Navin A. Bapat

Navin A. Bapat
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill | UNC · Department of Political Science

PhD

About

39
Publications
11,374
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
1,176
Citations
Additional affiliations
August 2007 - present
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Position
  • Professor (Associate)
August 2004 - May 2007
Pennsylvania State University
Position
  • Research Assistant

Publications

Publications (39)
Article
This study analyzes the possibility that COVID-19 will increase the risk of a military conflict between the United States and People’s Republic of China. The mechanism is that COVID-19 weakens American economic output, which undermines the U.S. capability to project force. This enables China’s efforts to revise the status quo. Although a rapid coll...
Chapter
The U.S. was in a position of economic and military hegemony after World War II. However, by the early 1970s, the U.S. dollar depreciated following President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard. To fight this problem, Nixon offered indefinite military protection from all of their enemies to all oil-producing states, if those states agr...
Chapter
This chapter argues that the strain of the war created a risk that the U.S. would scale back its security guarantees to the hosts of the energy market. Instead, the U.S. would rely on non-state actors within the hosts’ territory, which would ultimately undermine the hosts’ territorial sovereignty. The threat that the U.S. would adopt this alternati...
Book
This study argues that the war on terror can be explained as an effort to cement the U.S. dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency by expanding American control over the global energy markets. Since the 1970s, the states of OPEC agreed to denominate their oil sales in U.S. dollars in exchange for American military protection. The 9/11 attack...
Chapter
Using the logic of a game theoretic model, this chapter argues that the project to cement American dominance over the global energy market failed because the U.S. security guarantee created a series of perverse incentives. Host leaders recognized that they would only receive American support if the threat of terrorism persisted, and that they would...
Chapter
The fading of the U.S. security guarantee led to an increase in violence throughout the energy market states. The host states became vulnerable to military challenges by their rivals and began initiating conflicts to eliminate their internal and external rivals immediately, before the time when they would lose American support entirely. However, be...
Chapter
This chapter summarizes the book’s main conclusions. It argues that in the short term, the U.S. emerged victorious in the war on terror since the peg between energy sales and the dollar remains, and the euro has faded as a competitor. However, the enormous cost of the war on terror, and the credibility the U.S. lost by adopting the light footprint...
Article
The Islamic State in Britain: Radicalization and Resilience in an Activist Network. By Michael Kenney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 287p. $99.99 cloth, $31.99 paper. - Volume 17 Issue 3 - Navin A. Bapat
Article
To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias...
Article
Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving...
Article
Full-text available
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. Howeve...
Article
Full-text available
Although states rarely use economic sanctions specifically to combat transnational terrorism, potential targets of sanctions often face terrorist campaigns within their territory. States may avoid using sanctions against states with terrorists for fear of weakening target states excessively, thereby indirectly strengthening terrorist groups. Howeve...
Article
Full-text available
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts and cannot perfectly determine th...
Article
Since 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explana...
Article
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This artic...
Article
Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and inter...
Article
Full-text available
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by t...
Article
Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form...
Article
Several policymakers argue that military occupations are necessary to both prevent the riseof terrorist groups in weaker states. However, numerous empirical studies argue that military occupation typically causes a sharp rise in terrorism. This raises the question: why dopolicymakers believe military occupations can prevent sectarian terrorism, whe...
Article
Full-text available
States engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals. This gives militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups so much that sponsors cannot control them. This study develops a game theoretic model to explain why states take the risk of sponsoring militant...
Article
Full-text available
Members of the American foreign policy establishment argue that the United States should combat transnational terrorism by encouraging democratization. Yet, empirical studies indicate that democratization may increase political violence, thereby raising the question: why would American policymakers favor democratization when the empirical record sh...
Article
A considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful. However, few studies examine the question of when senders are willing to enforce sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that the imposition of sanctions creates an enforcement problem for sender states. We...
Article
Full-text available
This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terr...
Article
This paper critically examines the Obama Administration’s decision to increase the level of US forces in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban insurgency. Given the complexities of the Afghan situation, and the numerous tradeoffs associated with any US response, I turn to the a game theoretic model to capture the essence of the Administration’s decisio...
Article
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions “work” more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we su...
Article
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanc...
Article
Many scholars have examined terrorism as a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. However, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists often seek sanctuary from target attacks by crossing into foreign host states. This action effectively transforms the conflict from a purely domestic contest into an international issue. This paper explores why t...
Article
Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? In this...
Article
Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terroris...
Article
One of the most striking features of insurgency is how infrequently the two sides attempt peaceful negotiation. Very often, the government refuses to grant the insurgents legitimacy as a bargaining partner. Yet, some conflicts do reach a point at which the two sides open negotiation. This article seeks to develop an explanation of the timing of neg...
Article
Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security, Frank P. Harvey, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. x, 345. Following the second Gulf War, international observers were quick to criticize the unilateral behaviour of the United States. Without a UN mandate, the allies had undermined the very institution...
Article
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufba...
Article
Full-text available
As a tool of coercive diplomacy, states in the international system may support violent insurgencies to destabilize an opponent government. These security arrangements resemble asymmetric alliances consisting of the sponsor as the dominant party and the insurgency as the subordinate. In theory, this represents an e¢ cient exchange: the sponsors out...
Article
Thesis supervisor: Navin Bapat. Thesis (B.A.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2006. Library holds archival microfiche negative and service copy.
Article
Thesis supervisor: Navin Bapat. Thesis (B.A.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2006. Library holds archival microfiche negative and service copy.

Network

Cited By