

The UnPolitics of New Public Management in Ireland

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Published in *Administrative Reforms and Democratic Governance*,
edited by Jean-Michel Eymeri-Douzans, and Jon Pierre, pp. 55-67.
London: Routledge. 2011.

Introduction

Public bureaucracies and how we understand them have been subject to considerable change in recent years (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). New Public Management (NPM), championed by international organizations such as the OECD and IMF, has played an important role in determining the nature of these changes in many countries. The term captures a range of reform objectives affecting state bureaucracies and can be difficult to define with any precision. Not least, the agents of change have varied. In its most far-reaching form, NPM has been a core objective of government policy, but in some jurisdictions there has been more of a 'bottom-up approach' to public service reform that has acquired an NPM label. Recent studies in public management have raised the question of whether or not New Public Management, or rather reforms based in its key doctrines, are over, and if so, what the consequences have been for bureaucracies and their work and what doctrines will inform future administrative evolution (Christensen and Laegreid 2007).

In this paper, we seek to assess to what extent and with what effects NPM principles were adopted in Ireland, to account for what drove change and how best to explain the form it took, and to consider what the implications may be for the efficiency and coherence of public administration in Ireland. Many of the principles and indeed the rhetoric of NPM proved attractive to both politicians and senior bureaucrats as a remedy for problems in policy processes, and some of the organizational and procedural changes in Irish public administration bear similarities to those we would expect to see as a result of adopting principles of NPM. However, we contend that surface impressions are misleading. Organizational changes were not necessarily driven by NPM. The absence of strong political drivers meant that reform initiatives did not fundamentally alter the configuration of the Irish public administration. Many of the problems that NPM was intended to address are only now coming under scrutiny.

The Strategic Management Initiative: NPM Irish-style

In 2008 the OECD published a comprehensive government-commissioned programme to find a new trajectory for Irish public service reform. In its report, the

OECD argued that since the early 1990s, ‘Ireland has significantly advanced along a “*New Public Management*” continuum’ (OECD 2008: 18). What this continuum consisted of or where it went were not specified, but it raised the relatively unexplored issue of the Irish response to the international NPM movement.

Despite sharing many features of constitutional design and political-administrative culture with other English-speaking countries, Ireland was not a conspicuous adopter of NPM. There had already been attempts the early 1970s and mid-1980s to introduce private sector management ideas to the civil service¹, and to reform structures so as to separate policy design from routine administration (Stapleton 1991). But it was not until the mid-1990s that the Irish public service embarked on a substantial reform programme that exhibited characteristics of international NPM-style reforms.

While no single episode can be claimed as the start of the Irish conversion to NPM ideas, the need to improve management skills to complement traditional administrative priorities gradually became apparent to many. The increasing frequency of interactions at the EU level made Irish public servants aware of the reform processes taking place elsewhere. In the early 1990s, senior civil servants designed an explicit reform programme along lines drawn from the experiences of New Zealand and Australia, both of which had undergone advanced experiments in NPM. The then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds endorsed the plans, and charged the most senior network of civil servants – the Co-ordinating Group of Secretaries – chaired by his Department, with its development. With a change of government a few months later, his successor as Taoiseach ensured political continuity to the reform agenda by appointing a party colleague as ‘Minister of State with responsibility for the Strategic Management Initiative’.

This Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) was rooted in ideas of corporate management, tailored to national administrative requirements. It was designed to address three key areas (Quinn 1995: 60):

- Enhanced contribution of the public service to national development

¹ A distinction must be drawn between *public servants* (i.e. all those persons employed within the public sphere including teachers, nurses, local authority staff and so on) and *civil servants* (i.e. those public servants who work within central government departments and offices)

- Provision of top quality services in a timely and efficient manner
- Effective use of available resources

Underlining this new departure for the Irish public service, Government Departments began to speak of ‘strategic planning’ and ‘strategic management’ and to this end rapidly published their first statements of strategy in 1995 that went beyond the traditional one-year forecast. The majority of the architects of the SMI also saw their careers advance as the reform programme took root.

The main priorities of SMI were the public accountability of the bureaucracy, and performance efficiency in public services. It provided a blueprint for public management reforms across the constituent parts of the public service. A concern with ensuring a public service ethos meant that not long after its emergence, SMI was renamed the Public Service Modernisation Programme (<http://www.bettergov.ie>).

