Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups[1]

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We hope in this article to bridge the gap between all those researchers who in the trail of Almond and Verba (1963) have investigated the relationship between civic culture and political participation and those that are primarily interested in multicultural democracy. In earlier research we have found a correlation between political participation and political trust of ethnic minorities on the one hand and the network of ethnic associations on the other. (Fennema/Tillie, 1999) In this paper we treat the network of ethnic organizations a proxy for civic community. It is a long established assumption that voluntary associations create social trust, which, in turn can spill over into political trust. But if voluntary associations generate trust why would interlocking directorates among such organizations add to it? Our answer is that trust can travel trough a network of interlocking directorates and by doing so increase. Civic community building is the creation of trust among organizations.

Bottom up, increased social trust may generate political trust because the citizens feel that their leaders are competent to monitor local government. The rank and file sees their leaders as their agents. Top down, interlocking directors can spread the political trust they themselves have within the ethnic community. By doing so, they act as an agent for the local government. In both cases the interlocking directors have an important broker function.

Finally we discuss whether this civic community is generated by factors that stem from the political opportunity structure in the host country or whether more weight should be given to those cultural factors that originate in the country of origin.

"The role of social trust and cooperativeness as a component of civic culture cannot be overemphasized. It is, in a sense, a generalized resource that keeps a democratic polity operating."

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, 1965:357

INTRODUCTION[3]

The theory of multicultural democracy has been focused on the question whether ethnic minorities have a right to keep their own ethnic institutions and may legitimately defend their cultural identities. (Kukathas, 1992, Kymlicka, 1995, Kymlicka and Norman, 2000, Young, 1990) Are ethnic minorities entitled to a separate political existence within or outside the host countries' institutional

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framework? And if so, under what conditions? The debate focuses on civil and political rights and on institutional structures. The theory is normative rather than empirically informed. It is about what states should do to migrants and what they should allow migrants to do. What migrants actually do within and without the political institutions of the host countries is assumed rather than investigated. The general assumption is that they do not participate enough and that this lack of participation is due biases in the political opportunity structure of the host countries. In The Netherlands this debate has arrived with some delay (Penninx and Slijper, 1999; Slijper, 2000) and yet, the practise of multicultural democracy in The Netherlands is rather advanced. The Netherlands is one of the few countries where foreign residents have voting rights at the local level and the four largest ethnic minorities are proportionally represented in the municipal councils of the four big cities. In this paper we will account for the differences in political participation among these four ethnic minorities. We will focus on the political process rather than on institutional structures.

The development of multi-ethnic societies in Western Europe has also given rise to a heated debate about post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994, Bauböck, 1994). In this debate it is assumed that massive immigration undermines the power and the legitimacy of the traditional nation-state. It has led to a substantial presence of so-called denizens (Hammar, 1985), foreign residents that have most but not all the social and civil rights that normal citizens have. These denizens are supposed to have less loyalty to the political institutions of their host country because they cannot fully participate and because they still consider themselves as nationals from another country. Increasingly they draw their civil rights claims from supranational sources especially the European Union legal framework. Again the debate on post-national citizenship is normative rather than empirically informed. The empirical deficiencies in these normative research traditions are now being amended by new lines of research set out by Koopmans and Statham (1999, 2000). This new research stems from social movement research (Kriesi et al. 1995) and focuses on claims making by immigrant groups. Koopmans and Statham found a substantial ethnic mobilisation at the national level, which proved to be influenced by the openness of the political opportunity structures. Our focus, like that of Koopmans and Statham, is on the democratic process rather than on democratic rights. We study ethnic group formation and political participation of ethnic minorities at the local level. Our research is empirical rather than normative. The only normative claim we make is that democracy is better than other forms of government and that political participation is good for democracy. First we report some findings on political participation and political trust of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam. After that we will try to provide a theoretical explanation for the different levels of political participation and political trust among ethnic groups.

The case of Amsterdam

In 1985 voting rights in local elections were granted to foreign residents in the Netherlands. All parties, including those who could not expect to profit from the extension of the electorate, endorsed the constitutional reform. They were concerned with the lack of integration of ethnic minorities and hoped that political integration would spill over into other forms of integration. (Jacobs, 1998) In the 1986 local elections representation of migrants became an issue as the parties on the left actively searched for 'migrant candidates' (Cadat and Fennema, 1998). Immigrants massively voted and continued to vote for the left wing parties. (Tillie, 2000) Since then the number of municipal councillors that originate from migrant communities has risen sharply, especially in the big cities. By 1998, the four largest migrant communities, the Surinamese, Moroccans, Turks and Antilleans, were represented proportionally in the municipal councils of the four big cities. (Berger et al., 2000) The polls also showed a progressive turnout of migrant voters until 1994. However, in the 1998 elections turnout of all migrant groups declined, especially in Amsterdam. Nevertheless ethnic minorities in Amsterdam have still a relative high level of political participation when measured by other indicators (see Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

Ethnic groups vary in their degree of political participation and political trust.

