

# THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF TEMPORALITY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Michael G. Flaherty

---

## ABSTRACT

The social psychology of temporality suffers from the neglect of two intellectual traditions: symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. The writings of representatives from these two perspectives are reviewed in an attempt to show that symbolic interactionism and phenomenology are quite complementary, and that our understanding of temporality would be much enhanced if we would begin to synthesize them in our work. Both of these traditions teach us to use methods of naturalistic inquiry in the exploration of temporality as the latter is manifest in self-consciousness, interaction, and social realities.

## INTRODUCTION

A concern for the "neglect" of temporality may seem misplaced when one stops to consider the vast number of studies which focus upon the temporal facets of

---

**Studies in Symbolic Interaction, Volume 8, pages 143–155.**

**Copyright © 1987 by JAI Press Inc.**

**All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.**

**ISBN: 0-89232-719-7**

human conduct and experience. It is true that philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists have generated extensive literature on this topic—research which no student of temporality can afford to ignore. Yet, what of sociology? Durkheim ([1912] 1954) led sociologists toward the exploration of temporality in the early days of our discipline, but not nearly enough of us have followed his lead during the ensuing decades (Moore 1963). This, despite the eminently social character of temporality as well as its importance for societies of every type.

The sociology of temporality is deficient not only in terms of quantity, but also in quality. It has been many years since Sorokin ([1943] 1964, p. vii) protested the misbegotten way in which most members of our discipline think about time:

The prevalent sociological conceptions . . . of time, and of space are taken from the natural sciences. While adapted to a study of physico-chemical and partly biological phenomena, these concepts are far from being adequate for the study of the sociocultural world.

It is ironic that this naive, though nonetheless pervasive, image of temporality is no longer accepted in the natural sciences where Einstein's relativity has supplanted Newton's classical mechanics (Hendricks 1982).

Much of what is published on the sociology of time consists of criticism or suggestions (Hardesty 1982; Heirich 1964; Sorokin and Merton 1937). Indeed, if this area of inquiry has been slow to develop, it may be due, in no small degree, to the disproportionate effort we expend in deciding how to proceed, instead of allocating that energy for empirical investigation. And, of course, this paper offers still another set of objections and recommendations primarily justified because they differ from those which have preceded them.

It will be argued that the social psychology of temporality suffers from negligence with respect to two intellectual traditions: symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. This inattention has contributed to an impoverishment of the conceptualization of temporality. In addition, an attempt will be made to demonstrate that these two perspectives are quite complementary, and that our understanding of temporality would be greatly improved if we would begin to integrate them in our work.

## SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

The roots of symbolic interactionism can be traced to the writings of persons who did not think of themselves as proponents of that particular outlook. Certainly William James and George Herbert Mead are two of these people. The phrase, "symbolic interactionism," does not appear until 1937 when we see it used by Herbert Blumer (1969, p. 1) as a name for his new approach to the observation and analysis of interpersonal relations. Still, it is well known that James was a formative influence on Mead, and that in turn, Mead's ideas strongly shaped

those of Blumer. These three men have much to teach us about the examination of temporality, and their contributions will be discussed in this section of the paper.

For James (1890, p. 605), the focus of inquiry is on "the perception of *time*." He begins by locating the foundation for an awareness of temporality in the linkage between memory and expectation. We awaken to the world in all its wonder, and the acknowledgement of these sensations attenuates slowly. Moreover, one quickly learns to anticipate things based upon one's memories of similar circumstances. But what is it that remembers, and what is it that expects? In other words, what entity synthesizes the incoherency of experience into an orderly sense of continuity?

James answers these questions by plunging introspectively into the stream of consciousness. From this vantage point, he recognizes that we are never capable of apprehending the full immediacy of that which occurs now, and he uses the notion of "*specious present*" in order to express its fundamental evasiveness (1890, p. 609). The present, then, is merely an abstraction where, in metaphorical fashion, we sit "saddle-back" looking forward into the future and backward into the past.

