Nash equilibria in risk-sensitive dynamic games

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NASH EQUILIBRIA IN RISK-SENSITIVE DYNAMIC GAMES

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ABSTRACT

Dynamic games in which each player has an exponential cost criterion are referred to as risk-sensitive dynamic games. In this paper, Nash equilibria are considered for such games. Feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solutions are derived for two-person discrete-time linear-quadratic nonzero-sum games, both under complete state observation and shared partial observation.

KEYWORDS

Kalman filter, linear quadratic control, Nash, risk-sensitivity.
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1 Introduction

This paper studies discrete-time dynamic games where each player has an exponential-of-integral cost criterion. For short, the latter game is referred to as a risk-sensitive dynamic game. Risk-sensitive control is well studied in literature as an extension of classical control. The study of this extension to dynamic games seems to be new. As result of this, we develop Nash equilibrium solutions both under complete observation and shared partial observation.

Linear-Exponential-Gaussian (LEG) control has been introduced in the early 1970’s [1], [2]. In Jacobson [1], LEG control for discrete time with perfect state observation is treated. Jacobson also showed an equivalence of the optimal LEG control with the solutions of deterministic (cooperative and noncooperative) zero-sum quadratic games. In Speyer et al. [2], LEG control for discrete time with partial state observation is treated. For the case with costs only on the terminal state, it turned out that the feedback control law is a linear function of the current state. For general linear-exponential-quadratic-Gaussian (LEQG) control with costs on the intermediate states, [2] also obtained an optimal controller which is a linear function of the smoothed estimate of the entire state history.

Subsequently, Whittle [3] and [4], completed these results and characterized the solution in terms of a certainty equivalence principle. It was Whittle too who introduced the name risk-sensitive LQG control. Whittle assumes that the control at the current time is a function of the observation history up to the previous time, and obtained the solution for general LEQG control for discrete time with partial state observation. Jaensch and Speyer [5] and Fan et al. [6] extend the results of Whittle for the slightly more natural assumption that the control at the current time is a function of the observation history up to the current time.

LEQG control in continuous time was treated by Bensoussan and Van Schuppen, [7] for the partially observable case. Bensoussan [8] gives a good characterization of both the complete and partial observation cases.

In James et al. [9] finite horizon partially observed risk-sensitive stochastic control for discrete-time for nonlinear systems was considered. As in Whittle [3] and [4], they consider control with one-step-delayed observation. Their approach was motivated by the method used by Bensoussan and Van Schuppen [7] and the well-known separation method for risk-neutral control.

Collings et al. [10] present the output feedback discrete-time risk-sensitive LQG control solution derived via the methods in [7], [9], with a one-step delayed observation. With these methods, the solution is obtained without appealing to a certainty equivalence principle. In James and Baras [11], new results are presented concerning the certainty equivalence principle under certain standard assumptions.

In this paper, we go beyond LEQG control by considering discrete-time Nash equilibrium solutions in dynamic games with exponential cost criteria. For dynamic games without exponential cost cri-
teria, i.e. the risk-neutral case, we refer to Başar and Olsder [12]. The risk-sensitive dynamic game problem is formulated in Section 2 for the special case of a two-person linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game. In this section, also the definition of a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium is given. In Section 3, two theorems for the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution are derived, one for the complete state observation case and one for the shared partial observation case. The derivation leading to these theorems is mainly based on the results of the book of Başar and Olsder [12] on the theory of noncooperative dynamic games, and the detailed proofs of Whittle [3] Jaensch and Speyer [5] and Fan et al. [6] on risk-sensitive control. In Section 4, both theorems are applied to a two-person linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game. First, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution in the complete observable case is derived. Next, it is shown that the feedback Nash equilibrium solution in the shared partial observable case can be constructed from the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium design and two risk-modified Kalman filters.

