Neil RubinBeth Tfiloh Dahan High School · Jewish History
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The Oslo Process of September 1993 to January 2001 ultimately brought about a permanent break in American Judaism's traditional wall-to-wall support for any Israeli government. Drawing on extensive new sources, Rubin analyzes what this meant for the American and Israeli Jewish communities-critical constituencies in past and future negotiations.
American Jewry’s important role in national politics was well established by the early 1990s. As David G. Dalin wrote in 2001, “In many respects, the 1990s were a historic—indeed, a golden era for Jews in American politics and government.”1 It was, in fact, a remarkable period for Jews as individuals in the government and political parties, as well...
During the lead- up to Israel’s May 17, 1999, national election, the Clinton White House all but openly showed its favoritism of Israeli Labor Party leader Ehud Barak over Likud Party incumbent Binyamin Netanyahu. Yet, with the Barak campaign’s hiring of people such as Democratic Party strategist James Carville, that preference seemed clear. Indeed...
For most close observers of the White House and its Mideast policy, there was no doubt that the Clinton administration had all but publicly tipped its hand toward incumbent Shimon Peres as Israel’s 1996 elections drew near. As Baltimore Jewish Times Washington correspondent James D. Besser wrote just prior to Israel’s national elections, “In 1996,...
The general sense of optimism surging through the Jewish and diplomatic world on September 13, 1993, clearly rivaled that of other key moments in modern Jewish history, included heralded events such as David Ben-Gurion’s much- anticipated proclamation of Israeli statehood on May 14, 1948, and the seemingly miraculous success of the Arab- Israeli Si...
If there was one thing successive US administrations could agree on from 1967 to 1993, it was that progress on the Arab- Israeli front was slow, painful, and at best incremental. Until the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war, the United States had not played a major role as Israel’s top defender on the world stage,1 nor had it pushed Israel fo...