According to James (1890, p. 609), the basic "unit of composition of our perception of time is a *duration*." Reflexivity marks time's progress even in the absence of clocks since we are cognizant of so many of those corporal rhythms which characterize our physical existence. This brings us to the heart of the matter, for it is consciousness which remembers and expects, consciousness which integrates experience into an image of continuity, and consciousness which endures.

James (1890, p. 642) identifies the stream of consciousness as "the original intuition of time." His (1890, p. 624) report on the subjectivity of temporality alerts us to the fact that our sensation of duration changes; it is neither a psychological nor a sociological constant, but is, rather, a social psychological variable, and one which alters in response to the individual's confrontation with his or her surroundings:

a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing, but in retrospect short.

This line of inquiry brought James to the threshold of interpersonal relations, but he did not push the analysis much beyond the confines of mentality.

Mead brings the exploration of temporality out of mind, and puts it into the process of social interaction. He (1938, p. 289; 1982, p. 117) views time as a product of "experience," and as such, it is differentiated across a spectrum of "temporal perspectives." Familiar with the writings of Einstein as well as those of Bergson, he was entirely comfortable with the notion that one's sense of

temporality constantly shifts in accordance with the part one plays in the drama of any given situation.

With James, Mead (1982, p. 131) refers to the "specious present" because of its elusive qualities. Specious though it may be, Mead (1964, p. 336) restricts the appellation of reality to current conduct since "our pasts are always mental in the same manner in which the futures that lie in our imaginations ahead of us are mental." The contention that future possibilities develop from the actualities of social interaction is not as startling as the insight that the past is also shaped by contemporary events, but both arguments grow out of Mead's focus on the creative qualities of human nature in interpersonal relationships.

There is an unsophisticated tendency to look upon the past as nothing more than a set of irrevocable facts, but Mead (1964, p. 337) knew that "the novelty of every future demands a novel past." Otherwise, there would be no room in the universe for spontaneity. He (1964, p. 322) pointed out that "Each generation and often different minds within a generation have discovered different pasts." This constant redefinition of the past frees the present from the dead hands of historical determinism, and thereby allows improvisation. Consequently, Mead (1964, p. 323) concludes that "the past is a working hypothesis that has validity in the present within which it works but has no other validity."

Given the foregoing interpretation of the past, that which Mead (1938, p. 219) calls the "knife-edge present" is forever cutting into a future which cannot be fully predicted. This can be attributed to the impulsive phase of the self as it is manifest in human conduct. Mead's (1934) famous distinction between two moments of the self in interaction is, in fact, largely drawn upon their divergent temporalities. There is the "me" which represents the self as object—the backward glance at (and evaluation of) performance based upon one's acquaintance with social expectations. It is the "I," however, which forces "movement into the future," and Mead (1934, p. 177) asserts that "action of the 'I' is something the nature of which we cannot tell in advance."

Like jazz, the forms of social interaction coalesce and mutate through improvisation. Mead (1964, pp. 309, 313) was very sensitive to the property of "emergence" which is intrinsic to interpersonal relations, and he understood its implications for temporality: "Duration is always the happening of that which is novel." He was less impressed by the need to design a methodology as a guide for others who would delve into this extemporaneous skein of gestures and utterances.

Blumer (1969) does not treat temporality as a subject for exploration in its own right, but we are fortunate that he has labored to make explicit that which is merely implicit in Mead's legacy. In so doing, Blumer has formulated a set of theoretical as well as methodological principles which are crucial to a thoroughgoing comprehension of temporality.

The first of these premises "is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them" (1969, p. 2). The implica-

tion is that we cannot posit cultural consensus on some element of temporality, and then, in the style of Durkheim ([1912] 1954), grandly assume that everyone takes the same stance toward the resulting artifact. There is no gainsaying the operation of standardized temporal procedures, but Blumer's work demands that we ask ourselves what these procedures mean to persons who are immersed in everyday life. For example, one turns to the insightful research on terminal illness by Glaser and Strauss (1968, p. 166) where they note "the immense difference between the staff's and the patient's conceptions of time."