Turks show a higher voter turnout at municipal elections, they also participate more in other forms of local politics, they have a greater trust in political parties and governmental institutions and they are more interested in local politics. All these indicators show a stable rank-order: Turks score highest, followed by Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans.

Table 1
Voting turnout at municipal elections in Amsterdam, 1994 and 1998

	Municipal elections	
Ethnic group	1994	1998
Turks	67%	39%
Moroccans	49%	23%
Surinamese/Antilleans	30%	21%
Municipal turnout	*57%*	*46%*

(Source: Tillie, 1998; Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

Table 1 shows how dramatically voting turnout in Amsterdam dropped from 1994 to 1998 for all categories of voters. Turnout among Moroccan voters more than halves, Turkish voting decreases nearly 40 percent and the Surinamese and Antillean vote decreases with 30 percent. This drop is substantially more than the overall decrease in voters' turnout. While Turks had in 1994 a higher turnout than all other groups, including the autochthonous citizens, this is no longer the case in 1998. Yet the rank order of ethnic voters remains the same: Turks vote more often than Moroccans and Moroccans vote more often than Surinamese and Antilleans. We find the same rank order when we look at other forms of political participation, such as visiting meeting where matters concerning the neighborhood are discussed, active lobbying with respect to neighborhood issues and participation in neighborhood councils. And when we look at political trust, that is trust in political parties, the municipal council and in the Amsterdam civil servants, the Turks score highest, followed by the Moroccans, the Surinamese and, finally, the Antilleans (table 2).

Table 2
Political trust in Amsterdam

Ethnic group	*High trust score*	*N (100%)*
Turks	64%	109
Moroccans	40%	208
Surinamese	39%	297
Antilleans	25%	51
[Dutch]	59%	1595

(Source: Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

Turks show the highest degree of trust (compared to the other ethnic groups and also compared to the autochthonous population). Like in political participation, the Turks are followed by the Moroccans and Surinamese. Antilleans have the lowest degree of political trust. For more details we refer to Fennema and Tillie (1999).

We assume that the more the different ethnic groups vote and the more they trust the local political institutions the higher the quality of multicultural democracy. Multicultural democracy then is a democracy where ethnic minorities participate in the democratic process, thus providing the political elite with reliable information about the political preferences of the migrant population and the democratic institutions with popular legitimacy among the minority groups. In representative de-

mocracy elites play a central role in the articulation of political demands. (Manin, 1997) We assume that the possibilities for ethnic communities to present their preferences in the political arena depend at least partly on the integration of their ethnic leaders in the local power structure. In figure 1 we present a typology of political integration of ethnic groups based on the level of political participation of the members of the ethnic group and the degree of integration of the ethnic leaders in the local power structure. If both are high than we can call the ethnic group politically integrated. If the member of the ethnic group show a high degree of political participation but the ethnic elite is not integrated in the local power structure, we may call the ethnic group mobilized. If the elite of the ethnic group is well integrated but the rank and file does not participate we call the group pacified. Finally if the members of an ethnic group do not participate and the leaders of that group are not integrated into the power structure we call that group isolated.

Figure 1
Political participation and elite integration of ethnic minorities

		Degree of integration of the ethnic elite	
		High	**low**
Political participation Of all members of the Ethnic community	**High**	*Integrated*	*mobilized*
	Low	*pacified*	*isolated*

Turks in Amsterdam are best characterized as an integrated ethnic minority, while the Surinamese are more like a pacified ethnic minority. The Moroccans are somewhat in between, while the Antilleans are best characterized as an isolated ethnic minority (see Fennema et al., 2000).

Our results suggest that in Amsterdam multicultural democracy works better for Turks than for the other ethnic groups. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the Turks in Sweden. Turkish voter turnout has been consistently higher than ethnic voter turnout in general, since 1976. Only the Chilean and the German residents in Sweden show a higher voter turnout (Molina, 1999: 24). Research by Lise Togeby (1999) on electoral results in the two largest Danish cities has shown that in the local elections of 1998 in Århus Turks also had the highest voter turnout among ethnic minorities, but this was not the case in Copenhagen. In Århus, the voter turnout among Turks with (only) Turkish citizenship is higher than among Turks with Danish citizenship. In Copenhagen the voter turnout is highest among Turks with Danish citizenship. This seems to indicate that ethnic identity has a positive effect on political participation in Århus but not in Copenhagen. Ethnic culture as such – although apparently important – cannot fully explain the differences in voter turnout among ethnic groups. And the other way around: Turks contribute more to local democracy than other ethnic groups. In the remainder of this article we will present the theoretical argument why this is so.