An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 1995 ACC [13].
2 Problem formulation

We will consider a two-person discrete-time linear-quadratic dynamic game with exponential cost criteria. The system model is described by

\[ x_{k+1} = A_k x_k + B^1_k u^1_k + B^2_k u^2_k + w_k \]  

where \( x_k \in \mathbb{R}^n \), \( u^i_k \in \mathbb{R}^{m_i} \), and \( w_k \in \mathbb{R}^l \). The measurement model is

\[ z_k = H_k x_k + v_k \]

where \( z_k \in \mathbb{R}^p \) and \( v_k \in \mathbb{R}^p \). The random variable \( x_0 \) is normally distributed with mean \( \hat{x}_0 \) and with covariance matrix \( P_0 \), the processes \( \{w_k\} \) and \( \{v_k\} \) are assumed to be zero-mean, jointly Gaussian, independent random variables for all \( k = 0, 1, \ldots, N \) with known covariance matrices \( Q^w_k > 0 \) and \( R^v_k > 0 \), respectively.

Cost functional for player \( i \) is given by

\[ J^i(\theta_i) = \mathbb{E} \left\{ -\theta_i \exp(-\theta_i \Psi^i_{0}) \right\} \]

where the random cost \( \Psi^i_{0} \) are

\[ \Psi^i_{0} = \frac{1}{2} x^T N Q^i_N x_N + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} (x^T_k Q^i_k x_k + u^i_k R^i_k u^i_k + u^j_k R^{ij}_k u^j_k) \]

It is assumed that all matrices are of appropriate dimensions, \( Q^i_k \) are symmetric and \( Q^i_k \geq 0 \) for \( k = 0, 1, \ldots, N \) and \( R^{ij}_k > 0 \) for \( k = 0, 1, \ldots, N - 1 \). The parameters \( \theta_i \) are some scalar constants (positive or negative) which can be characterized as the risk-sensitivity parameter; they measure the optimizers’ sensitivity to risk. If \( \theta_i \) is positive, then player \( i \) behaves as if unobservables would take values in his advantage, which is an optimistic attitude (i.e., risk-seeking). If \( \theta_i \) is negative, then player \( i \) behaves as if unobservables would take values in his disadvantage, which is a pessimistic attitude (i.e., risk-averse). It is assumed that the players have different risk-sensitivity parameters.

The objective of both players is to minimize their cost function over the class of control laws. It is assumed that both players know the state as well as the cost functions. During the evolution of the game it is assumed that both players have the same information on the (either fully or partially observed) state and know each other’s control function up to the previous time. The information space \( \mathcal{W}_k \) of both players is the same at stage \( k \) and is defined as

\[ \mathcal{W}_k = \{ x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_k; u^i_0, u^i_1, \ldots, u^i_{k-1}; i = 1, 2; k \} \]

for complete state observation, and

\[ \mathcal{W}_k = \{ z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_k; u^i_0, u^i_1, \ldots, u^i_{k-1}; i = 1, 2; k \} \]
for shared partial state observation.

The available information \( \eta_k^i \) is a subset of the information space \( \mathcal{W}_k \). The strategy \( \gamma_k^i \) maps the available information \( \eta_k^i \) into the control, that is \( \gamma_k^i(\cdot): \mathcal{W}_k \to \mathbb{R}^{m_i} \), so that \( u_k^i = \gamma_k^i(\eta_k^i) \). For given values of \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \), an admissible strategy pair \((\gamma^1^*, \gamma^2^*)\) constitutes a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution if the following inequalities are satisfied for \( \gamma^i \in \Gamma^i, i = 1, 2 \)

\[
J^1^* \triangleq J^1(\gamma^1^*, \gamma^2^* ; \theta_1) \leq J^1(\gamma^1^, \gamma^2^* ; \theta_1)
\]

\[
J^2^* \triangleq J^2(\gamma^1^*, \gamma^2^* ; \theta_2) \leq J^2(\gamma^1^, \gamma^2^ ; \theta_2)
\]

where \( \gamma^i \triangleq (\gamma_0^i, \gamma_1^i, \gamma_2^i, \ldots, \gamma_{N-1}^i) \). The problem is to determine the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium. Therefore it is assumed that the available information of player \( i \) for the complete state observation case is \( \eta_k^i = \{x_k\} \) and for the shared partial state observation case this is \( \eta_k^i = \{z_k\} \). In this paper, the Nash equilibrium solution is characterized for both the complete and the shared partial observation case.
3 Risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium strategies

In this section two theorems are derived for feedback Nash equilibrium solutions in risk-sensitive dynamic games, one for complete state observation and one for shared partial observation.

