has made a maiden attempt to analyze the socio-economic factors affecting the respondent's WTP under CVM for the conservation of biodiversity of Sone Beel. Accordingly, the study findings indicate that more than half (70.25%) of the respondents were WTP for the conservation of Sone Beel. This implies that the biodiversity under threat is a major threat in the area. Furthermore, the majority of the households in the study area belonged to the scheduled caste fisherman community. In this study, although biodiversity threat is strongly significant in affecting the respondent's WTP for conservation biodiversity of Sone Beel, other factors such as distance, marital status, educational level, religion, household size, monthly household income, and father's occupation are also significant. Unfortunately, age, caste, sex, family status, living period, and occupation are found to be not significant. The best-fit model indicates that WTP depends upon the first and most important of the different socioeconomic factors. The results obtained in this study are in agreement with economic theory, in that social, demographic, economic characteristics and social values influence people's decision to pay or not, and if 'yes', it means the specific amount they are willing to pay. For example, it is quite a logical fact that WTP decreases as the distance increases. The most important conclusion of the study is that it establishes that people are actually willing to pay an amount, however small, to assist the conservation of Sone Beel.

Further, in this study, it is observed that those people who use the wetland are more willing to participate. They are aware of the main problems and quite concerned about them, especially because of the major problems like decrease of fish species, shortage of aquatic food, paddy cultivation in the Beel area, encroachment activity in the adjacent area of the Beel, access use of pesticides in and around the wetland, pollution of water, heavy siltation, etc. Moreover, respondents' lack of knowledge and education about biodiversity conservation policies, environmental awareness programs, etc., become the main obstacles that further affect the understanding of the value of conservation.

It is noteworthy that even a small country like UK could designate 161 wetlands as Ramsar sites, India being a mega-diversity country, so far managed to delineate a mere six sites to date. There is obviously a lot of ground to be included in our conservation efforts of wetlands. Sone Beel is designated as an important national wetland, according to the National

wetland Atlas. However, there is a proposal by the Government of Assam to declare this wetland as a Ramsar Site. Therefore, urgent actions aim at eliminating the incidence of WTP in the individuals in the study area should focus on:

1. More and more awareness programs need to be prolonged for people to increase their knowledge about the benefit of conservation to people.

2. More and more effective monitoring of the conditions of Sone Beel and the practices being followed under different schemes and their periodic evaluation.

3. Coordination among the stakeholders and integration of grassroot workers and consumers for effective evaluation of the schemes in practice.

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THE PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES, AND LEGAL ISSUES OF DIGITAL BANKING IN NIGERIA

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Abstract: *Digital banking is one of the numerous impacts of globalization and technological advancement on Nigeria's economy. It allows for smooth delivery of banking services, giving its numerous benefits. However, despite the numerous benefit of digital banking, it suffices to state that there are several challenges and also, a legal uncertainty as to whether there is sufficient legislation that regulates digital banking in Nigeria. It is concerning this that this study employs a hybrid method of research in ascertaining the prospect, challenges, and legal issues concerning digital banking in Nigeria. Online survey questionnaires were sent to 306 respondents (randomly selected) residing in Nigeria. Descriptive and analytical statistics were adopted in analyzing the responses to the questionnaire. The study found that the key challenges to digital banking in Nigeria are the lack of specific legislation regulating digital banking, poor internet infrastructures, and increased cyber fraud, amongst others. It was therefore concluded and recommended that, for a continuous advancement in technologically enable banking system, there is need for Nigeria government and stakeholders to ensure that there is a practical legal framework concerning digital banking. Furthermore, there is need for an intensify efforts in creating a conducive atmosphere for digital banking to thrive in Nigeria.*

Keywords: *Legal, Digital, banking, Globalization, Technology Nigeria*

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Introduction

Digitization is one phenomenon that has disrupted human activities, and transformed society as well as businesses¹. Digital technology and electronic networks present fascinating opportunities to promote commercial transactions across the globe. The ongoing revolution has helped reshape the various traditional systems in the country². One area of the economy that has been significantly affected by the intrusion of digital technology is the banking sector³. Digital banking or e-banking is a trending banking system that leverages digital technology to provide financial services to customers over the digital space. This banking system enables operators to move traditional banking activities from the traditional face-to-face service delivery mode to a digital environment, where human contact is minimal⁴.

Generally speaking, digital banks are fast-growing fintech companies hosted online to provide customers seamless banking and other financial services. Although the digital banking systems in Nigeria is not new, they have evolved over the years to win the heart of its customers due to the customer-centric, convenient and cheaper mode of services they offer⁵. In addition, researchers have observed that the recent growth of digital banks in Nigeria is attributed to its attractive services over traditional banks. For one, they allow customers to conduct their financial activities with ease and without delay, thus eliminating the problem of the long queues being a witness in our banking halls and at the ATM stands⁶, prompt response to customers' queries⁷. Indeed, financial technology (fintech) has enabled digital banking operators to provide a wide range of financial services. Most often than not, they make it easy for the customer to access loan facilities via the internet, thus removing the need for paperwork, a common attribute of the traditional banks. Other factors cited for the

¹ P. Parvianinen; M. Tiihinen; J. Kaariainen, and S. Teppola, "Tackling the Digitalization Challenge: How to Benefit from Digitalization in Practice", *International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management*, (2017), Vol. 5(1), 63-77.

² M.K. Brunnermeier; H. James, and J.P. Landau, *National Bureau of Economic Research*, (2019) Available at <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26300>. Doi10.3386/w26300.

³ O.T. Nguyen, "Factors Affecting the Intention to Use Digital Banking in Vietnam" *Journal of Asia Finance, Economics and Business* (2020). Vol. (7)(3), 303-310.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ L. Wewege, J. Lee, and M. C. Thomsett, "Disruptions and Digital Banking" *Journal of Applied Finance and Banking*, (2020), Vol. 10(6), 15-56.

⁶ O.O., Olumayowa, "Effect of Digital Banking on Customer Satisfaction Within the Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria" *Accountability, Transparency and Nation-Building*, (2020), 1412-1418.

⁷ B. Narteh, "Service Quality and Customer Satisfaction in Ghanaian Retail Banks: The Moderating Role of Price" *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, (2020), Vol. 36 (1), 68-88.

increasing usage of digital banks in Nigeria in recent times has been its ability to enhance customer satisfaction. Similarly, it provides an alternative to traditional banking service delivery during the period of restriction of movement as well as the need to limit the numbers of customers in the banking halls per time, which have been occasioned by the global pandemic (COVID19)⁸.

Example of these institutions in Nigeria is; Kuda bank, Rubies, ALAT, Vbank, Mint App, one bank, sparkle⁹, etc. It should be added that while some of these new generation fintech entrants are affiliated with some of the traditional banks, others are not. For instance, ALAT, which is commonly regarded as the first digital bank in Nigeria, is the digital arm of Wema Bank Plc, a commercial bank in Nigeria.¹⁰

The innovation and adoption of digital banking in Nigeria, no doubt, has improved the quality of products and services being offered by the entrant financial institutions. It has also improved the scale of profitability of banks in the country¹¹ and customer satisfaction. However, like other innovations in the past, the digital banking system is fraught with some peculiar challenges which may inhibit its growth and lofty aspirations.

Given the following, this study is set out to systematically examine the prospect, challenges, and legal issues of digital banking in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study will also proffer possible solutions in savaging some of the identified challenges concerning digital banking in Nigeria.

Methodology

The study employ the use of an hybrid method of research. The essence of the doctrinal method of research to critically evaluate some relevant literature and laws as it concern the theoretical and legal framework of digital banking in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the non-doctrinal research method is aimed at ascertaining the prospect, challenges and legal issues concerning digital

⁸ O., Ajayi, "Digital Banking in Nigeria: The State of Play and Legal Framework", 2021 Available at <https://www.olaniwunajayi.net/blog/digital-banking-in-nigeria-the-state-of-play-and-legal-framework>.

⁹ S. Timi-koleolu, and E. Aroh, "Establishing a Digital Bank in Nigeria- Legal Requirements" 2021 Available at https://pavestoneslegal.com/establishing-a-digital-bank-in-nigeria-legal-requirements/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration accessed 20th May, 2022.

¹⁰ I.A. Ogbuji, M.M. Ologundudu, and O.O. Oluyomi, "Comparative Analysis of Financial Technology and Traditional Bank Performance in Nigeria: The Camel Approach" *UNILAG Journal of Business*, (2021) Vol. 6(1), 145-168

¹¹ B.E. Akhigbe, P.I. Udobi-Owoloja, A.E. Ubi, M.A. Gbajumo-Sheriff, and B. Umoru, "Digital Banking and Bank Profitability in Nigeria" *Nigerian Journal of Management Studies*, (2020), Vol. 20(2), 24-34.

banking in Nigeria. Also it is aimed at proposing possible remedy that could aid savaging the challenges concerning digital banking in Nigeria.

Operation of digital banking in Nigeria

As already noted above, digital banking is gaining widespread popularity from members of the public, especially among the millennials, however, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is yet to fully recognize digital banks as it should be by way of regulations, policies, or guidelines. Consequently, to circumvent this irregularity/lacuna, operators of digital banks in Nigeria have found a lee way to operate and conduct their business by registering the digital banks as Microfinance banks according to the relevant category of microfinance license. Indeed, this innovation is an expression of ingenuity on the fintech operators.

A microfinance bank (MFB) license enables the holder to receive deposits and grant loans. However, according to the Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance Banks in Nigeria 2012 (MBF Guidelines), there are limits to activities which microfinance banks can undertake. The right holders are prohibited from engaging in foreign exchange transactions, and they are limited to a certain amount of loan given to customer per time (i.e., ₦500,000 for tier 2 Unit MFBs and ₦1,000,000 for other categories). Bearing in mind the possibility of contravening these guidelines by overzealous digital banks operating under the microfinance license, CBN issued a circular in 2021 reiterating the provisions of the guidelines.

Ajayi Olaniwun¹² while commenting on the ingenuity of the digital banks to operate under the license of microfinance banks, noted that there is a risk that the CBN might proscribe the use of MFB license by digital banks. This is because, in practice, they do not align with the intent and objectives for the establishment of MFB. That is, providing financial services¹³ such as saving, deposits, loans, domestic fund transfer to target clients such as the un-banked, low-income earners, vulnerable groups, micro-entrepreneur etc.¹⁴ In Nigeria, the operation of a microfinance bank depends mainly on the license obtained by the operator.

There are three types of licenses available;

¹² Ibid note 10.

¹³ Rule 1.0 & 1.2.1 Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in Nigeria 2012.

¹⁴ Rule 1.2.2 of Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in Nigeria 2012.

Category 1: Unit Microfinance Bank

There are two Tiers of Unit MFBs- Tier 1 (urban authorization) and Tier 2 (rural authorization). Tier 1 permits the holder to operate at most four branches, excluding its headquarters within five adjoining Local Government Areas, and Tier 2 Unit permits the holder to operate one branch outside the headquarters within the same local Government Areas subject to the approval of the CBN. The minimum capital requirement for Unit MFB is as follows: ₦200, 000,000 (Two hundred million naira for Tier 1 and ₦50 000 000 (Fifty million naira) for Tier 2.

Category 2: State Microfinance Bank

A State Microfinance Bank is authorized to operate within a specific State or the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), having a minimum capital of ₦100 million (one hundred million Naira). In addition, they are allowed to open branches in the approved State or the FCT. However, the approval of the CBN must be sought and obtained before the new branch or cash Centre is established¹⁵.

Category 3: National Microfinance Bank

A National Microfinance Bank license authorized the MFB to operate in more than one State of the Federation, including the FCT. The minimum capital requirement is ₦ 2 billion (Two Billion Naira). In addition, it is permitted to open branches in all states of the Federation and FCT. Subject to a prior request and approval by the CBN for each new branch or cash centre¹⁶.

The implication for digital banks operating as microfinance banks is that those with State licenses are restricted to the approved State and cannot operate outside the said State. Whereas those with National licenses are authorized to operate in all states of the Federation subject to the necessary approval. In reality, digital banks do not need branches to operate, hence they are called a branchless banks. Again, this situation indicates the inadequacy of conducting digital banking with MFB.

An Examination of the current Legal framework for Digital banking in Nigeria

It has earlier been discussed in this paper that there is no specific legislation that regulates the operations of digital banking in Nigeria. This has been the chief challenge to the acceptance and wide usage of digital banking by consumers in Nigeria. However, some legislation play

¹⁵ 3.2 of the Guidelines.

¹⁶ Ibid.

significant roles in the operation of digital banking in Nigeria. These legislations will be examined briefly as follows:

1. Central Bank of Nigeria Act¹⁷

This is one of the legislation responsible for regulating of banks and banks' service delivery in Nigeria. The National Assembly validly made the Act and it established the Central Bank of Nigeria in order to facilitate and ensure the realization of the purport of both the Act and BOFIA (Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act), which includes promoting stability and financial management¹⁸. The bank has the power to promote a sound financial system in Nigeria¹⁹. The CBN, through the Banker's Committee and collaboration with all banks in Nigeria, introduced the Bank Verification Number (BVN) in order to ensure more significant security for accessing the personal information and data of customers in the Banking system. The governor of CBN, in a bid to ensure the security of the electronic payments system in Nigeria, also released the regulatory framework for Bank Verification Number (BVN)²⁰ according to the power conferred on it by the Act and BOFIA. There may not be any specific legislation on digital banking yet in Nigeria. However, the CBN has been very proactive in ensuring that there is compliance with best practices in the banking sector.

2. Cyber Crimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) Act, 2015

The Cyber Crime Act is an Act of the National Assembly that promotes cyber security and protects electronic communications, networks, data, and computer programs. The Act is the regulatory and institutional framework for the protection, protection, prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of cyber crimes in Nigeria²¹. The Act penalizes the fraudulent use of internet to perpetrate fraud such as;

- i. Intentionally accessing a computer system or network for fraudulent purposes;
- ii. Obtaining data that are vital to national security;
- iii. Securing access to any program, commercial or industrial secrets or classified with intent to commit fraud;
- iv. Perpetration of any form of online or electronic fraud, etc²².

The Act equally imposes on financial institutions carrying on electronic financial transaction to verify the identity of a customer, by

¹⁷ Central Bank of Nigeria (Establishment Act) CAP. C4., 2007.

¹⁸ Section 1(3).

¹⁹ Section 2.

²⁰ CBN Regulatory Framework For Bank Verification Number (BVN) Operations and Watch-List For The Nigerian Banking Industry, 2017.

²¹ See Sections 1 & 2.

²² See Section 5 to 36.

requiring such customer to provide documents bearing the following information;

- Customer's name
- Addresses
- Other relevant information

If the above information have been verified, customer can be issued an Automated Teller Machine card, debit card, credit card or any other electronic devices²³. Interestingly, the Act also imposes an obligation on service providers such as telecommunication companies to ensure the protection of consumers' data according to the right to privacy provided in the Constitution²⁴. The Act equally makes provisions for the circumstances under which the service providers may release consumer's data or electronic communication or activities to a law enforcement agencies²⁵. The Cyber Crimes Act is a significant legislation that recognizes and regulates the use of the internet for electronic transactions in Nigeria. Though the Act does not explicitly mention digital banking, however, it covers all forms of the electronic transactions including online or digital banking.

3. National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) Act, 2007

The National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) Act, 2007 is an enactment of the National Assembly that established the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA). The agency is responsible for the monitoring, evaluation, coordination, and regulation of Information Technology practices in Nigeria²⁶. The NITDA, by Section 6, further has the responsibility to develop guidelines for electronic governance and monitor electronic data interchange in government, private sectors (for example, banks), public sectors, etc. The NITDA issued the Nigerian Data Protection Regulations, 2019, aiming to safeguard the rights of natural persons to data privacy and foster safe control. The NITDA act and Nigerian Data Protection Regulations are both viable legislations that regulate the operation of digital transactions in Nigeria, particularly as regards data protection. Though neither of these two legislations referred emphatically to digital banking, however, a proper interpretation of Section 6 of the NITDA Act shows that data protection in digital banking or transaction is regulated under this Act through the agency the Act established.

²³ See Section 37

²⁴ Section 38

²⁵ Section 39

²⁶ Section 6 of the Act

4. Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act

This is one of the primary legislation regulating the activities of banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria. Though BOFIA ²⁷ does not have any provision which regulates the operation of digital banking in Nigeria²⁸, however, the Act empowers the Central Bank of Nigeria to control the activities of banks and other financial institutions through regulations made by the governor of the bank. By section 58 of the Act, the governor of CBN has the power to make rules and regulations for the operation and control of all institutions under the supervision of CBN. It is interesting to note that the requirement of license is a condition precedent to the operation of any form of banking in Nigeria, as an unlicensed financial institution is prohibited under the Act²⁹

5. The Nigerian Communications Act, 2003

The Nigerian Communications Act is a regulatory framework for the use and operation of telecommunications in Nigeria³⁰. Digital banking is impossible unless there are telecommunication platforms which enhance the use of the internet. In Nigeria, there are telecommunication companies such as Globacom Ltd, MTN, Airtel, and 9mobile, which provide a network for internet access. The Nigerian Communications Act established the Nigerian Communications Commission³¹ (NCC), which is an agency that regulates the operation of this telecommunication company in Nigeria and ensures the strict compliance with the provisions of the Act.

The operation of a telecommunication Companies in Nigeria requires the issuance of a license by the Commission³², which the license may be suspended or revoked by the Commission where the operation of the company violates the provision of the Act, its subsidiary regulation, or any other written law relevant to the telecommunications industry³³. This provision implies that where a telecommunication company regulates and protects the use and right to privacy of the data of any individual and a violation of this right may necessitate the suspension or revocation of the license with which such company operates its business.

Therefore, while this Act may not have made an express provision for the regulation of digital banking in Nigeria, it imposes an obligation on

²⁷ Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act, Cap. B3. Laws of Federation, 2004.

²⁸ O.O. Aguda, "An Appraisal of the Legal Framework for Online Banking in Nigeria and South Africa" *Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Journal of Commercial and Property Law*, (2021) Vol. 3(1), 11-17.

²⁹ See Sections 58, 59 and 60 of BOFIA.

³⁰ See Section 1.

³¹ Section 3.

³² Sections 31-52.

³³ Section 44 Sub-Section 1.

telecommunication companies to incorporate with other institutions, bodies, and agencies to fight any violation of the digital rights of any individual.

6. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc) Act, 2004

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc) Act is an enactment of the National Assembly that is operative in the whole country. The Act established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission³⁴ as an agency that shall ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the Act. One of the powers of the Act among other things is to investigate all financial crimes, including Advanced Fee Fraud, computer credit card fraud, etc, and to adopt measures to trace, freeze or seize proceeds of such crimes³⁵.

The cursory examination of Section 6 of the Act shows that the Act empowers the Commission to investigate any fraud occasioned through digital banking. Furthermore, the Act empowers the Commission to direct a bank or any other financial institution to supply information about a customer, produce books and documents relating to such account, and freeze such account³⁶.

Though on the Commission's power to unilaterally freeze or stop outward payment or operation of the account, the court has variously held that such power is not exercisable without the Order of the court. One such instance was in the case of *Guaranty Trust Bank V Akinsiku Ademola* (2019)⁵ NWLR (PT. 1664) AT P. 30 (particularly at p. 43), Paras. E-H) where the court held that “Before freezing customer’s account or placing any form of restrain on any Bank account, a bank must be satisfied that there is an order of a court. By the provisions of Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission Act, 2004, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission has no power to give direct instructions to Banks to freeze the account of a customer without an order of a court, so doing constitutes flagrant disregard and violation of the right of a customer.

³⁴ Section 1.

³⁵ Section 6.

³⁶ Section 34 provides that “The Chairman of the Commission, or any officer authorized by an order issued under subsection (1) of this Section, or by any subsequent order, direct, the bank or other financial institution to supply any information and produce books and documents relating to the account and to stop all outward payments, operation or transactions (including any bill of exchange) in respect of the account of the arrested person”.

Challenges of Digital Banking in Nigeria

1. High cost, poor or lack of internet services

This is one of the significant challenges of digital banking in Nigeria³⁷. Digital banking entails the delivery of banking services or transactions such as cash deposit, withdrawal, transfer, the opening of an account, payment of utility bills, obtaining of a statement of account, etc. over the internet, thereby dispensing with the necessity for a physical visit to a bank³⁸. Digital banking is only digital because of the use of the internet for the delivery of these services³⁹. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, the cost of accessing the internet is high. Therefore, not many persons can afford it⁴⁰. It is, however a shared experience that often these internet services are very poor or even unavailable, thereby making it impossible to either start a transaction or to complete it, which occasions serious loss⁴¹ or setback to customers and ultimately impacting on the economy of the nation⁴².

2. Internet banking fraud

Internet banking fraud is one of the barriers to the wide acceptance and usage of digital banking in Nigeria. The rate of the internet or cyber fraud has increased in Nigeria since the introduction of digital banking⁴³. Internet fraud occurs when a third party accesses the digital account of a customer with the customer's secret codes without the consent of such customer and steals money from the account. Several people cannot guarantee the ability of financial institutions to maintain the safety and protection of their data; hence, they prefer to decline usage of digital

³⁷ A. Adepetun, 'Network Hitches Linger as Slow Internet Impacts Banking, Businesses' Available at <http://www.guardian.ng/business-services/network-hitches-linger-as-slow-internet-impacts-banking-businesses> Accessed 9th April, 2022.

³⁸ S.C. Chimeke, A.E. Ewiekpaefe, and F.O. Chete, "The Adoption of Internet Banking in Nigeria: An Empirical Investigation" *Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce*, 2006, Vol. 11(3), 48-58.

³⁹ O. Babatunde and O. Sunday, "E-Banking in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges" *Research Journal of Finance and Accounting*, (2017), Vol. 8(6), 18-23.

⁴⁰ E.I. Henry, "Factors that Influence Customers' Attitude Toward Electronic Banking in Nigeria" *Journal of Internet Commerce*, (2018), Vol. 17(3), 325-328

⁴¹ R. Achwald, 'Is Banking Online Safer than Banking on the Corner' *Computer Fraud and Security*, 2008(3) P. 11-12
www.researchgate.net/publication/250726752_Is_banking_online_safer_than_banking_on_the_corner Accessed 9th April, 2022

⁴² A. Tarhini, C. Mgbemena and R. Mosa'deh, 'User Adoption of Online Banking in Nigeria: A Qualitative Study' *Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce*, (2015), Vol. 20, 132-146.

⁴³ A.O. Aegwali, "Customers Perception of Security Indicators in Online Banking Sites in Nigeria" *Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce*, (1970), Vol. 13(3), 1-14.

banking platforms to avoid cyber fraud on their, which often lead to severe financial loss to customers⁴⁴.

3. Lack of specific regulation

In Nigeria, though there is the existence of the Bank and Other Financial Institution Act (BOFIA)⁴⁵, the Central Bank of Nigeria Act is the regulatory legislation on financial institutions which empowers the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to make rules, regulations or guidelines to control the activities of financial institutions in Nigeria. However, there is no single legislation or guidelines that regulate digital banking in Nigeria⁴⁶. The operators of digital banking in Nigeria have been condemned to operating their business with a Microfinance banking license or finance company license, which has the potential risk of being proscribed by CBN. The absence of regulatory guidelines for digital banking operation in Nigeria hinders its general acceptance of its operation, especially as investors are unwilling to take the risk of investing in it⁴⁷.

4. Poor power supply

Power is one of the basic amenities or infrastructural facilities that enhances the growth and development of the economy of a nation. It increases productivity in businesses. Poor power supply affects virtually every sector of Nigeria, including banking, and this often affects the integrity and quality of services that banks offer. Digital banking requires the use of computers that cannot function without a power supply⁴⁸. Poor power supply often delays banking transactions as it sometimes causes incomplete transaction, which sometimes occasions financial loss to either the bank or its customers.

⁴⁴ Z. Karim, K.M. Rezaul, and A. Hossain, "Towards Securing Information System in Online Banking", International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions, 2009, <http://www.doi.org/10.1109/ICITST.2009.5402619>. Accessed 9th April, 2022.

⁴⁵ CAP. B3, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

⁴⁶ O.O. Aguda, "An Appraisal of the Legal Framework for Online Banking in Nigeria and South Africa" *Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Journal of Commercial and Property Law*, (2021), Vol. 3(1), 11-17.

⁴⁷ A.B., Zarma, "Electronic Banking: Practices from other Countries, Associated Risks and Implications" *Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation Quarterly*, (2009), Vol. 11(3&4), 61-102 cited in I.A. Acha, "Electronic Banking in Nigeria: Concept, Challenges and Prospects" *International Journal of Development and Management Review*, (2008), Vol. 3(1), 23-45.

⁴⁸ I.A. Acha, "Electronic Banking in Nigeria: Concept, Challenges and Prospects" *International Journal of Development and Management Review*, (2008), Vol. 3(1), 67-89.

5. Inadequate or poor ICT knowledge on the use of internet banking

Digital banking requires the use of sophisticated technology for service delivery and service enjoyment⁴⁹. Unfortunately, while most banks or financial institutions lack sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled experts in Information and Communication Technology (ICT)⁵⁰, several customers do not also have enough skill to carry out banking transactions digitally⁵¹. In the same breath, many banks are not even willing to incur considerable expenses to secure the services of skilled ICT personnel. This challenge is one of the major setbacks to the wide acceptance of digital banking in Nigeria, which is a clog in the wheel of banking services delivery to consumers.