Social trust and the structure of civic community

In our study of ethnic groups in Amsterdam the concept of *civic community* is invoked to explain political participation and trust in political institutions. The concept of civic community refers to voluntary associations of free citizens that are set up to pursue a common goal or a common interest. These associations are supposed to generate social trust. Trust is defined here as good will among the members of an association which leads to risk taking in the decision to engage in interaction with other members of that association. (Cf Coleman, 1990: 91 ff) The concept of social capital refers to surplus capacity. Social capital allows x to do what she otherwise would not be able to do. X can either be an individual (x) or a group (X). According to Lin (1999: 35) social capital can be defined as "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions." Flap (1999) has operationalized the concept of social capital in terms of network size, the nature of ties and the resources possessed by those in the network. All theorists of social capital seem to share the conviction that the concept consists of two related but analytically separable elements: structure and content. The structural element is often called association and is

referred to as x' network or the network X. The content is referred to as trust and can be defined as an attitude of members towards x (often referred to as the *reputation* of x) or the attitude of x towards all members of X (*generalized trust*). The concept of social capital can be visualized in a network consisting of points and lines of trust relation between these points. It therefore is redundant to speak of social capital in terms of social networks on the one hand and trust on the other, as if trust is an attribute of actors independent from the structure of the network. It is not. Trust is a relational concept that refers either to the network position of the individual in the group or to the network characteristics of the group as a whole. It takes at least two to trust. Trust is always embedded. Already in its earliest formulation, that of David Hume, the concept of trust is emphatically relational. "Your corn is ripe to-day; mine is ripe to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid me to-morrow." (Hume as cited in Putnam 2000) According to Hume there cannot be society without trust.

When we speak of a society, we assume that trust among members of that society – even between those that belong to different groups – should be higher than the trust between members and non-members of that society. In a fragmented society social trust will be higher within groups than between groups. Thus an ethnically divided society will have low levels of social trust at the national level, yet one may find high levels of social trust within the ethnic communities. It may therefore in an ethnically divided society be useful to look for civic community within ethnic group rather that at the level of society as a whole.

Since the acute observations of Alexis de Tocqueville we tend to believe that the quality of democratic governance resides in voluntary associations. "Thus the most democratic country in the world now is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires…". Tocqueville then asked himself: "Is that just an accident, or is there really some necessary connection between associations and equality?" (Tocqueville, (1840) 1990: 275).

Indeed, what is it exactly that makes these associations so crucial for democracy? In the first place, so it seems, it is their *voluntary* character. As an alternative to loyalty, members of voluntary organizations have always the option of exit and that gives their voice a natural strength. Since each member can withdraw from it, the free will of the associates is the bottom line of the organization. Their support can never be taken for granted; the potential members must be 'seduced' to join. Forced co-operation can do the same trick, as is shown in aristocratic societies. But in such societies citizens are not free and independent. An elected government can also enforce co-operation for a common goal, but that would easily lead to democratic despotism. In both cases – in aristocratic societies and in centralised state-oriented democracies – vertical relations predominate, whereas in a society made of voluntary associations horizontal relations predominate. This brings us to the second aspect of voluntary associations: the importance of *horizontal* relations. Voluntary associations somehow have to treat their members as free and autonomous subjects and allow for horizontal relations. Horizontal relations make that that members of an association not only have the option of exit, but also that of voice. Through horizontal organization member can monitor their boards - even if these boards are not democratically elected. Disapproval of the leadership's policies can be aired and leadership is held accountable to the rank and file. The third element of voluntary associations that accounts for its political mobilisation potential is *trust*. Trust is needed to solve the collective action dilemma inherent in any purposive group. In all instances it is created and maintained because the members have mechanisms to monitor each other. Voluntary associations can be based on common interests, on shared values or on a common identity. If trust within associations is based on common interest only, we will call it calculated or strategic trust (Williamson, 1996: 272), if based on shared values we call it virtue and if it is based on a shared identity we call it loyalty. Ethnic association are always based on a common identity, they may be also based on common interests (in the case of ethnic sporting clubs) or on shared values (in the case of political or religious associations). Civic virtues teach citizens to contribute to the common good even if such contribution would be detrimental to their short-term private interest. The virtuous citizen is well aware of the fact that a free rider strategy is ultimately self destructive because if all citizens refuse to contribute to the common good, collective goods are impossible to obtain. He is therefore willing

to contribute to the common good on the condition that others make the same sacrifices. In this case strategic trust and virtue overlap. Hence citizens in a civic community behave virtuous and see to it that other citizens behave virtuous as well.

Membership of voluntary associations, so the advocates of civic community maintain, breeds capacities that citizens need to do something about bad governance by engaging in a process of political mobilization. Thus, voluntary associations are a hotbed of civic engagement and social trust.

Stolle (1998) has recently challenged the assumption that associations create trust by demonstrating that, at least in Sweden, voluntary associations do not socialise its members into trusting citizens. "It is not true that the longer and the more one associates, the greater one's generalized trust" (Stolle, 1998: 521). It is the other way around: voluntary associations attract trusting citizens in a process of selective recruitment. Apparently, social trust cannot simply be 'produced' by associations and other civic institutions. Newton (1999: 172) also found but a weak relationship between membership of voluntary associations and social trust in established democracies. Yet Marc Hooghe (1999) has shown that such a relationship *does* exist if past membership of voluntary associations is taken into account. So even if we must conclude that in a synchronic model membership of voluntary associations do not generate trust, in a diachronic model it does. Voluntary associations have a socialising effect upon their members. They are indeed the cradle of civic engagement. Former members of voluntary associations tend to be more positively oriented towards their neighbourhood and tend to have a stronger sense of political efficacy and political trust. Hooghe's findings are in line with the conclusions that Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) has drawn for Italy and for the United States.

