Nicolas Quérou

French National Centre for Scientific Research | CNRS · Institut des Sciences humaines et sociales (INSHS)

Agroecosystems are facing new challenges in the context of a growing and increasingly interconnected human population, and a paradigm shift is needed to successfully address the many complex questions that these challenges will generate. The transition to providing multiple services within an agroecosystem is a starting point for heightened multifu...

Agroecosystems are facing new challenges in the context of a growing and increasingly interconnected human population, and a paradigm shift is needed to successfully address the many complex questions that these challenges will generate. The transition to providing multiple services within an agroecosystem is a starting point for heightened multifu...

Motivated by the potential tension between coordination, which may require discriminating between identical agents, and social comparisons, which may call for small pay differentials, we analyze the optimal reward scheme in an organization involving agents with social preferences whose tasks are complementary. Although a tension exists between the...

We study optimal harvesting of a renewable resource with stochastic dynamics. To focus on the effect of risk aversion, we consider a resource user who is indifferent with respect to intertemporal variability. We find that a constant escapement strategy is optimal, i.e. the stock after harvesting is constant. Under common specifications of risk aver...

We analyze theoretically an institution called a “limited-tenure concession” for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction. The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which an agent can enjoy the public good, but offering the possibility of renewal contingent on ample private provision of...

We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any...

Motivated by the potential tension between coordination, which may require discriminating among identical workers, and social comparisons, which may intuitively call for small pay differentials , we analyze the design of optimal rewards in an organization with inequality-averse workers whose tasks are complementary. Inequality aversion surprisingly...

Motivated by recent discussions about the issue of risk perceptions for climate change related events, we introduce a non-cooperative game setting where agents manage a common pool resource under a potential risk, and agents exhibit different risk perception biases. Focusing on the effect of the polarization level and other population features, we...

We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with ”goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any...

We consider a contracting relationship where the agent's effort induces monetary costs, and limits on the agent's resource restrict his capability to exert effort. We show that, the principal finds it best to offer a sharing contract while providing the agent with an up-front financial transfer only when the monetary cost is neither too low nor too...

In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of social preferences in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Inequality is increased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, inequality aversion may lead to a n...

This note discusses some recent work on limited-tenure concessions related to the GREEN-Econ research project. It may be found in issue 24 of the series "Marine and Coastal Sciences in Occitanie". This issue may be downloaded at the following address: http://www.agropolis.org/publications/thematic-files-agropolis.php

How will countries harvesting mobile natural resources react to the possibility of regime shift? We address the non-cooperative exploitation of a migratory renewable resource in the presence of possible regime shift that affects its movement. Motivated by the anticipated effects of climate change, we model a regime shift that will alter the spatial...

We compare how the long-run distribution of fishing activities is affected in multispecies fisheries when facing different second-best control rules: (1) species-specific landing regulation, and (2) global input regulation. We show how this depends on the economic returns and on the type of ecological interaction considered. We highlight specifical...

In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordination success in a game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Equity is decreased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, difference aversion may lead...

We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user’s individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of su...

We consider a contracting relationship where the agent's effort induces monetary (opportunity) costs, and limits on the agent's resource restrict his capability to exert effort. We first show that, in some cases, the two main features of venture capital contractual arrangements are optimal, i.e. the principal finds it best to offer a sharing contra...

How will countries harvesting mobile renewable resource react to the threat of climate change? We address the non-cooperative exploitation of a migratory renewable resource in the presence of possible regime shift that affects its movement. Motivated by the anticipated effects of climate change, we model a regime shift that will alter the spatial m...

We consider analytically the non-cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad, which can grow and spread across spatial areas. We characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate, and determine how this decision depends on property-specific environmental fe...

We consider analytically the non-cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad such as an invasive weed species,infectious disease, fire, or agricultural pest. The stock of the public bad can grow and disperse across a spatial domain of arbitrary size. In this setting, we characterize the condition...