First the following proposition for the risk-sensitive dynamic game problem is derived, a similar result for risk-sensitive optimal control was given in Whittle [3, Theorem 1], Jaensch and Speyer [5, Theorem 3.1], and Fan et al. [6, Theorem 3.1].

**Proposition 1** Let $S_i = \Psi_0^i + \theta_i^{-1}\Psi_D$, where

\[
\Psi_D = \frac{1}{2} (x_0 - \tilde{x}_0)'P_0^{-1}(x_0 - \tilde{x}_0) + \frac{1}{2} v_0(R_0)'v_0 + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \left\{ w_k'(Q_k)'w_k + v_{k+1}'(R_{k+1})'v_{k+1} \right\},
\]

where $(x_0, \ldots, x_N, u_0, \ldots, u_{N-1}, z_0, \ldots, z_N)$ are the state, control and observation vectors at stage $k$.

If for $i = 1, 2$ the function $S_i$ is minimized with respect to $u_i^k, \ldots, u_{i,N-1}^k$ and extremized with respect to $x_0, \ldots, x_N$ and $z_{k+1}, \ldots, z_N$ for a given value of $W_k$, where the order of optimization is irrelevant and the infima and extrema are attained and denoted by the value $(u_1^k, u_2^k)$, then the strategy pair (or control law) at stage $k$ defined by $(\gamma_1^k, \gamma_2^k)$ is the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium at stage $k$.

**Proof:** In order to find the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution for the problem with cost-functionals of exponential-quadratic form as given in (3), it is shown in [14, Appendix], that the problem reduces to one in which for each player a Dynamic Programming recursion must to be solved. The Dynamic Programming recursion for player $i$, a recursion in terms of $\Phi_i^k(W_k)$, is given as

\[
\Phi_i^k(W_k) = \min_{u_i^k} \max_{\dot{z}_{k+1}} \Phi_i^{k+1}(W_{k+1})
\]

with boundary condition

\[
\Phi_i^N(W_N) = \max_{x_0, \ldots, x_N} \left( \Psi_0^i + \theta_i^{-1}\Psi_D \right).
\]

Here, we use the term $\theta_i$-extremizing, abbreviated as “ext”, to denote an operation in which one minimizes when $\theta_i \geq 0$ and maximizes when $\theta_i < 0$.

It turns out that for every $i$th player recursion (6), in which we also have to take into account possible dependence of $u_i^k$ on $x_k$, must be satisfied. The minimizing control is denoted by $u_i^*$. The recursion means that for every $i$th player the following equation in which $(u_i^k, \ldots, u_i^{N-1}) = (\gamma_i^k, \ldots, \gamma_i^{N-1})$ is substituted, must be solved
\[ \Phi_i^k(W_k) = \min_{U_{i,k-1}^{N-1}} \Phi_i^k \left( \Psi_0^i + \theta_i^{-1} \Psi_D \right). \] (8)

In general, here we use the notation \( X_k = (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_k) \), \( X_k^N = (x_k, x_{k+1}, \ldots, x_N) \) and \( U_{i,k-1}^{N-1} = (u_i^k, u_{i,k+1}^1, \ldots, u_{i,N-1}^1) \), with a similar convention for other variables.

Thus, the function \( \Psi_0^i + \theta_i^{-1} \Psi_D \) is minimized with respect to the decisions of player \( i \) currently unmade and \( \theta_i \)-extremized with respect to all quantities currently unobservable.

### 3.1 Decomposition

The recursion equation (8) can be decomposed into a forward recursion \( P_i^k \) and a backward recursion \( F_i^k \). Together with Proposition 1, this results in two theorems as stated below. First, the decomposition itself is shown.

At stage \( k \), the observation \( z_k \) is available and decision \( u_i^k \) has not yet been taken. The past function for the \( i \)th player at \( k \) is a function of \( z_0, \ldots, z_k; u_0^i, \ldots, u_{k-1}^i \). The future function for the \( i \)th player at \( k \) is a function of \( z_{k+1}, \ldots, z_N; u_i^k, \ldots, u_{N-1}^i \). According to Proposition 1 the order of optimization is irrelevant and thus the decomposition of (8) yields

\[ \Phi_i^k(W_k) = \max_{x_k} \left\{ P_i^k(x_k, W_k) + F_i^k(x_k) \right\} \] (9)

where the functions \( P_i^k(x_k, W_k) \) and \( F_i^k(x_k) \) are given below.