The Public Service Management Act 1997 helped to consolidate SMI priorities in practice. This Act transferred responsibility with respect to appointments, dismissals, performance and discipline of civil servants below a certain grade from Ministers to Secretaries-General (the most senior tier of the civil service). A number of other legislative developments followed in the areas of freedom of information and improving the scrutiny powers available to parliamentary committees.

Reforms to the system of appointment to the most senior levels of the public service were developed to broaden career mobility within the civil service proper and to allow for outside recruitment to a portion of top positions. The duration of appointment to the top position within each Department was limited to seven years. Recognizing the more frequent pathways from these jobs into the private sector, time restrictions were placed on accepting positions in consultancies and lobbying organizations that might create too open a conflict of interests or, more correctly, too cosy a relationship between public and private sectors.

In some key respects, therefore, we can see that commonly shared ideas about NPM were taken seriously in Ireland. But beneath the surface, relatively little changed

fundamentally. What may at first look like NPM-driven structural and behavioural change turns out, on closer inspection, to require a different kind of explanation. We consider three areas in which NPM ideas have often driven change: the role played by non-departmental agencies, the nature of public sector employment, and the values and ethos characterizing the priorities of public sector organizations and permeating the conduct of public servants themselves. In each of these cases, we find that the picture is more complicated than one might have anticipated.

Structural adaptation: agencies

Changes in organisational structure provide the most tangible evidence of NPM reform. Pollitt and Bouckaert identify the importance of both the vertical and horizontal dimensions in understanding the structural shape of the state, as does Roness (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Roness 2007). Reforms along the vertical dimension are concerned with centralization and decentralization. Horizontal reforms are concerned with the separation of tasks and the distribution of responsibility across levels of government (national, regional, local etc), and normally entail new structural forms.

In Britain during the 1980s, NPM reforms meant that many core functions of departments were devolved out into separate agencies. Rhodes argued that the British state was being 'hollowed out' by this outward and downward delegation of powers to non-departmental structures. The result, he argued, was that networks of interest groups and agency employees, not all of them public servants, both made and implemented policy in ways that were beyond the reach of democratic accountability (Rhodes 1994).

This interpretation is contested. Some have argued that structural change has in fact resulted in a much stronger concentration of power in the hands of government ministers, who monitor results more directly and with fewer intermediary levels of organization than previously (Holliday 2000). Indeed, structural reform may strengthen the controlling capacity of the core executive (specifically the department of the prime minister, or its equivalent), if strategic capacity is separated from policy implementation, and if performance standards provide mechanisms for managing and regulating (Eymeri-Douzans, ref). More realistically, perhaps, we might expect to find

that complex systems of governance and oversight develop across policy sectors (Hood et al. 2005).

We do indeed see a pattern of more frequent agency creation in Ireland over time (Hardiman and Scott 2009; McGauran et al. 2005). Drawing on a time-series database of state institutions, we identify a total of 340 ‘agencies’ (including commercial state-owned enterprises) in 2008.² These typically function under the aegis of 15 ministerial departments. Figure 1 shows that while the rate of establishment of new bodies grew over the decades, a considerable acceleration in the agencification process coincides with the reform period under consideration.

(Figure 1 about here)

But we should be cautious about assuming that the existence of more agencies indicates the intention to restructure public service management (Pierson 2000). In most instances, new agencies in Ireland do not reconfigure the work of departments, or set up new mechanisms for delivering services that are thereby rehoused outside departments. Rather, they reflect the creation of new competences, or the establishment of new areas of policy engagement. And as Pollitt and Bouckaert remind us, structural reform is no guarantee of success. The significance of institutional innovation may vary. Neither the radical reformers (New Zealand, Canada) nor the more conservative adaptors (Norway, Ireland) have demonstrated that NPM-style reforms have provided systemic measurable improvements in performance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt and Talbot 2004; Pollitt et al. 2004).

An analysis of the profile of Irish agencies according to their primary function is depicted in Figure 2 below, which shows the change in the composition of agencies between 1958 and 2008.