Blumer's (1969, p. 2) second premise states that "the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows." It is a fairly common experience to feel that time is passing either swiftly or leisurely, and such sensations are precipitated by events which transpire during interpersonal relations. This is apparent in Brendan Behan's (1959, p. 149) description of his feelings during a fight in a juvenile detention center: "I moved quickly, I suppose, but I remember everything as I went the few paces towards him, in slow motion . . . ."

The events which comprise an occasion do not act as crude stimuli for automatic responses. On the contrary, Blumer's (1969, p. 2) third premise reminds us "that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters." There is direct application of this principle for temporal experience in the tendency to translate subjective sensations of duration into standard units of temporality. As a case in point (Knox 1983, p. 326), observe how a soldier interprets his personal feelings for the sake of intersubjectivity:

I knew I didn't have time to get to the attic, so I dove for a closet just as two Jap officers came into the room. They had heard the piano from the street and had come in to play it themselves. Those son-of-a-guns must have played for an hour. Of course, it seemed like three months to me.

The third premise suggests that it may be fruitful to examine the juncture (or disjuncture) between individual and social interpretations of temporality.

Clearly, it is not enough to look at the artifacts of temporality: schedules, calendars, cultural periodicities, and so forth. The preceding principles bespeak a commitment to enter the stream of consciousness and conduct which persons weave together into encounters. Blumer (1969, pp. 34-5) asserts that we must "return to the empirical social world," and this "is the world of everyday experience." This can only be accomplished by "seeing the situation as it is seen by the actor," and this requires the use of interviews, participant-observation, introspection, and the analysis of "human documents" such as letters, diaries, autobiographies, reports in the popular press as well as literature (Blumer 1969, pp. 56, 119).

Symbolic interactionism has been all but roundly ignored by those sociologists

who study temporality. This has been the briefest of introductions to the writings of James, Mead, and Blumer on temporality, and their efforts do not exhaust the potential contribution of symbolic interactionism to the social psychology of time. Still, they are representative of a promise which has gone unfulfilled. The phenomenology of temporality has suffered a similar fate.

## PHENOMENOLOGY

Again, we have an approach to temporality which was affected by the work of someone who did not align himself with the subsequent movement. Bergson was not a phenomenologist, but his outlook is isomorphic with that of philosophers and sociologists who do identify with the latter school of thought such as Husserl, Heidegger, Minkowski, Schutz, and Luckmann. Their findings are reviewed in this section of the paper.

Bergson ([1889] 1910, pp. 107–108) contrasts the “homogeneous” time of clocks with the “heterogeneous duration of the ego.” Clock time is derived from cultural agreements and it is comprised of equal units while the sensation of duration varies idiosyncratically in association with the vagaries of subjectivity. Hence, the familiar fact that duration is sometimes felt to be protracted, and at other times it seems to be compressed. There can be no unit of measurement for the lived time of duration since consciousness is continuous in nature rather than discrete.

In concert with his contemporary, William James, Bergson ([1922] 1965, p. 44) believes that our sense of time’s passage would be literally unthinkable in the absence of human reflexivity where “our consciousness feels itself enduring.” Mind implies temporality for Bergson, and he is, if anything, more emphatic on this point than his American counterpart. His ([1922] 1965, p. 48) vehemence stems from a vision of mentality as indispensable to the experience of duration: “it is impossible to imagine or conceive a connecting link between the before and after without an element of memory and, consequently, of consciousness.”

Of great utility is Bergson’s ([1922] 1965, p. 62) insistence that “Real duration is *experienced*.” He reminds us that clocks, calendars, and schedules result from temporality, and that they are not its most direct manifestation. On the other hand, Bergson fails to unite lived time with the particulars of social interaction. The closest he comes to pulling temporality out of consciousness is his ([1922] 1965, pp. 70, 90) recognition of relativity—that is, the play of “multiple times” which “depend upon one’s point of view.”