The past function \( P_i^k(x_k, W_k) \) of player \( i \) at stage \( k \) is defined as

\[
P_i^k(x_k, W_k) \triangleq \max_{x_{k-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \theta_i^{-1} (x_0 - \hat{x}_0)' (\hat{W}_i^0)^{-1} (x_0 - \hat{x}_0) 
+ \frac{1}{2} \theta_i^{-1} v_0^i (\hat{W}_i^0)^{-1} v_0 + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} \left\{ g_j^i(x_j, u_j^i, u_j^i) + \theta_i^{-1} (n_j(x_{j+1}, u_j^i, u_j^i, x_j) + m_{j+1}^{x_j}(x_{j+1}, x_{j+1})) \right\} \right].
\] (10)

The future function \( F_i^k(x_k) \) of player \( i \) at stage \( k \) is defined as

\[
F_i^k(x_k) \triangleq \min_{u_{i,k}^{N-1}} \max_{x_{k+1}^N} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x_N^t Q_N x_N + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=k+1}^N \theta_i^{-1} m_j(z_j, x_j) 
+ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=k}^{N-1} \left\{ g_j^i(x_j, u_j^i, u_j^i) + \theta_i^{-1} n_j(x_{j+1}, u_j^i, u_j^i, x_j) \right\} \right].
\] (11)
with
\[ g_k^i(x_k, u_k^i, u_k^j) \triangleq x_k^i Q_k^i x_k + u_k^i R_k^i u_k^i + u_k^j R_k^j u_k^j \]
\[ m_k(z_k, x_k) \triangleq (z_k - H_k x_k)' (R_k^i)^{-1} (z_k - H_k x_k) \]
and
\[ n_k(x_{k+1}, u_k^i, u_k^j, x_k) \triangleq (x_{k+1} - A_k x_k - B_k^i u_k^i - B_k^j u_k^j)' \]
\[ \times (Q_k^{ii})^{-1} (x_{k+1} - A_k x_k - B_k^i u_k^i - B_k^j u_k^j) \]
for \( i = 1, 2 \) and \( j \neq i \).

It follows immediately that \( P_k^i(x_k, W_k) \) satisfies the following forward recursion
\[ P_{k+1}^i(x_{k+1}, W_{k+1}) = \text{ext}_{x_k} [P_k^i(x_k, W_k) + \frac{1}{2} g_k^i(x_k, u_k^i, u_k^j) + \frac{1}{2 \theta_i} n_k(x_{k+1}, u_k^i, u_k^j, x_k) + m_{k+1}(z_k, x_k)] \] (12)
with initial condition
\[ P_0^i(x_0, W_0) = \frac{1}{2 \theta_i} (x_0 - \hat{x}_0)' P_0^{-1}(x_0 - \hat{x}_0) + \frac{1}{2 \theta_i} v_0^i (R_0^i)^{-1} v_0. \]

Similarly, the function \( F_k^i(x_k) \) satisfies the following backward recursion
\[ F_{k+1}^i(x_{k+1}) = \min_{u_k^i} \text{ext}_{x_k} \left[ F_k^i(x_k) + \frac{1}{2} g_k^i(x_k, u_k^i, u_k^j) + \theta_i^{-1} n_k(x_{k+1}, u_k^i, u_k^j, x_k) \right] \] (13)
with terminal condition \( F_N^i(x_N) = \frac{1}{2} x_N' Q_N^i x_N. \)

The following two theorems follow directly from the discussion on the dynamic programming recursion (8) and on the decomposition of function \( S^i \). The theorems concern the recursions needed to determine feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibria. For the complete observation case, we have the following theorem.

**Theorem 1**

Let \( u_k^i \) be the minimizing value of \( u_k^i \) in the recursion equation \( F_k^i(x_k) \) for \( i = 1, 2 \), then the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium at stage \( k \) for the complete observable case is given by \( (\gamma_1^*(x_k), \gamma_2^*(x_k)) \).
For the shared partial observation case, we have the following theorem which is in fact an alternative form of Proposition 1.