(Figure 2 about here)

² Data are drawn from a time-series database of Irish state institutions compiled by the Mapping the Irish State project, funded by the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences. See <http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping>

This throws into doubt any thought that NPM lies behind agency creation. Service delivery shows the largest growth, but this has happened in addition to, not instead of, expansion of staff in core service providing departments, and is found in areas of activity into which the state was expanding as time went on. The growth of the regulatory state accounts for many of the new agencies. Advisory and consultative bodies have also grown rapidly. This is quite striking, as it reveals not only that core governmental functions are not being outsourced or reconfigured to any great degree, but that the specialized role of the civil service itself – formulation of policy options, provision of specialist advice to government – no longer seems to be performed to a standard or in a manner that governments are content with.³ Agency formation in Ireland does not seem flow from the search for more efficiency-enhancing ways of doing things, or a concern with improving performance standards. It seems instead to reflect a tendency to bypass existing deficiencies by building new institutions.

A review published by the OECD in 2008 lends some weight to this interpretation. It identified several factors that may underlie the perceived value of creating new agencies, including:

- Signalling and embodying new policy priorities
- Involving stakeholders
- Providing executive bodies with managerial flexibility, bringing in specialised skills, and allowing more performance focus
- Responding to European Union requirements related to the independence of regulators (OECD 2008, pp.297-8) .

This report concluded that the principal reason why government ministers created such a large number of new agencies in Ireland was to make it possible to employ more staff without appearing to breach limits on core departmental civil service numbers (OECD 2008: 295-8).

³ This is especially noticeable when we consider government's greatly increased levels of spending on private sector consultants' reports. A 2007 report by the Comptroller and Auditor General found that the use of consultancies in the Civil Service increased from 983 costing €79.6 million during the three year 1994-1996 period, to 1,159 costing €124 million during the two-year period 2004-5 (Office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General 2007: 185).

Although there is a (not wholly unfair) perception in Ireland that no public body is ever closed down, there have been some episodes of what we may think of as de-agencification. Health care underwent considerable agency consolidation with the merger of over twenty bodies into a single agency, the Health Services Executive (HSE), in 2005. Decision-making authority and budgetary controls were consolidated away from regional authorities into a single national body. Health care reorganization reflects standard NPM objectives such as rationalizing wasteful fragmentation of provision, while creating a clear separation between policy-making on the part of the Department of Health and service delivery which was to be the domain of the HSE. However, these reforms have thrown up many new organizational problems, duplication of function, and lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibilities. Indeed, the complexities of health service structures have tended to undermine public confidence in the Irish health service (Wren 2003).

The OECD report commented critically on the absence of guiding criteria in organization reform in Ireland. It noted the weak use of performance measurement techniques, the ad hoc approach to agency formation, and the variety of legal and budgetary relationships obtaining between agencies and departments (OECD 2008: 300-02). The need for new agencies had not been subject to evidence-based efficiency audit, and most agencies have no clear performance targets. Oversight of agencies' work is often very weak since a considerable proportion of board members are direct political appointees (Clancy and Murphy 2006); scandals about poor financial accountability in the state training agency FÁS in 2009 were symptomatic of these problems. In sum, we can argue that while Ireland created many agencies, which in principle might indicate the influence of NPM thinking, closer inspection suggests that most of the agency-building in Ireland has to be explained in other ways.

Public sector employment

If NPM ideas were to be widely adopted, we might expect to find major changes in the terms and conditions of employment of the public service, especially of those employed in state agencies, consistent with an emphasis on cost containment, efficiency, and conformity with private sector disciplines. We see very little of this in Ireland though. Eyméri-Douzans (ref), invoking Hood and Lodge, refers to key features of the 'public service bargain' that traditionally differentiate public

employees from those in the private sector, such as security of employment, standardized pay scales, and enhanced pension provision. In Britain, these features typically do not obtain across many sectors of employment in the myriad bodies exercising delegated state power. In Ireland, however, the public service bargain has not been fundamentally altered. Non-departmental public bodies vary in their propensity to be staffed by civil servants or by employees recruited directly and without the direct involvement of the central Public Appointments Service. But there is little reliance on short-term employment contracts or individualized pay scales. Security of employment and pension entitlements are generally much better than anywhere in the private sector. Performance verification was introduced for all under a social partnership agreement in the mid-2000s. Performance bonuses are payable only to senior staff members, but these are not strongly conditional: it is relatively rare for them not to be awarded to some degree.