Bergson’s concentration on the subjectivity of duration set the stage for Husserl’s ([1928] 1964, p. 22) “phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness.” Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 24) reiterates the necessity to enter the sensation of temporality, but he is also much more concerned with the need for systematic observation: “phenomenological data are the apprehensions of time, the lived experiences.” As the founding father of phenomenology, Husserl seeks a pre-

suppositionless science which is fully in touch with the immediacy of perception as well as introspection.

Husserl ([1928] 1964) echoes William James by acknowledging the operation of memory and expectation in one's experience of temporality. He illustrates his paradigm with the tonal succession and duration of a song. When we listen to a melody, we are only ever hearing (i.e., perceiving) one note at a time. Previous notes, as well as their order, are retained in consciousness through memory, while future notes are anticipated because of familiarity with the medium. Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 47) conceives of human beings as possessed of a "temporally constitutive consciousness" which constructs the sensation of duration from the raw material of memory, perception, and expectation.

This construction transpires as attention carries events past that which he calls the "now point"—a term akin to the notion of a "specious present." Therefore, when experience is bracketed by phenomenological reduction, Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 53) finds that "the essence of the intuition of time . . . is consciousness of *what has just been* and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration." His ([1928] 1964, p. 57) metaphor for this "retention" is a "comet's tail" since attention precedes memory, and the latter then trails off to varying lengths.

Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 57) refers to that memory which follows immediately upon the perception of an event as "primary remembrance." It is a lingering image or afterglow prior to interpretation, and it is the "comet's tail" which stretches out behind the senses. Subsequent to the cognitive registration of an event, there can occur that which Husserl calls "secondary remembrance" where a "new memory" is reconstituted from past impressions in harmony with the dictates of intentionality. This is the realm of recollection, reverie, and revisionism.

All is flux, and the future is born of these changes. Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 86) avows that the rule of one perception is ever overthrown by the next:

the now-moment is characterized as the new. The now, just sinking away, is no longer the new, but that which is shoved aside by the new. In this being-shoved-aside lies an alteration.

Husserl ([1928] 1964, p. 60) falls back upon "the unity of consciousness" in order to account for the way in which constant novelty becomes an experience of continuity, but he is not as mentalistic as Bergson. This is most apparent in his ([1928] 1964, p. 61) depiction of interpersonal relations as a concatenation of "temporally constitutive acts."

The phenomenological analysis of temporality was elaborated by Heidegger. He studied with Husserl while both men held positions at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger's ([1927] 1962, p. 61) phenomenology is "the science of the Being of entities—ontology." He ([1927] 1962, p. 379) asks "What does it mean to say, 'Time goes on' or 'Time keeps passing away?'" On the face of it,

such statements suggest an autonomy for temporality relative to human existence, but Heidegger denies this implication. His rendering of ontology indicates that human existence is intrinsically temporal in character.

Temporality cannot be an essential attribute of human existence without simultaneously serving as an indicator for the nature of this or that particular mode of existence. Therefore, Heidegger ([1927] 1962, p. 39) writes that "time . . . functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being." This hypothesis is of great salience for research on the temporal components of social interaction, and it resurfaces in the work of Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962) as well as that of Schutz and Luckmann (1973). The relevance of this hypothesis is that it attracts our attention to variation in interpersonal relations as the key factor shaping one's experience and one's exhibition of temporality.

For Heidegger, phenomenology is neither a theory nor a substantive school of thought; it is primarily a methodology. Moreover, he advocates a radical empiricism, and on this point, he ([1927] 1962, p. 50) is quite emphatic: "the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!'" We are instructed to remove all obstacles between our senses and the object of our inquiry. The resulting data document those properties necessary to the phenomenon in question. Heidegger ([1927] 1962, pp. 61, 187) argues forcefully that "the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*," and the goal of this activity is the "'intuition of essences'" which are "grounded in existential understanding."

Heidegger's ([1927] 1962, p. 68) methodology brings us back to ontology and the "priority of '*existensia*' over *essentia*." Temporality is manufactured from utterances and gestures—from our being here in the world with others. Time does not go on nor does it pass away. It is our conduct which comes and goes. Temporality can only be differentiated from human existence through abstraction. We act in this world, and it is our sequences, durations, periodicities, and simultaneities that mark the moments of our performances. Like J. Alfred Prufrock, we measure out our lives with coffee spoons (Eliot 1936).