We examine the efficiency, distributional, and environmental consequences of assigning spatial property rights to part of a spatially-connected natural resource while the remainder is competed for by an open access fringe. We refer to this as partial enclosure of the commons. We obtain sharp analytical results regarding partial enclosure of the com...

Since existing regulatory schemes are often suboptimal, we compare the performance of several second-best control rules implemented on multi-species sheries in terms of their eect on biodiversity and on eort transfer. We show how these eects depend on the economic returns and on the type of ecological interaction considered. We highlight specically...

We consider a moral hazard problem where the agent has limited capability-because of limited wealth-which restricts his possible actions. In such cases, the lower the level of wealth of the agent, including transfer from or to the principal, the lower the maximum effort level that can be provided. We show then that the optimal contract is, in some...

We examine theoretically a system of spatial property rights over a mobile re- newable resource. The resource grows and is harvested in each area, but harvest in one patch imposes an externality on other patches through resource movement. This externality gives rise to over-extraction by non-cooperative patch owners. We propose a new institutional...

Species' interactions and the involvement of fishermen in several fisheries may not be properly accounted for by regulatory schemes,thus making regulation suboptimal. Being the only implementable instruments, the degree of ineffciency of three second-best instruments is assessed (by using a bioeconomic multispecies model) in terms of their ability...

This paper addresses the management of multispecies fisheries, and suggests the use of restricted fishing policies as an interesting option for unassessed fisheries (as is the case within developing countries). Specifically, we consider a predator–prey system under two potential management policies: an unrestricted regime where agents can compete t...

We analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where agents care about consumption or prices of their neighbors. We characterize the relation between optimal prices and consumersʼ centrality in the social network. This relation depends on the market structure (monopoly vs. oligopoly) and on the type of externalities (consumpt...

We consider a model of non-renewable resource extraction where players do not know their opponents' utility functions and form conjectures on the behavior of others. Two forms of beliefs are introduced, one based on the state of the resource, the other on this state and on the others' strategy (their consumption). We focus on consistent equilibria,...

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is “smoother” in the sense that small variations in an agent’s bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of s...

In this paper, we consider a model of multilateral bargaining where ho-mogeneous agents may exert e¤ort before negotiations in order to inuence their chances to become the proposer. E¤ort levels have a permanent ef-fect on the recognition process (persistent recognition). We prove two main results. First, all voting rules are equivalent (that is, t...

We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) neg...

The problem of resource extraction developed in Levhari and Mirman (1980) is reconsidered under a situation of incomplete information. Specifically, players do not have information about other players' benefit functions. It is assumed that each player relies on simple, non probabilistic beliefs about the other players' behaviour. Basically, players...

In this paper, we study the (symmetric) equilibria of a model of multilateral bar- gaining where players are heterogeneous regarding their time preferences, and make costly efforts at the beginning of the process in order to inuence their probabilities of being the proposer for all stages of the negotiation process. We analyse whether the optimalit...

This paper studies optimal pricing in networks in the presence of local consumption or price externalities. It analyzes the relation between prices and nodal centrality measures. Using an asymptotic approach, it shows that the ranking of optimal prices and strategies can be reduced to the lexicographic ranking of a specific vector of nodal characte...

We consider a repeated regulation model in an oligopoly under asymmetric information with pollution. An iterative procedure is proposed where the regulator designs stationary taxes, and firms are not required to be perfectly rational. They can form and update simple beliefs about their competitors' aggregate output at each period. Two versions of t...

We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not...

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide...

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given...

Series on mathematical economics and game theory ; 2

This paper studies optimal pricing and strategic decisions in net- works with quadratic objective functions, following Ballester, Calvo- Armengol and Zenou (Econometrica, 2006). It focusses on two ques- tions: How do optimal prices and strategies reflect the position of agents in the network? What is the eect of a change in the net- work structure...

We study a multilateral bargaining game: it consists in a modeling of negotiation situations in the framework of game theory, which uses an extension of a model of bilateral bargaining adapted to many players. We present the case of perfect information, and a particalar case of imperfect information. We define concepts of solution for the game, we...