Sigrid Rossteutscher (2000), however, argues that voluntary associations may just as well foment a political culture that is anti-democratic and thus undermines democratic governance rather than supporting is. Referring to the nationalist associations at the turn of century in Germany she argues that voluntary association may very well amplify an authoritarian and nationalist political culture. Rossteutscher makes a point that is very relevant to the present study. Indeed, many ethnic associations in Amsterdam have a nationalist orientation and are not particularly favourable to democratic values. Why then should these associations contribute to the democratic process? The answer is twofold. First, as Rossteutscher herself argues, these associations may contribute to the democratic process is the environment is sufficiently civic. This is so because associations have a culture of deliberation. Almost by definition, members of associations debate amongst each other, which in turn tends to lead to increased levels of political interest. Secondly, if these associations operate in a democratic framework they will profit from accepting the 'rules of the game'. We can illustrate the point by referring to the internal struggle within the Turkish Islamic organizations between the old guard that rejects the political culture in The Netherlands and wants to stay away from Dutch politics and the younger generation that speaks fluently Dutch and advocates an active participation in local politics because that is conceived to be beneficial to the association's mission (Sunier, 1996). The same Milli Görüs that has been banned in Germany for its anti-democratic radicalism, participates actively and seemingly loyally in the Amsterdam democratic arena. Nothing adds more to a process of deradicalization than participation in democratic institutions. Maoists as well as fascists were well aware of that. Civic engagement is not in itself democratic but within democratic governance it tends to become so. Horizontal links tend to become stronger at the expense of the vertical ones.

In vertical networks the trust that is needed to collaborate for a common endeavour is not generalized but narrowly focused on the principal, be it the 'lord', the 'godfather' or the 'government'. This goes for all hierarchical organizations, including feudal communities, Communist Parties or the Mafia, where horizontal linkages are discouraged. The difference between a Mafia organization and a civic community is that in a civic community obligations are not personalized and the norms that guide behaviour tend to be universalistic rather than particularistic. Even an elected national government is 'sovereign', which means that it can enforce its will upon the citizens. The relationship between governments – even if elected - and its 'subjects' is essentially vertical. Once again, such vertical relationships may very well be based on trust, but trust in vertical relations is not based on

self-reliance and it is not generalized trust. Trust in government is, in other words, necessarily a vertical relationship as it is based on dependency rather than on equality. In a civic society citizens comply with collective rules out of conviction rather than out of personal loyalty or fear, and free riders are sanctioned by all citizens rather than only by the principal.

In hierarchical organizations personal trust can be very high if personal loyalties are strong and if the penalties for defection are heavy. In a civic community the sanctions for defection seem less severe and certainly less spectacular, partly because social trust is not vertically organized and not oriented towards a principal.

Generalized trust does not have to be reciprocal. One does not have to return the favour one has received from A back to A, one may also return it to B, C, D or E, on the condition that B, C, D, and E do the same thing. The wider the circle of actors that one can repay the favours received from one of them, the more social capital is invested in the group. Yet, even in a civic association there is a limit to the range of trust. As Flap (1999) says, there will be a discount rate to the present value of future help. If the chances for ego to be repaid for his present aid to B, C or E become lower, ego will be less inclined to help B, C, or E. Increasing the size of the association decreases the chances that ego will be repaid if communication within the group does not increase with the same speed. We know from network theory that the number of possible links among the members of a group increases by ½ n (n-1). Thus, other things being equal, it seems more difficult to maintain trust in a large group than in a small one. But other factors also influence the creation and maintenance of social capital. If the social distance between the association and the rest of society is large, members are strongly dependent on the group because they cannot defect. Social trust, then, is dependent on the closure of social groups. The more ego is dependent on the group, the more important for ego is the reputation (s)he holds within the group and the higher the group's social control.

In our argument so far there is one missing link from associational life to civic community. Why should trust that has been built up in one voluntary association spill over to other organizations and to the public space? Why should members of voluntary associations more readily collaborate in a common endeavour which is not part of the mission of the association of which they are members and why should they be more likely to be self-confident in politics and trust the government? In other words, why should dedicated members of a church choir or a bowling club be good citizens?

There are two answers to this question. The first is that trust is related to civility and becomes a generalized attitude that is not restricted to the association where it originally developed. This answer stresses the cultural aspect of civil society. It is based on the assumption that the norms and values of a voluntary association have a civic core that has wider implications than the group in which such norms and values are embedded. Voluntary associations create civic virtues among its members and these virtues are transferred to a wider circle of associational activities that make up civil society. The second, institutionalist answer is that in a civic community voluntary associations communicate amongst each other through informal contacts and because their membership and boards overlap. Here the structural side of civil society is emphasized. Interlocking directorates among voluntary associations play a crucial role in the formation of civil society because they create permanent communication channels between different organizations. We would therefore expect a strong civic community to have many voluntary associations that are horizontally connected through interlocking directorates. Even though these horizontal relations in the form of interlocking board memberships exist only at the elite level, they form a crucial element in the formation of civic communities. Of course, interlocking directorates are also a form of social capital for the carriers of such interlocks. Ethnic leaders that sit on the board of many ethnic associations have more social capital than those who sit on the board of just one ethnic association.