Minkowski ([1933] 1970) is the next major figure who has a hand in the evolution of a phenomenology of temporality. He hearkens back to Bergson for his assertion that there is an insurmountable disjuncture between lived time and the time of clocks. Minkowski is especially attuned to this as a consequence of his inquiries into those temporal abnormalities which accompany various sorts of psychopathology. The following first person account (Coate 1968, p. 66) of a psychotic interlude evidences the kind of metamorphosis which piques his curiosity:

I went back into my own room and got into bed, but now I could not sleep, and this was dangerous for the room was filled with an unearthly light and my hand cast no shadow on the wall. The church spire which was a landmark from my window had disappeared, and time was passing at an altered speed. Time was stretched out like an elastic band, each minute of it was at once thinner and larger than usual.



Social psychologists can profit by his investigation of modulation in temporality brought on by the kinetics of subjectivity and situation.

In keeping with Heidegger, Minkowski ([1933] 1970, p. 25) sees temporality enmeshed in human existence, and this includes the "states of consciousness, as well as the events which unfold around us." Not only is activity "a phenomenon of temporal nature," but the emotions are also structured by temporality ([1933] 1970, pp. 25, 161). We fear that which has not yet happened, but we are angered by what has already transpired. Memory encompasses regret or remorse, while anticipation spawns hope and desire as well as dread. The blossoming of our conduct and consciousness thrusts us into the future. Being is time, and for Minkowski ([1933] 1970, p. 18), this means that time is also "becoming," and a "synonym of life in the broadest sense of the word."

Many of the foregoing themes unite in the writings of Schutz and Luckmann (1973). They stand upon the shoulders of James and Bergson as well as Mead and Husserl. Schutz and Luckmann (1973, p. 23) envision social reality as a mosaic that is composed of "finite provinces of meaning, upon each of which we could confer the accent of reality." These disparate realities are defined by engrossment; that is, one tends to bestow the accent of reality on anything that one becomes absorbed with in either a cognitive or an affective mode. Thus, they (1973, p. 22) conclude that the "source of all reality is subjective; everything that evokes our interest is real."

The salience of their polymorphous model is that temporality varies across the spectrum of realities. Schutz and Luckmann (1973, p. 27) aver that the "inner time of dreams . . . differs from the homogeneous space/time of natural science." Likewise, the temporality of violence diverges from standardized time in everyday life. Witness the following account (Baker 1985, p. 117) of a gun battle between an undercover policeman and a narcotics dealer:

I had this little .25 automatic hidden down in this like jockstrap. All I remember is trying to get into my fucking pants and he was shooting. That was a very bad situation that seems to be going by very slowly, when in fact it all happened within a matter of seconds.

Episodes such as the preceding one are indicative of that which Schutz and Luckmann (1973, p. 48) refer to as "the incongruence of the various temporal dimensions."

Left at that, their line of reasoning would proffer merely the statics of typology per se. It would advance little more than a classification of realities which correspond to peculiar temporalities of one kind or another. Happily, they (1973, p. 56) avoid the sterility of categories by adding the dynamics of subjectivity and interpersonal relations to their theory of temporality:

The temporal articulation of the stream of consciousness is determined by the tension of consciousness, which alters with transitions from one province of reality with finite meaning-

structure to another, as well as, to a lesser extent, with transitions from one situation to another within the everyday life-world.

Three fundamental levels of analysis—self, interaction, social reality—are synthesized most efficaciously in Schutz and Luckmann's formulation. It remains unfinished, however, since they do not specify *how* it is that mutations of situation or transformations of social reality change the experience of time within consciousness.

The phenomenology of temporality has met with no more acceptance than has symbolic interactionism. One looks in vain for any reference to either of these perspectives when consulting most sociological publications which are concerned with the topic of time. Nor has this short review done justice to phenomenological research on temporality, but space does not permit the more thorough discussion that this literature deserves. Still, the intention is served if these few paragraphs adumbrate the scope of what we are missing by alluding to the breadth and depth of phenomenological work in this field.