Presentation and Analysis of Data

The study used a questionnaire distributed to respondents residing in Nigeria, in this regard, the data obtained from the questionnaire is therefore analysed below:

Sample Size and Techniques

The study adopted an online survey questionnaire to enable the researcher to reach out to the respondents residing in various states in Nigeria. However, in selecting the respondents to respond to the questions, the study uses simple random sampling techniques. The essence of adopting or using a simple random sampling technique is concerning the fact that in several studies by Aidonojie et al.⁵², it has been argued that it is seemly suitable in selecting or choosing respondents from a heterogeneous population. In this regard, this study tends to focus on Nigeria which is said to be heterogeneous. Furthermore, it suffices to state

⁴⁹ E.I. Stella, "Strategic Impact of ICT on Modern Day Banking in Nigeria", *International Journal of Strategic Information Technology and Applications*, (2014), Vol. 5(4), 56-74.

⁵⁰ B.E. Ahigbe, P.I. Udobi-Owoloja, Ubi, A.E., Gbajumo-Sheriff, M.A., & Umore, B., "Digital Banking and Bank Profitability in Nigeria", *Nigerian Journal of Management Studies*, (2020), Vol. 20(2), 24-34.

⁵¹ C. Jayshree, "Internet Banking-Benefits and Challenges in an Emerging Economy" *International Journal of Research in Business Management*, (2013), Vol. 1(2), 19-26.

⁵² P.A. Aidonojie, I.E. Oailhimire, and O.P. Agbale, "The Legal and Ethical Issues concerning Diagnosing and Treatment of Patients by Pharmacists in Nigeria", *Euromentor Journal*, (2022), Vol. 13(2), 113-138; P.A. Aidonojie, T.A. Majekodunmi, O.O. Ikubanni, and N. Ibrahim, "The causes of the Rising incidence of domestic violence in Nigeria: Proposing Judicial Separation as a Panacea", *Jurnal Hukum UNISSULA*, (2022), 38(2), 61-80; Aidonojie P.A, Odojor A.O., and Agbale O.P., (2021), The Legal Impact of Plea Bargain in Settlement of High Profile Financial Criminal Cases in Nigeria, *Sriwijaya Law Review*, Vol. 5(2), PP. 161-174.

that in several studies by Aidonojie *et al.*⁵³, Majekudumi *et al.*⁵⁴, and Oladele *et al.*⁵⁵ It has been also stated that a simple random method of sampling method is hassle-free in selecting or sampling a population and it is devoid of any form bias.

However, 306 respondents residing in Nigeria were selected randomly to respond or give an informed answer concerning the prospect, challenges, and legal issues concerning digital banking in Nigeria.

Data Analysis

The data derived or generated through the use of an online survey questionnaire is hereby analysed below:

Research Question One

What State do you reside?

306 responses




Figure 1: Identification of the various states residing in Nigeria by the respondents

⁵³ P.A. Aidonojie, “The Societal and Legal Missing Link in Protecting a Girl Child against abuse before and Amidst the Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria” *Jurnal Hukum UNISSULA*, (2022), 38(1), 61-80; Aidonojie, P.A., Nwazi, J. and Ugiomo E., (2022), The Legality, Prospect, and Challenges of adopting Automated Personal Income Tax by States in Nigeria: A Facile Study of Edo State, *Cogito Multidisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 14(2), PP. 149 – 170; Aidonojie, P.A., Okuoghae N., Agbale, O.P., Idahosa, M. E., (2022), Supervisor and Supervisee Relationship: The Legal and Ethical Issues Concerning Academic Theft in Nigeria Tertiary Institution, *Euromentor Journal*, Vol. 13(1), PP. 113-138.

⁵⁴ Majekodunmi, T.A., Oluwaseun, J.A., Idahosa, M.E., Ikubbanni, O.O. and Aidonojie, P.A., (2022), The causes of the Rising incidence of Terrorism occasioning Deprivation of the Right to Life in Nigeria, *KIU Journal of Humanities*, Vol. 7(2), PP. 5-19.

⁵⁵ O.O. Oladele, P.A. Aidonojie, J.E. Uzualu, O.O. Ikubanni and A.I. Oyedeji, “An Empirical Study of Criminalizing Minor Infractions of Tax Laws in Nigeria: The Need for Negotiated Punishments”, *KIU Journal of Humanities*, (2022), 7(2), 23-35.

| S/N | States in Nigeria | Responses of Respondents | Percent |
|-----|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Abia | 19 | 6.2% |
| 2 | Adamawa | 11 | 3.6% |
| 3 | Akwa Ibom | 10 | 3.3% |
| 4 | Anambra | 10 | 3.3% |
| 5 | Bauchi | 7 | 2.3% |
| 6 | Bayelsa | 13 | 4.3% |
| 7 | Benue | 9 | 2.9% |
| 8 | Borno | 7 | 2.3% |
| 9 | Cross River | 14 | 4.6% |
| 10 | Delta | 17 | 5.6% |
| 11 | Ebonyi | 6 | 2% |
| 12 | Edo | 24 | 7.8% |
| 13 | Ekiti | 16 | 5.2% |
| 14 | Enugu | 9 | 2.9% |
| 15 | (FCT) Abuja | 8 | 2.6% |
| 16 | Gombe | Nil | Nil |
| 17 | Imo | 14 | 4.6% |
| 18 | Jigawa | Nil | Nil |
| 19 | Kaduna | 8 | 2.6% |
| 20 | Kano | 2 | 0.7% |
| 21 | Katsina | 4 | 1.3% |
| 22 | Kebbi | Nil | Nil |
| 23 | Kogi | 8 | 2.6% |
| 24 | Kwara | 17 | 5.6% |
| 25 | Lagos | 13 | 4.2% |
| 26 | Nassarawa | Nil | Nil |
| 27 | Niger | 4 | 1.3 |
| 28 | Ogun | 11 | 3.6% |
| 29 | Ondo | 5 | 1.6% |
| 30 | Osun | 9 | 2.9% |
| 31 | Oyo | 8 | 2.6% |
| 32 | Plateau | 2 | 0.7% |
| 33 | Rivers | 10 | 3.3% |
| 34 | Sokoto | 4 | 1.3% |
| 35 | Taraba | Nil | Nil |
| 36 | Yobe | 4 | 1.3% |
| 37 | Zamfara | 3 | 1% |
| | Total | 306 | 100% |

Table 1: Valid Identification of the various states residing in Nigeria by the respondents

Figure 1 and Table 1 above are valid data presentations reflecting the valid responses of the respondents identifying the places or states they reside in Nigeria.

Research Question Two

Do you agree that Nigeria is one of the countries that have adopted digital banking?

298 responses






Figure 2: Respondents' identification of the usage of the digital banking system in Nigeria

| | Response | Percent |
|--------------|------------|-------------|
| Valid Yes | 248 | 83.2% |
| Valid No | 50 | 16.8% |
| Total | 298 | 100% |

Table 2: Valid responses of respondents' identification of the usage of the digital banking system in Nigeria

Figure 2 and Table 2 above represent the respondents' responses identifying that Nigeria is one of those countries that has adopted a digital bank system as against the manual banking system.

Research Question Three

Which of the following serves as the Prospects of adopting digital banking in Nigeria?  

259 responses




Figure 3: Cluster respondents' responses identifying the prospect of digital banking in Nigeria

| Prospect of Digital Banking System | Cluster of Response | Percentage |
|---|---------------------|------------|
| Digital banking provides a better and more convenient avenue for transferring and receiving monetary funds among individuals across the globe | 139 | 53.7% |
| Elimination of barrier of location in rendering banking services | 124 | 47.9% |
| The use of digital banking is time-saving | 116 | 44.8% |
| It eliminates the long queue at the usual traditional banking that requires physical contact | 115 | 44.4% |
| The adoption of digital banking complies with the Covid19 social distancing | 114 | 44% |
| The use of digital banking has resulted in an efficient and easier international transaction system | 111 | 42.9% |
| Digital banking is more economical and a prudent means of money transaction | 96 | 37.1% |

Table 3: Valid Cluster of respondents' responses identifying the prospect of digital banking in Nigeria

Figure 3 and Table 3 are respondents' clusters of valid responses identifying the various prospect of the digital banking system in Nigeria.

Research Question Four

Do you agree that the use of digital banking in Nigeria has some challenges?

296 responses




Figure 4: Respondents identify that there are challenges in using digital banking in Nigeria

| | Response | Percent |
|--------------|------------|-------------|
| Valid Yes | 247 | 83.4% |
| Valid No | 49 | 16.6% |
| Total | 296 | 100% |

Table 4: Valid Respondents' identification of the fact that there are challenges using digital banking in Nigeria

Figure 4 and Table 4 are valid cluster responses of respondents identifying that there are several challenges concerning the use of digital banking in Nigeria.

Research Question Five

Which of the following serves as the challenges of using digital banking in Nigeria?



258 responses




Figure 5: Respondents' identification of some of the challenges often encountered in using the digital banking system in Nigeria

| Challenges of Digital Banking System in Nigeria | Cluster of Responses | Percentage |
|--|----------------------|------------|
| Inadequate primary Legal framework that comprehensively regulates digital banking in Nigeria | 129 | 50 |
| Incidence of an internet fraudster | 114 | 44.2 |
| Inadequate or poor ICT knowledge concerning the use of digital banking by most individual | 131 | 50.8 |
| Incidence of loss of vital data or information derives and store in using digital banking | 94 | 36.4 |
| Irregular power supply | 131 | 50.8 |
| Poor internet services | 142 | 55 |

Table 5: Valid cluster of respondents identifying the challenges often encountered in using the digital banking system in Nigeria

Figure 5 and Table 5 are valid cluster respondents' responses identifying some of the challenges often encounter in using the digital banking system in Nigeria.

Research Question Six

Which of the following can aid in salvaging the challenges and improve the adoption of digital banking in Nigeria? [Copy](#)

258 responses




Figure 6: Respondent identification of remedies that could aid in salvaging digital banking system challenges in Nigeria

| Remedies concerning digital banking system challenges in Nigeria | Cluster of Responses | Percentage |
|--|----------------------|------------|
| Enactment of a primary legal framework that will extensively regulate digital banking in Nigeria | 115 | 44.6 |
| Sensitisation and training of the general public concerning the use and how to utilize digital banking | 128 | 49.6 |
| Adequate power supply | 112 | 43.4 |
| Enactment of policies that will require the provision of well-enhanced internet services by the network provider | 117 | 45.3 |
| Prosecution and conviction of anyone involved in internet fraud-related issues | 150 | 58.1 |
| Provision of a backup storage device | 88 | 34.1 |

Table 6: Valid cluster of respondents identifying remedies that could salvage digital banking system challenges in Nigeria

Figure 6 and Table 6 are a cluster of respondents' valid responses identifying some of the possible remedies that could aid in salvaging the identified challenges concerning the digital banking system in Nigeria.

Discussion of Findings

Given the above data presentation obtained and collated from the questionnaire sent to the respondents, figure 1 and table 1, are to the effect that the respondents (306 respondents) are individuals who reside in Nigeria. In this regard, it suffices to state that the essence of figure 1 and table 1 is aimed at ensuring that the respondents are well informed and knowledgeable to respond to the questions as they relate to the prospect, challenges, and legal issues of digital banking in Nigeria. However, in figure 2 and table 2 above 83.2% of the respondents were able to identify the fact that Nigeria is one of those countries that have adopted or developed from the manual banking system to a digitalised banking system. In this regard, in figure 3 and table 3, the respondents identify some of the prospects of digital banking system tends to offer and some of these prospects identified by the respondents are as follows;

- i. 53.7% of the respondents stated that digital banking provides a better and more convenient avenue for transferring and receiving monetary funds among individuals across the globe
- ii. 47.9% of the respondents stated that it eliminate the barrier of location in rendering banking services
- iii. 44.8% identify that the use of digital banking is time-saving
- iv. 44% of the respondents further stated that the adoption of digital banking complies with the Covid19 social distancing
- v. 42.9% also stated that the use of digital banking has resulted in an efficient and easier international transaction system
- vi. 37.1% of the respondents were also of the opinion that digital banking is more economical and a prudent means of money transaction

However, despite the beautiful and fanciful prospect digital banking tends to offer, in figure 4 and table 4, 83.4% representing majority of the respondents agreed that there are several challenges concerning the use of digital banking in Nigeria. Furthermore, figure 5 and table 5 represent the respondents' identification of some of the challenges concerning digital banking in Nigeria as follows;

- i. 50% of the respondents stated that there is an inadequate primary Legal framework that comprehensively regulates digital banking in Nigeria;
- ii. 44.2% stated that the incidence of internet fraudsters is a challenge to digital banking in Nigeria;
- iii. 50.8% stated that there is inadequate or poor ICT knowledge concerning the use of digital banking by most individual;
- iv. 36.4% stated that there is the challenge of incidence of loss of vital data or information derives and store in using the digital banking system;

v. Furthermore, 50.8% and 55% also stated that Irregular power supply and Poor internet services are major challenges of a digital banking system.

However, the above challenges identified by the respondents are not peculiar. This is concerning the fact that some of these challenges are most of the challenges that often affect Nigerians in the productive use of technological means in Various endeavors. Furthermore, the above challenges were also captured by Aidonjie et al in several of their studies concerning the use of technology in e-contract of agreement⁵⁶, administration of justice, and human security⁵⁷. Also, the use of technology in the advancement of legal education⁵⁸ and legal education amidst the Covid19⁵⁹.

Given the above challenges identified in figure 5 and table 5, the respondents further identify possible remedies to salvage the challenges and this is as presented in figure 6 and table 6 as follows;

i. 44.6% of the respondents stated that there should be an enactment of a primary legal framework that will extensively regulate digital banking in Nigeria;

ii. 49.6% stated that sensitisation and training of the general public concerning the use and how to utilize digital banking is very important;

iii. 43.4% also stated that there is a need for an adequate power supply;

iv. 45.3% of the respondents believes that enactment of policies that will require the provision of well-enhanced internet services by network provider will aid in correcting network challenge;

v. Also, 58.1% of the respondents stated that there is a need for prompt prosecution and conviction of anyone involved in internet fraud-related issues;

vi. Furthermore, 34.1% of the respondents stated that provision of a backup storage device will aid in salvaging the incidence of loss of vital information stored digitally.

⁵⁶ P.A. Aidonjje, A.O. Odojor, and K.O. Oladele, "An Empirical Study of the Relevance and Legal Challenges of an E-contract of Agreement in Nigeria" *Cogito Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, (2020) 12(3), 170-190.

⁵⁷ P. A. Aidonjje, O.O. Ikubanni, N. Okoughae, A.O. Ayodeji, "The challenges and relevance of technology in administration of justice and human security in Nigeria: Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic", *Cogito Multidisciplinary Journal*, (2021), Vol. 13(3), p. 149-170.

⁵⁸ P.A. Aidonjje, O.A. Odojor, O.O. Ikubanni, A.A. Oyebade, A.I. Oyedeji and N. Okuoghae, "The Challenges and Impact of Technological Advancement to the Legal Profession in Nigeria given the Covid-19 Pandemic", *KIU Journal of Humanities* (2020), 6 (4), 5-19.

⁵⁹ P.A. Aidonjje & A.O. Odojor, "Impact and Relevance of Modern Technological Legal Education Facilities amidst the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of Law Students of Edo University Iyamho", *KIU Journal of Humanities*, (2020) 5(4), 7-19.

Conclusion/Recommendation

The researcher has been able to examine the impact of technology advancement in the Nigerian banking sector. The study was able to identify that there is numerous benefit to digital banking in Nigeria. Some of these benefits include the convenience of receiving and transferring legal tender, elimination of distance barriers involved in the traditional banking system, and aid in the flexibility of international trade. However, irrespective of the fanciful advantage of digital banking in Nigeria, a cursory review of the available legal framework reflects that it does not provide for and regulate digital banking in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study also identifies several challenges concerning the digital banking system in Nigeria.

Concerning the above, it suffices to state that despite the challenges concerning digital banking in Nigeria, the prospect of digital banking outweighs the challenges. In this regard, for a better and more effective operation of digital banking in Nigeria, the study, therefore, recommend as follows;

- i. A review of the current legal framework in Nigeria concerning the banking sector to adequately provide for and regulate digital banking in Nigeria;
- ii. Training and sensitization of the general public on the use of digital banking;
- iii. Provision of a stable power supply and internet services;
- iv. Strict and swift prosecution of internet fraudster involve digital banking scam-related crime.

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THE MOMENT OF CONSUMMATION OF AN OFFENCE RELATING TO THE MANIPULATION OF AN EVENT: UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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Abstract: *An offence is consummated when the committed act falls within a criminal rule. Fixing the starting point of the offence consummation has legal relevance for, a number of reasons: on the one hand, it marks the time when there is corpus delicti of crime in place; on the other hand, it defines the date of the offence, which has practical interest for addressing some issues, e.g., determining the applicable criminal law, calculating the limitation period for criminal liability, the incidence of an amnesty law, etc. Hence, this article identifies the peculiarities of the moment of consummation of an offence relating to the manipulation of an event. For this purpose, account was taken of legal provisions, judicial practice, and doctrinal approaches.*

Keywords: *match-fixing, bet-fixing, sports event, bet, offence, criminal law, Republic of Moldova.*

Introduction

Under Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova titled “Manipulation of an event”, encouraging, influencing or advising a participant in a sporting/betting event to undertake actions, which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned, with a view to obtaining undue goods, services, privileges or advantages of any kind for oneself or for others represents an offence. The latter is punishable by a fine varying in the range of 2,350 to 4,350 conventional units (approximately EUR 6,000 to EUR 11,300) or by a term of imprisonment of one to three years, in both cases depriving the person of the right to hold

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certain positions or exercise a certain type of activity for a period of up to three years; while the legal person is punishable by a fine varying in the range of 6,000 to 9,000 conventional units (approximately EUR 15,550 to EUR 23,350), depriving that person of the right to exercise a certain type of activity.

The criminal liability is aggravated as per Article 242¹ (2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, if the same actions (i) are committed by a trainer, an athlete's agent, a member of the jury, an owner of the sports club or by a person who is a member of the sports organisation leadership. In this case, the natural person is punishable by a fine varying in the range of 3,350 to 5,350 conventional units (approximately EUR 8,700 to EUR 13,880) or by a term of imprisonment of two to six years, in both cases depriving the person of the right to hold certain positions or exercise a certain type of activity for a period varying from four to seven years.

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova establishes also the liability for (bet-fixing) betting on a manipulated sports event, as well as for informing other people about an existing agreement to manipulate sporting or other events with the purpose to persuade those people to bet.

In this Article, however, we will focus on the moment of consummation of an offence related to the manipulation of an event, an offence commonly referred to as "match-fixing"¹.

¹ I. Preston & S. Szymanski, Cheating in Contests, in *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 2003, vol. 19, iss. 4, p. 613; Andreff W. Different Types of Manipulation in Sport. In: Breuer M. & Forrest D. (eds.). *The Palgrave Handbook on the Economics of Manipulation in Sport*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer, 2018, p. 13; Andreff W. *An Economic Roadmap to the Dark Side of Sport*. Vol. I. Sport Manipulations. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer, 2019, p. 10; 7 Carpenter K. Match-Fixing – The Biggest Threat to Sport in the 21st Century?, in *The International Sports Law Review*, 2012, iss. 2, p. 13; Carpenter K., Global Match-Fixing and the United States' Role in Upholding Sporting Integrity, in *Berkeley Journal of Entertainment and Sports Law*, 2013, no. 2(1), pp. 214-229; Harvey A. & Levi H. Match fixing in international sport, in Byers T. (ed.). *Contemporary Issues in Sport Management: A Critical Introduction*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2016, p. 296-314; Maennig W. *Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures*, in *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 2005, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 187-225; Feltes T. Match Fixing in Western Europe, in Haberfeld M.R. & Sheehan D. (eds.). *Match-Fixing in International Sports. Existing Processes, Law Enforcement, and Prevention Strategies*. Cham: Springer, 2013, pp. 15-30; Forrest D. Match Fixing: An Economics Perspective. In: Haberfeld M.R. & Sheehan D. (eds.). *Match-Fixing in International Sports: Existing Processes, Law Enforcement, and Prevention Strategies*. Cham: Springer, 2013, pp. 177-197; Serby T., The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: the best bet for the global fight against match-fixing?, in *The International Sports Law Journal*, 2015, no. 15(1), pp. 83-100; Spapens A., and Olfers M. Match-fixing: The current discussion in Europe and the case of the Netherlands, in *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law*

Synthesis of legislation, judicial practice and the literature

As can be seen, Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova only describes the act (*actus reus*) without defining its harmful consequences. It results that the event manipulation offence is a formal one². It shall be considered as consummated at the time of commission of one of the actions listed in Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, i.e.: encouraging, influencing or advising a participant in a sporting/betting event to undertake actions, which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned. In other words, the *corpus delicti* of offence referred to in Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova will be acknowledged at the moment of committing the harmful act, without the need for consequences to be produced.

Pursuant to Article 30 (1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, “a prolonged offence is an act committed with a sole intention characterised by two or more identical criminal actions, committed with a single purpose and representing one crime in their entirety”.

Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that “a prolonged offence shall be consummated at the moment when the last criminal action or inaction was committed”.

Based on the aforementioned provisions we identify the following conditions for a sole prolonged offence to occur, features that allow to delimit it both from other forms of legal or natural unit of crime and from the concurrence of identical crimes, which ultimately allows to qualify the committed acts either under one or multiple rules of incrimination:

- (i) the presence of at least two acts of crime;
- (ii) the acts of crime must be identical;
- (iii) the committed acts of crime in their entirety form one crime;
- (iv) the intention unit;
- (v) the sole purpose;
- (vi) the acts of crime are committed by the same person³.

and Criminal Justice, 2015, no. 23, pp. 333-358; UNODC IOC (2016), *Booklet for legislators. Model Criminal Law provisions for the prosecution of competition manipulation*ю [accessed 01.09.2022], Available at: <https://bit.ly/2z2ZeoC>.

² S. Brînză, and Stati V., *Tratat de drept penal. Partea speciala [Criminal law treaty. Special Part], Vol. II*. Chisinau: Central Printing House, 2015, p. 110; Stati V., *Infrațiunea de manipulaare a unui eveniment (art. 242¹ CP RM) Partea II [The crime of manipulating an event (Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova): study of criminal law. Part II]*, *National Law Review*, 2013, no. 12, p. 8; Stati, V., *Infrațiuni economice: Note de curs [Economic offenses: Course notes]*. Chisinau: CEP USM, 2014, p. 180.

³ St. Copetchi, *Delimitarea infrațiunii unice prelungite de concursul de infrațiuni, precum și de unele forme ale unității infraționale [Delimitation of the single crime*

In light of those conditions, we deduce that the event manipulation offence can be, under certain circumstances, a prolonged (continued) offence. This conclusion is confirmed by the case-law. Hence, in the *Kmit* case, the Prosecutor held that the alleged manipulation of three football matches played on 4 July 2013 in Tirana and, respectively, on 11 July 2013 and 29 August 2014 in Chisinau would form one offence⁴.

Instead, in the *Gluhoi and others* case, both the First Court and the Appeal Court considered that influencing three athletes to undertake actions, which would produce a manipulated effect on the sporting event in which they participated, the acts committed on 9 February 2017, 20 March 2017 and, respectively, on 22 March 2017, represented multiple offences⁵.

Such an approach would confuse an independent observer. Thus, according to V. Berliba and R. Cojocaru, “by repeating the actions/inactions the prolonged crime looks like multiple crime, the difference being related to a subjective matter, namely there is a sole purpose in the prolonged crime, while multiple crime involves as many intentions as the number of crimes”⁶.

Concurrently, St. Copetchi claims that, “in the assumption of certain actions/inactions of identical crimes, in the presence of a sole intention relative to the actions/inactions concerned, regardless of their number, the committed acts shall be qualified pursuant to the rules of sole prolonged offence, while in the presence of multiple intentions towards them, the committed crimes shall be qualified pursuant to the rules of multiple crime”⁷.

We affiliate ourselves with these opinions. Therefore, although “in case of a sole prolonged crime, any crime episode may represent itself an offence”⁸, the key matter that determined the legislator to consider it was a sole crime was the unity of criminal intention. To apply Article 30 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova it has to be ascertained that the perpetrator was “driven” by the same criminal decision to attain a single goal. The sole intention could be deduced from certain objective circumstances. To this end, a relevant factor is the time between the actions/inactions. The briefer the time between the actions/inactions, the

extended by the competition of crimes, as well as by some forms of the criminal unit], *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, Series “Social Sciences”*, 2016, no. 8(98), pp. 138-139.

⁴ Buiucani District Court, Decision from 26 January 2016, Case No. 10-731/2015.

⁵ Chisinau Court of Appeal, Judgment from 3 June 2019, Case No. 1a-463/19.

⁶ V. Berliba, and R. Cojocaru, Controverse referitoare la interpretarea și incriminarea infracțiunii unice prelungite [Controversy over the interpretation and incrimination of the prolonged single offense], in *Ombudsman*, 2004, no. 12, pp. 13-15.

⁷ St. Copetchi, *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

more convincing is the statement that the perpetrator committed one offence. And vice-versa: the longer the time between the actions/inactions, the less likely is the statement that the perpetrator committed one offence.

In the first case (*Kmit*), the one-year timeframe between the actions (the second and the third match) did not raise any issue to ascertain that the perpetrator was guided by a single criminal decision. In the second case (*Gluhoi and others*), the timeframe of several days did not have any weight to consider that just one crime was committed. Furthermore, in the second case, although the lawyer of the accused person argued to apply Article 30 (1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, the courts rejected that request, considering it as a “method of defence”, and stated that the perpetrator’s actions should be qualified as per the rules of multiple crimes.

