Miguel Segundo-OrtinUtrecht University | UU · Philosophy and Religious Studies
Miguel Segundo-Ortin
PhD in Philosophy
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30
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Introduction
I work in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences from an embodied and situated perspective. My primary research interests are the complementarities and tensions between ecological psychology and enactivism, the philosophy of minimal cognition (with a particular emphasis on plants), and the relationship between socio-cultural norms, perception, and individual agency. I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Wollongong, under the supervision of Prof. Daniel D. Hutto, Dr. Michael Kirchhoff, and Dr. Glenda Satne (as an associate supervisor)
Publications
Publications (30)
According to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of an empirically...
Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and...
Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cog...
Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by...
Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representati...
Maiese and Hanna (2019) argue that social institutions shape and transform our embodied minds, and that detrimental and harmful institutions can be reverted in order to promote mentally healthy, authentic, and fulfilling lives. This commentary aims to complement this proposal by understanding the role that narratives and narrative practices play in...
In their recent paper, Kingsland and Taiz argue that proponents of plant intelligence and plant neurobiology misuse historical sources to support their claims, suggesting a pattern of bias. They critique the reliance on subjective judgments and the systematic misuse of past literature by notable scientists. This response addresses their criticisms...
The behaviour settings approach was introduced as a means to study the variability of human beings’ behaviour outside the lab. More recently, it has been argued that it also provides a fruitful avenue for developing situated accounts of cognition. This article will provide a proof of concept for the latter suggestion, focusing on the science of sel...
Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-con...
Ecological psychology is one of the main alternative theories of perception and action available in the contemporary literature. This Element explores and analyzes its most relevant ideas, concepts, methods, and experimental results. It discusses the historical roots of the ecological approach. The Element then analyzes the works of the two main fo...
This article discusses the possibility of plant decision making. We contend that recent work on bacteria provides a pertinent perspective for thinking about whether plants make choices. Specifically, the analogy between certain patterns of plant behaviour and apparent decision making in bacteria provides principled grounds for attributing decision...
According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions...
This chapter focuses on Heft's ecological interpretation of behavior settings, and specifically on the question how to understand individual agency within this framework. We will argue that although Heft's remarks about agency offer promising suggestions, they do not yet provide a full-fledged account of how agency can be understood as being situat...
We explore the nature of expert minds in skilled performance by examining classic Japanese dramatist Zeami’s account of skilled expertise in Noh drama. Zeami characterizes expert minds by the co-existence of mushin and riken no ken. Mushin (“no-mind”) is an empty state of mind devoid of mental contents. Riken no ken (“seeing with a separate seeing”...
Although it is a common claim in the ecological psychology literature that our perception of the environment’s affordances is influenced by socio-cultural norms, an explanation of how this is possible remains to be offered. In this paper, I outline an account of this phenomenon by focusing on the ecological theory of perceptual learning. Two main t...
Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction, between two agents and one object. When describing the interpersonal dimension of this triangle they frame it as a form of simulation, theorizing or both, involving representations of the other agent’s mental states - representation of representations -...
A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines eco...
Unlike animal behavior, behavior in plants is traditionally assumed to be completely determined either genetically or environmentally. Under this assumption, plants are usually considered to be noncognitive organisms. This view nonetheless clashes with a growing body of empirical research that shows that many sophisticated cognitive capabilities tr...
This special issue highlights the growing interdisciplinary interest in minimal cognition, bringing together a number of philosophers and scientists interested in investigating where, how, and why cognition arises. In what follows, we introduce the topic of minimal cognition by giving a brief look at debates and discussions about the lower bounds o...
In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the te...
This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in...