We will focus in this paper on the institutional aspects of civil society. Only at the end we will come back to the cultural aspects. Organizations seem to us paramount to the building and maintenance of social trust. Indeed, the probability that each man – or woman – returns the favours that have been done to him in a indeterminate future will increase if he knows that he or she is being moni-

tored and that he can be sanctioned if he does not return the favours in due time. But trust cannot travel among organizations unless there are institutional links among these organizations. *Civic community building is the creation of trust among organizations.* In connected networks of voluntary associations norms and values can be maintained through the circulation of information that builds and destroys reputations of its members. Not just the power holders can collect evaluative information about each of the members but everybody can, because evaluative information circulates through newspapers and other mass media. In this sense even gossip builds social capital. (Wittek, 1999) The larger the amount of horizontal linkages, the more egalitarian is the community structure. The denser these horizontally connected networks are, the more effective the mechanism of reputation formation. These two assumptions taken together lead us to the hypothesis that horizontal networks are more effective to build and destroy reputations in a community than are hierarchical ones. This does not mean, of course, that such networks are more efficient in all respects. What it means is that they are better equipped to maintain social norms and social cohesion. If the social norms are focused upon co-operation then the community that is formed by a fully connected network with many horizontal ties has a lot of social capital. Social capital at the group level can be defined as the capacity of a group to produce collective goods and pursue common goals. (Coleman, 1990, Putnam, 1993, 2000, Fukuyama, 1995 and 1999). It is operationalized in this paper as the relative number of voluntary associations and the connectivity of the network of personal interlocks among these voluntary associations plus the level of trust in the community formed by this network of organizations. [4] In table 3 the summary results are presented. The first row gives the rank order for the number of voluntary organizations that were found in the files of the Chamber of Commerce. We considered this an indication of formalization of the civic community even though it does not exclude the possibility that some of these organization were no more than just 'paper organizations'. We find that Turks have the largest number of organizations, followed by Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. The second row indicates the rank order according to the number of organizations that have no interlocks with any other ethnic organization (the lower the percentage of isolated organizations the higher the rank order). Here we find that the Moroccan community scores highest (that is has the lowest number of isolated organisations), followed by the Turkish community, the Surinamese and then the Antillean community. The third row gives the rank order according to the total number of interlocking directorates in the network. The final row is a civic community index based on the ranking in the first three rows. The lower the index the higher the civic community score.

Table 3
Organizational and network indicators of civic community

Ethnic group	(1) Organizations In network	(2) Isolated organizions	(3) No. of interlocks	(4) Civic Community
	N	as % of (1)	N	Index
Turks	89	46	62	4
Moroccans	82	39	45	5
Surinamese	70	71	12	9
Antilleans	35	80	8	16

(Source: calculated from Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

We found that Turks in Amsterdam have many voluntary associations and these associations are well connected through a network of interlocking directorates. The Turkish community in Amsterdam is the most 'civic' of all ethnic communities, followed by the Moroccans, the Surinamese and finally the Antilleans that show the smallest degree of civic community when measured in terms of

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[4] Individual social capital, on the other hand, refers to the empowerment of actors because they are embedded in a social network and they have a certain reputation within that network. Individual social capital has been termed ego's 'second order resources' by Jeremy Boissevain (1974).

ethnic associations and their interlocking directorates. The differences in the strength of civic community become even more impressive when we also look at the use of ethnic newspapers and television (Table 4).

Table 4
Frequency reading 'ethnic newspapers'

Ethnic group	Percentage regular readers	N (100%)
Turks	51%	109
Moroccans	15%	209
Surinamese	4%	297
Antilleans	-	-

(source: Fennema and Tillie, 1999)

Turks have the best organizational means to solve their own problems, and are less in need for government support. Yet, their political participation and their trust in local politics is much higher than that of the other ethnic groups (table 1 and 2). This illustrates our theoretical point: those groups that are best equipped to provide for collective goods themselves by means of voluntary associations are also best equipped to monitor local government and confident that political institutions provide good governance.

An important element of our theoretical model is the relation between the ethnic community and the local polity. We will therefore focus on the external relations of the *leaders* of an ethnic community. We assume that the political impact of the social capital of the ethnic community largely depends on the relations of these ethnic leaders with the power structure of the multi-ethnic society. If the leaders of an ethnic group have many contacts with the dominant group this indicates a high level of social integration, if they have hardly any such contacts, the ethnic group is not integrated. The group is then either mobilised or isolated (see figure 1).

Table 5 presents the results of a survey among the political elites of the ethnic groups in four big cities in Holland. The figures are based on three questions where we asked to name five persons the respondent would consult in case of an important career decision (1), the choice of school for their children (2) and when looking for a new house (3). In each case we asked to indicate the ethnicity of the five advisors.