A weird approach, is not it? In fact, the Prosecutor must demonstrate in each individual case if the perpetrator had just one or multiple criminal intentions. These matters were not commented in the considered cases. The courts accepted the position of the state accuser without arguing, based on case evidence, why the Prosecutor was right, and not the Lawyer.

Concerning the Republic of Moldova, the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (hereinafter referred to as the Venice Commission) indicated, inter alia, that pretty frequently the judges would not dare casting doubt on the indictments submitted by the Prosecutor, and such a fact leads to a large number of convictions. Due to this reason, the Venice Commission warns that the judges have to overcome such “sympathy for prosecutors”⁹. Some judges are afraid to “anger” the prosecutors, as the General Prosecutor could take actions against them for certain sentences, decisions, ruling or judgements, which, in the opinion of General Prosecutor were contrary to the law (Article 307 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova).

Let us admit that even when there is one year between the actions/inactions the perpetrator could be guided by a sole criminal decision. In this situation there must be plausible arguments and evidence to persuade an independent observer. For example, during a championship or tournament, the perpetrator could have decided from the start to encourage, influence or advise the participants in different matches/events or phases, so that ultimately his favoured person/team wins. In this case the perpetrator pursued a sole purpose.

In case of *Kmit* it is difficult to believe that the perpetrator took the decision on 4 July 2013 in Tirana to manipulate also the match played on

⁹ Venice Commission, *Amicus curiae brief on the immunity of judges for the Constitutional Court of Moldova*, 2013, Opinion no. 698/2012 [accessed 01.09.2022], Available at: <https://bit.ly/3sEhnKM>.

29 August 2014 in Chisinau under the aegis of another sports organisation. Those matches were played with different adversary teams under different competitions: one match was played during the preliminary phases of 2013 UEFA Europe League, while the other – in the course of the 2014 national football championship of the Republic of Moldova. When the first match was played, the second one was not even scheduled yet. These circumstances enable us to draw the conclusion that the acts of this case should have been classified pursuant to the rules of multiple offences. The actions, which took place on 4 July 2013 and, respectively, on 11 July 2013, when the same sports teams played during the same football championship constituted just one offence, while the actions which took place on 29 August 2014 – the second offence.

On the contrary, in case of *Gluhoi and others*, having regard to the relatively short timeframe between the actions, when lacking evidence to prove that there were multiple criminal intentions and by virtue of the *in dubio pro reo* principle, the actions should have been considered as a sole prolonged (continued) offence.

Controversy may occur related to the moment of consummation of the event manipulation offence when the perpetrator would act through IT systems or electronic communications networks.

As per *modus operandi*, the event manipulation offence could be committed in the cyberspace both off-line and on-line. The cyberspace where the virtual existence increasingly has become a second human nature, represents a conducive environment (or a “wild west”, as per the words of B. Sandywell¹⁰) to commit certain offences.

Hence, the perpetrator could choose to convey messages or make calls using a device connected to the Internet, which entail encouraging, influencing (save the facts expressed by physical violence) or advising a participant in a sports event (which, at the same time, could be a betting event) to undertake actions which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned, with a view to obtaining undue goods, services, privileges or advantages of any kind for oneself or for others. In this situation, Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova is applicable¹¹.

By the way, this has been the case of *Gluhoi and others*, where the perpetrator, a professional tennis player from the Republic of Moldova,

¹⁰ B. Sandywell, On the globalisation of crime: the Internet and new criminality, in: Y. Jewkes, and M. Yar, (eds.), *Handbook of Internet Crime*, London and New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 39.

¹¹ Gh. Reniță, Controverse legate de răspunderea penală pentru manipularea unui eveniment și pariurile aranjate săvârșite în cyberspațiu [Controversy over criminal liability for handling an event and arranged bets made in cyberspace], in *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae*, “Social Sciences”, 2017, no. 8(108), p. 234.

sent messages from his Facebook account to T.I. (a participant in “ITF Woman” tennis competition held in Hammamet, Tunisia), G.B. (a participant in “ITF Men’s F2 Futures” tennis competition held in Ramat Hasharon, Israel) and to M.K. (a participant in “ITF F11 Futures” tennis competition held in Hammamet, Tunisia) on 9 February 2017, 20 March 2017 and 22 March 2017 aiming to influence them to undertake actions, which would produce a manipulated effect on the sports event they were part of, for consideration in the amount of \$500, EUR 700 and EUR 600.

In this context, we identify the moment of sending, receiving or getting acquainted with the information about encouraging, influencing or advising a participant in a sports/betting event to undertake actions which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned. The constitutive elements of the investigated offence would be gathered when the message/phone call was received and, correspondingly, its content became known. As a rule, there is some concurrency between these moments. However, the prominent moment is when the content becomes known. In the process of basing this option we shall stress that encouraging, influencing or advising are to be transposed on a participant in a sports event, who perceives the criminal feature of the action. The offence referred to in Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova cannot get its final countenance unless the information is brought to the attention of the recipient.

If the message fails to get to the person concerned due to reasons beyond the perpetrator’s will (e.g., due to a technical fault or due to an error of the IT system or of the electronic communications network), the committed actions would qualify as an attempt to commit an offence, as there would be no perfect match between the specific act committed by the author and the pattern described by the incrimination rule.

Furthermore, there would be an attempt to commit an offence if the recipient (i.e. the participant in the sporting/betting event) received the message in question on a technical device, but was not able to read it due to a technical fault, etc. or got acquainted with its content when the sporting/betting event concerned was completed. In this assumption, the perpetrator’s endeavours to manipulate an event were unsuccessful.

Following those remarks, special literature claim, ultimately, that “when qualifying the action as per Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, it does not matter whether the participant in a sporting/betting event would undertake or not the actions, which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned, nor does it whether the perpetrator would obtain or not undue goods, services, privileges or

advantages of any kind for oneself or for others. Such circumstances may be taken into account when individualizing the punishment”¹².

We agree with this opinion. Indeed, these matters have no impact on the scope of offence aiming to manipulate an event.

A possible discrimination?

A person who encourages, advises or influences a participant in a sporting/betting event to behave in a way that would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned, with a view to obtain undue goods, services, privileges or advantages of any kind for oneself or for others, shall be imposed criminal liability in compliance with Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova.

In its turn, the participant in a sporting/betting event should not be “obedient” and follow the instructions to manipulate (rig) the sporting/betting event he was part of.

The participant has to report any inappropriate influence to relevant Federations/Associations or to other entities under which aegis the event is carried out. This approach was followed by the athletes contacted by the perpetrator in *Gluhoi and others* case, who notified shortly the “Tennis Integrity Unit” of the International Tennis Federation after they received messages from G.N. on their Facebook account with the proposal to manipulate the sports event they were part of.

In the Republic of Moldova, if a participant in a sporting/betting event fails to fulfil his aforementioned obligation and adopts the behaviour requested by the offender referred to in Article 242¹ of the Moldovan Criminal Code, then the former may be held to disciplinary/contractual liability both for the failure to report and for his behaviour against the principle of fair-play during the event, and no criminal liability shall be imposed on him. For example, in compliance with Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova titled “Manipulation of a match outcomes (match-fixing)” (edition of 2020), manipulation of a match outcome shall be treated as a misconduct; i.e. the intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the outcome or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtain an undue advantage for oneself or for others. To a great extent, this definition is taken from Article 3 (4) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (the Macolin Convention). The difference is that the aforementioned Convention operates with the notion “manipulation of sports competitions”, which is more appropriate than “manipulation of a match

¹² S. Brînza, and V. Stati, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

outcome” referred to in Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova. There is some incoherence between the title of Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova and its content. Although the Article title implies it is possible to hold somebody liable for the manipulation of match outcomes, its content stipulates that prejudicing the course of sports competitions is also penalised. Hence, the words “outcomes” and “outcome” from the title and, respectively, from the first indent of the aforementioned Article shall be excluded. They are redundant and generate confusion.

Article 59 (1) of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova provides for several scenarios of match manipulation, namely:

a) *actions taken outside the field of play*: any agreement or conspiracy between a match-fixer and any other person who intends to influence or alter a match outcome; accepting, providing, offering, promising, receiving or requesting any advantage of monetary value or of other kind relating to the manipulation of matches;

b) *actions inside the field of play*: deliberate loss of a match or of a match phase (e.g., providing for goals, issuing yellow and red cards, imposing penalties, etc.); intentionally wick performance of a football player during the match (e.g., wick defence or attack); wrong application of game rules by the referee and/or by another official person of the match (e.g., issuing erroneously yellow and red cards, imposing penalties); intervention on the field of play during the game or to any equipment (e.g., cutting the power supply of a football stadium); agreement to receive compensation from a third person in exchange of obtaining a positive outcome in a match or competition (e.g., acceptance of a bonus from a third party who is willing to offer a certain “additional motivation” to a player or referee);

c) *omissions*: inactions in the field of play, even if this thing is necessary on the basis of the rules of the game (e.g., failure to issue yellow and red cards, to impose penalties); failure to comply with the obligation to report without delay an approach, incident or suspicion aiming to manipulate the match outcomes; failure to denunciate immediately any conduct falling under the provisions of this Article to the Football Association of Moldova.

This is an exemplificative list rather than an exhaustive one. But it contains several conceptual inadequacies. In particular, accepting, providing, offering, promising, receiving or requesting any advantage of monetary or other value or relating to the manipulation of matches is susceptible to sanctioning pursuant to two rules of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova, namely Article 58 and Article 59. However, during the law-making process, it is prohibited to lay down the

same rules in several articles or paragraphs of the same regulatory act or in two or more regulatory acts. To avoid legal parallelism, it would be appropriate to exclude the wording about accepting, providing, offering, promising, receiving or requesting any advantage of monetary value or of other kind relating to the manipulation of matches from Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova. Furthermore, failure to report an approach, incident or suspicion aiming to manipulate the match outcomes to the Football Association of Moldova shall not be considered as manipulation of the match itself, as well as failure to denounce any conduct falling under the incidence of provisions referred to in Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova to the Football Association of Moldova. Such inactions should form a different misconduct to be sanctioned under a separate article. By definition, the article must have a unitary character and contain one or several interrelated rules subordinated to the same idea.

In brief, Article 59 of the Disciplinary Code of the Football Association of Moldova should be applicable to any committed actions/inactions, which affect the course or outcome of sports competitions. In practice, there should be regulations/codes in place to penalise contractually/disciplinary any misconduct of a participant relative to all sporting/betting events, which contravene the principle of fair-play. The applied sanctions include fines and bans to practice sports-related activity. A lifetime ban may be applied in serious cases.

The relevant literature states that “Although it may look paradoxical, sports laws constitute a driving tool for developing an efficient system to fight corruption in the sports industry. This is true not just from the perspective of its capacity to rapidly do justice compared with the slow ordinary justice, but also for its capacity to regulate a general interest. The suspension of sporting activities, which generate success, money and glory, has a strong discouraging effect, which is more sensible than criminal sanctions, which ultimately could be mitigated”¹³. Furthermore, it was stated that “domestic investigations of sports associations to penalise the people responsible for match-fixing would have a more significant impact than criminal proceedings due to rapidity and avoidance of formality brought by criminal proceedings. Sports (i.e. disciplinary) sanctions may be more effective than criminal sanctions (such as depriving of the right to carry out any football-related activities, as for the majority it would represent a loss of livelihood and imply changing the occupation)”¹⁴.

¹³ E. Musco, El fraude en la actividad deportiva [Sports fraud], in *Revista Penal*, 2001, no. 1, p. 76.

¹⁴ M.A. Prokopets, and D.M. Zhubrin, Борьба с договорными матчами (на примере практики УЕФА и Спортивного арбитражного суда в г. Лозанна) [Fight

Nevertheless, in relation to this finding, we shall bring into discussion the alleged discrimination between the enforcement actions applicable to the offender for the manipulation of an event and to the participant in a sporting/betting event.

Thus, in particular, under the conditions where the act of encouraging a participant in a sporting/betting event represents, in fact, an instigation, for the purpose of Article 42 (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova (according to which “a person shall be treated as an instigator when the latter, by all available methods, persuades another person to commit an offence”), while the advising act, in its turn, is a way of complicity pursuant to paragraph (5) of the same Article (which stipulates that “a person shall be treated as an accomplice if he contributed to the commission of an offence by means of advice, guidelines, supply of information, provision of means/instruments or removal of barriers, as well as the person who promised beforehand that he will favour the offender, hide the means or instruments used to commit the offence, its trace or items gained illegally, or the person who promised beforehand to purchase or to sell such items”).

It means that the offender referred to in Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova may be subject to criminal liability for instigating a participant in a sporting/betting event to commit a disciplinary/contractual infringement, as well as for complicity in committing the infringement in question. Hence, the instigator or accomplice will be subject to criminal liability, while the author who manipulated (rigged) the sporting/betting event in which he participated – will be subject to disciplinary/contractual liability. Is this concept compliant with the principle of equality before the law?

The principle of equality is violated when a differentiated treatment is applied in similar situations without having objective and reasonable justification.

To this end, the offender of the manipulation of an event and the participant in a sporting/betting event find themselves in distinct situations and, therefore, may not pretend to be subject to an identical treatment. Equality among people implies equal treatment in equal or similar situations. Different situations must be treated differently.

In particular, the offender referred to in Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova and, respectively, the participant in the sporting/betting event committed different acts. The former inoculates a decision to the latter aiming to rig the event he is part of. The offender

against fixed matches (on the example of the practice of UEFA and the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne)], in *Sports: economics, law, management*, 2012, no. 2, pp. 23-25.

could use the participant in the sporting/betting event as an “object” or “means” to obtain undue goods, services, privileges or advantages of any kind for oneself or for others, i.e. to achieve a criminal purpose. But people shall be treated as subjects not as objects.

Certainly, it is possible that there is an accepted and well-defined “co-operation” between the offender who manipulated an event and the athlete or the person who participated in a betting event. Furthermore, it is possible that the initiative to rig a sporting/betting event comes from the person who participated in such events, while the offender referred to in 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova just supported the proposal by encouraging that person or by giving guidelines to subsequently obtain proceeds from betting shops.

Therefore, in perspective, we shall think over the possibility to define criminal liability in the Republic of Moldova for the participant in a sporting/betting event who would undertake actions/inactions susceptible to manipulate (rig) the event he is part of.

Conclusions

According to Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, the *corpus delicti* of match-fixing offence will be acknowledged at the moment of committing the harmful act (*actus reus*), without the need for consequences to be produced.

Controversy may occur related to the moment of consummation of the event manipulation offence when the perpetrator would act through IT systems or electronic communications networks. In this context, we identify the moment of sending, receiving or getting acquainted with the information about encouraging, influencing or advising a participant in a sports/betting event to undertake actions which would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned. The constitutive elements of the investigated offence would be gathered when the message/phone call was received and, correspondingly, its content became known.

A person who encourages, advises or influences a participant in a sporting/betting event to behave in a way that would produce a manipulated effect on the event concerned, with a view to obtain undue goods, services, privileges or advantages of any kind for oneself or for others, shall be imposed criminal liability in compliance with Article 242¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova.

In contrast, if a participant in a sporting/betting event fails to fulfil his obligation and adopts the behaviour requested by the offender referred to in 242¹ of the Moldovan Criminal Code, then the former may be held to disciplinary/contractual liability both for the failure to report and for his

behaviour against the principle of fair-play during the event, and no criminal liability shall be imposed on him.

Therefore, in perspective, we shall think over the possibility to define criminal liability in the Republic of Moldova for the participant in a sporting/betting event who would undertake actions/inactions susceptible to manipulate (rig) the event he is part of.

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MANIPULATIVE ARGUMENTATION IN ANTI-UKRAINIAN DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN POLITICIANS: INTEGRATION OF DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL AND CLASSICAL RHETORICAL APPROACHES

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Abstract: *Anti-Ukrainian discourse of the Russian politicians is based on delegitimization of the images of Ukraine and the Western world while constructing a positive image of Russia in the narratives of Self-Defense, Liberation of Ukraine, and Liberation of the World, with roles of a Villain, a Hero-Liberator, a Victim-Hostage and Villain's accomplice in different configurations. These models of argumentation rely on specific topoi of Threat, Protection and Strength and their revealing subtopoi, underpinning the discourse-forming concepts of Empire of evil, Empire of good and Ukronazis. Delegitimizing strategies of transfer and over-generalization are based on metaphors, metonymy, and lexical semantic means to denote the recurrence, systematicity and regularity of negatively connotated actions of the "alien" group. At the pragmatic level "We"- "They" dichotomy is based on ideologemes-based intertextuality, as well as the flouting of the cooperative maxims triggering the discursive implicatures. Maxims violation is marked by such manipulative techniques as the role reversal, ambivalent interpretation of the same concept, words with diffuse semantics, "complexity reduction", the construction of presupposition and the use of contrasting evaluative names to designate the forces of evil and good. Manipulative devices correlate with general rhetorical topoi of peristalsis, Genus and Species, Subject – Adjuncts, Past Fact / Future Fact, Testimony, antitheton and truncated syllogism.*

Keywords: *Anti-Ukrainian discourse, Russian media, narrative, topoi, manipulative devices, intertextual allusion, conversational implicature.*

Introduction. The article is focused on the topoi, manipulative strategies and techniques of the anti-Ukrainian discourse of the Russian politicians (ADRP) considering the formation and transformation of the new archetypal dichotomy "Russia/Ukraine" in analogy with archetypal opposites good - evil, order - chaos, light - darkness, top - bottom, male - female, altruism - egoism with a clear tendency towards absolute antagonism of members of the opposition and their association with other

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dichotomous archetypes, i.e. Russia = order = goodness = light, etc. and Ukraine, respectively, chaos = evil = darkness, etc.

Such a dichotomy is superimposed on the discourse-forming conceptual dichotomy “we-they”, inherent in any ideological discourse, with a universal cognitive strategy to generalize members of the opposed groups, which involves not only the image of Ukraine itself and the image of Russia in relation to Ukraine, but also the image of the West and its relations with Russia in connection with the events in Ukraine, as well as other members of the group categorization “own” – “alien”.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the method of manipulative argumentation in shaping the image of Ukraine, Russia, and the West in the anti-Ukrainian discourse from the perspective of topoi, manipulative strategies, techniques for their implementation and narratives for conceptualizing recent events and their participants.

Data and methods

The paper employs integrative methodology composed of critical discourse analysis in combination with elements of rhetorical analysis and narrative analysis¹ to identify metaphorical narratives. Critical discourse analysis is added by pragmatic analysis within the framework of Grice’s theory of *conversational Implicature*² since the ideological anti-Ukrainian discourse is a violation of all maxims of cooperation, which are deformed to actualize discursive implicatures, that is, to implement manipulative influence at the implicit level.

The research data encompass the texts of Russian politicians Vladimir Putin³, Vladislav Surkov⁴, Oleg Roy ⁵and Denis Dubrovin⁶. The paper

¹ Narrative analysis was used as a component of discourse analysis and relied on studies identifying narrative and metaphorical models for the conceptualization of wars in the 20th century. Examples of such an analysis are presented in: G. Lakoff, “Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the Gulf”. *Cognitive Semiotics*, VI (2) (2009), 5-19; J. Lule, War and its Metaphors: News language and the prelude to war in Iraq. *Journalism Studies*, 5(2) (2003), 179-190.

² P. Grice, (1975), Logic and conversation. In Cole, P. & Morgan, J.L. (eds.), *Syntax and semantics* 3, New York: Academic Press. 41-58.

³ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022]. Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>

⁴ Владимир Сурков. *Украины нет. Есть украинство – специфическое расстройство умов* [Ukraine is not. There is Ukrainianism - a specific disorder of minds]. Available at: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/02/26/surkov-ukrainy-net-est-ukrainstvo-specificheskoe-rasstroystvo-umov>

⁵ Олег Рой, “Украинство – сплав нацизма и манипуляции” [“Ukrainianism is an alloy of Nazism and manipulation”], *Взгляд. Деловая газета*, 7 апреля 2022. Available at: <https://vz.ru/opinions/2022/4/7/1152532.html>

employs integrative methodology composed of critical discourse analysis in combination with elements of rhetorical analysis and narrative analysis⁷ to identify metaphorical narratives.

Literature Review

The study has used the research background and terminology both of the contemporary discourse-analysis and classical argumentation theory dating back to Aristotle⁸ and Cicero⁹. Although both the theory of argumentation within discursive-historical branch of the modern critical discourse-analysis and the classical theory of argumentation use the same concept of *topos*, which is one of the key concepts in this article, their approaches in understanding this concept are radically different.

According to discourse analysts, *topoi* or *loci* are defined as “conclusion rules”, which connect the argument with the claim, justifying the transition from the argument to the conclusion¹⁰. Among the most common *topoi* in political discourse the scientists identified *Topos of Burdening*, *Topos of Reality*, *Topos of Numbers*, *Topos of History*, *Topos of Authority*, *Topos of Threat*, *Topos of Definition*, *Topos of Justice*, *Topos of Urgency*¹¹, as well as the *topoi* of challenge, belonging, “constructing a hero” and *topos of History*. For example, the *topos of History* can be formulated as follows: “because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation”.¹² At this, discourse analysts use a simplified *topos*-based reconstruction scheme of the internal structure of arguments.

⁶ Денис Дубровин. *Первая гибридная война: кровь, ложь и углеводороды* [The first hybrid war: blood, lies and hydrocarbons], 20 апреля 2022. Available at: https://tass.ru/opinions/14415359?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com

⁷ Narrative analysis was used as a component of discourse analysis and relied on studies identifying narrative and metaphorical models for the conceptualization of wars in the 20th century. Examples of such an analysis are presented in: Lakoff, G. “Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the Gulf”. *Cognitive Semiotics*, VI (2) (2009), 5-19; J. Lule, War and its Metaphors: News language and the prelude to war in Iraq. *Journalism Studies*, 5(2) (2003), 179-190.

⁸ Aristotle, *Topica* (Transl. by E.S. Forster). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989; Aristotle. *Art of Rhetoric* (Transl. by J.H. Freese). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.

⁹ Cicero, *Topica* (Transl. by T. Reinhardt). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Rubinelli, Sara. *Ars Topica. The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*. Berlin: Springer, 2009.

¹⁰ Kienpointner, Manfred, *Alltagslogik*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-holzboog, 1992, p. 194.

¹¹ Wodak, Ruth. *The Discourse of Politics in Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 44.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

If compared to classical rhetoric, the discursive-historical understanding of topoi is closest to the notion of specific topoi (in Aristotelian definition - right / wrong, the good / the unworthy, the advantageous / the disadvantageous, the noble /the base), which intersects with the Aristotle's concept *idia*. At the same time, the topoi of critical discourse analysis do not correlate with Aristotle's general topoi, which constitute the basic relations between concepts or their designating words – for example, Genus / Species, Whole / Parts, Subject / Adjuncts, Similarity / Difference, Cause / Effect, Antecedent / Consequence, Possible / Impossible, Past Fact / Future Fact, Authorities, Witnesses, etc.

In its attempt to generalize the discursive-analytical and rhetorical approaches, our article uses the concept of topoi in its two facets: as a kind of mental units, a ready-made argument putting the audience in a favorable frame of mind¹³ (Rubinelli, 2009: 148), and a structural-semantic models, rhetorical devices guiding the construction of arguments.

In their first facet the topoi as universal values or normative reference points (the idea of God, law, justice, morality) are the components in the argumentative models, acceptable for any argument. At the same time, the first aspect does not exclude and even presupposes the second one, since to actualize the topoi-ideas, it is necessary to use a certain model of argumentation, including semantic-structural and syntactic means.

A certain novelty of the article consists in its attempt to integrate the research approach of critical discourse analysis and classical rhetoric method in terms of explicating the topoi-ideas (close to specific topoi) in terms of topoi–rhetorical models (close to general topoi).

In this perspective, topoi-rhetorical devices correlate with such levels of critical discourse analysis (in its Norman Fairclough's¹⁴ version) as (a) “discourse as text”, involving the interpretation of metaphors, lexical-semantic and syntactic means as well as (b) “discourse as discursive practice” based on discursive implicatures, intertextuality and presuppositions as an implicit plan to activate and confirm such topoi-idea. In their turn, the means of two first levels of analysis correlating with rhetorical devices are aimed at revealing topoi-ideas as the arguments of the evaluation-normative plan to substantiate discursive strategies and discourse-forming concepts at the third level of critical-discourse analysis, namely “discourse as a social practice”. Topoi-ideas underpin discursive

¹³ Sara Rubinelli, op. cit., p. 148.

¹⁴ Fairclough, Norman, *Critical discourse analysis*. London, New York: Longman, 1995; Fairclough, Norman. A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analysis in social research. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis*. London: Sage, 2009, 162–186.

strategies associated with the pragmatics of “out-of-discursive” actions in support of OWN group and discrediting the group of THEY. In this regard, in addition to the discursive-historical notion of *topoi*, the article uses some explanatory tools of cognitive-discursive approach - to identify the basic cognitive strategies of the transposition and overgeneralization, within the semantic category of Us-Them Categorization and Polarization, introduced by Teun van Dijk¹⁵.

