Marko Tesic

Marko Tesic
University of Cambridge | Cam · Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence

PhD
I am a Research Associate at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge

About

14
Publications
1,665
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
48
Citations
Introduction
I am a Research Associate at Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge. I currently explore the capabilities of AI systems and how these capabilities translate onto the specific demands in the human workforce. This research is carried out in collaboration with the OECD and experts in occupational psychology.

Publications

Publications (14)
Article
Full-text available
Bayesian reasoning and decision making is widely considered normative because it minimizes prediction error in a coherent way. However, it is often difficult to apply Bayesian principles to complex real world problems, which typically have many unknowns and interconnected variables. Bayesian network modeling techniques make it possible to model suc...
Chapter
Full-text available
As AI systems come to permeate human society, there is an increasing need for such systems to explain their actions, conclusions, or decisions. This is presently fuelling a surge in interest in machine-generated explanation in the field of explainable AI. In this chapter, we will consider work on explanations in areas ranging from AI to philosophy,...
Article
Full-text available
Counterfactual (CF) explanations have been employed as one of the modes of explainability in explainable artificial intelligence (AI)—both to increase the transparency of AI systems and to provide recourse. Cognitive science and psychology have pointed out that people regularly use CFs to express causal relationships. Most AI systems, however, are...
Article
Providing an explanation is a communicative act. It involves an explainee, a person who receives an explanation, and an explainer, a person (or sometimes a machine) who provides an explanation. The majority of research on explanation has focused on how explanations alter explainees' beliefs. However, one general feature of communicative acts is tha...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper, we bring together two closely related, but distinct, notions: argument and explanation. We clarify their relationship. We then provide an integrative review of relevant research on these notions, drawn both from the cognitive science and the artificial intelligence (AI) literatures. We then use this material to identify key direction...
Preprint
Full-text available
Providing an explanation is a communicative act. It includes an explainee, a person who is receiving an explanation, and an explainer, a person (or sometimes a machine) who provides an explanation. The majority of research on explanation has focused on how explanations alter explainees’ beliefs. However, one general feature of communicative acts is...
Preprint
Full-text available
Counterfactual (CF) explanations have been employed as one of the modes of explainability in explainable AI-both to increase the transparency of AI systems and to provide recourse. Cognitive science and psychology, however, have pointed out that people regularly use CFs to express causal relationships. Most AI systems are only able to capture assoc...
Article
Full-text available
In real world contexts of reasoning about evidence, that evidence frequently arrives sequentially. Moreover, we often cannot anticipate in advance what kinds of evidence we will eventually encounter. This raises the question of what we do to our existing models when we encounter new variables to consider. The standard normative framework for probab...
Article
Full-text available
In their 2010 (Erkenntnis 73:393–412) paper, Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann (henceforth ‘DFH’) argue that the generalized version of the Nagel–Schaffner model that they have developed (henceforth ‘the GNS’) is the right one for intertheoretic reduction, i.e. the kind of reduction that involves theories with largely overlapping domains of appl...
Article
Full-text available
Recent research suggests that people do not perform well on some of the most crucial components of causal reasoning: probabilistic independence, diagnostic reasoning, and explaining away. Despite this, it remains unclear what contexts would affect people's reasoning in these domains. In the present study we investigated the influence of manipulatin...
Article
Full-text available
We provide a novel Bayesian justification of inference to the best explanation (IBE). More specifically, we present conditions under which explanatory considerations can provide a significant confirmatory boost for hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the relevant evidence. Furthermore, we show that the proposed Bayesian model of IBE is...

Network

Cited By