Technological upgrading, combined with a commitment to improving efficiency, might have been expected either to increase productivity or to result in lower staff requirements. However, personnel numbers in the public service have grown rather than declined. Social partnership negotiations about pay and conditions of employment, not NPM as such, provided the context for agreements on increased work flexibility. Recruitment and staffing problems persist across the public service. A dearth of high-level policy expertise in key areas such as education, health and finance has long been noted, but flexible professional contracts are still problematic. Initiatives to improve the quality of regulation were slow to develop. Accountability relationships between departments and agencies are often contested (Connaughton 2006).

Part of the explanation for resistance to more thorough-going organizational reform may perhaps be traced to the strength and influence of public sector trade unions. Approximately 80% of public employees are unionized, and public service employees have been estimated to constitute over half of all trade union members. Collective bargaining coverage under the pay deals negotiated through social partnership structures is 100%. During the 2000s, under partnership agreements, two rounds of benchmarking legitimated changes in public sector pay with reference to the rates

prevailing in the private sector. But rather than constraining levels of public service remuneration, this resulted in a significant boost to the pay and pension rates of most public employees. Benchmarking agreements were controversial at the time, as economic commentators suggested that the outcomes owed more to the strength of public sector unions than to any clear economic rationale (O'Leary 2002). Senior public servants' pay rates were similarly given a significant boost by the relevant remuneration review bodies over time. New promotion pathways to senior positions were opened up, but these did not provide for direct recruitment from the private sector. While direct comparisons between public and private sectors are difficult on account of compositional differences to do with age, gender, education and experience, among other factors, the controversy over the privileged position of public sector employees gained fresh impetus from research findings that the public sector premium had increased sharply during the 2000s, especially at the top (Kelly et al. 2009, p.356).

Cultural adaptation: values and organizational culture

Change in the values espoused by employees in the public sector is less readily quantifiable than structural reforms, but here too we might expect to be able to find evidence, if it exists, of the extent of NPM-inspired reforms. Organization theory depicts values as essential components of organisational culture and as instrumental in determining, guiding and informing behaviour (Hofstede and Hogstede 2005; Schein 2004). Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman propose that 'there is no more important topic in public administration and policy than public values' (Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007, p.355). Bozeman proposes that performance is, quite simply, 'the extent to which the values represented in policy objectives are achieved' (Bozeman 2007, p.79).

NPM implies a shift toward an ethos derived from commercial activity, whereby efficiency and cost-effectiveness are the main criteria of good performance. In some countries the transformation has been quite radical, and public service values such as integrity or concern for the public interest may seem to be eclipsed entirely (Kakabadse et al. 2003, p.477). Horton notes the difficulties presented by an NPM emphasis on 'productivity, efficiency, risk taking, independence and accountability' which, she argues, can often be in conflict with 'traditional Weberian values of

procedural correctness, equality of treatment, risk avoidance and strict adherence to rules and regulations’ (Horton 2006, p.538). Indeed in Australia, erosion of the public service ethos resulting from extensive NPM reforms was deemed to have been so pervasive that government passed legislation to promote a switch from rules-based to values-based management in its public service (Halligan and Adams 2004).

The difficulties in marrying traditional values with those associated with NPM were recognised in a review of the SMI published in 2002. It stated that the programme of reform for the civil service, *Delivering Better Government*, had:

...envisaged a more performance and customer oriented culture taking hold within the civil service. These represented new values to be added to more traditional ones such as equality, consistency, fairness, transparency and propriety in dealings with staff and customers (PA Consulting 2002, pp.17-18).

To test the extent of value shift among public servants, MacCarthaigh conducted a series of workshops with middle to senior ranking civil servants (MacCarthaigh 2008).⁴ Participants were drawn from groups that had already been created to foster a networking culture across public sector management. The findings provide a valuable window into the organizational culture of the Irish civil service. The values most commonly identified as characterizing the work of the civil service are set out in Figure 3 below.