Another aspect of novelty of this paper is, in our opinion, an attempt to demarcate the notions of “topos” and discourse-forming “concept”¹⁶. Unlike the concept, the topos is communicatively oriented and sets the model for the development of events, that is, it represents a dynamic plan of the concept. For example, the concept “Under-State” is associated with the topos of uselessness, which, in turn, is associated with the elimination strategy “if such an entity is ineffective and useless, it must be abolished.” As a dynamic / pragmatic plan of discourse-forming concepts, *topoi*-ideas

¹⁵ Van Dijk, Teun A., The Reality of Racism. In: Zurstiege G. (eds). *Festschrift für die Wirklichkeit*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2000, p. 211-226

¹⁶ The notion of a discourse-forming concept is used to designate a key concept that integrates the structure of a certain discourse determining its cognitive semiotic space (Kravchenko, N., Goltsova, M., Kryknitska, I. “Politics as Art: The Creation of a Successful Political Brand”. *Journal of History, Culture and Art Research*, 9 (3) (2020), 314-323; Kravchenko, N. et al. “Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication” or half a century of IT consumer identity formation: A pragmatics approach”. *Token: A Journal of English Linguistics*, 13 (2021), 141-169). Kravchenko, N. Et al. “Illocutionary Pragmatic Adaptation Challenge: Ukrainian Translations of English-language Soft Law Texts”. *Amazonia Investiga*, 11(49) (2022), 267-276). In some studies, the term discourse-forming concepts is substituted by a notion of discourse-forming values (Kravchenko, N., Pasternak, T. “Institutional eco-pragmatics vs. anthropo-pragmatics: problems, challenges, research perspectives”. *Cogito. Multidisciplinary research journal*, XII (2) (2020), 24-39; Kravchenko, N. et al. “Illocutionary Pragmatic Adaptation Challenge: Ukrainian Translations of English-language Soft Law Texts”. *Amazonia Investiga*, 11(49) (2022), 267-276). In discourses created by media, such discourse-creating values are often ideologemes-simulacra that construct spaces of secondary signification and mythologizing. When compared with the post-structural version of discourse analysis, the “closest” to our understanding of discourse-forming concepts is the notion of nodal points as privileged discursive points which partially fix the meaning in a chain of signification, sustaining the identity of a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definite meanings” - e.g., God, nation, party, class, etc. (Torfing, J. *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*. Wiley, Social Science, 1999, 98-99). The notion of discourse-forming concepts also intersects with the concept-ideas that provide the “internal form” of texts as a macro-sign component of discourse in discursive semiosis (Kravchenko, N. *Discourse and discourse analysis: Concise encyclopedia*. Kiev.: Interservis, 2017 (in Russian); Kravchenko, N. *Interactive, genre, and conceptual modelling of International Legal Discourse*. Kiev: Referat, 2006 (in Russian).

determine the argumentative strategies, and the metaphorical narratives of the Tale of a Just War.

Discussion

The material of the study showed that the main topoi of Anti-Ukrainian discourse include the topoi of history, danger or threat, benefit / uselessness, responsibility, law, abuse, justice, culture, strength, power. In this respect ADRP is not original - most of these topoi used in ideological discourse were identified by discourse analysts. Specific for ADRP is the foregrounding and distribution of key and auxiliary topoi, as well as the techniques and frequency of their actualization.

Thus, it is identified that one of the most frequent is the topos of history, which, however, is instrumental, intermediate for actualizing key topoi of threat, responsibility, protection, and power in the global argumentative model of “Fair War” with narratives of “Self-Defense” and “Salvation”.

In turn, such topoi are ambivalent - depending on their correlation with the group “We” or “They”: we are responsible, they are irresponsible; they threaten, we protect ourselves and / or protect others.

Topoi are determined by three discourse-creating concepts and their subconcepts as shown in the Figure 1.






Figure 1. Discourse-creating concepts and subconcepts in anti-Ukrainian discourse of the Russian media

Discourse-creating concepts and their associated topoi are revealed in two narrative models of war conceptualization, schematically presented in Table 1.

| concepts | topoi | pragmatic aspect of the topoi | narrative models |
|---|----------------------------|--|---|
| Ukronazis vs. Empire of good (Fighter against the forces of Evil) | THREAT POWER JUSTICE | Threat to Ukraine needs protection from Russia | A tale of just war: “The Story of Salvation 1”: <i>Ukrainian authorities</i> are a <u>Villain</u> <i>Ukraine</i> is a <u>Victim</u> / <u>Hostage</u> <i>Russia</i> is a <u>Hero-Liberator</u> |
| Empire of evil vs. Empire of good. | THREAT PROTECTION | A world threatened by the US-centric West needs Russian protection | A tale of just war: “The Story of Salvation 2”: NATO / USA / <i>Western World</i> are <u>Villain</u> |

| | | | |
|--|-------------------|---|--|
| | | | <i>Ukraine is a <u>Villain's accomplice</u> The World is a <u>Hostage</u> Russia is a <u>Hero-Liberator</u></i> |
| Ukronazis, Empire of evil vs Empire of good. | THREAT PROTECTION | The danger threatening Russia requires its defensive response | A tale of just war: "Self-defense narrative": <i>Russia is a <u>Victim and Hero</u>; Ukraine or Anti-Russia is a <u>Villain</u> NATO / USA / Western World are <u>Demonic forces</u>, <u>Villain's accomplice</u>, <u>whose orders are carried out by Villain</u>.</i> |

Table 1. Narrative models of a tale of just war in anti-Ukrainian discourse of the Russian media

The "Liberation / Salvation" narratives, which position Russia as a Hero-Liberator, the Western world as a villain, and Ukraine as an accomplice of a villain, correspond to a model of argumentation based on the topoi Threat (THEIR group, Western world) and Protection and Strength (OUR group), as a dynamic plan of discourse-forming concepts Empire of evil and Empire of good.

The two main models of argumentation construct respectively the narrative of "Salvation" and the narrative of "Self-Defense".

Narratives of Salvation

The Narrative of Salvation is manifested in Russian discourse in its two versions: Liberation of Ukraine and Salvation of the World, with various argumentative schemes and methods of their implementation.

Accordingly, the construction of the scenarios involves topoi and ideologemes to characterize, on the one hand, the role of the Liberator and, on the other, the role of the Vilain, projected in the anti-Ukrainian discourse on the dichotomous opposition WE and THEY. Consider this dichotomy in view of the subtopoi that construct the key topoi as shown in Table 2.

| WE | THEY |
|--|---|
| Membership categorization | |
| Metonymy: Russia; citizens of Russia, Ukrainian territories or Ukrainians who want self-determination to join Russia; countries that have been attacked by NATO | Metaphor: NATO and the whole Western world as an “evil empire” that threatens the “inner group” Metonymy: USA, Ukraine=anti-Russia as the threat manifestations |
| KEY TOPOS: TRUSTWORTHINESS vs. THREAT | |
| Instrumental topoi | |
| RESPONSIBILITY | IRRESPONSIBILITY |
| <i>на протяжении 30 лет мы настойчиво и терпеливо пытались договориться с ведущими странами НАТО о принципах равной и неделимой безопасности в Европе.</i> | <i>В ответ на наши предложения мы постоянно сталкивались либо с циничным обманом и враньём, либо с попытками давления и шантажа: Те, кто претендуют на мировое господство, публично, безнаказанно и, подчеркну, без всяких на то оснований объявляют нас, Россию, своим врагом. В этом ряду и обещания нашей стране не расширять ни на один дюйм НАТО на восток</i> |
| Compliance with international law; Integrity | Violation of international law: illegal use of military force against other countries, distortion of UN Security Council decisions; Abuse |
| <i>Что касается нашей страны, то после развала СССР при всей беспрецедентной открытости новой современной России, готовности честно работать с США и другими западными</i> | <i><u>Сперва без всякой санкции Совета Безопасности ООН провели кровопролитную военную операцию против Белграда, использовали авиацию, ракеты прямо в самом центре Европы. Несколько недель непрерывных бомбёжек по мирным городам, по жизнеобеспечивающей инфраструктуре (...). Затем</u></i> |

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>партнёрами и в условиях фактически одностороннего разоружения нас тут же попытались дожать, добить и разрушить уже окончательно</p> | <p>наступила очередь Ирака, Ливии, Сирии. <u>Нелегитимное использование военной силы против Ливии, извращение всех решений Совета Безопасности ООН по ливийскому вопросу привело к полному разрушению государства, к тому, что возник огромный очаг международного терроризма, к тому, что страна погрузилась в гуманитарную катастрофу, в пучину не прекращающейся до сих пор многолетней гражданской войны. (...).Подобную судьбу уготовили и Сирии. (...).Однако особое место в этом ряду занимает, конечно же, вторжение в Ирак тоже без всяких правовых оснований</u></p> |
| <p>Adherence to universal values (Topos of justice) based on archetypal dichotomy of good and evil</p> | <p>a violation of universal values (topos of injustice) based on archetypal dichotomy of good and evil</p> |
| <p><u>Да, собственно, и до последнего времени не прекращались попытки (...) разрушить наши традиционные ценности и навязать нам свои псевдоценности, которые разъедали бы нас, наш народ изнутри, те установки, которые они уже агрессивно насаждают в своих странах и которые прямо ведут к деградации и вырождению, поскольку противоречат самой природе человека¹⁷</u></p> | <p><i>Ведь такое шулерское поведение противоречит не только принципам международных отношений, но прежде всего общепризнанным нормам морали и нравственности. Где же здесь справедливость и правда?</i></p> |

Table 2. Topoi and subtopoi in anti-Ukrainian discourse of the Russian media

¹⁷ Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

Thus, the topos “threat” (for the world) is based on the subtopoi “illegitimacy”, “injustice”, “irresponsibility” (of THEIR actions), revealing aspects of the metaphorical ideologeme “empire of evil”, which is directly nominated in the Russian discourse:

Поэтому с полным на то основанием, уверенно можно сказать, что весь так называемый западный блок, сформированный США по своему образу и подобию, весь он целиком и есть та самая “империя лжи”¹⁸.

As shown by the Table 2, the subtopoi are primarily actualized by direct nomination and evaluation of the actions of the group “THEY”: threat to universal values and human nature; violation of international law; the desire to redistribute the world and establish own order; creating an imbalance in the world, the practice of unjustified attack on other states; consequences: complete destruction of the states, humanitarian catastrophes, international terrorism, mass migration, etc.

At the same time subtopoi, instrumental for the topos “threat”, are based not only on the denotative level of events / actions description, but also on the connotative level, associated with “personal” qualities of the group of THEY, with the involvement of their negative evaluations: brazen lie, pressure, blackmail, recognition of one's superiority over others, euphoria from absolute superiority, low level of general culture and arrogance, and so on.

In critical discourse analysis¹⁹, such labeling is defined as a means of predication strategy, while substantiation of negative characteristics of the group “THEY” through reference to their actions and associated events correspond to the strategy of argumentation. Both strategies are subordinated to a more global strategy of delegitimization - the construction of a negative image of THEY as an image of the enemy.

With that in mind, predication as a marking of THEIR qualities is also, in our opinion, a part of the argumentative strategy, since such characteristics of the “alien group” as deceitful, insidious, cruel, unprincipled at the connotative level activate the topos of “threat”.

Narrative of Salvation in the Tale of a Just War presupposes the roles of Villain and Hero-Liberator. The paper identified that the construction of these roles, especially the role of Villain, involves over-generalization and transfer strategies.

The strategy of over-generalization is based on generalization of the negative patterns of action or behavior of THEIR group into the cognitive

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*

¹⁹ R. Wodak, & M. Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2001; Renkema, J. *Discourse, Of Course: An Overview Research in Discourse Studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 2009.

scheme (which is then activated during any references to this group). For example, models of the situation related to military operations against Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yugoslavia, are generalized to the general negative cognitive pattern of action of Western "peacekeeping" forces; Cases of hostilities not authorized by UN resolutions - to the scheme "all THEIR actions violate international law".

Some linguistic markers of over-generalization are displayed below (Table 3).

| example | linguistic device | function in the implementation of the strategy |
|---|--|---|
| <i>вторжение в Ирак тоже без всяких правовых оснований</i> / the invasion of Iraq is also without any legal basis | an adverb-modifier of the mode of action <i>тоже</i> / also | to denote the recurrence and systematicity of violations of international law |
| <i>это наиболее вопиющие, но далеко не единственные примеры пренебрежения международным правом</i> / these are the most egregious, but by no means the only examples of disregard for international law | adverbs of spatial generalization <i>везде, во многих регионах мира</i> / everywhere, in many regions of the world, in combination with the attributes of generalization <i>далеко не единственные</i> / no means the only | to indicate the regularity of violations |
| | adverbial modifier of temporal generalization <i>и до последнего времени</i> / and until recently | to refer to recurrence of negatively connotated actions of the group of THEM. |

Table 3. Linguistic markers of the strategy of over-generalization.

Considered in terms of Aristotelian general topoi, the above means of generalization correspond to peristasis as a description of attendant circumstances in terms of recurrence. In its turn, peristasis is one of the figures of reasoning contributing in rhetoric to amplification of thought or subject matter.

The strategy of generalization is also marked by such linguistic techniques as the metonymic (synecdoche) identification of Genus and Species concepts added by tactics of using words with diffuse (blurred) semantics in combination with the tactics of “complexity reduction” and the use of contrasting evaluative names to designate the forces of evil (they) and the forces of good (we), as illustrated by the following example:

Ведущие страны НАТО (generalized nomination) для достижения своих собственных целей (diffuse semantics) во всём (diffuse semantics) поддерживают на Украине крайних националистов и неонацистов, (“complexity reduction” with the use of contrasting negative evaluations), которые в свою очередь никогда не простят крымчанам и севастопольцам их свободный выбор – воссоединение с Россией. Они, конечно же, ползут и в Крым (metaphor-metonymy with animalistic input source space, associating the source conceptual space with insect or reptile), причём так же, как и на Донбассе, с войной с тем, чтобы убивать, как убивали беззащитных людей каратели из банд украинских националистов, пособников Гитлера во время Великой Отечественной войны²⁰ (intertextual allusion).

Due to the vagueness of the metaphor-metonymy “will climb into the Crimea”, it remains unclear who exactly “will climb” there. After all, the pronoun “They” is semantically subordinated to two actors - NATO and “extreme nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine.” The vagueness of the argument implements the strategy of hypo-hyperonymic identification of NATO and Ukraine.

In terms of Aristotle the identified metonymy corresponds to Genus / Species topics, when NATO and Ukraine are not associated as part and whole (Ukraine is not a member of NATO), but as generic and specific concepts based on political and ideological grounds and topos of threat to Russia. Thus, such identification is another implicit argument for justifying the war with Ukraine as a measure of protection against NATO (topos of self-defense).

In addition to the strategy of generalization, the analysis of anti-Ukrainian discourse reveals the strategy of transfer, when a negative model from one cognitive sphere is projected into another cognitive sphere. Such a strategy aims to effectively build new or intensify old models of situations, linking them with the negative schemes of others.

An explicit lexical-semantic marker of this strategy in the above example is the adverb with a particle and a comparative conjunction так же, как и на Донбассе (“just like in the Donbass”) to denote “similarly”.

²⁰ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

Implicitly the transfer strategy is realized at the level of the intertextual allusion, which refers to the topos of history. In terms of rhetorical invention, the allusion corresponds to the topics of Past Fact / Future Fact subcategorized to the topic of circumstances in which one refers to general events in the past or to what will occur in the future based on the record of the past. In such a way the allusion at the same time overlaps both with Aristotle's topos of Testimony, bringing precedents forward from the past, and topos of the Possible and Impossible when discussing what is likely or not for the future.

Due to the allusion to the events of World War II, the activated old models of negatively connoted situations are transferred into the present in order to form presuppositions about analogical behavior of Ukrainian military forces and punishers from gangs of Ukrainian nationalists, accomplices of Hitler (*каратели из банд украинских националистов, пособников Гитлера*).

From a syntactic point of view, the means of generalization include passive, impersonal and indefinite-personal sentences, an object in the position of a phrasal subject, any impersonalization aimed at "removing" the speaker from his own discourse to reduce responsibility for own statements:

Apart from the image of the generalized Villain, the Narrative of Salvation involves the image of the Hero-Liberator. If the Western world is a Villain, then its antagonist, i.e the Hero-Liberator, is Russia. While in the scenario "Salvation of Ukraine" such a role is explicit, in the scenario "Salvation of the World" it is implied and marked connotatively by positive and evaluative characteristics of the Hero, such as responsibility, legitimacy, justice, adherence to universal values (see Table 1 (left column). But such subtopoi are not sufficient to construct the role of the Hero-Liberator, because the implementation of this role requires such parameters as strength and ability to resist the forces of evil.

Such topoi are actualized at the level of discursive implicatures, often based on intertextual allusions involving the topos of history.

Именно так и было в 90-е годы, в начале 2000-х годов, когда так называемый коллективный Запад самым активным образом поддерживал сепаратизм и банды наёмников на юге России. Каких жертв, каких потерь нам тогда всё это стоило, через какие испытания пришлось пройти, прежде чем мы окончательно сломали хребет международному терроризму на Кавказе²¹

At the implicit level there the paper has revealed an opposition of the consequences of THEIR and OUR actions, identified at the level of

²¹ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

semantic coherence of the whole text. While They initiated a surge of international terrorism, We broke his back, which actualizes the contextual semes “strength”, “power”, “victory”, characterizing the Hero in the context of trials that must always be passed to fulfill his mission (the sixth stage in the Campbell's Monomif of the Hero²², when in the trial of the hero increases his strength before the main trial - the struggle with darkness, the forces of evil).

Just as in the world of myth and fairy tale when the Hero usually fights a monster, this fragment uses a metaphor-idiom referring to a terrible living creature whose back must be broken by the Hero in the struggle to survive.

Through the reference in this passage to “international terrorism”, the movement towards self-determination of the peoples of Ichkeria, Tatarstan, etc. is generalized into the “international terrorism” scheme, which becomes an argument to justify actions to combat the national liberation movement, reversing the roles of the Victim-Attacker.

Besides the role reversal, the text under consideration also demonstrates the manipulative technique of ambivalent interpretation of the same concept. Depending on the context, the notion of self-determination is either equated to *separatism* generalized to international terrorism, or is used to denote the “freedom of choice”.

The notion of “separatism (international terrorism)” is used when it concerns liberation movements in Russia: *Именно так и было в 90-е годы, в начале 2000-х годов, когда так называемый коллективный Запад самым активным образом поддерживал сепаратизм и банды наёмников на юге России* (the collective West most actively supported separatism and mercenary gangs in southern Russia).

The concept of “freedom of choice” is employed when referring to the Ukrainian territories: *свобода выбора для всех самостоятельно определять своё будущее и будущее своих детей. И мы считаем важным, чтобы этим правом – правом выбора – могли воспользоваться все народы, проживающие на территории сегодняшней Украины, все, кто этого захочет. Крымчане и севастопольцы сделали свой выбор – быть со своей исторической Родиной, с Россией, и мы это поддержали*²³ (freedom of choice for all to independently determine their own future and the future of their children. And we consider it important that this right - the right to choose - could be

²² Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

²³ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

used by all the peoples living on the territory of today's Ukraine, by anyone who wants it).

Let us analyze one more example of the use of the topos of history for the implicit construction of the role of the Hero-Liberator.

Почему всё это происходит? Откуда эта наглая манера разговаривать с позиции собственной исключительности, непогрешимости и вседозволенности? Откуда наплевательское, пренебрежительное отношение к нашим интересам и абсолютно законным требованиям? Ответ ясен, всё понятно и очевидно. Советский Союз в конце 80-х годов прошлого века ослаб, а затем и вовсе развалился. Весь ход происходивших тогда событий – это хороший урок для нас и сегодня, он убедительно показал, что паралич власти, воли – это первый шаг к полной деградации и забвению. Стоило нам тогда на какое-то время потерять уверенность в себе, и всё – баланс сил в мире оказался нарушенным²⁴ (Why is all this happening? Where does this impudent manner of speaking from the position of one's own exclusivity, infallibility and permissiveness come from? Where does the disdainful, disdainful attitude towards our interests and absolutely legitimate demands come from? The answer is clear, everything is clear and obvious. The Soviet Union in the late 80s of the last century weakened, and then completely collapsed. The whole course of events that took place then is a good lesson for us today as well; it convincingly showed that the paralysis of power and will is the first step towards complete degradation and oblivion. As soon as we lost our self-confidence for a while, and that's it - the balance of power in the world turned out to be disturbed).

This fragment is an example of violation of the cooperative maxim of relevance of information. On the one hand, the speaker adheres to this maxim at the level of cohesion, that is the formal-logical connection “question-answer” (*Почему всё это происходит? / Why is all this happening?... Ответ ясен, всё понятно и очевидно / The answer is clear, everything is clear and obvious*), but violates it at the level of coherence or semantic relationship, because further deployment of the text does not explain “what exactly is clear and obvious.”

According to the principle of cooperation the answer to the speaker's question is derived as a discursive implicature based on implicit antithesis. In terms of rhetorical devices, it is based on truncated syllogism and antitheton. A syllogism with unspecified prerequisite (entinema) omits the main prerequisite:

Советский Союз в конце 80-х годов прошлого века ослаб, а затем и вовсе развалился (...). Стоило нам тогда на какое-то время

²⁴ *Op. cit.*

потерять уверенность в себе, и всё – баланс сил в мире оказался нарушенным (The Soviet Union in the late 80s of the last century weakened, and then completely collapsed (...). As soon as we lost confidence in ourselves for some time, and that's it - the balance of power in the world turned out to be disturbed).

A complete formal syllogism would be as follows: because a strong empire was the guarantor of balance in the world.

The antitheton, built from contraries, includes the following parts:

(a) our weakness leads to the strengthening of the group THEM and to the imbalance in the world: *наглая манера разговаривать с позиции собственной исключительности, непогрешимости и вседозволенности?* (impudent manner of speaking from the position of one's own exclusivity, infallibility and permissiveness come from?)

(b) our strength would lead to Their weakening and restoring balance. Thus, the discursive implicature is inferred as: Russia is responsible for the balance in the world; the restoration of a strong Russia will ensure balance in the world.

Another vector of actualization of the Hero-Liberator role is the way the anti-Ukrainian discourse covers the events of this war.

On the one hand, the messianic role of Russia as the Hero-Liberator of the world from Nazism is explicitly actualized through the construction of the discourse-creating concept of Ukronazis (see Figure 1), based on animalistic metaphors, labeling, and other devices.

*Мы удивляемся жестокости нацбатовцев, но эта жестокость – прямое следствие их приверженности идеологии украинства. (...) Потому что именно мы обязаны показать миру звериную сущность украинства, чтобы ни оно само, ни что-то подобное никогда больше не возродилось*²⁵ (We are surprised at the cruelty of the National Battalion, but this cruelty is a direct consequence of their commitment to the ideology of Ukrainianism. (...)) Because it is we who are obliged to show the world the bestial essence of Ukrainianism, so that neither it, nor anything like it, will ever be reborn).

On the other hand, the implicit actualization of the messianic role of the Hero-Liberator of the world is carried out through the use of presuppositions that identify Ukraine with the forces of world evil (the role of the Villain in the Fairy tale about a just war - see Table 1). The mechanism of formation is the structural or semantic complication of the thematic (left) part of the statement, which requires some cognitive effort to interpret it. Due to this, the rhematic part, which is intended to become new presuppositional information, is taken for granted.

²⁵ Олег Рой, “Украинство – сплав нацизма и манипуляции” [“Ukrainianism is an alloy of Nazism and manipulation”],

If to present such a mechanism in terms of Aristotle's rhetoric, then such a technique will correspond to the method of constructing arguments Subject - Adjuncts, i.e. the subject - free members of the sentence. The focus in such an argumentative model is not on what is essential ("subject"), but on what is accidental or simply characteristic of something (its "adjuncts"). That is, the semantic focus of the phrase on the subject distracts attention from its adjunct characteristics allegedly secondary in meaning, and therefore the information presented as secondary is not in doubt, constructing the presupposition.

*(...) это Первая мировая гибридная война. Которая идет не столько на украинском театре боевых действий, сколько в мировой экономике в виде торговых, логистических и финансовых войн, а также в медийном, культурном, кибернетическом пространстве и даже на научном треке (примером которого является военно-биологическая деятельность США на Украине ...)*²⁶.

Due to the fact that some of the information is given in brackets ('an example of which is the military biological activity of the United States in Ukraine'), the semantic emphasis of the phrase is focused on the concept of "world hybrid war" and its manifestations. At the same time, an example that illustrates the peripheral facet of such a war is perceived as verified information that forms the premise about Ukraine as a springboard for US biological projects to develop biological weapons directed against Russia.

The construction of the concept of UKRONAZIS with the topos "threat" is used not only in the scenario "Salvation of the World", but also the "Salvation of Ukraine".

Even though such a scenario is increasingly moving to the periphery, it is still relevant, although it now concerns the East of Ukraine, the "liberation" of the Russian-speaking population.

In this scenario, Russia's role as a Liberator is often explicitly mentioned:

*Терпеть всё это было уже просто невозможно. Необходимо было немедленно прекратить этот кошмар – геноцид в отношении проживающих там миллионов людей, которые надеются только на Россию, надеются только на нас с вами. Именно эти устремления, чувства, боль людей и были для нас главным мотивом принятия решения о признании народных республик Донбасса*²⁷ (It was simply impossible to endure all this. It was

²⁶ Денис Дубровин. *Первая гибридная война: кровь, ложь и углеводороды* [The first hybrid war: blood, lies and hydrocarbons],

²⁷ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

necessary to immediately stop this nightmare - the genocide against the millions of people living there, who rely only on Russia, hope only on us).

At the same time, the scenario of Liberation-Salvation can be actualized implicitly - by allusive nominations associated with certain ideologemes. For example, the ideologemes “Soviet people” and “common Soviet identity” are actualized by the address *Уважаемые товарищи!* / “Dear comrades!”, allusion to a common Soviet past (fight against fascism), inclusive pronoun *нашу* / our, and words with the seme “commonality” (*общую Родину*).