**Theorem 2**

Let $u_i^\ast_k$ be the minimizing value of $u_i^k$ in the recursion equation $F_i^k(x_k)$ for $i = 1, 2$, and let vector $\tilde{x}_i^k$ be the value of $x_k$ extremizing $P_i^k(x_k, W_k) + F_i^k(x_k)$. Then, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium at stage $k$ for the partially observable case is given by $(\gamma_1^1(\tilde{x}_1^k), \gamma_2^2(\tilde{x}_2^k))$.

This theorem is in fact an extension of [5, Theorem 3.2], in which only one player is considered.

**Proof:** Both theorems follow directly from the discussion on the dynamic programming recursion (8) and on the decomposition of function $S^i$, see (9)-(11). If the state is completely observable, then the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution is $(\gamma_1^1(x_k), \gamma_2^2(x_k))$ and is determined from the backward recursions $F_i^k(x_k)$ for $i = 1, 2$ in (13). See also [12, Theorem 6.6] in which the risk-neutral case is considered. The feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution for the case of shared partial observation is obtained by replacing $x_k$ by $\tilde{x}_i^k$, where $\tilde{x}_i^k$ is the value of $x_k$ extremizing $P_i^k(x_k, W_k) + F_i^k(x_k)$. Theorem 2 is, in fact, an extension of, Theorem 3.2 in [5] and [6] where only one player (optimal control problem) is considered.

Both theorems are applied to the two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game as formulated in Section 2, the results of which are presented in the following section.
4 Evaluation of forward and backward recursions

In this section, first the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solutions for the complete observation case is determined from the backward recursions \( F_i^k(x_k) \) for \( i = 1, 2 \), see Corollary 1 in Section 4.1. Next, the forward recursions \( P_i^k(x_k, W_k) \) for \( i = 1, 2 \) are evaluated and finally the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solutions for the shared partial observation case is determined, see Corollary 2 in Section 4.2.

4.1 Complete observable risk-sensitive dynamic game

The LEQ dynamic game solution follows as a special case of Theorem 1. First some preliminary notation for Corollary 1 is given. Define

\[
\begin{align*}
(M_i^k)^{-1} &= (\tilde{M}_i^k)^{-1} + \theta_i Q_i^w, \\
\tilde{M}_i^1 &= F_i^k M_i^{k+1} F_k + N_i^1 R_k^1 N_i^1 + N_i^2 R_k^2 N_i^2 + Q_i^k, \\
\tilde{M}_i^2 &= F_i^k M_i^{k+1} F_k + N_i^2 R_k^2 N_i^2 + N_i^1 R_k^1 N_i^1 + Q_i^k
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( N_i^k \) \( (i = 1, 2, \; k = 0, 1, \ldots, N) \) be appropriate dimensional matrices satisfying the set of linear matrix equations

\[
\begin{align*}
(R_{11}^k + B_{11}^1 M_{k+1}^1 B_k^1) N_i^1 + B_{12}^1 N_i^2 + B_{11}^1 M_{k+1}^1 A_k &= B_{12}^1 M_{k+1}^1 A_k \\
(R_{22}^k + B_{22}^1 M_{k+1}^2 B_k^2) N_i^2 + B_{21}^2 N_i^1 + B_{22}^1 M_{k+1}^2 A_k &= B_{21}^2 M_{k+1}^2 A_k
\end{align*}
\]

where the matrices \( \tilde{M}_i^k \) are obtained recursively from

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{M}_1^k &= F_i^k M_i^{k+1} F_k + N_i^1 R_k^1 N_i^1 + N_i^2 R_k^2 N_i^2 + Q_i^k \\
\tilde{M}_2^k &= F_i^k M_i^{k+1} F_k + N_i^2 R_k^2 N_i^2 + N_i^1 R_k^1 N_i^1 + Q_i^k
\end{align*}
\]

with boundary conditions \( \tilde{M}_N^1 = Q_N^1 \) and \( \tilde{M}_N^2 = Q_N^2 \) and with

\[
F_k = A_k - B_{11}^1 N_k^1 - B_{22}^1 N_k^2.
\]

