Matthias Greiff

Matthias Greiff
Technische Universität Clausthal | TUC · Institute of Economics

Dr. rer. pol.

About

41
Publications
14,315
Reads
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188
Citations
Additional affiliations
July 2013 - August 2013
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
Position
  • Visiting Lecturer
February 2011 - present
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen
February 2008 - January 2011
Education
January 2008 - June 2011
Universität Bremen
Field of study
  • Economics
September 2006 - December 2007
September 2004 - January 2006
The New School
Field of study
  • Economics

Publications

Publications (41)
Article
Full-text available
While recycling helps to limit the use of primary resources, it also requires considerable technological investments in regional circular flow systems. The effectiveness of recycling systems, however, also depends on household behavior. Therefore, current research increasingly focuses on behavioral and psychological theories of altruism, moral beha...
Preprint
Full-text available
We examine scientific quality and editorial favoritism in the field of experimental economics. We use a novel data set containing all original research papers (N=569) that exclusively used laboratory experiments for data generation and were published in the American Economic Review (AER), Experimental Economics (EE), or the Journal of the European...
Article
Reputation systems are an important part of many markets and online platforms. One central design choice that market designers face pertains to how much feedback to collect, and how to aggregate it. To explore this matter, we vary the design of reputation systems in the lab to evaluate how aggregation choices affect (i) evaluation behavior, (ii) ex...
Article
Full-text available
Customer reviews reduce search cost and uncertainty about a product's quality. Hence, the quantity and quality of reviews has positive impacts on purchase intentions, sales, and customer satisfaction. In order to increase review quality, retailers and online platforms employ different monetary incentives. We experimentally compare two different inc...
Article
Full-text available
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses esteem. Similar to psychological game theory, utilities depend on beliefs, but only in...
Article
Full-text available
Methodische Fragen zum Verhältnis von Experimentaldaten und Theorien werden in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften intensiv diskutiert. In den letzten Jahren wird dabei häufig eine explorative Vorgehensweise gegenüber einer hypothetisch-deduktiven Vorgehensweise favorisiert. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Vor- und Nachteile der beiden Vorgehenswei...
Article
Full-text available
In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary role assignment as well as the way information is display...
Article
Full-text available
The purpose of the paper is to review recent studies on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing and to identify research gaps in the recently mushrooming literature on the topic. We examine a total of 53 empirical studies published between 2009 and 2016. In contrast to previous reviews we classify the research according to the type of study, i.e., the app...
Article
Full-text available
This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can inf...
Article
Full-text available
This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can inf...
Article
Full-text available
This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can inf...
Article
Full-text available
This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can inf...
Article
Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix...
Article
We investigate a repeated public good game with group size two and stranger matching. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period, participants receive information regarding the evaluation of the previous period. Evaluations are subjective judgments, hence our reput...
Article
Full-text available
We review a large number of empirical studies on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing. We distinguish between laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. Based on this survey we identify the following two gaps in the recently flourishing literature on PWYW pricing: (1) studies on PWYW pricing for goods with high cost...
Article
Full-text available
Abstract: We review a large number of empirical studies on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing. We distinguish between laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. Based on this survey we identify the following two gaps in the recently flourishing literature on PWYW pricing: (1) studies on PWYW pricing for goods with...
Article
Using a repeated public good game with stranger matching, we compare how two different reputation systems with endogenous evaluations affect rates of cooperation. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner’s contribution. At the beginning of each period, participants receive information about the partner’s evalu...
Article
Full-text available
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing is a participative pricing mechanism. On the one hand, it gives the buyer the option to determine the price of a good, allowing her, in contrast to other participative pricing mechanisms such as reverse auctions, to do monetary harm to a seller by paying nothing. On the other hand, a seller may apply a PWYW pricing...
Article
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We...
Article
Full-text available
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Through PWYW, companies entrust the buyers in determining the prices of specific products. Empirical studies show that when PWYW pricing is implemented buyers do not behave selfishly in a number of cases and that some sellers are able to use PWYW to increase turnover as...
Data
This is the Python code for the simulations in the JEE paper.
Book
Full-text available
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Empirical studies show that a PWYW pricing mechanism is able to increase a seller’s turnover and profit. This paper addresses PWYW pricing for bundles of experience goods. The paper shows that a PWYW pricing mechanism, if applied ex post consumption, separates the decisi...
Book
Full-text available
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Through PWYW, companies entrust the buyers in determining the prices of specific products. Empirical studies show that when PWYW pricing is implemented buyers do not behave selfishly in a number of cases and that some sellers are able to use PWYW to increase turnover as...
Article
We study an evolutionary model of a public good game with rewards played on a network. Giving rewards to contributors transforms the game but gives rise to a second-order dilemma. By allowing for coevolution of strategies and network structure, the evolutionary dynamics operate on both structure and strategy. Players learn with whom to interact and...
Article
Full-text available
We use a public good game with rewards, played on a dynamic network, to illustrate how self-organizing communities can achieve the provision of a public good without a central au-thority or privatization. Given that rewards are given to contributors and that the choice of whom to reward depends on social distance, free-riders will be excluded from...
Article
Am Beispiel der amerikanischen Zigarettenindustrie, die zwischen 1919 und 1940 von drei Oligopolisten dominiert worden ist, wird das Konzept endogener Preisführerschaft anhand eines spieltheoretischen Modells erläutert. Im Modell existieren multiple Gleichgewichte. Findet eine Gleichgewichtsauswahl anhand der Kriterien Paretodominanz oder Risikodom...
Article
We experimentally investigate a ?nitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner’s contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, e...
Article
We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a controlled laboratory experiment we test our model. In th...
Article
Full-text available
We model a macroeconomy with stock-flow consistent national accounts built from the local interactions of heterogenous agents (households, firms, bankers, and a government) through product, labor, and money markets in discrete time. We use this model to show that, without any restrictions on the type of interactions agents can make, and with asymme...
Article
Full-text available
We study an evolutionary model of a public good game with rewards played on a network. Giving rewards to contributors transforms the game but gives rise to a second-order dilemma. By allowing for coevolution of strategies and network structure the adaptive dynamics operate on both structure and strategy. Players learn with whom to interact and how...
Article
Full-text available
We present a model of the distribution of labour in science. Such models tend to rely on the mechanism of the invisible hand (e.g. Hull 1988, Goldman & Shaked 1991 and Kitcher 1990). Our analysis starts from the necessity of standards in distributed processes and the possibility of multiple standards in science. Invisible hand models turn out to ha...
Article
We present a model of the distribution of labour in science. Such models tend to rely on the mechanism of the invisible hand (e.g. Hull 1988, Goldman & Shaked 1991 and Kitcher 1990). Our analysis starts from the necessity of standards in distributed processes and the possibility of multiple standards in science. Invisible hand models turn out to ha...
Article
This is a review of "Economy and Morality – The Philosophy of the Welfare State" (E.Elgar)by Yuichi Shionoya.
Article
This is a review of the book "Comtemporary Post-Keynesian Economics" by Wray & Forstater.
Article
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09538250701662101?journalCode=crpe20#.VGiZl9ZHs6e
Article
We model an abstract economy of locally interacting heteroge- neous agents in four markets, to understand the generation of power law-type distributions of income inequality and firm size in advanced societies. We model a macroeconomy with national accounts built from the interactions of agents (workers, capitalists, bankers, and the government) in...