Уважаемые товарищи! Ваши отцы, деды, прадеды не для того сражались с нацистами, защищая нашу общую Родину, чтобы сегодняшние неонацисты захватили власть на Украине (Dear comrades! Your fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazis, defending our common Motherland, so that today's neo-Nazis seized power in Ukraine).

The analysis of anti-Ukrainian discourse shows that the concepts of “liberation” and “fraternal people” are only semantic ideologemes, empty signifiers that are filled with meaning only in certain ideological contexts. In particular, the positive connotations associated with such meanings are destroyed in the context of the whole anti-Ukrainian discourse, in which such ideologemes as “insidiousness of Ukrainians”, “understate” and others are implanted. Thus, a direct allusion to historical events becomes the basis for the actualization of the ideologeme of “insidiousness of Ukrainians.”

*То атаман Полуботок подведет, то западены к Гитлеру переметнутся. Принуждение силой к братским отношениям - единственный метод, исторически доказавший эффективность на украинском направлении*²⁸ (Ataman Polubotok will let you down, then the Westerners will go over to Hitler. Forced coercion into fraternal relations is the only method that has historically proven effective in the Ukrainian direction).

Since the syntactically dependent idiom “fraternal relations” includes semes “unity”, “love” and “friendship”, then in combination with the main component *Принуждение силой* (Coercion by force) it forms an implicit oxymoron: Coercion by force to unity, love, and friendship. This device violates the maxim of relevance as the semantic coherence and stimulates the search for an argument - a discursive implicature that should be the answer to the question “Why should fraternal relations be forced?”. Intertextual allusions with negative historical connotations intensify old

²⁸ Владимир Сурков. *Украины нет. Есть украинство — специфическое расстройство умов* [Ukraine is not. There is Ukrainianism - a specific disorder of minds].

models of situations that are transferred to modern realities and generalized to the scheme (transfer strategy): Ukraine and Ukrainians have always been insidious and unreliable towards their “benefactors”, so they need to be forced for friendship.

Narrative of Self-Defense

The narrative scenario of Self-Defense of The tale of the Fair War is primarily based on the topos of history as part of a more generalized argumentative scheme with the topos of "danger / threat." Such scenario involves intertextual allusions underpinning the pragmatic strategies of transfer and generalization.

In particular, in the example below, a direct allusion to the events of World War II is used to implement the transfer strategy: negative historical connotations about the unexpected attack of Nazi Germany are transferred to the model of behavior of NATO and Ukraine as metonymic manifestations of threat forces.

В результате страна оказалась не готова к тому, чтобы в полную силу встретить нашествие нацисткой Германии, которая без объявления войны напала на нашу Родину 22 июня 1941 года. Врага удалось остановить, а затем и сокрушить, но колоссальной ценой. Попытка ублажить агрессора в преддверии Великой Отечественной войны оказалась ошибкой, которая дорого стоила нашему народу. В первые же месяцы боевых действий мы потеряли огромные, стратегически важные территории и миллионы людей. Второй раз мы такой ошибки не допустим, не имеем права²⁹ (As a result, the country was not ready to fully meet the invasion of Nazi Germany, which attacked our Motherland on June 22, 1941 without declaring war. The enemy was stopped and then crushed, but at a colossal cost. An attempt to appease the aggressor on the eve of the Great Patriotic War turned out to be a mistake that cost our people dearly. In the very first months of hostilities, we lost huge, strategically important territories and millions of people. The second time we will not allow such a mistake, we have no right).

Thus, the discursive implicature that is inferred by combining two conceptual spheres based on the transfer strategy, can be formulated as follows: we can no longer wait for them (i.e. Ukraine as a metonymic personification of the “alien” group) to attack first. Involving the topos of history with the transfer strategy becomes a means of actualizing the key topos of “threat”, which becomes an implicit argument in favor of an attack on Ukraine. At the same time, thanks to the allusion, the ideologeme of “NATO / Ukraine insidiousness” is being formed.

²⁹ *Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 24 февраля 2022 года* [Address of the President of the Russian Federation February 24, 2022].

Conclusion

The construction of Russia's positive image in the anti-Ukrainian discourse is carried out through the delegitimization of the image of Ukraine and the Western world in the narratives of Self-Defense and Liberation of the Tale of a Just War. The "Liberation / Salvation" narrative, which positions Russia as a Hero-Liberator, the Western world as a villain, and Ukraine as an accomplice of a villain, is a model of argumentation based on the topoi Threat (THEIR group, Western world) and Protection and Strength (OUR group), as a dynamic plan of discourse-forming concepts Empire of evil and Empire of good. The argumentation model associated with another variant of the Liberation/Salvation narrative is based on such a configuration of roles as the Ukrainian authorities - the Villain, Ukraine - the Victim / Hostage and Russia - the Hero-Liberator.

The same topoi Threat (THEIR group, Ukrainian power) and Protection and Strength (Russia) are underpinned in this model by the discourse-creating concepts of Ukronazis and Empire of good.

The Self-defense narrative of the Tale of Fair War positions Russia as a Victim and Hero at the same time, Ukraine or Anti-Russia as a Villain and NATO / USA / Western World – as Demonic forces, embodied Evil, whose orders are carried out by Villain. This model of the event conceptualization is based on the topos Threat associated with the discourse-forming concepts of Ukronazis, Empire of evil and Empire of good.

As subtopoi, the article identified such components arguing topoi-ideas as responsibility / irresponsibility, legitimacy / illegitimacy, universal human values / pseudo-values, justice / injustice in the archetypal dichotomy of good - evil associated with the opposition WE-THEY. The most frequent is the topos of history, which is equally productively used by both groups as realizing the strategy of transfer when a negative model from one cognitive sphere is projected into another cognitive sphere to build new or intensify old models of situations associated with the "alien" group.

In addition to transfer, the article identified the cognitive-pragmatic strategy of over-generalization aimed at constructing the internal and external groups and their associated images of the Hero and the Villain in the generalized value dichotomy of Good and Evil. At the verbal level this strategy is marked with metaphors, metonymy, and lexical semantic means to denote the recurrence, systematicity and regularity of negatively connotated actions of the "alien" group.

At the pragmatic level the generalized images of We and They are based on means of ideologemes-based intertextuality, as well as the flouting of the cooperative maxims triggering the discursive implicatures. Maxims violation is marked by such manipulative techniques as the role

reversal, ambivalent interpretation of the same concept, tactics of using words with diffuse semantics, “complexity reduction”, the construction of presupposition and the use of contrasting evaluative names to designate the forces of evil and good.

The article revealed the correlation of manipulative techniques of the verbal and pragmatic levels with general rhetorical topoi. The lexical semantic means of generalization correspond to peristasis as the figure of reasoning and amplification. Metonymy and synecdoche correlate with Genus and Species topos. Intertextual allusions relate to the topics of Past Fact / Future Fact and overlap with Aristotle’s topos of Testimony, bringing precedents forward from the past, and topos of the Possible and Impossible. Violations of maxims of cooperation with inference of discursive implicatures are associated with truncated syllogism. Implicit antitheses correspond to antitheton and the technique of presuppositions construction relies on Subject – Adjuncts topos.

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SEMANTIC PHENOMENA IN ENGLISH CLINICAL TERMINOLOGY OF VETERINARY MEDICINE

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Abstract: *This paper explored semantic phenomena in English clinical terminology of veterinary medicine. The aim of this work is to study such semantic phenomena as synonymy, antonymy, polysemy and hyperogynymia in clinical veterinary terminology. The author focuses on the generalization of theoretical views on the essence of the phenomena of synonymy and antonymy in terminology in general. The peculiarities of the using synonymous and antonymous units in English clinical terminology of veterinary medicine are shown. The main types of synonyms and antonyms and their structural features in the studied terminology are identified and analyzed. Synonymy and antonymy are typical phenomena in this system that make it more flexible. They are characterized by sufficient consistency and order. The phenomenon of polysemy in veterinary clinical terminology is rare, but in various forms. Hyper-hyponymic relations between units, based on generic-species conceptual commonality, form multi-level hierarchical structures that represent a complex framework of the terminological vocabulary of clinical veterinary medicine. This type of relationship between units is one of the most important principles for structuring knowledge and organizing the terminological composition of the "animal disease" term system.*

Keywords: *semantic phenomena, clinical terminology, veterinary medicine, synonyms, antonyms, structural types, polysemy, hyperogynymia.*

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Introduction

The terminology of veterinary medicine is a set of names denoting the concepts of veterinary medicine as a science, and special nomenclature names of veterinary medicine as a field of professional activity. Modern terminology of veterinary medicine is one of the most extensive and complex systems. The lexicon of veterinary medicine is several hundred thousand words and phrases. The huge volume of modern veterinary terminology is explained by the exceptional diversity of the categories of scientific concepts it reflects.

The terminology of veterinary medicine consists of 3 main terminological groups: anatomical, clinical and pharmaceutical, each of which defines its own range of concepts. Anatomical terminology names the organs of the animal and their functions, clinical designates the names of diseases, their symptoms, disease states, and pharmaceutical gives the names of drugs. In clinical terminology, the most frequent are lexical units denoting the names of diseases, processes and treatment methods.

The terminology of veterinary medicine is a set of terms denoting the concepts of veterinary medicine as a science and special nomenclature of veterinary medicine as a field of professional activity. The modern terminology of veterinary medicine is one of the most extensive and complex in terms of concepts and content systems of terms. The lexicon of veterinary medicine consists of several hundreds of thousands of words and word combinations. The huge volume of modern veterinary terminology is explained by the exceptional variety of categories of scientific concepts reflected in it.

The terminology of veterinary medicine consists of 3 main terminological groups: anatomical, clinical and pharmaceutical, each of which defines its own scope. Anatomical terminology names the organs of the animal and their functions, clinical terminology indicates the names of diseases, their symptoms, painful conditions, and pharmaceutical terminology gives the names of medicinal products. In clinical terminology, the most frequent are the lexical units denoting the names of diseases, processes and treatment methods.

A whole number of studies of veterinary clinical terminology, defining its main characteristics, have been carried out by such linguists: S. Amelina and I. Hopak¹, L. Komarova^{2,3}, V. Lashkul⁴, T. Nemova and M.

¹ S.M., Amelina, I.M. Hopak, *Structural and semantic peculiarities of English terms in the veterinary sublanguage in the context of Ukrainian translation*. Scientific herald of National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine: Philological sciences. Kyiv, 2016, Vol. 248, 156-161.

² L.N., Komarova, *The origins of veterinary terminology II International Scientific and Practical Conference*. "A new word in science: development strategies". Cheboksary, CHGU, 2017, 1(9), 1-4.

Lychuk⁵, Yu. Rozhkov^{6,7}, O. Syrotina⁸, Yu. Timkina^{9,10}, T. Cherepovska and O. Binkevich¹¹, L. Yagenych¹² and others.

However, semantic phenomena based on paradigmatic relations, such as hypero-hyponymy (generic-species), synonymy, antonymy, polysemy, homonymy, characteristic of veterinary terms, have not been sufficiently investigated by linguists in these works.

The problem of semantic phenomena of English clinical veterinary terminology still remain unresolved, which determines the relevance of the study.

The aim of our work is to study the specifics and analysis of semantic phenomena in English clinical veterinary terminology.

Materials and methods of research

The terms for the study were selected from the following lexicographical sources: Black's Veterinary Dictionary (2015); Concise veterinary dictionary (1988); Veterinary dictionary (2012); Dictionary of Veterinary Nursing E-Book (2007); Saunders comprehensive veterinary dictionary e-book, Veterinary Dictionary (2018).

³ L.N. Komarova, *Eponyms in Veterinary Medicine in English*. XI International scientific-practical conference "Priority directions of development of science and education". Cheboksary, CHGU, 2016,1-5.

⁴ V.A. Lashkul, *Language means of process category in the English epizootological terminology*. International journal of philology, 2021, 12(4), 50-54.

⁵ T.V. Nemova, M.I. Lychuk, *Features of formation and translation of terminology of clinical veterinary hematology*. International journal of philology, 2020, 11 (3), 73-81.

⁶ Yu. H. Rozhkov, *From the history of formation of the English veterinary terminology*. International journal of philology. 2021, 12 (3), 90-97.

⁷ Yu. H. Rozhkov, *Verbalization of Animal Diseases in English: Linguocognitive and Structural-Semantic Aspects*. Dissertation for a Doctor of Philosophy in Philology degree: specialty - 035 Philology. Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, Kyiv, 2021, 224.

⁸ E.A. Sirotina, *Categories of space and time in the English terminology of veterinary medicine*. Studia Humanitatis, 2020, No. 3.

⁹ Yu. Yu Timkina, *English-language lexical and grammatical units in the field of «Veterinary science»*. Baltic Humanitarian Journal. Kaliningrad: Assotsiatsiya PAAS, 2019, 2 (19), 62-65.

¹⁰ Yu. Yu Timkina, *Classification of veterinary terminology in English*. Philological sciences. Questions of theory and practice. Tambov: Gramota, 2017, 6(1), 72, 156-158.

¹¹ T. Cherepovska, & O. Binkevych, *Morphological peculiarities of veterinary terminology in the context of teaching English for specific purposes*. Scientific Proceedings of Ostroh Academy National University: Philology Series, 2019 (5 (73)), 310-312.

¹² L.V. Yagenich, *On the classification of veterinary medicine terminology in modern English*. Fundamental science for universities. Moscow: Moscow State Pedagogical University, 2020, (1), 342-351.

The main methods used in the study were sampling of language material, definition analysis, classification as well as word-formation and term-component analyzes.

Literature Review

To the semantic phenomena in terminology, which are traditionally considered in lexicological studies, linguists include such phenomena as synonymy (doubling), antonymy, homonymy, polysemy, metaphORIZATION, metonymization in terminology, and more recently also paronyms, that is, the proximity of words by form with their complete or partial difference in meaning, which causes their mixing in use, and hyponyms are generic semantic relations between lexical units.

The works of D. Lotte, A. Akhmanova, S. Grinev, D. Shmelev, T. Kandelaki, A. Superanskaya, A. Reformatsky, V. Danilenko, T. Kiyak, B. Golovin, I. Kochan, V. Leichik, S. Shelov, L. Alekseev and others are devoted to the study of synonymy and antonymy.

V. Leichik, S. Shelov, S. Grinev, V. Tatarinov, L. Alekseeva, N. Novodranova in their scientific research not only recognize, but also regard terminological synonymy as a positive process, indicating a high level of development of science.

Analysis of modern linguistic literature indicates two absolutely opposite points of view regarding the essence of terminological synonymy and the classification of synonymous terms. Some researchers (L. Alekseeva, S. Hrynyov, V. Leychyk, S. Majhaeva, Yu. Slozhenikina, S. Shelov, etc.) treat synonymy in terminology positively. Other linguists (V. Favorin, A. Shapiro, E. Tolikina, V. Molodets, O. Akhmanova and others) deny synonymy in terminology.

The works of Yu. Apresyan, Sh. Bali, L. Vvedenska, V. Danylenko, E. Derdy, L. Novikov, O. Taranenko, and others are devoted to the study of the theoretical foundations of antonymy on the material of different languages. Terminological antonymy as a systemic phenomenon was studied on the material of the English language by R. Dudok, Yu. Melnikov, R. Shutnikov, S. Shabarzina, and others.

Research of many domestic and foreign scientists V. Gladko, Yu. Gurova, V. Karaban, Z. Karimova, V. Levitskyi, F. Lytvyn, I. Olshanskyi, A. Superanskaya, O. Taranenko, J. Lyons, E. Schneider and others are devoted to the diverse aspects of the polysemy study, the peculiarities of the formation of branch terminological systems, and the relations between the structural units of professional languages.

Research by R. Boltyanska, V. Vynogradova, Y. Kovalik, L. Lipko and others is devoted to the problem of distinguishing the phenomena of polysemy and homonymy.

Although polysemy, homonymy and synonymy are undesirable phenomena in medical terminology, they are relatively common and no field of veterinary medicine can avoid them. Polysemy and synonymy accompany the development of every new branch of medicine. This situation is typical for the time of rapid formation of new terms and theoretical treatment of scientific terminology. Although homonyms are quite rare within the same field of veterinary medicine, synonyms quantitatively expand the vocabulary.

The phenomenon of hyperonymy occupies a central place in the terminology of both the English language and any other language of scientific communication. At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, many works of scientists (B. Laurel., Frank W. Roder, J. Lyons, N. Arutyunova, S. Hrynyov-Grynevych) were devoted to the study of hypero-hyponymic categories.

Among the research of modern Ukrainian scientists devoted to the problem of hyperonymy, published over the last decade, we should note the works of N. Mashtakova, M. Teplova, O. Konovalova, A. Shevchuk.

Synonymy

Synonymy is a common phenomenon in the English clinical terminology of veterinary medicine, which includes names denoting pathogens and vectors of diseases; diseases and pathological conditions of the animal; forms of their course and signs (symptoms, syndromes); environmental factors affecting the health of the animal; methods of diagnosis, prevention and treatment of diseases, etc.

Extreme activity in synonymous relations in the English clinical terminology of veterinary medicine was demonstrated by terminological units that nominate animal diseases. Selected by continuous sampling from special dictionaries^{13,14,15} these terms served as material for the study of synonymous relations.

Despite significant advances in the study of synonymy, there is still no generally accepted definition of the term "synonym" in linguistics. In modern scientific literature, there are many definitions of the concepts of "synonym" and "synonymy", however, a single point of view and a single approach to their definition has not been developed. Synonyms are, as you know, words that have the same or similar meaning. Terms expressing the

¹³ B. Edward, *Black's Veterinary Dictionary*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015, 514p.

¹⁴ V.P. Studdert, *Saunders Comprehensive Veterinary Dictionary*. London: Elsevier Ltd, 2015, 508 p.

¹⁵ R.G. Bengis, R.A. Kock, J. Fischer, (2002), *Infectious animal diseases: the wildlife/livestock interface. Revue scientifique et technique - Office international des epizooties*. Vol. 21 (1), 53-65.

same concepts, denoting the same objects and phenomena of reality, these are the terms-synonyms. T. Panko defines synonyms in terminology as “terms related to the same denotation, but having differences in terms of concepts, as well as differing in the semantics of word-forming elements, etymology, degree of modernity and features of functioning”¹⁶.

E. Kortun believes that term synonymy is a type of semantic relationship based on the ability of different terminological units to designate the same special concept, expressing various additional features, emotional or stylistic coloring, compatibility with other terminological units¹⁷.

In the general literary language, synonymy is a positive phenomenon, since it contributes to its enrichment. Synonyms in terminology are treated ambiguously. Until recently, the opinion prevailed that this phenomenon is undesirable in term systems, since it violates one of the mandatory requirements for terms.

From another point of view, in the paradigm of cognitive science, synonymy is treated positively. Studies conducted in line with cognitive linguistics, terminologists (L. Alekseeva, S. Grinev, V. Leichik, S. Madzhaeva, Yu. Slozhenikina, S. Shelov, etc.) indicate that the processes of synonymy and variance are active processes and testify to the constant nature of the development of the science language. Synonymous relations are considered "backbone"¹⁸, and the ability of synonyms to name the same special concept, highlighting its individual features from different angles, is necessary in the scientific process¹⁹.

Linguists who recognize the existence of terminological synonymy distinguish a number of its specific features, in contrast to a similar phenomenon in common vocabulary^{20, 21}. From a linguistic point of view, the presence of synonyms provides the functional flexibility of the terminological system necessary for the implementation of various communicative tasks.

¹⁶ T.I. Panko, *Ukrainian terminology*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, p. 181.

¹⁷ E.A. Kortun, *Synonymy of terms (based on the terminology of the oil-producing and oil-refining industries)*. Scientific notes of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur State Technical University, 2012, No. 2(9), p. 36.

¹⁸ M.Ya. Salamakha, *Synonymous relations in the English-language termschology of the field of environmental protection*. Scientific journal of the Chershet National University named after Yury Fedkovich. German Philology, 2013, Issue 653, p. 128.

¹⁹ V.A. Tatarinov, *General Terminology: Encyclopedic Dictionary*. Russian Terminological Society RossTerm. Moscow: Moscow Lyceum, 2006, pp. 172-173.

²⁰ I.V. Artemova, *Terminological specifics of medical discourses*. Herald of the Russian Friendship University: Series "Education Issues: Languages and Specialties", 2006, 1 (3), 49-52.

²¹ Yu.V. Slozhenikina, *Terminological variability: semantics, form, function*. Moscow: LKI Publishing House, 2010, 288 p.

An analysis of the synonymy features of veterinary terminology gives reason to present its classification according to the following criteria: according to the degree of absolute identity of the meaning (absolute and relative synonyms), by structure (synthetic, analytical).

A detailed analysis of absolute / relative synonyms with corresponding examples from the terminology under study is given below.

Absolute synonyms arise as a result of the existence in the terminological system of borrowings, loan translation and terms created on the basis of their own language to denote the same concept: absolute synonymous terms are interchangeable in any context. As the results of the study showed, the composition of the synonymic series of absolute synonyms, as a rule, includes terms formed from Latin-Greek elements and national terms.

Examples of absolute synonymy are the following synonymous series: fluorosis – mottled enamel, pneumonia – pneumonitis, peritoneal inflammation – peritonitis, pharyngemphraxis – pharyngeal obstruction, heart disease – cardiac disease, myocarditis – myocardial inflammation, pericarditis – inflammation of pericardium; elephant leg – elephantiasis.

In the course of our research, we discovered synonymous relations between 1) borrowed terms: stomatitis – mucositis, toxanemia – toxic anemia, bilharziasis – schistosomiasis, toxomplasmosis – toxoplasma infection; 2) terms from the actual English language: rabies – canine madness; lumpy jaw – big jaw; black leg – quarter evil; 3) borrowed and actually English terms: Avian cholera – Chicken cholera.

So, in the terminology of veterinary medicine, the phenomenon of absolute synonymy is caused, as a rule, by the existence of two variants of terms: international (Latin and Greek) and national. The gradual assimilation of veterinary terminology in the national language led to the development of its own means of nomination. The main reason for the spread of this phenomenon lies in the peculiarities of the development of veterinary terminology in the English language, which took place on the basis of Greek and Latin.

This process was accompanied by the formation of synonymous series consisting of borrowed and proper English terms, for example: Pestis African Suum – African Swine Fever – African Pig Plague – Montgomery Swine Flue; Rabies – Hydrophobia – Dog Madness; Asiatic fowl cholera – Avian flu – Chicken Flu.

Relative synonyms are synonyms in which the identity of individual lexical and semantic meanings is found, that is, incomplete coincidence of the component composition of denotative meanings²².

²² M.Ya. Salamakha, *Synonymous relations in the English-language termschology of the field of environmental protection*. Scientific journal of the Chershvet National University named after Yuri Fedkovich. German Philology. 2013, Issue 653, p. 130.

These include the veterinary terms, which have the same semantic core of meaning, but different peripheral components. As an example, consider a synonymous series of relative synonyms: disease, illness, sickness, morbidity, infirmity, ailment, indisposition; complaint, disorder, malady, badness.

Our research shows that the activity of using these synonyms is different. In English clinical terms, only three nominations are used to denote animal diseases: disease, sickness and illness. For example, May sickness, Grass sickness, African Horse sickness, Mad Dog disease, Swine Vesicular disease, etc. Moreover, "disease" is a certain, serious illness. This word usually refers to various diseases, viruses, for example: Lyme disease, Nairobi sheep disease, Pullorum disease, Rabbit hemorrhagic disease.

The following synonymous series can serve as examples of relative synonyms: Tuberculosis – Pearl disease. The term Tuberculosis in English and Ukrainian means a disease that affects the lungs of animals and humans, while the term Pearl disease means tuberculosis that affects animals. Elephant foot – Barbados leg. In the first case, the name of the disease was formed from the symptom that led to infection with filaria (the causative agents of elephantiasis), various parts of the body, most often the legs, were covered with huge growths that resembled the legs of an elephant. In the case of Barbados leg, the same disease had a completely different history of its name. The disease was discovered in Africa, but was brought from the island of Barbados. In the English terminology for animal diseases, these terms denote partially overlapping concepts. In particular, the semantic analysis of these key terms showed that these units with their own content volume differ in shades of meaning, have different origins and are characterized by different combinatorial compatibility.

The synonymy of the studied terms is characterized by the variant of their form, by which we mean formal variations of the same linguistic sign. Such relations of variant occur between units identical in content and different in the way of expression.

According to the structure, veterinary terms-synonyms can be classified on the basis of the following structural types when they enter into synonymous relationships:

- 1) one-word term – one-word term: contusion – seizure, dropsy – hydrophobia, volvulus – ileus, deitis – vulvitis²³;
- 2) terminological combination – one-word term: goat posthitis – goatpox, cattle plague – rinderpest, breast inflammation – mastitis;

²³ B. Edwards, *Black's Veterinary Dictionary*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 59.

3) terminological phraseology – terminological phraseology: fog fever – acute bovine pulmonary edema, wooden tongue – wooden tone, quarter evil – black leg, cardiac defect – valvular defect²⁴;

4) eponym – one-word term: Lyme disease – borreliosis, Corrión's disease – bartonellosis,

5) abbreviation – terminological combination: BP – blood pressure, ANS – autonomic nervous system, CVS – cardiovascular system, EDUD – eating, drinking, urinating and defecating, BHV – bovine herpesvirus, BT – blue tongue²⁵.