Table 5
Personal advisors of ethnic politicians within their own group, from the Dutch community and from within other ethnic groups

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese
% personal advisors within own group	30	25	35
% Dutch advisors	45	33	30
% personal advisors from other ethnic groups	25	42	35

(Source: Fennema et.al.2000)

Turkish leaders have substantially more Dutch advisors than Moroccan and Surinamese leaders. Surinamese politicians have the smallest number of Dutch advisors. Turks, that have the strongest civic community, also have leaders that are best integrated in the Dutch elite structure. These results run counter to the general idea among experts in Holland, who assume that the Surinamese elites, because they share the language and some history with the Dutch, are better integrated in

Dutch society.[5] The stronger the ethnic community the better the ethnic elite seems integrated in the local community.

Multicultural democracy and ethnic identities

We assume that social trust in ethnic communities will spill over into trust in local political institutions if community leaders are integrated in the political system. This may work bottom up as well as top down. Bottom up the political trust will increase when members of the ethnic community can monitor their ethnic leaders by way of the reputation ladder of these leaders in the community. The higher the level of participation of the members of an ethnic group in the ethnic associations and the higher the trust of the rank and file in the directors of these associations the higher the quality of multicultural democracy. We have not yet collected information on the trust that the rank and file of different ethnic groups in Amsterdam has in their own ethnic leaders, but we expect that the trust in their own ethnic leaders is highest among the Turks and lowest among the Antilleans. We do have an additional argument that is supported by previous research. Lelieveldt (2000) found that associations have very good access to the local government and he suggests that they have much better access than individuals. Furthermore he found a relation between network centrality of voluntary organizations and political participation. If this is true ethnic groups with many voluntary associations have better access to the local power structure than ethnic groups that lack such associations. This may increase the trust in political institutions among ethnic groups with a strong civic community.

Top down, political trust will increase if the leaders are able to 'spread' their trust in and their commitment to the political institutions through the network of interlocked ethnic associations. Those leaders that are big linkers themselves have more change of doing so that leaders that lack this form of social capital. Of course, ethnic leaders will only do so, if they consider political institutions as efficient and fair. If the government has an open ear for the demands of ethnic groups this will also increase the political commitment of ethnic leaders to the political institutions. Good governance itself creates political trust among citizens (Levi, 1998, Rothstein, 1998), but it does so in a two-step flow of communication (Katz, 1957).

We assume that political participation is related to the social capital of the group because individual members can more easily get access to the political arena through the ethnic networks and because social trust increases the self-confidence and political efficacy of the individual members of the civic community. But why should this civic community have an ethnic identity? Why is it that the civil society in Amsterdam is organized along ethnic lines? According to Bo Rothstein social trust must be 'produced' by collective memories, that is, by specific constructions of the past that are sometimes deliberately created to forge a cohesive community. Essential parts of these collective memories are historical sites and traditions, which are more often than not 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm, 1983, Galema et al., 1993). In the case of ethnic groups these traditions are derived from the national culture of the country of origin. Many authors have pointed out that this 'ethnic culture' is quite often a remake or even a caricature of the national culture, that ethnicity can be considered 'a myth' (Steinberg, 1989). Even an ethnic myth, however, can be very helpful to create social trust among the members of the ethnic group because it creates a shared identity. According to Weinstock (1999) there are causal relationships between loyalty (based on shared identity), strategic trust (concurrence of individual ends), virtuous trust (shared values) and unity of the group. We find these three dimensions of trust in all ethnic groups to some extent. Yet Turks score high on ethnic loyalty, virtuous trust and strategic trust. There conception of nationhood is strong, their religion provides them with shared values while their political culture allows them to make strategic alliances. Turks tend socialize much more the members of the own ethnic group than the other ethnic groups.

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[5]What it also shows is the high amount of intimate connections between the political elites from different ethnic background. Here Moroccan score highest: they have even more advisors from other ethnic groups than from their own ethnic community.

There is reason to believe the collective memory of Turks in Amsterdam has more elements that can bolster social trust than the collective memories of Surinamese and Antilleans. Earlier research has shown that the ethnic leaders are well aware of these differences. A Turkish member of the town council stated: "Surinamese people are never sure of themselves, they lack self-confidence." And with reference to the Turkish group: "We Turks are proud, and we have been raised proudly, because we have colonized other countries. This is also true for left-wing people. I have noticed that Turkish people are very self-confident, wherever they are." (Cadat and Fennema, 1998:107) Indeed, Turkish politicians use their ethnic culture as a shield against Dutch dominance: "They (*the Dutch*, MF/JT) know everything about them (*the Surinamese*, MF/JT), thus they can more easily dominate them than they can dominate us. We say 'We are Turks' and they have not a clue about our culture and our outlook." (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 109) Surinamese do not show a lot of ethnic consciousness. A Surinamese politician expressed this by saying: "We have always been Dutch, except that we lived overseas" (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 102). This difference in ethnic consciousness and the self-confidence that goes with it may partly explain the differences in ethnic organisation between the Turks and the Surinamese. Thus importance of collective memories and the content of such collective memories shape the civic community of ethnic groups and have an impact on the amount of social trust within these ethnic communities.