(Figure 3 about here)

Participants in the workshops converged on the view that ‘traditional’ public service values featured strongly in their work and the work of their organisations. Some of the values which one might associate most closely with the NPM agenda did indeed emerge as significant, such as flexibility, value for money (effectiveness) and speed of service delivery (efficiency). ‘Accountability’ featured most strongly; indeed for many participants this now seemed to be the pre-eminent value of public service work. Some values that may have been expected in the context of modernisation, such as innovation, did not emerge at all. Yet what is most striking is the degree to which

⁴ These workshops were supplemented by in-depth interviews with key informants drawn from currently serving and past senior civil servants.

participants prioritized values associated with a public service ethos and a conception of their role as above all impartial, fair, and honest. This does not seem to offer much support to claims that the values of the public service are being displaced by those of commercial life.

Neither do we see any discernible trend away from civil servants' conception of their role as apolitical executors of government policy as is expected within the conventional Whitehall-type model. Senior civil servants have always had to work closely with their ministers. But there is relatively little evidence of systematic functional politicization of the civil service role, in the sense of an alignment of civil servants' values with those of their minister, of the sort that has long been noted, for example, in Germany (Mayntz and Derlien 1989).

When asked what the drivers for changes in values were, a wide variety of themes were identified. These are summarized in Figure 4 below.

(Figure 4 about here)

What is striking about these findings is there appears to be relatively little sense of a coherent driving reform agenda driving change. While they were clearly aware of the public service reform agenda, participants also identified more general drivers such as changes in the wider society, EU compliance requirements, and the expectations of incoming individual employees. All these were seen as having implications for the ethos of the public service, pressing public servants to raise standards of performance and service delivery.

Participants were divided on the issue of what values were necessary to underpin the work of the civil service in the future. Some participants identified the need to restate traditional core values, whilst others believed that performance standards should be more clearly promoted. The conception of the citizen as customer, including customer charters and access to information, seems to have been quite widely accepted. Responsiveness to the public is facilitated by the extension of information and

communications technology, and is driven by changing public expectations about the quality and speed of public service.

Explaining variations in adoption of NPM

The trends we have identified here suggest that public service reform in Ireland has facilitated the spread of ideas about improving service delivery, but has set relatively soft targets, and is backed by little or no serious evaluation and few effective sanctions. International NPM debates did not shape the agenda of public service reform in any coherent or systematic way. Indeed, an insider view suggests that the senior civil servants who devised the Strategic Management Initiative considered it ‘sensible to avoid a rigid adherence to any...theoretical frameworks’ (McKevitt 1995, p.34). From the outset, therefore, a number of distinctive features to NPM Irish-style emerged. It was designed to promote market-type efficiencies but it was not intended to be a radical programme of reform. New right thinking played little or no explicit role in its conception and it did not originate in an ideological adoption of the market as inherently superior to state-led decision-making. SMI was never intended to lead directly to cuts in personnel as had occurred elsewhere. Administrative reform has rarely or never been the subject of electoral or ideological conflict in Ireland.

Ireland’s public service reform initiative therefore had no direct political sponsor or driver, and was a project of the senior civil service itself, principally the Department of the Taoiseach. This is not necessarily an impediment to effectiveness: in Denmark, as in Ireland, the Department of Finance was the principal source of monitoring, and there too, ‘soft’ benchmarks for performance management were adopted, with relatively little recourse to evidence-based assessment (Hansen 2005, p.344).

But as other countries have found, without the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ in the form of government backing, hard decisions can all too easily be deferred indefinitely. A push for effectiveness, efficiency, and cost containment must at some point imply budgetary disciplines. As Eymeri-Douzans notes (ref), the French administrative elite could adopt a fairly relaxed approach to reform objectives until Sarkozy’s government introduced a stronger budgetary spur. No Irish government took up the challenge.

Reform of work practices and of personnel management had a largely symbolic character (Roche 1998).

NPM has tended to find its most whole-hearted political sponsors among governments of the right. But the Irish party system lacks any clear left-right differentiation. The largest party, Fianna Fáil, traditionally appeals almost equally to voters from all social class backgrounds. Alternative governments need to include parties whose support is drawn from a cross-class spread. Governments (and indeed individual candidates for election) typically attempt to blur sharp lines of ideological division, and to work with approaches to policy that are depicted as pragmatic and realistic rather than derived from a clear set of partisan principles (Mair and Marsh 2004; Marsh 2008).