The presence of a large number of the above-described terms is mainly due to non-linguistic reasons – the peculiarities of the development of veterinary science and practice.

First of all, there is a fundamental possibility of distinguishing different distinguishing features in the same object, which is manifested in the use of different motivational features when defining terms. Secondly, the same object (symptom, syndrome, disease, pathological process, diagnostic method, method of treatment, surgical operation, infectious agent, etc.) can be discovered or described and, accordingly, named differently by different specialists in one country or by specialists from different countries, or at different times, or simultaneously, but independently of each other. If at the same time a similar scientific concept has formed in the thinking of specialists, then the names created by them are synonyms of the interpretive type. Thirdly, in connection with a deeper knowledge of the object, the concept formed about it is enriched. In the thinking of a specialist, other essential distinguishing features of the concept are depicted. On this basis, there is a need to express an enriched concept with a new sound complex, in which a more precisely oriented sign would be presented. Fourth, interpretive synonyms can arise when a new classification of a group of concepts appears. Fifth, interpretive synonymy can be the result of establishing the identity of a disease that was previously denoted by different names.

Therefore, synonyms in terminology continue to appear and exist, and therefore require constant study. It must be recognized that modern terminology in general and the terminology of veterinary medicine in particular have created the necessary theoretical foundation for a broad scientific analysis of synonymous relationships between terminological units.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 78.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 61.

Antonymy

Semantic relations in the lexical system of the language are supplemented by antonymy. With its definition, the concept of opposites acquires a philosophical, logical and linguistic meaning. According to M. Pestova, antonyms are words that are opposed by the most general and most significant semantic feature, and they are at the extreme points of the corresponding lexical and semantic paradigm²⁶.

The vocabulary of the language of science, with the same frequency as the general literary language, is also characterized by the phenomenon of antonymy. But, considering the terms named various animal diseases, we came to the conclusion that in this term system antonymic relations are less frequent compared to synonymy. At the same time, examples of two types of antonyms can be found in the veterinary vocabulary: lexical and derivative.

In the nominations of animal diseases, **lexical type** of antonymy can be demonstrated by the following example: abrachia – apodia. Antonymy in this pair of nominations is achieved by contrasting one of the components of the meaning: upper (limbs) – lower (limbs), since the term abrachia in English means the absence of upper limbs, apodia – respectively, lower limbs.

Derivative antonymy is formed by using antonymous morphemes, indicating respectively redundancy, exaggeration and insufficiency, lowering the established norm. Most often, this role is played by pairs of prefixes such as hypo- (hyper-), oligo- (poly-), macro- (micro-), for example: hypertrophy (growth, increase in the size of something, in particular an organ) – hypotrophy (underdevelopment, for example, of an organ, part of the body); hyperaesthesia (abnormally increased sensitivity to pain in an animal) – hypoaesthesia (reduced sensitivity to pain); hyperkinesia (increased muscle activity of the limbs of the animal's body) – hypokinesia (limited movement of the limbs due to limited muscle functioning); oligodontia (a congenital pathology in the absence of one or more teeth – polydontia is a congenital pathology, which is characterized by an excessive number of teeth; oligodactyly (an anomaly in the development of the animal, consists in an insufficient number of fingers on the paws of the animal) – polydactyly (consists in the presence of such a number of fingers in the animal that exceeds the norm; macrostomia (developmental anomaly: excessively wide mouth gap) – microstomia

²⁶ M.S. Pestova, *Antonymy as an object of theoretical research*. Bulletin of the South Ural State University. Series Linguistics. Yuzhno-Uralsk: Publishing House. SURU, 2014, 18-21.

(developmental anomaly characterized by narrowing of the mouth opening)²⁷.

There are many antonymous pairs among the English composite terms of veterinary medicine, for example: autochthonous microorganisms (microorganisms, typical and permanent inhabitants of this ecosystem (for example, soil, gastrointestinal tract, etc.) – allochthonic microorganisms (microorganisms alien to a given ecosystem, temporarily present in it or those that are at rest. Their presence depends on a random change in external conditions (an increase in the concentration of nutrients or the addition of new, certain substances) that allow the development of the above microorganisms)²⁸; active immunity (the body's resistance that develops in response to the introduction (hit) of an infectious agent or vaccine preparation and, as a rule, is characterized by an increase (appearance) of antibodies²⁹ – passive immunity (the resistance of the body, obtained due to ready-made protection factors³⁰; multifactorial etiology / disease (diseases in which more than one agent / cause is responsible for a specific pathological process³¹ – monofactorial etiology / disease (diseases in which one agent / one cause is responsible for a specific pathological process)³².

The nominations of generic antonymous terms - composites mainly express the unity of opposite concepts, attributes express their opposite signs, that is, the values of attributes are opposed according to one of the semantic components.

So, antonymy is a significant specific feature characteristic of the English clinical terminology of veterinary medicine. It allows you to designate the semantics of the term system and ensures its symmetry, stability and consistency.

Polysemy

One of the special features of the term is its unambiguity. The study of various terminological systems and subsystems showed that in the terminological vocabulary, as well as in the literary language, there is such a phenomenon as ambiguity, or polysemy. By polysemy we understand the presence of the same word in several interconnected meanings, which

²⁷ Yu. H. Rozhkov, *Verbalization of Animal Diseases in English: Linguocognitive and Structural-Semantic Aspects. Dissertation for a Doctor of Philosophy in Philology degree: specialty - 035 Philology*. Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, Kyiv, 2021, p. 125.

²⁸ V.V. Nedosykov, V.P. Lytvyn, V.V. Polishchuk, V.V. Mel'nyk, O.M. Homzykov, O.H. Martynyuk, *Dictionary of epizootological terms*. Kyiv: VAT Ryabyna, 2014, p. 5.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 27.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 27.

³¹ Ibid, p. 34

³² Ibid, p. 34.

usually arise during the modification and development of the primary meaning of this word³³.

There is no doubt that among the main features of terms, unambiguity is the leading one³⁴. It is natural that this feature turns into a requirement for a term when creating a term, since it is known that each concept is unambiguous in itself. And this is, according to the law of identity, one of the elementary conditions of correct thinking³⁵.

According to T. Stasiuk³⁶, the notion of the unambiguity of the term is a common mistake that arose as a result of attributing to it (the term) the unambiguity of the reflection of reality.

The reasons for ambiguity (polysemy) and the forms of its expression in veterinary terminology vary. Yu. Shestok³⁷ outlines two reasons for the ambiguity of veterinary terms.

1. Epistemological: human thinking at the same time supports the tendency towards unambiguity and precision of word usage, and counteracts it by finding verbal expression for new concepts.

2. The nature of the development of veterinary science: the number of micro-terminological systems is increasing, which makes it possible to use the same language units to denote different concepts.

According to S. Shelov, the reason for ambiguity lies in the "lagging" of the term from the evolution of the content of the expressed concept³⁸. Following the development of scientific knowledge, this or that concept is divided into two or more independent concepts, and the same sound complex continues to be used for their expression within the same microsystem.

Observations show that in the English-language terminological system for the designation of animal diseases, the main property of the term – ambiguity – manifests itself consistently. The phenomenon of polysemy is represented by individual examples. Polysemy can occur in unit cases. First, as a result of convergence of the meanings of the term denoting a certain organ or its parts and diseases of the organ. Thus, alveolitis has two

³³ O.S. Akhmanova, *Dictionary of linguistic terms*. Moscow: Ripol Classic, 2013, p. 43.

³⁴ S.V. Grinev-Grinevich, *Terminology*. Moscow: Academy, 2004, p.120.

³⁵ Yu.V. Slozhenikina, *Terminological variability: semantics, form, function*. Moscow: LKI Publishing House, 2010, p. 55.

³⁶ T.V. Stasyuk, *The nature of the term in the cognitive-anthropological paradigm of linguistics*. Scientific Bulletin of the UNESCO Department of KLNU. Series Philology. Pedagogy. Psychology. Kyiv: Nat. lingu. un-t, 2012, 25, 95-100.

³⁷ O.V. Shestok, *Polysemy of terms of medical sciences. (Dis...candidate of philol. sciences)*. Krasnodar, 1996, pp. 156-158.

³⁸ S.D. Shelov, *Essay on the theory of terminology: composition, conceptual organization, practical applications*. Moscow: PrintPro., 2018, p. 211.

meanings fixed in Orlov's dictionary: 1) inflammation of the alveoli of the lungs, without further damage to the bronchi; 2) inflammation of the alveoli of the teeth, which develops during the removal of teeth in animals. Secondly, polysemy arises as a result of the synonymy characteristic of the name of various organs, when differentiating, for example, the nominations of inflammatory processes: brucellosis – can be inflammation of the lymph nodes around the genital organs of an animal, as well as inflammation of the genital organs themselves, for example, testicles³⁹.

Polysemy is introduced into veterinary terminology by homonymous terms, which are words that are written the same way, but are different from the similarities and meanings of the words of the ancient Greek language. Thus, the homonymous pair athelia – -a+thele is based on two terms: athelia – comes from the Greek ateles – "incomplete, imperfect", is used with the meaning "incomplete development of a certain organ or tissue" and negative from the Greek prefix -a + root –thele – "sedge" – "anomaly of development: absence of mammary nipples".

So, we can see that the polysemy of veterinary terms that refer to animal diseases is natural due to the asymmetry of the linguistic sign, when the same form is used to denote different objects and perform different functions. The problem of polysemy in scientific terminology, and in particular, the semantic differentiation of polysemous terms, seems to be important, since the accuracy of the description of scientific concepts depends on the use of terms. This statement also applies to veterinary terminology, for which the accuracy of the choice of the term is also important, since the health of the animal depends on it, and therefore the health of the person.

Analyzing various veterinary terms that denote the names of diseases, we can conclude that the phenomenon of polysemy (multiple meanings) in veterinary terminology is less common than in literary language, but occurs in different forms.

Hyperogyponymia

Multi-level hierarchical structures, built on the relations of hyperogyponymy between professional concepts, represent a complex frame of terminological vocabulary. Interrelations in the hierarchy between individual language units and between their associations depend on the interconnected positions of terms in relation to each other. A hyperonym is the name of a generic concept characterized by general important qualities, while specific concepts are represented by hyponyms,

³⁹ F.M. Orlov, *Dictionary of veterinary clinical terms*. Moscow: Rosselkhozizdat, 2018, p. 198.

which are names of a specific concept that can include a larger number of components. The majority of veterinary clinical terms, combined by formal-semantic hyponymic relations, are formed on the basis of joining a hyperonym with one or more consistent and inconsistent definitions expressed by nouns.

For example, in the English language, the term "disease" is a generic (hypernym) for a number of disease types included in the term system "animal diseases": Bovine diseases – diseases of ruminants; avian diseases – diseases of birds; sheep and goat diseases (diseases of sheep and goats); equine diseases (diseases of horses); swine diseases (pig diseases); bees diseases (bee diseases); multiple species diseases (diseases of different species of animals)⁴⁰. The relations of hypero-hyponymy permeate the entire hierarchical structure of terms for animal diseases. The basis of any terminological system is the genus-species principle. Hyponymy is considered a "categorical relationship of lexical units based on logical and semantic subordination"⁴¹.

The construction of a hierarchical structure of terms for the designation of animal diseases was carried out by analysis of the relationship between a term denoting a general generic concept and a term reflecting species variants of the same concept. Similar terms form a hierarchy that is built on sequential subordination, for example: infectious diseases (hyperonym) – Lyme disease, Rabies, Leptospirosis, Canine hepatosoonosis, Canine skin pythiosis (hyponyms); cattle diseases (hyperonym) – Theileriosis, Bovine tuberculosis, Bovine babesiosis, Bovine brucellosis, Dermatophilosis (hyponyms).

Hypero-hyponymous connections of terms for animal diseases are built on the basis of differentiation: 1) Diseases by location, 2) Diseases by types of animals.

In the terminology used to denote animal diseases, hypero-hyponymous connections are formed between the terms indicating the place affected by the disease and the species of animals. The hyperonym Diseases by location is generic in relation to other terms included in its group: endocrine and metabolic diseases; hematology, oncology and immunology; dermatological diseases; diseases of the gastrointestinal tract; cardiac and respiratory diseases; diseases of the urinary tract; diseases of the reproductive system; neurological and musculoskeletal disorders; ophthalmological diseases. At the same time, in each hyperonym, a number of hyponyms can be distinguished, which are

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.49.

⁴¹ M.V. Lysyakova, *Hyper-hyponymic taxonomy in terminology*. Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series "Linguistics", 2006, 8, p. 26.

presented in the form of a structure of terminology for the designation of animal diseases.

Diseases by location

1. Infectious diseases: sepsis; Feline leukemia virus; Feline immunodeficiency virus; Feline infectious peritonitis; Lyme disease; Rabies; Granulocytic Ehrlichiosis; Canine Bartonella vinsonii infection; Leptospirosis; Canine hepatosoonosis; Canine skin pythiosis; Nasal cavity aspergillosis.

2. Endocrine and metabolic diseases: Diabetes insipidus; Canine Hypotheriosis; Canine hypertheriosis; Hyperparathyroidism; Hypercalcaemia; Insulinoma; Pituitary gland-specific hypercorticism; Pituitary gland-specific hyperadrenocorticism; Adrenal tumor; Hyperkalemia; Hyponatremia.

3. Hematology, oncology and immunology: Immune mediated thrombocytopenia; Hyperthermia; Systemic lupus erythematosus; Willebrand disease; Postvaccinal fibrosarcoma.

4. Dermatological diseases: Alopecia; Itch; Dermatophytosis; Demodecosis.

5. Diseases of gastrointestinal tract: Stomatitis; Oesophagitis; Canine Megaesophagus; Cholangiohepatitis.

6. Cardiac and respiratory diseases: Supraventricular arrhythmia; Feline dirofilariasis; Polyps of air passages; Tracheal paralysis.

7. Diseases of urinary ways: Polyuria; Polydipsia; Glomerulonephritis.

8. Diseases of reproductive system: Hypertheriosis; Infertility; Orchitis.

9. Neurologic and musculoskeletal disorders: Canine vegetative dystonia; Feline convulsive disorder; Feline Born's disease.

10. Ophthalmological diseases: Epiphora; Dry keratoconjunctivitis; Ulcerous keratitis; Eyes neoplasia.

The second type of hypero-hyponymous connections of terms for the designation of animal diseases is built according to the principle of differentiation of Diseases by types of animals. This hyperonym is represented by diseases of specific animal species.

Diseases by types of animals

1. Multiple species diseases: Anthrax; Aujeszky disease; Leptospirosis; Rabies; Trichinellosis.

2. Cattle diseases: Theileriosis; Bovine tuberculosis; Bovine babesiosis; Bovine brucellosis; Dermatophilosis; Malignant catarrhal fever.

3. Sheep and goat diseases: Contagious agalactia; Scrapie; Nairobi sheep disease; Contagious caprine peluropneumonia; Caprine arthritis.

4. Equine disease: Contagious equine metritis; Dourine; Epizootic lymphangitis.

5. Lagomorphs diseases: Tularemia; Rabbit haemorrhagic disease; Myxomatosis.

6. Avian diseases: Avian chlamidiosis; Fowl pox; Fowl typhoid; Avian tuberculosis; Marek's disease.

7. Fish diseases: Spring viraemia of carp; Infectious haemopoietic necrosis; Epizootic haematopoietic necrosis.

8. Mollusks diseases: Bonamiosis; Perkinsosis; Microcytosis.

9. Swine diseases: Atrophic rhinitis of swine; Enterovirus encephalomyelitis.

10. Bee diseases: Acariosis of bees; American foulbrood; European foulbrood; Varroosis.

Therefore, in the process of interaction of terms located at different hierarchical levels, stable connections are established during transitions from one concept to another, and their interpenetration occurs. Any veterinary medical classification is a hierarchical structure entering into hyperonymic relationships of terms forming large term systems. The terms for animal diseases show the interrelationships of phenomena, processes, subjects corresponding to this field of work of veterinary doctors, and their arrangement can be achieved thanks to the correct classification of realities from which terms are created based on the selection of generic and species phenomena. Therefore, the regularity of the participation of terminological units in stable systemic relations of subordination, which are characteristic of the processes of integration or differentiation of their components both at different and at the same level of their detection, is expressed.

Conclusions

Semantic phenomena based on paradigmatic relations, such as hypero-hyponymy (generic-species), synonymy, antonymy, polysemy, homonymy, play an important role in the organization of the English terminology of clinical veterinary medicine. Thus, synonymy and antonymy are typical phenomenon in terminology. This testifies to the existing flexibility of terminology, which allows, in the case of synonymy, to interchange terms, in the case of antonymy, to structure concepts based on the opposition of their meanings. The frequency of the use of synonyms in the the English terminology of clinical veterinary medicine is higher than that of antonyms. This is mainly due to non-contractual reasons - the

peculiarities of the development of veterinary science and practice. The phenomenon of polysemy in veterinary clinical terminology is less common than in literary language, but occurs in various forms. Hyperhyponymic relations between units, based on generic-species conceptual commonality, form multi-level hierarchical structures that represent a complex framework of the terminological vocabulary of clinical veterinary medicine. This type of relationship between units is one of the most important principles for structuring knowledge and organizing the terminological composition of the "animal disease" term system. The structural analysis of the hierarchical organization of the English terms of clinical veterinary medicine allows not only to have an idea of the content of this subject area, but also to better understand the principles of formation of branch terminology, which is of great importance for lexicographic and translation practice.

The structural analysis of the hierarchical organization of the English terms of clinical veterinary medicine allows not only to have an idea of the content of this subject area, but also to better understand the principles of formation of industry terminology, which is of great importance for lexicographic and translation practice.

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TYPOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF ILLOCUTIONARY SPEECH ACTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: *This article provides a comprehensive analysis of English illocutionary speech acts' typological peculiarities of utterances-statements in dialogic discourse of Old-, Middle-, and Early Modern English. The research is the first attempt to identify and prove the relevance of English affirmative, imperative, interrogative statements' use as direct, indirect illocutionary speech acts in diachrony. Corpus data of the research are certified and argued in English utterances-statements as the illocutionary speech acts in the paradigm as: assertive or verdictive utterances, directive or exercitive utterances, commissive utterances, expressive or behabiative utterances, declarative or expositive utterances. Illocutionary force intensity feature is characterized by the speaker's intentional purpose in English utterances-statements of illocutionary assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, declarative goals, which actualize different types of illocutionary speech acts as "strong illocutionary force – weak illocutionary force". Direct / indirect illocutionary speech acts are highlighted in the objective / subjective content of an utterance, depending on the illocutionary force and purpose, the syntactic type, and conventionality / unconventionality of the speech acts as "affirmative statements", "imperative statements", "interrogative statements". Peculiarities of English illocutionary speech acts' relevant use in diachrony are outlined as the realization of speaker's intentional verbal proposition, depending on illocutionary paradigm of the main illocutionary verbs in utterances-statements.*

Keywords: *direct / indirect illocutionary speech act, utterance-statement, illocutionary force, illocutionary verb, Old- / Middle- / Early Modern English.*

Introduction

Nowadays, the study of the speech acts taxonomy in the dialogic discourse of modern Germanic languages is the subject of numerous discussions and controversies among worldwide well-known linguists, where they do not always find a unanimous solution as to the usage of a

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certain type of the speech act in the appropriate context. Modern philological studies offer a solution to the issue of the speech acts typology realization by taking into account the application of a three-level stage of the speech acts analysis, namely a comprehensive analysis of illocutionary, locutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts. The scientific research of foreign and Ukrainian scholars is increasingly focused on the study of Germanic languages' modern discourse of speech by illocution, locution, and perlocution of an utterance by a speaker (addresser) for the achievement of the set goal.

In historical Germanic and English studies, the direct / indirect speech acts' feature by illocutionary purpose and utterance force in complex sentences with illocutionary verbs in the diachronic development of languages acquires special significance. Despite the wide range of researches to the field of speech acts' implementation in dialogic discourse, there still remain insufficiently covered issues, which are referred to coverage of actualization and functioning of direct or indirect speech acts as illocutionary ones in discourse of different texts' genres in a diachronic perspective: in Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English. This is a certain gap in the analysis of language discourse in the studied periods.

The object of the present scientific research is complex affirmative sentences with illocutionary verbs that implement different types of speech acts in Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English. **The subject of the research** is the communicative and pragmatic properties of affirmative utterances-statements in diachrony. **The aim of the article** is to provide a comprehensive communicative-pragmatic analysis of the illocutionary speech acts of objective intentional affirmative content within the subjective context in complex affirmative sentential constructions in historical English studies.

Thus, **the key objectives** of the research involve:

1) characterizing the syntactic and communicative paradigms of direct / indirect illocutionary speech acts of affirmative utterances-statements in the Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English periods;

2) finding out and highlighting the basic peculiarities of the speech acts' feature and functioning with the illocutionary goal of different utterances intentions in complex sentences with matrix verbs of illocutionary force of speech in historical diachrony.

The material of the study served English positive / affirmative utterances-statements (12382 sentences) with main illocutionary verbs (66 verbs) in the dialogic discourse from Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English, selected from the corpus of 77 different written works by Jeffrey Chaucer, William Shakespeare, Tomas Middleton and 1 epic work by an unknown (anonymous) author.

Literature Review

Within the theory of speech acts, modern philological studies are distinguished by numerous achievements of scientific research in various communicative, pragmatic aspects of linguistic discourse in modern and historical Germanic, as well as English studies. For the last decades of XX-XXI centuries, scientific researches of foreign and Ukrainian pragmatic English studies were focused, primarily, on the following aspects: 1) speech acts taxonomy studies – J.L. Austin¹, J.R. Searle²; 2) general conceptual principles of communicative and pragmatic syntax – G.G. Pocheptsov³, D.E. Ekoró & M. Gunn⁴; 3) illocutionary, locutionary, perlocutionary aspects of speech acts – S. Bäckström⁵, A.I. Prihodko⁶, N. Kravchenko et al.⁷; 4) direct / indirect speech acts in an illocutionary perspective – N. Kravchenko⁸, J.M.G. Núñez⁹; 5) pragmatic peculiarities of English sentence in a synchronic perspective – O.M. Tuhai¹⁰.

The current literature review shows that modern linguistics lacks the particular historical works on the comprehensive analysis of communicative syntax in terms of the study of illocutionary speech acts in complex affirmative sentences-statements with the involvement of basic periods in the English language development, namely Old-, Middle-, and Early Modern English. Even though there are numerous publications on speech acts, public speech's utterances in the discourse of modern language on various topics, the ones based on the dialogic discourse in diachrony of the English language are missing from these studies. Additionally, locutionary and perlocutionary phenomena of the modern dialogic discourse speech acts are still to be studied as well. So, the present paper is aimed to make a major contribution to the research of pragmatic

¹ J.L. Austin, *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962, 166 p.

² J.R. Searle, *A taxonomy of illocutionary acts*. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), *Language, mind and knowledge*, 1975, pp. 344-379.

³ G.G. Pocheptsov, *Selected works on linguistics*. Vinnitsa: Nova kniga, 2013, 560 p.

⁴ D.E. Ekoró, & M. Gunn, *Speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics: A review*. LWATI: A journal of contemporary research, 18 (4), 2021, pp. 130-143.

⁵ S. Bäckström, *A dogma of speech act theory*. *Inquiry*, 2020, pp. 1-17.

⁶ A.I. Prihodko, *Illocutive typology of evaluatory utterances*. *Science and education a new dimension: Philology*, 4, 2013, pp. 32-36.

⁷ N. Kravchenko, M. Prokopchuk, A. Pozhar, L. Kozyarevych-Zozulya, & Y. Rozhkov, *Illocutionary Pragmatic Adaptation Challenge: Ukrainian Translations of English-language Soft Law Texts*. *Amazonia Investiga*, 11(49), 2022, pp. 267-276.

⁸ N. Kravchenko, *Illocution of direct speech acts via conventional implicature and semantic presupposition*. *Lege artis. Language yesterday, today, tomorrow. The journal of University of SS Cyril and Methodius in Trnava*, II (1), 2017, pp. 128-168.

⁹ J.M.G. Núñez, *Embedded root phenomena and indirect speech reports*. *Linguistics*, 59 (6), 2021, pp. 1531-1566.

¹⁰ O.M. Tuhai, *Pragmatic potential of Early Modern English sentence with clausal complementation*. *Transcarpathian philological studies*, 10 (2), 2019, pp. 28-36.

aspects in terms of illocutionary speech acts characteristics with illocutionary verbs in the historical perspective.

Theoretical Framework

One of the directions of modern linguistics in terms of communicative-functional syntax is historical pragmatic linguistics, which outlines the pragmatic properties of speech communication in the language discourse as a system in the historical development of a language with the definition of constant and variable elements of speech acts in complex sentences, which is the result of dynamic processes in verbal communication, self-development of language, culture, and society¹¹.

Language and speech are the main sources of information, which constitute the basis for the establishment of laws, categories, forms of human thinking. Language serves as a form of thought existence in situations of objective reality. In the process of linguistic communication, the important aspect for perceiving and understanding particular features, patterns, varieties of human thinking is the comprehensive study of sentence semantics, which occurs to become an important legitimate object of a linguistic research. The social essence of a language is to provide the communicative component between the participants of information or news imparting, where the latter is implemented by utterances or sentences¹². As a system of arbitrary speech sound signs, language can be interpreted as the sound, produced by the human speech apparatus. Based on this concept, pragmatics and communicative linguistics can be interpreted as knowledge of understanding words' semantics in relevant situations and sentence utterances as speech acts in the closely related context¹³.