But even if all ethnic groups would have a high level of civic community and social trust, multi-ethnic societies are still likely to lack good governance because of the difficulty to form a well-connected *interethnic* civic community. Ethnic communities tend to be exclusive and therefore the binary connectivity between ethnic communities tends to be low. Even if this does not lead to ethnic strife, the lack of connectivity in civil society may cause low levels of trust. Lijphart (1968) has suggested that the lack of social trust between different communities that make up civil society can be made up for by elite-co-operation. If a polity consists of a number of disconnected civic communities, inter-elite strategic trust becomes all-important, as the Dutch example of consociationalism has shown. Critics of consociationalism have argued that this may lead to good governance, but not to democratic governance (Fennema, 1976; Huntington, 1981) Be it as it is, a fragmented civil society is better than no civil society at all. In such fragmented civil society the bridges that connect the otherwise isolated parts of the network become extraordinary important because it are the only routes along which the social trust can travel. The persons that form these bridges may strategically exploit this importance.

The Netherlands is a case in point. Religious segmentation has only in the twentieth century led to a system of pillarization (*Verzuiling*), in which each religious group formed voluntary associations of its own that were heavily interlocked at the elite level. The denominational civic communities thus formed were called 'pillars'. Subsequently, a system of denominational elite collaboration was established around 1917. The 1917 political compromise led up to state policies that favoured the creation of even more denominational associations. Arend Lijphart (1968) has coined the concept consociational democracy for such political accomodation through strategic trust among the denominational elites. Even though Lijphart himself has suggested that consociational democracy requires a certain passivity and deference of the rank and files, one might also argue that there cannot be a properly functioning consociational democracy without strong a civic community within each of the pillars. Indeed, the contemporary Dutch 'polder model', which is based on consensus by consultation, may well depend heavily on strong civic tradition that have been built up in the old consociational democracy. The specific mode of civic community building in the twentieth century was largely a result of a political compromise and a conscious effort of the Dutch state to support voluntary associations. The Netherlands might well be a perfect example of what is nowadays called associative democracy (Hirst, 1994, Vertovec, 1999).

Policies of civil society building have also been applied to the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands after WWII. Ethnic organizations have been subsidized from the 1960's onward and the maintenance of ethnic culture has not only been tolerated, but also actively promoted. This was not done to bolster local democracy. Rather, the government was accustomed to farm out subsidies to organizations that could maintain local community structure and organize social welfare among minority groups. Even voting rights for foreign residents, granted in 1985, were not given because of any

democratic impulse (Jacobs, 1998). Rather it was an – quite successful - attempt to integrate the different ethnic group into Dutch political arenas and to obtain a certain loyalty of these groups towards the political institutions at the local level. The development of ethnic communities was at least partly an unintended result of political opportunity structures and government policies that prevailed in The Netherlands until 1990.[6]

These 'minority policies' that were largely implemented by the municipalities seem to have had a positive impact on local democracy. Until 1994 voter turnout of the minority groups was surprisingly high. One third of the councillors now has an ethnic background. (Berger et al. 2000) Yet, the positive impact of minority policies on political participation and political trust among migrant groups in Amsterdam does not account for the large differences among the different ethnic groups. The stable hierarchy among the different groups in terms of civic community, political participation and political trust in which Turks have the lead, followed by Moroccans, then Surinamese and finally Antilleans, point in the direction of a culturalist explanation. It is very likely that at least part of the social capital of the different ethnic groups derives from the country of origin. The fact that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are largely patterned along the lines of political and religious cleavages that exist in Turkey points in this direction. But there are other indications are well. Former research has shown that many migrant politicians come from families that were already involved in politics in the country of origin. Many of them even had been active themselves in political youth organizations. Before entering Amsterdam politics they had been active in ethnic organizations. (Cadat and Fennema, 1998: 101) Civic virtue and social capital seem to have migrated together with the ethnic groups. Furthermore, the migrant politicians themselves acknowledge the importance of political culture. As we have seen above, Turkish politicians – even those from left wing parties - maintained that they were able to cope better with ethnic discrimination than immigrants from the colonies because they considered themselves on par with the Dutch. They especially stressed the fact that Turkey has never been colonized. This shows that ethnic consciousness is not just a project of 'invented traditions,' it is anchored in all too real historical experience.

This would explain why Surinamese and Antilleans score consistently lower on the civic community index, why they participate less in Amsterdam politics and why they have less trust in the political institutions. We find comparable patterns of electoral turnout in Great Britain, where Indian voters have a higher turnout than white voters, while voters from Caribbean countries have a substantially lower turnout. (Saggar, 1998: 55) Here, as well as in The Netherlands, the explanation for the low participation of citizens from the Caribbean islands may be found in their history of colonisation and slavery.[7] In a multicultural society there are large differences in civic organization, political organization and political trust among ethnic groups that may well be explained by the history of the country of origin.