The feedback Nash equilibrium solution for the complete observation case is fully determined by the recursions for future functions of both players. The future function for player \( i \) is quadratic in the state variable

\[
F_i^k(x_k) = \frac{1}{2} x_k^\prime \tilde{M}_i^k x_k.
\]

If \( \theta_i < 0 \), then it is necessary that \( \tilde{M}_i^1 + (\theta_i Q_i^w)^{-1} < 0 \) for \( l > k \).
Corollary 1  The two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game with \( Q^i_k \geq 0 \) and \( R^{ij}_{k} \geq 0 \) \((j \neq i)\), admits a unique feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution, if and only if, (15)-(16) admits a unique solution set \( \{N^i_k; i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, \ldots, N \}\), in which case the equilibrium strategies are linear in the state variable
\[
\gamma^i_k(x_k) = -N^i_k x_k.
\] (21)

For a proof the backwards recursive equations (13) are solved here for \( k = N, N - 1, \ldots, 0 \). This goes similar as in the proof of [12, Corollary 6.1].

Remark 1: The nonnegative definiteness requirements imposed on \( Q^i_k \) and \( R^{ij}_{k} \) are sufficient conditions so that the future functions (13) are strictly convex and can be minimized, but they are by no means necessary. Less stringent conditions for which the statement in Corollary 1 is still true is that
\[
R^{ii}_{k} + B^i_k M^i_{k+1} B^i_k > 0, \ i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, \ldots, N.
\]
Furthermore, if the set of equations (15) and (16) admits more than one set of solutions, every such set constitutes a feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution. See also [12, Remark 6.4].

Remark 2: A precise condition for which the set of equations (15) and (16) admits a unique solution is the invertibility for each \( k = 0, 1, \ldots, N \) of the matrix in which the \( ii \)th block is given by \( R^{ii}_{k} + B^i_k M^i_{k+1} B^i_k \) and the \( ij \)th block by \( B^i_k M^i_{k+1} B^j_k, \) where \( i, j = 1, 2, j \neq i \). See also [12, Remark 6.5].

4.2 Partially observable risk-sensitive dynamic game

The partially observable LEQ dynamic game solution follows as a special case of Theorem 2. First some preliminary notation for Corollary 2 is given. Let the vectors \( \hat{x}^i_k \) satisfy risk-modified Kalman filter recursion equations
\[
\hat{x}^i_{k+1} = A_k \hat{x}^i_k + B^1_k u^1_k + B^2_k u^2_k \\
+ A_k \left[ (\tilde{W}^i_k)^{-1} + H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} H_k + \theta_i Q^i_k \right]^{-1} H^i_k \left( \tilde{W}^i_k \right)^{-1} \left( z_k - H_k \hat{x}^i_k \right) \\
\cdot \{ H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} (z_k - H_k \hat{x}^i_k) - \theta_i Q^i_k \hat{x}^i_k \}
\] (22)
with initial condition \( \hat{x}^i_0 = \hat{x}_0 \).

The matrices \( \tilde{W}^i_k \) satisfy the set of forward matrix Riccati equations
\[
\tilde{W}^i_{k+1} = A_k \left[ (\tilde{W}^i_k)^{-1} + H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} H_k + \theta_i Q^i_k \right]^{-1} A_k^t + Q^w_k
\] (23)
with initial condition \( \tilde{W}^i_0 = P_0 \).
For the partial recursions yields that the past function for player $i$ has the form
\[ P^i_k(x_k, W_k) = \frac{1}{2\theta_i} \left( x_k - \hat{x}^i_k \right)' \left( \hat{W}^i_k \right)^{-1} \left( x_k - \hat{x}^i_k \right) \]
\[ + \frac{1}{2\theta_i} \left( z_k - H x_k \right)' \left( R^i_k \right)^{-1} \left( z_k - H x_k \right) + \ldots \] (24)

where $\ldots$ indicates terms independent of $x_k$.

If $\theta_i < 0$, then it is necessary that $\hat{W}^i_l + (\theta_i Q^i_k)^{-1} < 0$ for $l \leq k$.