The basics of the theory of language or speech acts were developed by J.L. Austin (1962) in the 30-th of the XX-th century and foremost covered in his lecture courses at Oxford University (1952-1955) and then at Harvard University (1955) – "How to do things with words", where for the first time ever the researcher represented the concept of performative utterances, speech acts in the interaction "sentence – utterance – speech

¹¹ L.P. Kalytyuk, *English interrogative sentence. Structure. Semantics. Pragmatics: A manual for students of higher educational institutions*. Kyiv: Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, 2014, 116 p.

¹² Pocheptsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-392.

¹³ F. Faisal, D. Saputri, E. Nurliza, N. Azmi, S.N. Fauzia, & I. Indani, *Indirect speech act analysis of Indonesian education department students of Serambi Mekkah University*. In M. Usman, W. Khafidah, & M. Daud (Eds.), *The proceeding book of the 4th international conference on multidisciplinary research*, 4 (1), 2021, p. 85; O. Tuhai, *Subject Control Infinitive Constructions in Early Modern English*. *World Journal of English Language*, 12 (1), 2022, pp. 367-383.

act", as well as he provided his own classification of speech acts. The central idea of this interaction is that all utterances-statements can be performing illocutionary, locutionary, perlocutionary speech acts at the same time¹⁴.

Some of the Austin's developed speech acts types such as verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives were transformed then by Searle (1975) into utterance acts as representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, declarations. And "in the context, an illocutionary act is carried out by way of pronunciation, that is the performance of an illocutionary speech act in saying or announcing something. Context is one of the factors that determine an illocutionary act by uttering a statement"¹⁵.

In our study of complex sentences of affirmative nature in Old English (OE), Middle English (ME), Early Modern English (EModE), we focus on sentences-statements as illocutionary speech acts' utterances, taking into account communicative and pragmatic orientation of addresser's verbal propositional actualization in the utterances-statements, depending on semantics of illocutionary verbs in the dialogic discourse as the semantic material organization in communication. The rationale stance of our research is based on the verbal intentional action of the speaker in complex sentences along with significant illocutionary aspects within the theory of speech acts by Austin (1962), Searle (1975).

(1) ME: "*For I defye the seurtee and the bond Which that thou seyst that I have maad to thee*". – "*For I renounce the bond and its demand Which you assert that I have made with you*" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The knight's tale")¹⁶.

In example (1) we witness the usage of the illocutionary verb assert (seyst – ME) as an illocutionary speech act-assertive in the dialogic discourse of Middle English, where the knight as a speaker addresses to the addressee and claims that he rejects the bond and its demand – what the listener asserts that the speaker had made with the latter one. The illocutionary force of assertiveness, the purpose of this statement are directed to the addressee, who is aware of this fact and accepts the addressed statement as appropriate.

In order to solve the tasks set in our study, it is essential to consider and clarify such concepts and points as pragmatics, speech act,

¹⁴ Austin, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-99; Searle, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-359.

¹⁶ M. Hutchins, (Ed.), *Troilus and Cressida and the Canterbury tales by Geoffrey Chaucer. With modern English versions of both works*. In *Great books of the western world*, Vol. 22. Chicago – London – Toronto – Geneva – Sydney – Tokyo – Manila: William Benton, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952, p. 186.

illocutionary force of an utterance, locution and perlocution, as well as direct / indirect speech act and discourse.

Pragmatics describes any language units regardless of confession or differentiation of their linguistic nature, and unites them into groups on the basis of commonality of an addressee's reaction. It classifies linguistic units from the standpoint of the theory of human behaviour in communication¹⁷. Pragmatics is the study of language use in human communication of society conditions as to pragmatic aspects of implicature, presupposition, deixis, and speech acts¹⁸. Language pragmatic aspects are fully manifested within the speech acts, which stand to be the main components of communicative acts, where an addresser in the process of generating a communicative unit (statement) performs a certain action. A speech act is a sentence in action reported by an utterance¹⁹.

The analysis' leading parameters in any speech act are locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary aspects, which describe an utterance, namely its content, form, force of influence that corresponds to the plan of content, expression, and actualization of an utterance in speech²⁰²⁰. Generally, there are four types of speech acts such as: 1) locution – an act of pronunciation; 2) proposal – an act of instruction; 3) illocution – an act of giving a statement the communicative purpose; 4) perlocution – an act of influence on the addressee²¹.

Speech acts are distinguished by the degree of a speaker's illocutionary force expression and by semantic features in a sentence-utterance²². The illocutionary force is distinguished by the illocutionary goal, the way to achieve it, the intensity of illocutionary force, and so on. One of the most important components of illocutionary force is the illocutionary goal, which serves as a fundamental concept of illocutionary logic. The purpose of any illocutionary act is an idea that is intrinsic to it as an act of this type. Moreover, each illocutionary verb of a natural language names or claims some illocutionary force or any type of an illocutionary speech act²³.

¹⁷ Pocheptsov, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

¹⁸ A.P. Jaya, & H. Haryati, *Illocutionary act and paradigmatic case in selected chapters of short stories book "Australia day" by Melanie Cheng*. Proceeding of national seminar on linguistics, literature, culture and language teaching, 11, 2021, p. 44.

¹⁹ R.D. Orizka, Oktaviani, & A. Triyogo, *An analysis of speech acts used in Peter Rabbit movie*. E-link journal, 8 (2), 2021, pp. 150-157.

²⁰ M.M. Buzrukova, *The study of speech act as a unit of discursive activity*. JournalNX- A multidisciplinary peer reviewed journal, 6 (9), 2020, pp. 5-7.

²¹ Capone, *Speech acts: Classification and definition*. In K. Brown (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of language and linguistics*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Elsevier, 2006, p. 682.

²² Pocheptsov, *op. cit.*, p. 434; E.W. García, *Toward a pragmatic account and taxonomy of evaluative speech acts*. Pragmatics, 29 (1), 2019, pp. 107-131.

²³ Bäckström, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-17.

The term "verbs of the speech act" is widely used to apply to all verbs that belong to any type of verbal behaviour such as to claim, to threaten, to praise, to complain, to boast, or to a less common group of verbs that actualize the target intentions of a speaker such as to say, to interrupt, to whisper. Such terms as "verbs of illocutionary force", "verbs of communication", "verbs of speech", "performative verbs" are considered synonymous with the above mentioned term to denote verbs of the speech acts realization²⁴.

In pragmatic linguistics, language discourse is considered as a verbalized form of social activity, which is "determined by values, social norms, conventions or social practice"²⁵. The term "discourse" is the multidimensional phenomenon and is used in different contexts as "the blurred category". Discourse is the environment for diverse linguistics and speech phenomena functioning; it is operational space for dynamic meaning creation. Classic definitions of discourse are as "coherent text in conjunction with extralinguistic – pragmatic, socio-cultural, psychological, and other factors", "text in the post event / action aspect", "speech, which is immersed in life"²⁶. Moreover, the lingual aspect of discourse development includes communicators' speech actions and the text itself, where a discourse space is described as "a communicative event, in which the speakers' interaction is mediated by a text"²⁷.

Example (2) is considered as the linguistic discourse in the dialogic speech between the speaker Lord Bassanio and the listeners Antonio and Portia in the context of social speech activity in the work of Shakespeare:

(2) EModE: *Lord Bassanio (to Antonio and Portia): "Nay, but hear me: Pardon this fault, and by my soul I swear I never more will break an oath with thee"* (Shakespeare, "The merchant of Venice")²⁸.

Complex sentence can convey an action that serves as a speech act,

²⁴ K. Proost, *Speech act verbs*. In K. Brown, & K. Allan (Eds.), *Concise encyclopedia of semantics*. 1st ed. Oxford: Elsevier, 2009, pp. 915-916; O.M. Tuhai, *Performative verbs as expression of volitional inducement in Early New Modern English*. In L. Shlossman (Ed.), *The fifteenth European conference on languages, literature and linguistics*. Proceedings of the conference, May 10, 2017, pp. 27-31.

²⁵ O. Kolesnyk, & M. Holtseva, *Lies and deception in modern English diplomatic discourse: pragmatics in interdisciplinary focus*. *Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2022, pp. 154-173; D. Skrypkaru, & O. Kolesnyk, *Semantic dimension of discourse space (based on the scripts of English TV series "How to get away with murder")*. *Studia philologica*, 17 (2), 2021, pp. 59-60.

²⁶ Ibid., Skrypkaru & Kolesnyk, pp. 59-60.

²⁷ S. Zhabotynska, & N. Slyvka, *Emotive speech acts and their discourse modifications in the literary text*. *Discourse and interaction*, 13 (1), 2020, p. 122.

²⁸ A.L. Rowse, (Ed.), *The annotated Shakespeare: Three volumes in one illustrated: The comedies, the histories, sonnets, and other poems, the tragedies and romances*. New York: Greenwich House, 1988, p. 332.

which can be expressed directly and indirectly through a sentence. As a direct speech act, a sentence and a speech act equally realize identical semantic correspondence with unanimous illocutionary force expression. An indirect speech act implies the implicit expression of speaker's communicative intention, where it is clearly illustrated by the definition of pragmatic meaning as the formula that a speaker wants to express.

Namely, assertive-statements realize the illocutionary force of a dominant statement. Indirect speech acts-assertives actualize ascertaining shades of assertion, assumption, doubt, (dis)agreement²⁹.

Next examples demonstrate direct speech acts (3) – (4) and indirect speech acts (5) in the dialogic discourse of Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English:

(3) OE: "*benden reafode rinc oðerne, nam on Ongendio irenbyrnan, heard swyrd hilted ond his helm somod, hares hyrste Higelace bær. He ðam frætsum feng ond him fægre gehet leana mid leodum, ond gelæste swa*". – "One warrior stripped the other, Looted Ongentheow's iron mail-coat, His hard sword-hilt, his helmet too, And carried the graith to King Hygelac; He accepted the prize, promised fairly That reward would come, and kept his word" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")³⁰.

(4) ME: "*Of him thenke I my tale for to holde, Bothe of his joye, and of his cares colde; And al his werk, as touching this matere, For I it gan, I wil ther-to referre*". – "My proper tale hereafter I shall hold, Both of his joy and of Ins cares so cold. And all the business of this sad affair, As I began, I shall to you declare" (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")³¹.

(5) EModE: Fenton: "Her father hath commanded her to slip Away with Slender and with him at Eton Immediately to marry: ..." (Shakespeare, "The merry wives of Windsor")³².

Methodology

Presently, the scientific study of speech acts is characterized by interdisciplinary approaches, taking into account related scientific paradigms in the linguistic area of the issue under discussion. The overall methodology of our scientific research is complex and includes the following methods: 1) the theory of speech acts was used to determine illocutionary acts of utterances-statements in dialogic discourse of the Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English periods; 2) the taxonomy of speech acts, introduced by Austin (1962) and Searle (1975),

²⁹ Kalytyuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-62.

³⁰ S. Heaney, (Trans.), *Beowulf: A new verse translation*. New York – London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000, pp. 200-201.

³¹ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³² Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 495.

was involved to identify the relevant basic types of speech acts as utterances-statements; 3) the method of communicative-pragmatic analysis was used to outline the communicative feature of complex sentence constructions as direct and indirect speech acts in the English language of the studied periods; 4) the descriptive qualitative and quantitative methods were introduced to describe diverse phenomena of illocutionary speech acts and highlight the exact number of their most / least usage in Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English; 5) historical analysis was used to compile the corpus of research, to characterize the formulated sample sentences as utterances-statements in their functional realization as illocutionary speech acts in the historical diachronic perspective.

Results and Discussion

Basic types of illocutionary speech acts with illocutionary verbs in Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English

In this study, we focus on the illocutionary aspect of the analysis of sentences-utterances as the illocutionary speech acts, as we consider and witness particular complex sentences that contain illocutionary verbs of different types of speech acts in the dialogic discourse of Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English. Foremost, it seems relevant to highlight the typology of speech acts by Austin (1962) and Searle (1975), taking into account the general meaning and particular semantics of the studied illocutionary verbs. According to semantics of illocutionary verbs under the research (66 verbs from our corpus data) and their historical or Anglo-Saxon equivalents from Old- and Middle English³³, we distinguished five types of illocutionary speech acts in the English diachronic dialogic discourse – total 12382 sentences (see Appendix, Table 1):

I. Assertives or verdictives as illocutionary speech acts in the studied complex sentences with the illocutionary verbs such as *assert*, *assure*, *predict*, *inform*, *tell*, *notify*, *inform*, *acknowledge*, *admit*, *remind*, *testify*, *confirm*, *certify*, *prove*, *confess*, *assume*, *guess*, *state*, *swear*, *insist* (total 5202 sentences from OE, ME, EModE).

Examples (6) – (8) show complex sentences as utterances-statements from Old-, Middle-, and Early Modern English dialogic discourse, where the exemplified sentences actualize implementation of illocutionary assertive or verdictive speech acts with the help of illocutionary verbs as *inform* (*secgan* – OE), *assure* (*graunte* – ME), *predict* – EModE:

(6) OE: *Beowulf mabelode, bearn Ecgþeowes: "Nu we sæliðend secgan wyllað, feorran cumene, þæt we fundiaþ Higelac secan. Wæron*

³³ H. Sweet, (Ed.), *The student's dictionary of Anglo-Saxon*, 11th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

her tela willum bewenede; þu us wel dohtest". – Beowulf, son of Ecgtheow, spoke: "Now we who crossed the wide sea have to inform you that we feel a desire to return to Hygelac. Here we have been welcomed and thoroughly entertained. You have treated us well" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")³⁴.

(7) ME: "Ther were never two so wel y-met, Whan ye ben his al hool, as he is youre: Ther mighty god yet graunte us see that houre!" – "You two will make the best pair ever yet! And heaven bless the day which well assures That you are his as much as he is yours" (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")³⁵.

(8) EModE: "Nor can I fortune to brief minutes tell, Pointing to each his thunder, rain and wind, Or say with princes if it shall go well, By oft predict that I in heaven find: But from thine eyes my knowledge I derive, And, constant stars, in them I read such art As truth and beauty shall together thrive, If from thyself to store thou wouldst convert; ..." (Shakespeare, "Sonnets")³⁶.

II. Directives or exercitives as illocutionary speech acts in the studied complex sentences with the illocutionary verbs such as *ask*, *order*, *command*, *request*, *plead*, *pray*, *invite*, *prescribe*, *demand*, *offer*, *induce*, *incite*, *persuade*, *seduce*, *beg*, *advise*, *recommend* (total 3594 sentences from OE, ME, EModE).

Examples (9) – (11) demonstrate complex sentences as utterances-statements from Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English dialogic discourse, where these sentences actualize implementation of illocutionary directive or exercitive speech acts with the help of illocutionary verbs as offer (*wordum* – OE), pray (*preyen* – ME), request – EModE:

(9) OE: "Gesæt þa wið sylfne se ða sæcce genæs, mæg wið mæge, syððan man-dryhten þurh hleoðorcwyde holdne gegrette, meaglum wordum". – "After Hygelac had offered greetings to his loyal thane in lofty speech, he and his kinsman, that hale survivor, sat face to face" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")³⁷.

(10) ME: Melibee, Dame Prudence: "And therefore, dere and benigne lady, we preyen yow and biseke yow as mekely as we conne and mowen, that it lyke unto your grete goodnesse to fulfillen in dede your goodliche wordes; ...". – "Therefore, dear and benign lady, we pray and beseech you, as humbly as we can, that it shall please you, in your great goodness, to fulfill your goodly words in deeds; ..." (Chaucer, "The

³⁴ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

³⁵ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁶ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 1501.

³⁷ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

Canterbury tales: The tale of Melibeus")³⁸.

(11) EModE: *Lord Cardinal*: "Your news is pleasing. Whilst you remain in Milan, I request you To know the welcome of no house but ours" (Middleton, "More dissemblers besides women")³⁹.

III. Commissives as illocutionary speech acts in the studied complex sentences with the illocutionary verbs such as *commit, promise, contract, undertake, intend, threaten, agree, vow, vouch, refuse, decline* (total 1180 sentences from OE, ME, EModE).

Sentences (12) – (14) exemplify complex utterances-statements from Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English dialogic discourse, where the exemplified sentences realize implementation of illocutionary commissive speech acts with the help of such illocutionary verbs as *refuse (nolde – OE), vouchsafe (voucheth – ME), threaten – EModE*:

(12) OE: "ða se gīst onfand þæt se beadoleoma bitan nolde, aldre sceþðan, ac seo ecg geswac ðeodne æt þearfe; ...". – "But he soon found His sword fails to do his battle-torch extinguished: the shining blade refused to bite" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁴⁰.

(13) ME: "Now voucheth sauf that I may yow devyse How that I may been holpe and in what wyse". – "Now vouchsafe that I may for you devise A plan to help me, telling in what wise" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The Franklin's tale")⁴¹.

(14) EModE: *Edmund*: "When I dissuaded him from his intent, And found him pight to do it, with curst speech I threaten'd to discover him: he replied, 'Thou unpossessing bastard!'" (Shakespeare, "King Lear")⁴².

IV. Expressives or behabiatives as illocutionary speech acts in the studied complex sentences with the illocutionary verbs such as *congratulate, thank, deplore, welcome, praise, compliment, regret, condole, greet* (total 1888 sentences in OE, ME, EModE).

Complex sentences (15) – (17) exemplify utterances-statements from Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English dialogic discourse, where the represented sentences actualize implementation of illocutionary expressive or behabiative speech acts with the help of such illocutionary verbs as *welcome (wilcuman – OE), thank – ME, praise – EModE*:

(15) OE: þa to dura healle Wulfgar eode, word inne abead: "Eow het secgan sigedrihten min, aldor Eastdena, þæt he eower æþelu can, ond ge him syndon ofer sæwylmas heardhicgende hider wilcuman". – At the

³⁸ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

³⁹ G. Taylor, & J. Lavagnino, (Eds.), *Thomas Middleton. The collected works*. Oxford – New York: Clarendon Press, 2007, p. 1041.

⁴⁰ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

⁴¹ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

⁴² Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 1899.

door of the hall, Wulfgar duly delivered the message: "My lord, the conquering king of the Danes, bids me announce that he knows your ancestry; also that he welcomes you here to Heorot and salutes your arrival from across the sea" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁴³.

(16) ME: "And thanked god, that he mighte han hire al, That no wight of his blisse parten shal". – "And he thanked God that he might have her, all, That none partook of his bliss now, nor shall" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The merchant's tale")⁴⁴.

(17) EModE: *Master to wife*: "Was it in man to wound so kind a creature? I'll ever praise a woman for thy sake" (Middleton, "A Yorkshiere tragedy")⁴⁵.

V. Declaratives or expositives as illocutionary speech acts in the studied complex sentences with the illocutionary verbs as *declare, announce, proclaim, approve, authorize, excommunicate, name, reproach, surrender, bless* (total 518 units in OE, ME, EModE).

Examples (18) – (20) represent complex sentences as utterances-statements from OE, ME, EModE dialogic discourse, where the exemplified sentences implement realization of the illocutionary declarative or expositive speech acts with the help of such illocutionary verbs as announce (*bodode* – OE), proclaim (*dorste* – ME), bless – EModE:

(18) OE: "Reste hine þa rumheort; reced hliuade geap ond goldfah; gæst inne swæf oppæt hrefn blaca heofones wynne bliðheort bodode. ða com beorht scacan scima after sceadwe". – "That great heart rested. The hall towered, gold-shingled and gabled, and the guest slept in it until the black raven with raucous glee announced heaven's joy, and a hurry of brightness overran the shadows" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁴⁶.

(19) EModE: *Dogberry*: "Come hither, neighbour Seacole. God hath blessed you with a good name: to be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but to write and read comes by nature" (Shakespeare, "Much ado about nothing")⁴⁷.

(20) ME: "And hardily, they dorste leye hir nekke, The miller shold nat stele hem half a pekke Of corn by sleighte, ne by force hem reve; ...". – "And stoutly they proclaimed they's bet their neck The miller should not steal one half a peck Of grain, by trick, nor yet by force should thieve; ..." (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The reeve's tale")⁴⁸.

⁴³ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁴ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

⁴⁵ Taylor & Lavagnino, *op. cit.*, p. 466.

⁴⁶ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

⁴⁷ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

⁴⁸ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

Utterances-statements as illocutionary speech acts in Old English, Middle English, Early Modern English

I. Assertive utterances / verdictive utterances: they include the delivering of an official or an unofficial evidence fact or value verdict that is based upon the truth and belief of a speaker's propositional action.

(21) ME: "*Nay*," *quod the syke man*, "*by Seint Simoun! I have be shriven this day at my curat; I have him told al hoolly myn estat*";. – "*Nay*," *said the sick man*, "*by Saint Simeon! I have been shriven today by my curate; I have him told the whole truth of my state*;" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The summoner's tale")⁴⁹.

In example (21), we evidence the assertive or verdictive utterance as the assertive or verdictive illocutionary speech act with the illocutionary verb *tell*, where the speaker – a sick man – expresses his statement about the fact (evidence fact) of the truth of his current affairs that he has already told a third person (curate) the whole truth about the state of his affairs under the confession. Thus, we can confirm actualization of assertiveness in Middle English discourse and the illocutionary effect of the represented assertive speech act.

II. Directive utterances / exercitive utterances: they include the intentional / urged direction proposition, based upon the speaker's decision of a certain cause of actions to get an addressee to do / to induce (persuade) something to be performed.

(22) EModE: *Duke of York*: "*At your pleasure, my good lord. Who's within there, ho!*" (to a Servingman) "*Invite my Lords of Salisbury and Warwick To sup with me to-morrow night. Away!*" (Shakespeare, "King Henry VI" Part II)⁵⁰.

Sentence (22) demonstrates the directive or exercitive utterance as the directive or exercitive illocutionary speech act with illocutionary verb *invite* in the imperative mood. Based on his intentional directive proposition with illocutionary verb *invite*, the addresser, the Duke of York, invites the addressees (Lords Salisbury and Warwick) to come to dinner (to sup) with him the following evening. Such communicative act of invitation's expression along with the speaker's urgent directive proposition stands as the exemplification of recipients' inducement to perform the suggested communicative action regardless of the addressees' desire. By this fact, we can surely confirm the feature of illocutionary exercitive speech act as a directive / exercitive utterance in Early Modern English discourse.

III. Commissive utterances: they include the speaker's commission / obligation to perform some course of an action in the future.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 291.

⁵⁰ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 836.

(23) OE: *Wiglaf maðelode, wordrihta fela sægde gesiðum him wæs sefa geomor: "Ic ðæt mæl geman, þær we medu þegun, þonne we geheton ussum hlaforde in biorsele, ðe us ðas beagas geaf, þæt we him ða guðgetawa gyldan woldon gif him þyslicu þearf gelumpe, helmas ond heard sweord". – Sad at heart, addressing his companions, Wiglaf spoke wise and fluent words: "I remember that time when the mead was flowing, How we pledged loyalty to our lord in the hall, Promised our ring-giver we would be worth our price, Make good the gift of the war-gear, Those swords and helmets, as and when His need required it" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁵¹.*

In complex sentence (23), the commissive utterance with the illocutionary verb *promise* (*geheton* – OE) represents the commissive illocutionary speech act, where the speaker Wiglaf expresses their (his and other people's) commitment and obligation to the person, who gave them the rings, to be worthy of this award and repay for the provided fighting or combat equipment. By the fact of the obligation utterance or obligatory speech commitment by Wiglaf before the addressee, we testify and prove the addresser's relevant use of illocutionary speech act of commission in the spoken discourse of Old English.

IV. Expressive utterances / behabiative utterances: they include the speaker's psychological / emotional state under the certain conditions about the state of affairs, specified in the propositional content.

(24) EModE: *Tangle: "Non declaravit adversarius, sayst thou? What a villain's that. I have a trick to do thee good: I will get thee out a proxy, and make him declare with a pox to him". – First suitor: "That will make him declare to his sore grief. I thank your good worship. But put case he do declare?" (Middleton, "The phoenix")⁵².*

In the dialogic discourse of sentence (24), we testify the reaction of the First suitor as a speaker to the previous offer of the addresser Tangle to do him good, namely to release him (the speaker) from all powers (obligations) and force the enemy to declare that he has a pox on the skin and can not be married. As a reaction to Tangle's speech, the First suitor expresses his emotional state – namely gratefulness in his speech-utterance to the addresser with the help of the illocutionary verb *thank*, where the expressive or behabiative utterance realizes the expressive illocutionary speech act in the form of gratitude and high appreciation for the expressed proposition. Based on this example, we confirm the appropriate use of the expressive / behabiative utterance as an expressive or behabiative illocutionary speech act in the dialogic discourse of Early

⁵¹ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-179.

⁵² Taylor & Lavagnino, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

Modern English.

V. Declarative utterances / expositive utterances: they include the speaker's proclamation of the state of affairs, based on the propositional content and reality.

(25) OE: "*Swa hit oð domes dæg diope benemdon þeodnas mære, þa ðæt þær dydon, þæt se secg wære synnum scildig, hergum geheaðerod, hellbendum fæst, wommum gewitnad, se ðone wong strude, næs he goldhwæte gearwor hæfde agendes est ær gesceawod". – "The high-born chiefs who had buried the treasure Declared it until doomsday so accursed That whoever robbed it would be guilty of wrong And grimly punished for their transgression, Hasped in hell-bonds in heathen shrines. Yet Beowulf's gaze at the gold treasure when he first saw it had not been selfish" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁵³.*

In the linguistic discourse of Old English (25), we witness the use of the illocutionary verb declare (benemdon – OE) in the declarative or expositive utterance for the implementation of the declarative / expositive illocutionary speech act as the proclamation by high-ranking leaders (þeodnas mære – OE), who buried the treasure, of their will (desire) or volition that anyone, who robs this place with the gold treasure, will be found guilty of wrong, grimly punished in this crime for their transgression, and hasped in hell-bonds in heathen shrines. In fact, in their speech-utterance þeodnas mære (the high-born chiefs) as the speakers proclaim and expose the current state of affairs, based upon the real situation about the buried gold treasure, specifying the fact that "Yet Beowulf's gaze at the gold treasure when he first saw it had not been selfish".