Such conclusion is, of course, difficult to digest for activist readers who are unwilling to wait for ages to see any improvement in democratic governance. Anti-racist activists and even some colleagues may suggest that such a conclusion is 'blaming the victim'. It is certainly a conclusion that suits a more contemplative if not conservative view on human progress. But is the conclusion inevitable? Is there no way to improve the quality of civil society by policy measures? Would it not be possible that government-policy props up the horizontal structures of civil society thus increasing social trust and the development of civic virtues? Tocqueville would, most likely, have rejected such a possibility, because it would increase the power of government. We, however, are willing to consider the potential of (local) government to create civic community.

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[6] After 1990 the Dutch minority policies came heavily under attack (see Fermin, 1997).

[7] It is striking to see how little attention is paid to these ethnic differences in voting behaviour. In a recent issue of the Revue Européenne de Migration Internationales, two contributions note these differences but refuse to reflect upon it. Andrew Geddes' conclusion is typical: "African-Caribbean people are less likely to be found in formal, elected political institutions, but as already noted the utilisation of ethnic categories to explain this in terms of 'integration' and 'alienation' may neglect other socio-economic factors (…)" (Geddes 1998 : 45). A 'culturalist' explanation of political participation is within the realm of ethnic studies still 'not done'.

Preliminary conclusions and further research

The Amsterdam case study has so far clarified a number of points.

First, the initial opening of the political opportunity structures at the local level was initiated by the autochthonous political elites, including even those who could not reasonably expect to profit from it. They did so because they assumed that political integration would spur other forms of integration. Whether this is true or not, it did foster multicultural democracy. Granting voting rights to foreign residents triggered off a quest for migrant candidates among the political parties in Amsterdam and it legitimised to some extent the principle of group representation in the political arena. Secondly, ethnic organizations did not restrain political integration but seem to have generated it. Even ethnic organizations that did not adhere to democratic values have contributed to the democratic process. Ethnic communities become civic communities when they become involved in the democratic process.[8]

Thirdly, it seems plausible that cultural factors account for the different levels of political trust and political participation of the ethnic communities in Amsterdam.

Recently some political scientists have argued that it is *primarily* the political opportunity structures rather than cultural characteristics of migrants that determine political integration of ethnic minorities. This may be true when we look at all migrants in the same city and compare their degree of political participation with migrants in another city. To make this argument both Soysal (1994) and Ireland (1994) rely on international comparison. Their conclusions are, so far, not very convincing. First because they rely on rather descriptive case studies (in the case of Soysal taken from secondary sources) which does not allow for very rigorous comparison. Secondly, because the international comparison has to take account of so many variables that even a more rigorous empirical approach would encounter serious methodological problems. To solve these problems we will study political participation and political trust of three ethnic communities in Berlin (Turks, Jews and Italians) according to the same research design that was applied in Amsterdam. The two cities differ substantially in the political opportunity structure. In Berlin, most immigrants have not been allowed to vote at the local elections. Berlin never had a strong tradition of consociational democracy. Finally, in Berlin the different ethnic groups were not able to profit from minority policies comparable to that in Amsterdam. In Brussels we find Turks as well as Moroccan residents. Yet in Brussels many of them group are not able to vote nor do these groups seem to benefit from government policies comparable to those in The Netherlands. The ethnic minorities in Brussels may well benefit, however, from consociational institutions that are in Belgium very strong.

We have to see how the Turkish communities in Berlin and Brussels fared under such different circumstances. If an open political opportunity structure induces political participation we would expect the Turks in Berlin and Brussels have a dramatically lower level of political participation and far less trust in local politics than the Turks in Amsterdam. If political opportunity structures are all pervasive and if minority policies stimulates civic community building among ethnic groups, we would find the weakest civic community among the Turks in Berlin, a somewhat stronger civic community among Turks in Brussels and the strongest civic community among the Turks in Amsterdam.

If, on the other hand, ethnic culture is the principle determinant of ethnic community building we would expect the Turks in Berlin and in Brussels to be organized in the same way as the Turks in Amsterdam even though they may well score lower on political participation and political trust. We then expect to find exactly the same rank order in political participation and political trust among the different ethic groups in Brussels as we have found in Amsterdam.

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[8]Political integration does not necessarily correspond with other forms of integration. Whereas the Turks in Amsterdam are well integrated in the political arena, they are far less integrated in the labour market and in the educational system. The Surinamese, on the other hand seem well on their way to integrate in the labour market, but they lag behind in the political arena.

Another point that still needs further research is the way in which citizenship plays a role in the political integration at the local level. Our research in Amsterdam shows that Turks are better integrated in the local political arena than Surinamese and Antilleans. Nevertheless most members of the latter groups have a Dutch passport and problems of dual citizenship hardly play a role. Their transnational orientation seems relatively restricted. Turks, on the other hand, tend to be in a situation where dual citizenship and transnational politics may play a role. Yet, they are far better integrated into the local power structure than the immigrants from the (former) colonies. We therefore suggest that for ethnic minorities political integration at the local level and a transnational orientation may not be mutually exclusive. Soysal (1994) makes the same point, but her research does not provide us with much empirical detail about transnational ethnic politics. So far, very little research has been done on transnational politics of ethnic groups. As long as this remains the case, the conundrum of modern diasporas and post-national citizenship is thin air.

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