**Corollary 2** The two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game and with partial observations without delay, admits a unique feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution, if and only if, (15) and (16) admits a unique solution set $\{ N^i_k; i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, \ldots, N \}$, in which case the equilibrium strategies are
\[ \gamma^i \left( \hat{x}^i_k \right) = -N^i_k \hat{x}^i_k \] (25)

where
\[ \hat{x}^i_k = \left[ I + \theta_i \hat{W}^i_k \hat{M}^i_k + \hat{W}^i_k H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} H_k \right]^{-1} \]
\[ \left( \hat{x}^i_k + \hat{W}^i_k H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} z_k \right) \] (26)

**Proof:** As shown in Theorem 2, for the partial observable case, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium is $(\gamma^1_k (\hat{x}^1_k), \gamma^2_k (\hat{x}^2_k))$, where $\hat{x}^1_k$ and $\hat{x}^2_k$ are determined by extremizing $P^i_k(x_k, W_k) + F^i_k(x_k)$ with respect to $x_k$ for $i = 1$ and $i = 2$ respectively. Substitution of the results of (20) and (24) yields
\[ P^i_k(x_k, W_k) + F^i_k(x_k) = \frac{1}{2} \theta_i^{-1} \left( x_k - \hat{x}^i_k \right)' \left( \hat{W}^i_k \right)^{-1} \left( x_k - \hat{x}^i_k \right) \]
\[ + \left( z_k - H x_k \right)' \left( R^i_k \right)^{-1} \left( z_k - H x_k \right) \]
\[ + \theta_i x_k' \hat{M}^i_k x_k + \ldots \]
\[ = \frac{1}{2} \theta_i^{-1} \left[ x_k' \left( \hat{W}^i_k \right)^{-1} + \theta_i \hat{M}^i_k + H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} H_k \right] x_k \]
\[ - 2 x_k' \left( \hat{W}^i_k \right)^{-1} \hat{x}^i_k + H^i_k (R^i_k)^{-1} z_k + \ldots \].

Extremizing with respect to $x_k$ yields $\hat{x}^i_k$ as in (26). From Corollary 1 we know that $\gamma^i_k (x_k) = -N^i_k x_k$ and thus the result follows.

**Remark 3**: Equations (22) and (23) can be considered as a risk-modified Kalman filter for player $i$. The vector $\hat{x}^i_k$ denotes the estimate of $x_k$ which $\theta_i$-extremizes the past function of player $i$ at $k$. If in these equations the matrices $Q^i_k$ are zero for $k = 0, 1, \ldots, N - 1$, then they reduce to one set of equations for both players which is exactly the Kalman filter.
5 Conclusion

Whereas risk-sensitivity in control theory is well studied in literature, risk-sensitivity in dynamic games has not been considered before in literature. In this paper results have been presented for risk-sensitive dynamic games. A two-person linear-quadratic dynamic game in discrete time has been considered with exponential cost criteria, where the players have different risk-sensitivity parameters. Nash solutions have been derived under the hypothesis that the strategies at the current time are functions of the observation history up to the current time. This is similar as the hypothesis in Jaensch and Speyer [5] and Fan et al. [6] for risk-sensitive control. This hypothesis is an extension of the results of Whittle [3] and [4], who assumes that the control at the current time is a function of the observation history up to the previous time.

We derived two theorems on feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibria and it is shown that the derivation leading to these theorems is based on known results of both dynamic game theory and of risk-sensitive control theory.

In the discrete-time risk-sensitive game, as presented in this paper, the results for the complete observable risk-sensitive dynamic game are a simple extension of similar results in both dynamic game theory and risk-sensitive control theory. Even though the results for the complete observation case are not very difficult to derive, they are important results since they are the basis for the shared partial observable case. The results for this latter case are less straightforward. It is shown in this paper that the feedback Nash equilibrium for the partially observable stochastic problem can be constructed from the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium design for the complete observable stochastic problem and from two risk-modified Kalman filters. It turned out that if there are no intermediate state costs these two filters are identical and exactly the well-known Kalman filter, which is analogous to the risk-sensitive control situation. However, for the more general case with costs on the intermediate states, it turned out that for each player one gets a risk-modified Kalman filter.

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References