But partisan position-taking is not essential for achieving change, and conflictual policies can risk becoming embattled and immobilized. A pragmatic orientation toward solving recognized problems in the public sector could be more effective (Green-Pedersen 2002), and Ireland's relatively unideological politics might have been an asset to a reform strategy. The Taoiseach who approved SMI in 1994, Albert Reynolds, was then the leader of Fianna Fáil, which was at that time in coalition with the Labour Party. The government that oversaw its implementation was a 'Rainbow' coalition government made up of Fine Gael, the Labour Party, and the small Democratic Left party. Neither government found the objectives of SMI uncongenial. All subsequent governments broadly supported it, including introducing statutory supports such as the Public Service Reform Act 1997 noted above. But the issues were not so much depoliticized as lacking in clear political objectives from the outset.

The Irish public service bears relatively little resemblance to the public administration traditions of continental Europe or Scandinavia. If the French public service elite cannot easily drive its own reform agenda, it is not clear how the Irish elite could be expected to do better. The Irish public administration owes a good deal to its Whitehall origins as part of the British system of government prior to independence, and is similarly based on generalist civil servants and a strong non-partisan tradition (Maguire 2008). Some important divergences from the British model came about over time, under pressure of the very different developmental circumstances of the Irish

state. Sections of the civil service were accorded a prominent role in policy implementation in politically sensitive areas. For example, during the protectionist phase (1932-1948), the then Department of Industry and Commerce played an active role, under the direction of the Minister, in promoting the formation and guiding the location of fledgling domestic industry (Daly 1992). The pivotal role of the Department of Finance as the guardian of fiscal orthodoxy was established from an early date (Fanning 1978). During the 1950s, the policy thinking that led to a shift in state support toward export-orientation and the eventual dismantling of trade barriers is widely credited as having come from within the Department of Finance itself (Bew et al. 1989; Bradley 1990; Whitaker 1973). By the late 1960s, senior civil servants had come to believe that their policy development role should be clearly demarcated, and that more routine tasks of implementing ministerial initiatives should be hived off (Devlin Report 1970). But although these ideas were officially welcomed by government, they never got sustained political follow-through (Stapleton 1991). Administrative competences were only effectively mobilized when shaped by a clear political imperative.

Conclusion


NPM proposes an increase in organizational autonomy consistent with the slogan 'let the managers manage', especially in areas such as human resources management and budgetary allocation. But the other side of this is that strong control mechanisms are needed to 'make the managers manage' (Christensen et al. 2007). If NPM is intended to replace traditional hierarchical modes of governance with performance-driven and devolved mechanisms, it is not clear that this can be achieved through non-hierarchical means of policy implementation.

The Irish public service reform initiative was a product of the public service itself, whose reform-minded outlook has often been lauded. But self-managed reform radically weakens the potential for the successful implementation of painful or less palatable changes.

The 2008 OECD report suggested that the public service reform initiatives since the launch of the Strategic Management Initiative in 1994 had been 'primarily focused on


putting *processes* in place' (OECD 2008: 23). This probably understates the bold objectives of that reform programme, but it might overstate what had actually been achieved. The report goes on to portray a system that, while not in crisis, is nonetheless fragmented, lacking in coherence, and has a poor sense of reform priorities. SMI lacked a firm theoretical underpinning and was subject to shifts of emphasis and grafting on of new initiatives as it developed. As the public service now struggles to cope with the implications of economic contraction, problems of effectiveness and efficiency have not gone away, while the challenge of achieving 'joined-up government' remains acute.

Figure 1: Irish agencies 1958-2008



Source: Mapping the Irish State database

Figure 2. Profile of national state agencies by function, 1958 and 2008



Source: Mapping the Irish State database

Figure 3. Most commonly identified values among public servants

What values inform the work and activities of the civil service?

'Classic' public service ethos	NPM-consistent values
Collegiality	Accountability
Commitment (to citizens)	Flexibility
Fairness	Leadership
Honesty	Speed (of service delivery)
Impartiality	Value for money
Integrity	
Legality	
Loyalty	
Neutrality	
Quality service	

Source: MacCarthaigh 2008

Figure 4. Reasons given for changes in values

What are the drivers for changes in values?

Modernization reform pressures	External drivers
Public service reforms	Greater political expectations
Legislative change	Social change
Social partnership	EU
Less emphasis on precedent	Expectations of new staff members

Source: MacCarthaigh 2008

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