## SUGGESTIONS

Having surveyed, albeit cursorily, symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, let us now consider what they teach us about the study of temporality. In so doing, we can partition this curriculum into five vital lessons.

The first of these lessons is that *an understanding of self-consciousness is utterly indispensable to the comprehension of temporality*. This point is stressed by Bergson as well as James and practically every one of the other persons who followed in their footsteps. Cognitive processes are the bedrock for the individual's awareness of duration. Regardless of environmental circumstances, human beings *feel* (if nothing else) the succession of events formed by the blinking, beating, and breathing of their bodies. We must ask ourselves how these disparate pieces are fused by memory and anticipation.

The sensation of duration is relative to experience. Therefore, it behooves us to jettison the vestiges of Newton's clockworks. Data demand that we accede to the protean properties of temporality as they are manifest in subjectivity. Human existence is change, and the consciousness of change. By labelling the moments of self in interaction, Mead has given us words with which to speak of temporal alternations in mentality.

Examination of lived time illuminates the differentiation of duration among the populace. This fact should alert us to disjuncture between individual and social definitions of time. We return, then, to perhaps the central question in sociology: How is social order possible? In other words, how do we achieve temporal intersubjectivity given that there is great variation in the experience of duration at the level of subjectivity? The latter version of this issue is particularly

appropriate since the interplay of individual and collective phenomena is the special terrain of social psychology.

The second lesson is that *temporality is shaped by the forms and processes of social interaction*. This we learn from Mead and Blumer as well as Heidegger, Schutz, and Luckmann. Self-consciousness of duration is, in part, the result of one's own conduct, and, in part, a response to the behavior of other participants to an encounter. We try to imagine what comes next, but the future typically surprises us, and the past accumulates as the residue of those inferences. Moreover, our gestures and utterances must be timed to fit in with those of our fellow actors.

Sharp transitions from one form of interaction to another are said to alter the person's experience of time. Indeed, this paper has already exhibited several documents in which individuals testify to the sensation of anomalous temporality when the nature of their relations to others shifted abruptly. We need to know how this happens. What does the person attend to when the tempo of duration is felt to slow or quicken? This question will force us to investigate ties between the overt and covert sides of social interaction.

The importance of social interaction as a crucible for temporality is not restricted to outlandish incidents, although the drama of the latter can (like a microscope) prove useful by magnifying operative processes. Synchronization, periodicity, succession, and so on; where do these elemental ideas come from save primary socialization? Yet, too little effort has been aimed at the study of those contexts wherein children are inculcated with prevailing cultural images of time. We must delve into commonplace forms of interpersonal relations as well as deviance if we are to grasp fully the foundation for temporal intersubjectivity.

The third lesson is that *temporality is structured across a multiplicity of social realities*. This message is embedded in the writings of James, Heidegger, Schutz, and Luckmann. Like Chinese boxes, dreams, play, fraud, violence, and all of the other finite provinces of meaning confront us as worlds within worlds. Temporal characteristics of one subuniverse of social reality are frequently incommensurate with those of another. Consequently, temporality is a potential cue which helps the person organize his or her experience by aiding in the identification of the occasion—a requisite accomplishment if one is to merge gracefully with ongoing activity.

We need to map the topography of social realities as well as the boundaries of their respective temporalities. Divergent states of being tend to display distinct temporal modalities, but the transformation from one reality to another is, itself, often associated with profound modifications in the person's feeling of duration. What is it, precisely, that the individual apprehends, such that his or her sense of time changes? We should seek to discover not only what is perceived, but also how this information is processed.

This agenda is complicated by ambiguity in our definition of the concept "social reality." Is social reality coterminous with nothing more than personal

engrossment? James (1890), Thomas and Thomas (1928), Schutz and Luckmann (1973), as well as Goffman (1974) answer in the affirmative. Nevertheless, this seems to be a very subjective denotation. Whence its "social" properties? Clarification is necessary in order to make further headway toward deciphering the coded relationship between temporalities on the one hand and social realities on the other.