Thus, the speakers proclaim both the latest state of affairs and their will, but at the same time they expose their warning about the consequences of the wrongdoing or the violation of the law in case of robbery of the buried gold treasure. Moreover, this way of addressers' declarative proclamation along with their expositiveness and warning with the help of the verb benemdon (declare) gives us the reason to assert the relevant use of the declarative or expositive statement as an illocutionary speech act to achieve the purpose of the addresser in the presented dialogic discourse. So, we confirm the relevant use of the declarative / expositive utterance in the OE language.

Illocutionary force and goal of utterances-statements in complex sentences of Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English

In our research, it is witnessed that the studied utterances-statements in complex sentences of Old-, Middle-, and Early Modern English

⁵³ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

demonstrate certain illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance intentional orientation or direction in order to realize a particular illocutionary goal by the corresponding illocutionary verb from our corpus data.

In terms of the speech acts theory, the main types of the speaker's illocutionary goals are distinguished as: 1) an assertive goal – to state how things are going on; 2) a directive goal – to motivate or force someone to do something; 3) a commissive goal – to oblige a speaker to do something; 4) an expressive goal – to express personal feelings, instructions; 5) a declarative goal – to change a world by way of this utterance⁵⁴.

According to the five types of an illocutionary goal of utterances-statements in complex sentences of the Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English periods, we distribute sentences-utterances as illocutionary speech acts by an illocutionary purpose or a goal along with the determination of the intensity of illocutionary force in the paradigm: "strong illocutionary force:: weak illocutionary force", taking into consideration such following aspects as, respectively: 1) social status of a speaker in the paradigm "authoritative / equal status:: subordinate status", 2) obligation of speaker's propositional action realization in the paradigm "obligatory implementation of a speaker's verbal proposition:: optional implementation of a speaker's verbal proposition", 3) controllability of speaker's propositional action realization in the paradigm "controllability of speaker's verbal proposition implementation by an addresser:: controllability of speaker's verbal proposition implementation by an addressee", 4) direction / orientation of speaker's propositional action realization in the paradigm "focus of speaker's verbal proposition implementation on a recipient / an addressee:: focus of speaker's verbal proposition implementation on the interests of an addresser".

I. Utterances-statements of the illocutionary assertive goal:

(26) EModE: *Mariana (to the Duke): "My lord, I do confess I ne'er was married; And I confess besides I am no maid: I have known my husband; yet my husband Knows not that ever he knew me"* (Shakespeare, "Measure for measure")⁵⁵.

In example (26), the illocutionary assertive goal is realized by the illocutionary verb confess in order for the speaker Mariana to utter the statement as the fact to convince the Duke as an addressee that she is not married and is not a servant. The social status of the addresser is defined as the subordinate status to the reference of the Duke as an addressee, because he has a higher social level. Implementation of the speaker's

⁵⁴ Egoro & Gunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-143.

⁵⁵ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 741.

propositional action's illocutionary goal is optional, but controlled.

So, the intensity of a speaker's assertive goal in speech act of an assertive utterance-statement is defined as the weak illocutionary force.

II. Utterances-statements of the illocutionary directive goal:

(27) OE: *The coast-guard: "Swylce ic maguþegnas mine hate wið feonda gehwone flotan eowerne, niwtyrwydne nacan on sande arum healdan, oþðæt eft byreð ofer lagustreamas leofne mannan wudu wundenhals to Wedermearce, ...". – The coast-guard: "What's more, I'll order my own comrades On their word of honor to watch your boat Down there on the strand keep her safe In her fresh tar, until the time comes For her curved prow to preen on the waves And bear this hero back to Geatland"* (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁵⁶.

III. Utterances-statements of the illocutionary commissive goal:

(28) ME: *Author: "This Januarie is ravished in a traunce At every time he loked on hir face; But in his herte he gan hir to manace, That he that night in armes wolde hir streyne Harder than ever Paris dide Eleyne". – Author: "January was rapt into a trance With each time that he looked upon her face; And in his heart her beauty he'd embrace, And threatened in his arms to hold her tight, Harder than Paris Helen did, that night"* (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The merchant's tale")⁵⁷.

In examples (27) – (28), the directive and commissive illocutionary goals of the illocutionary verbs *order* (*hate* – OE), *threatened* (*manace* – OE), respectively, actualize the strong intensity of the speech act's illocutionary force of the speakers' commissive utterances-statements due to the authoritative / equal social status of the addressers – the coast-guard (27), January (28). The latter fact determines obligatory implementation of speakers' verbal propositions of order, threat with controllability by the addressers and the direction or orientational focus on the recipients.

IV. Utterances-statements of the illocutionary expressive goal:

(29) ME: *"Thou seist also, that it displeth me But-if that thou wolt preyse my beautee, And but thou poure alwey up-on my face, And clepe me "faire dame" in every place; ...". – "You say also that it displeases me Unless you praise and flatter mv beauty, And save you gaze always upon mv face And call me "lovely lady" every place; ..."* (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The physician's tale")⁵⁸.

In sentence (29), the illocutionary expressive speech act is realized by illocutionary verb *praise* (*wolt preyse* – ME) in the speaker's expressive

⁵⁶ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁷ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

utterance-statement. The intensity of the illocutionary expressive goal is determined as the weak illocutionary force due to the subordinate social status because of speaker's less authority that exclusively causes the addresser's feeling expression of addressee's glorification as his own interest without any controllability from a speaker's side. Thus, implementation of an illocutionary expressive goal of an addresser's verbal propositional action is confirmed as optional with focus of speaker's verbal proposition implementation on the interests of an addresser.

V. Utterances-statements of the illocutionary declarative goal:

(30) OE: "*cwæð, he guðcýning ofer swanrade secean wolde, mærne þeoden, þa him wæs manna þearf*". – "*He (Hygelac) announced his plan: To sail the swan's roads and search out that king, The famous prince who needed defenders*" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁵⁹.

In example (30), the illocutionary verb *announced* (*cwæð* – OE) actualizes the illocutionary declarative goal of the speaker's declarative utterance-statement. The social status of the addresser (Hygelac) and the addressee (king) is defined as the equal social status with focus on the latter. Hence, it is witnessed and determined the strong intensity of the illocutionary declarative goal with the obligation of speaker's verbal propositional action implementation and the controllability by the addresser.

Thereby, numerous exemplifications from of Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English dialogic discourse witness and confirm the characteristics of utterances-statements with:

I. The strong illocutionary force, which implements and includes:

- 1) authoritative social status:: equal social status of a speaker;
- 2) obligation of speaker's propositional action implementation;
- 3) controllability of speaker's verbal proposition implementation by an addresser;
- 4) direction / orientation / focus of speaker's verbal proposition implementation on a recipient / an addressee.

II. The weak illocutionary force, which actualizes and contains:

- 1) subordinate social status of a speaker;
- 2) optionality of speaker's propositional action implementation;
- 3) controllability of speaker's verbal proposition implementation by an addressee;
- 4) direction / orientation / focus of speaker's verbal proposition implementation on the interests of an addresser.

⁵⁹ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

Direct and indirect illocutionary speech acts in Old English, Middle English, and Early Modern English

In historical English studies, it is noticed that complex sentences with the studied illocutionary verbs can realize direct or indirect speech acts of utterances-statements of different types as *assertives*, *directives*, *commissives*, *expressives*, *declaratives*.

In sentences (31) – (37), it has been exemplified *assertive* utterances, *directive* utterances, *commissive* utterances, *expressive* utterances, *declarative* utterances as the direct speech acts (31) – (33), (36) – (37) with such illocutionary verbs as *thanked* (*þancedon* – OE), *swear* (*swere* – ME), *intend* (*entende* – ME), *command* (*command* – EModE), *bless* (*bless* – EModE), and the indirect speech acts (34) – (35) with such illocutionary verbs as *persuade* (*glose* – ME), *ask* (*ask* – EModE):

(31) OE: "*þá wæs sund liden éoletes æt ende. Panon up hraðe Wedera léode on wang stigon saéwudu saéldon syrcan hrysedon gúðgewaédo; Gode þancedon þæs þe him ýþ-láde éaðe wurdon*". – "It was the end of their voyage and the Geats vaulted Over the side, out on to the sand, And moored their ship. There was a clash of mail And a thresh of gear. They thanked God For that easy crossing on a calm sea" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁶⁰.

(32) ME: "*And this on every god celestial I swere it yow, and eek on eche goddesse, On every Nymphe and deite infernal, On Satiry and Fauny more and lesse, That halve goddes been of wildernesse; And Atropos my threed of lyf to-breste If I be fals; now trowe me if thou leste!*" – "*And this I swear, by every God supernal, And swear it, too, by every bright Goddess, By every Nymph and Deity infernal, By every Faun and Satyr, more and less, Those demi-gods that haunt the wilderness, That Atropos may snip her fatal shears If I am false or justify your fears!*" (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")⁶¹.

(33) ME: Author: "*Whan that she leyser hadde, and for to entende To lernen bokes was al hir lyking, How she in vertu mighte hir lyf dispende*". – Author: "*Whenever she hail time; she did intend To learn from books, which were to her liking, I low she in virtue might her whole life spend*" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The monk's tale: Zenobia")⁶².

(34) ME: "*Ye shal eek seen, your fader shal yow glose To been a wyf, and as he can wel preche,...*". – "*You'll see – your father shall you so persuade, You'll marry there, for he knows how to preach; ...*" (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")⁶³.

⁶⁰ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 440.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

1. (35) EModE: *Follywit*: "Yet I am a fool to ask that, for how can they keep their countenance that have lost their credits?" (Middleton, "A mad world my masters")⁶⁴.

(36) EModE: *Temper (to Jesus)*: "If thou be the son of God, command that these stones be made bread" (Middleton, "The two gates of salvation: The evangelists")⁶⁵.

(37) EModE: *Florizel*: "I bless the time When my good falcon made her flight across Thy father's ground" (Shakespeare, "The winter's tale")⁶⁶.

At this given point of direct and indirect illocutionary speech acts with English illocutionary verbs, it should be mentioned that specific share of direct / indirect speech acts in different periods of English language development varies, where the use of complex sentences to denote direct / indirect speech acts is the peculiar reflection of general trends in the speech behaviour of communicators⁶⁷. In the period from the VI-th to the XVII-th centuries, there occurs the tendency for the amount increase of direct speech acts realizations by complex sentences implementations with the studied illocutionary verbs at the expense of assigning to the statement more categorical, confidential sense with corresponding illocutionary verbs in specific speech acts, as it was exemplified in (38):

(38) EModE: *Sir Nathaniel*: "When in the world I lived, I was the world's commander; By east, west, north, and south, I spread my conquering might: My scutcheon plain declares that I am Alisander" (Shakespeare, "Love's labour's lost")⁶⁸.

Direct and indirect speech acts are characterized by morphological and syntactic indicators. In some languages, linguists distinguish three leading syntactic types of sentences, which are typically associated with three basic illocutionary forces of utterances, namely complex sentences are considered in the paradigm "syntactic type of a sentence – illocutionary force / type of an utterance" as: declarative sentences – "assertiveness / statement", interrogative sentences – "request / question" and imperative sentences – "order / request"⁶⁹. Hence, in case of the direct corresponding of a sentence's syntactic type with the illocutionary force of an utterance, a complex sentence actualizes the direct speech act. However, the indirect relationship between the syntactic type of a complex sentence and the illocutionary force signals about the indirect speech act.

⁶⁴ Taylor & Lavagnino, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 689.

⁶⁶ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 2369.

⁶⁷ Kalytyuk, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁶⁸ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

⁶⁹ Y. Huang, *Speech acts*. In K. Brown, & K. Allan (Eds.), *Concise encyclopedia of semantics*, 1st ed. Oxford: Elsevier, 2009, p. 922.

An illocutionary speech act is associated with intentionality and sentence proposition that actualize the objective content of the discourse, and with the utterance conventionality or conventions, which are considered as the subjective content of context with speaker's independent ways of his purpose and intentions' implementation, and identification by the listener. Actualization of an illocutionary speech act as an objective content of the dialogic discourse is based on the subjective content of language discourse, pragmatic conventions, where the latter are associated in consciousness of a native speaker with a certain scenario interaction within a given communicative situation. Realization of an illocutionary speech act is based on conventions as the ability of language signs to represent related concepts in a particular language environment⁷⁰.

Functioning of complex sentences-statements of affirmative nature in the dialogic discourse of Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English is witnessed, according to such parameters as: 1) illocutionary force and illocutionary goal as an objective content of an utterance-statement – assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, expressive; 2) syntactic type of the sentence-statement, depending on the intentional purpose – in the paradigms: "affirmative statement", "imperative statement", "interrogative statement"; 3) conventionality / unconventionality of the speech act as +/- subjective content of an utterance-statement.

From our corpus data of Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English, we witness and testify that sentences-utterances of the affirmative character actualize *direct illocutionary speech acts* in all five types of the speech acts of the English language dialogic discourse as:

I. Affirmative statements:: conventional speech acts :: + / + objective / subjective content of the English dialogic discourse:

(39) ME: "*Who fedde the Egipcien Marie in the cave, Or in desert? no wight but Crist, sans faille. Fyve thousand folk it was as gret merveille With loves fyve and fisshes two to fede. God sente his foison at hir grete nede*". – "*Who gave Egyptian Mary food to eat In cave or desert? None but Christ, say I. Five thousand folk, the gospels testify, On five loaves and two fishes once did feed. And thus God sent abundance for her need*" (Chaucer, "The Canterbury tales: The tale of the man of law")⁷¹.

(40) EModE: *Demetrius*: "*I am full sorry That he approves the common liar, who Thus speaks of him at Rome: but I will hope Of better deeds to-morrow. Rest you happy!*" (Shakespeare, "Antony and Cleopatra")⁷².

⁷⁰ I. Budi, *Conventionality and intentionality in the performative concept*. A young scientist. Vol. 4.3 (44.3), 2017, p. 23.

⁷¹ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

⁷² Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 2011.

II. Imperative statements:: conventional speech acts :: + / + objective / subjective content of the English dialogic discourse:

(41) EModE: *Lucius (to Captain)*: "This forwardness Makes our hopes fair. Command our present numbers Be muster'd; bid the captains look to't" (Shakespeare, "Cymbeline")⁷³.

(42) OE: *Wiglaf (to the old King – the leader of the Geats)*: "hátað heaðo-maére hlaéw gewyrcean, beorhtne æfter baéle æt brimes nósan". – "Order my troop to construct a barrow on a headland on the coast, after my pyre has cooled" (Anonymous, "Beowulf")⁷⁴.

(43) ME: "And at o word, with-uten repentaunce, Wel-come, my knight, my pees, my suffisaunce!" – "I am content, befall what may befall; Welcome, my knight, mv peace, mv all in all!" (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")⁷⁵.

Examples (39) – (43) are defined as complex sentences of declarative and imperative nature with such illocutionary verbs as testify, approve, command, order, welcome, which implement the direct illocutionary speech acts in concordance of the specified syntactic types of the exemplified sentences with particular illocutionary force of utterances-statements in paradigms "affirmative statement", "imperative statement". The assertive goal (39), the declarative goal (40), the directive goal (41) – (42), the expressive goal (43) as the intentional purpose of these utterances-statements actualize the objective content in studied complex sentences with the conventional use of speech acts in the subjective context of their representation as the statements with identification by an addressee as the affirmative, imperative statements of affirmative nature in discourse of OE, ME, EModE.

Interestingly, in speech act's theory development, as noticed by Lewiński (2021), the basic form of illocutionary pluralism is recognized to be the one, involved in indirect speech acts realized as questions or requests, where illocutionarily secondary (indirect) speech acts, but locutionarily primary (direct) speech acts, are the means to perform illocutionarily primary (direct) speech acts, but locutionarily secondary (indirect) speech acts.

Hence, questions and requests are regarded as indirect illocutionary speech acts with direct locutionarity⁷⁶.

According to our research results, we can confirm that the rationale stance of the indirect speech act's use in the Old English, Middle English,

⁷³ Ibid., p. 2312.

⁷⁴ Heaney, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

⁷⁵ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁷⁶ M. Lewiński, *Speech act pluralism in argumentative polylogues*. Informal logic, 41 (3), 2021, pp. 430-431.

Early Modern English languages can be considered by speech act's realization at the syntactic / grammatical level by the complex sentence itself in the form of an interrogative statement, as well as by an indirect question, which is placed in the subordinate / complementary clause in the postposition of the main illocutionary verb of the speech act.

Indirect illocutionary speech acts are witnessed in the complex sentences of the studied periods in diachrony as utterances-statements of the interrogative affirmative character as:

III. Interrogative statements:: unconventional speech acts :: + /-objective / subjective content of the English dialogic discourse:

(44) ME: *But Pandarus brak al this speche anoon. And seyde to Deiphebus: "wole ye goon, If yourë wille be, as I yow preyde, To speke here of the nedes of Criseyde?" – Till on the conversation Pandar broke And said: "Deiphebus, to all this folk, May I now beg you somewhat to declare Of Cressida's unfortunate affair?"* (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")⁷⁷.

(45) ME: *"Eek though I speke of love unfeleingly, No wonder is, for it no-thing of newe is; A blind man can nat juggen wel in hewis". – "And if unskilled in love my pen I ply, No wonder that, for who would dare assert A blind man should in colors be expert?"* (Chaucer, "Troilus and Cressida")⁷⁸.

(46) EModE: *Mother Gruel: "Then she demanded of me whether I was your worship's aunt or no?"* (Middleton, "Michaelmas tearme")⁷⁹.

(47) EModE: *Cade: "Dare any be so bold to sound retreat or parley, when I command them kill?"* (Shakespeare, "King Henry VI" Part II)⁸⁰.

Sentences (44) – (47) from Middle English and Early Modern English have been exemplified as complex sentences of the interrogative affirmative character with such illocutionary verbs as beg, declare, assert, demand, command, which implement or actualize indirect illocutionary speech acts in concordance of the interrogative syntactic type of these sentences with the illocutionary directive or exersitive force (beg, demand, command), declarative force (declare), assertive force (assert) of the above mentioned utterances-statements in the paradigm "interrogative statement". The objective content of these interrogative statements is ensured by actualizing the relevant illocutionary force and the intentional purpose of the utterances-statements as the directive, declarative, or assertive force / goal in the interrogative context, where the latter is perceived by the listener not as the subjective content, but more as the

⁷⁷ Hutchins, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁷⁹ Taylor & Lavagnino, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

⁸⁰ Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 872.

objective content of the speaker's verbal proposition, which is implemented or realized by the directive statements, declarative statements, and assertive statements.

To recapitulate, in the English dialogic discourse in diachrony, above mentioned exemplifications of the illocutionary speech acts (44) – (47) are fixed as the unconventional speech acts in the objective content of the objective context, which determines their actual perception or identification by the addressee as the interrogative statements, outlining the latter as indirect illocutionary speech acts.

Conclusions

In the long run of our discussion, we put forward and claimed our rationale stance that in the dialogic discourse of Old-, Middle-, Early Modern English complex sentences as the utterances-statements with illocutionary verbs were testified as assertive utterances (verdictives) (with such illocutionary verbs as *assert, assure, predict, inform, tell, notify, inform, acknowledge, admit, remind, testify, confirm, certify, prove, confess, assume, guess, state, swear, insist*), directive utterances (exercitives) (with such illocutionary verbs as *ask, order, command, request, plead, pray, invite, prescribe, demand, offer, induce, incite, persuade, seduce, beg, advise, recommend*), commissive utterances (with such illocutionary verbs as *commit, promise, contract, undertake, intend, threaten, agree, vow, vouch, refuse, decline*), expressive utterances (behaviatives) (with such illocutionary verbs as *congratulate, thank, deplore, welcome, praise, compliment, regret, condole, greet*), declarative utterances (expositives) (with such illocutionary verbs as *declare, announce, proclaim, approve, authorize, excommunicate, name, reproach, surrender, bless*).

The findings showed the studied English utterances-statements to function as the illocutionary direct and indirect speech acts of the illocutionary goal with weak or strong illocutionary force depending on the addresser's intentional verbal proposition. The feature of the speaker's illocutionary force is characterized by the social status of an addresser, the obligatory implementation of a speaker's verbal proposition, controllability and orientation or direction of a speaker's verbal propositional action.

It has been defined the meaning of the objective and subjective contents of the illocutionary direct and indirect speech acts as "affirmative statements", "imperative statements", "interrogative statements" due to the indicators or parameters of illocutionary force / goal, of the special syntactic type of utterances-statements, and conventionality / unconventionality of the studied speech acts. Further research perspectives are considered in the study of the pragmatic potential of

locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary speech acts in the linguistic discourse space of the diachronic Germanic studies.

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Appendix

Table 1. Realization of illocutionary speech acts with illocutionary verbs in Old English, Middle English, Early Modern English

| Illocutionary speech acts in complex sentences as utterances-statements with illocutionary verbs in dialogic discourse of Old English, Middle English, Early Modern English | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Illocutionary speech acts / verbs | Old English | Middle English | Early Modern English | | Total |
| | "Beowulf" | Chaucer | Shakespeare | Middleton | |
| I. assertives / verdictives | | | | | |
| 1. assert | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| 2. assure | 0 | 34 | 123 | 107 | |
| 3. predict | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| 4. inform | 2 | 8 | 42 | 6 | |
| 5. tell | 16 | 1387 | 1414 | 390 | |
| 6. notify | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
| 7. acknowledge | 1 | 8 | 25 | 30 | |
| 8. admit | 1 | 4 | 48 | 36 | |
| 9. remind | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 10. testify | 0 | 3 | 6 | 9 | |
| 11. confirm | 0 | 7 | 42 | 39 | |
| 12. certify | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10 | |
| 13. prove | 9 | 46 | 64 | 64 | |
| 14. confess | 0 | 62 | 162 | 200 | |
| 15. assume | 0 | 3 | 16 | 8 | |
| 16. guess | 0 | 50 | 54 | 46 | |
| 17. state | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | |
| 18. swear | 0 | 56 | 313 | 220 | |

| | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 19. insist | 0 | 7 | 2 | 1 | |
| Total | 31 | 1685 | 2318 | 1168 | 5202 |
| II. directives / exercitives | | | | | |
| 20. ask | 4 | 180 | 235 | 214 | |
| 21. (take/give) order | 20 | 16 | 19 | 21 | |
| 22. (give) command | 1 | 23 | 96 | 57 | |
| 23. (have) request | 1 | 5 | 8 | 15 | |
| 24. plead | 1 | 7 | 56 | 32 | |
| 25. pray | 0 | 295 | 812 | 768 | |
| 26. invite | 0 | 4 | 36 | 57 | |
| 27. prescribe | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | |
| 28. demand | 0 | 13 | 17 | 8 | |
| 29. offer | 3 | 11 | 42 | 84 | |
| 30. induce | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | |
| 31. incite | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | |
| 32. persuade | 0 | 1 | 63 | 51 | |
| 33. seduce | 0 | 0 | 11 | 6 | |
| 34. beg | 1 | 35 | 25 | 24 | |
| 35. advise | 1 | 41 | 90 | 46 | |
| 36. recommend | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | |
| Total | 32 | 635 | 1533 | 1394 | 3594 |
| III. commissives | | | | | |
| 37. commit | 2 | 16 | 88 | 53 | |
| 38. promise | 4 | 42 | 68 | 53 | |
| 39. contract | 0 | 2 | 7 | 5 | |
| 40. undertake | 2 | 34 | 53 | 34 | |
| 41. intend | 1 | 8 | 87 | 32 | |
| 42. threaten | 4 | 4 | 35 | 30 | |
| 43. agree | 1 | 47 | 29 | 35 | |
| 44. (make) vow | 2 | 14 | 57 | 33 | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| 45.(avouch) / vouch(safe) | 0 | 28 | 88 | 30 | |
| 46. refuse | 3 | 17 | 44 | 54 | |
| 47. decline | 1 | 3 | 22 | 8 | |
| Total | 20 | 215 | 578 | 367 | 1180 |
| IV. expressives / behabiatives | | | | | |
| 48. congratulate | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| 49. thank | 7 | 125 | 303 | 322 | |
| 50. deplore | 0 | 5 | 1 | 5 | |
| 51. welcome | 7 | 35 | 373 | 507 | |
| 52. praise | 5 | 13 | 56 | 40 | |
| 53. compliment | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| 54. regret | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | |
| 55. condole | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | |
| 56. greet | 3 | 12 | 40 | 17 | |
| Total | 23 | 195 | 777 | 893 | 1888 |
| V. declaratives / expositives | | | | | |
| 57. declare | 2 | 54 | 8 | 10 | |
| 58. announce | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 59. proclaim | 0 | 5 | 81 | 44 | |
| 60. approve | 0 | 11 | 43 | 35 | |
| 61. authorize | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| 62. excommunicate | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | |
| 63. name | 3 | 8 | 46 | 50 | |
| 64. reproach | 0 | 11 | 6 | 1 | |
| 65. surrender | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | |
| 66. bless | 1 | 20 | 31 | 35 | |
| Total | 10 | 111 | 220 | 177 | 518 |
| Total speech acts / verbs | 116 | 2841 | 5426 | 3999 | 12382 |