Questions

Questions (5)
Question
Hey there,
I'm searching for data on the number of professional economists. In particluar, I'd like to know the number of economists working within universities for each country.
Best
Matthias
Question
I’ve become interested in the literature on the measurement of social value orientation (SVO) because SVO is of increasing interest for behavioral economists. What puzzled me about the SVO tests is reciprocity. Assume you want to measure SVO for two players, A and B, using a test that relies on decomposed games like Liebrand’s ring test or the slider measure by Murphy, Ackermann and Handgraaf. Take as an example the dictator game in which both players choose between two self-other-allocations, x=(2,0) and y=(1,1). Assume that A chooses y. There are two reasons: (1) a concern for B’s payoff, and (2) a preference for reciprocity. (2) is a possible motivation behind A’s choice if A expects B to choose y and wants to reward B’s kindness by being kind. But this implies that SVO is sensitive to players’ expectations.
In the literature, I’ve found no discussion of reciprocity motives in relation to SVO tests, hence my question is: Has anyone seen a discussion of this issue, or does anyone know why the SVO literature remains silent about this issue?
Question
I'm looking for data from prisoner's dilemma experiments in which participants played only one round of the game. A closely related experiment, which I found, is Goeree, Holt and Laury (J Pub Econ 2002) where participants play ten one-shot games without feedback between games (hence, no learning effects).
Question
In economics and biology, the terms "conditional cooperation" and "indirect reciprocity" are used to describe behavior, where subjects condition their behavior in stage t of a repeated game on the opponent's reputation (see Bolton, Katok, Ockenfels / J Pub Econ 2006), or where subjects play a one-shot game and condition their behavior on the opponent's expected behavior (see Fischbacher, Gächter, Fehr / Economic Letters 2001). I’m wondering whether there is a difference between "conditional cooperation" and "indirect reciprocity," or whether these terms are interchangeable?
Question
Controlled laboratory experiments are used (i) to explore individual behavior and (ii) to test theories about individual behavior. A lot of anomalies (endowment effect, context dependence, influence of irrelevant alternatives or framing) are found, not to mention non-material incentives and social preferences. In most agent-based macro-model, the focus is on fluctuations at the macro-level (cyclical behavior of prices, wage-profit-cycles, wealth distribution in econophysics models) which emerge from individual interactions governed by simple rules of thumb. I would like to know more about how the empirical insights from behavioral economics can be taken into account for modeling the behavior of individual agents in agent-based macro-models. Given the variety and complexity of individual behavior found in controlled laboratory experiments, how should the individual behavior of agents be modeled?

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Projects

Projects (6)
Project
The project aims to answer the question of how collective, generally formulated sustainability goals can be transformed into individual behaviour. In addition, the influence of environmental policy instruments in this context will be examined. The holistic sustainability goals formulated for the area of energy and resource efficiency will be broken down to the action level of individual households. The options for action are reconstructed as social dilemma situations by means of game theoretical interaction models and transferred into economic decision experiments. The innovative methodological core of the project lies in linking the methods of experimental economics with the resources and the dissemination and application possibilities of a professional game design (gamification).
Project
This project studies the production of economic knowledge and the distribution of labor in research.