The fourth lesson is that *we require a methodology which pushes us into direct contact with the objects of our inquiries*. This comes to us from Heidegger as well as Blumer. Symbolic interactionists and phenomenologists are compatible both in terms of observation and the interpretation of data. There is no effective alternative to intruding on the immediacy of self-consciousness, interpersonal relations, and social realities, as these things are experienced by persons in everyday life. We desire an unalloyed empiricism which puts us in touch with the full sensuality of human existence. Here, I can do no better than paraphrase Susan Sontag (1966, p. 14): In addition to a hermeneutics, we need an erotics of temporality.

The fifth and final lesson is that *symbolic interactionism and phenomenology are complementary, and these two perspectives should be integrated in our research*. This dictum pertains not only to temporality, but also to other studies of human conduct and consciousness. Throughout the foregoing pages, care has been taken to highlight the parallels between the work of symbolic interactionists and that of phenomenologists in their explorations of time. The first four lessons represent crucial areas where these traditions coincide.

This is not to say that these outlooks are entirely redundant. Contrast is possible as well as comparison. The point is that our understanding of any particular phenomenon is facilitated by an eclectic interactionism where the emphasis is on investigation rather than debate about how to investigate. Blumer (1969, p. 141) once decried the inordinate amount of effort expended on what he called the "exegesis" of theoretical positions. An ecumenical approach could close some of those counterproductive cleavages which have been spawned by an unfortunate sectarianism in the field of social psychology.

## REFERENCES

- Baker, M. 1985. *Cops: Their Lives In Their Own Words*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Behan, B. 1959. *Borstal Boy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bergson, H. [1889] 1910. *Time and Free Will*. Translated by F. L. Pogson. New York: Macmillan.
- \_\_\_\_\_. [1922] 1965. *Duration and Simultaneity*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Blumer, H. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Coate, M. 1968. "The Cosmic Crises." Pp. 63-9 in *In Their Own Behalf: Voices from the Margin*, edited by C. H. McCaghy, J. K. Skipper, Jr., and M. Lefton. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Durkheim, E. [1912] 1954. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Translated by J. W. Swain. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

- Eliot, T. S. 1936. *Collected Poems 1909–1935*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Glaser, B. G., and A. L. Strauss. 1968. *Time for Dying*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Goffman, E. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hardesty, M. 1982. "Ethnomethodology and Symbolic Interactionism: A Critical Comparison of Temporal Orientations." *Symbolic Interaction* 5: 127–137.
- Heidegger, M. [1927] 1962. *Being and Time*. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. London: SCM Press.
- Heirich, M. 1964. "The Use of Time In the Study of Social Change." *American Sociological Review* 29: 386–397.
- Hendricks, J. 1982. "Time and Social Science: History and Potential." Pp. 12–40 in *Time and Aging: Conceptualization and Application in Sociological and Gerontological Research*, edited by E. H. Mizruchi, B. Glassner, and T. Pastorello. Bayside, New York: General Hall.
- Husserl, E. [1928] 1964. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Edited by M. Heidegger. Translated by J. S. Churchill: Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- James W. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1. New York: Henry Holt.
- Knox, D. 1983. *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Mead, G. H. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1938. *The Philosophy of the Act*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1964. *On Social Psychology*. Edited by A. Strauss. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1982. *The Individual and the Social Self*. Edited by D. L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. [1945] 1962. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by C. Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Minkowski, E. [1933] 1970. *Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies*. Translated by N. Metzger. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Moore, W. E. 1963. *Man, Time, and Society*. New York: Wiley.
- Schutz, A., and T. Luckmann, 1973. *The Structures of the Life-World*. Translated by R. M. Zaner and H. T. Engelhardt, Jr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Sontag, S. 1966. *Against Interpretation*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Sorokin, P. A. [1943] 1964. *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time*. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Sorokin, P. A., and R. K. Merton, 1937. "Social Time: Methodological and Functional Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 42: 615–629.
- Thomas, W. I., and D. S. Thomas. 1928. *The Child in America*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.