Marek M Kaminski

Marek M Kaminski
University of California, Irvine | UCI · Department of Political Science

Ph.D.

About

47
Publications
22,352
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
632
Citations

Publications

Publications (47)
Article
Full-text available
I investigate the paradoxes associated with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) point-based ranking of national soccer teams. The ranking has been plagued with paradoxes that incentivize teams to avoid playing friendly matches, i.e., matches that are not part of any official FIFA tournament or preliminaries, and applying ot...
Article
Full-text available
We study the primacy effects that occur when voters cast their votes because a candidate or party is listed first on a ballot. In the elections that we analyzed, there are three potential types of such effects that might occur when voters vote for (1) the first candidate listed on the ballot in single-member district (SMD) elections ( candidate pri...
Article
Full-text available
The uniqueness of Poland’s experience with the 2020 coronavirus lays in the interplay of two factors: the decisive governmental response to the pandemic, and the overlap of the pandemic with the country’s presidential election scheduled on May 10, 2020. The government’s fast reaction, combined with the citizens’ discipline, resulted in the suppress...
Article
Full-text available
I analyze institutions of prison subculture that mitigate potential violent confrontations among inmates, in contrast to Hobbesian-Zimbardo default spontaneous violence. The games that are relatively rarely played in prison are Chicken and other violent confrontation games. Incoming rookie inmates are subject to initiation tests that allocate them...
Article
Before the parliamentary elections in 2018, the ruling party in Turkey, AKP, introduced a new apparentement provision in the electoral law, which allowed parties to make electoral alliances in order to meet the electoral threshold. We claim that this was an ex post mistake. AKP’s electoral engineering was motivated by their fear that its coalition...
Article
The ruling party in Turkey, the AKP, made an ex post mistake by changing the electoral law before the parliamentary elections in 2018. The new apparentement provision allowed parties to make electoral alliances and the alliances’ total votes could then be used to meet the threshold. Surprisingly, the MHP met the threshold in the election, while one...
Preprint
FIFA's ranking of national soccer teams is plagued with paradoxes. One surprising paradox is a dramatic underrating of the hosts of main tournaments. The hosts, who are absent from the preliminaries, for a long time, play only friendlies that award few points. Three models estimate the magnitude of the resulting “Host Effect” at 14.1-16.7 positions...
Article
Full-text available
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pr...
Chapter
Full-text available
Introduction The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a noncooperative 2x2 game (two players with two strategies each) that represents an apparently paradoxical phenomenon of independently rational decisions leading to socially suboptimal outcomes. In a popular interpretation, two robbers, who were caught by police and are held incommunicado, expect to be ch...
Article
Full-text available
I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of spoilers. In single-office elections, a “classic” spoiler turns a winner into a non-winner and a non-winner into a winner. Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office elections. In such elections, spoilers include a “Kingmaker”, who turns a non-winner into a winner; a “Kingslayer...
Article
Full-text available
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite numb...
Book
Full-text available
Comparison of single-member districts and proportional representation systems (in Polish)
Book
Full-text available
A collection of articles on collective action and related topics by former collaborators, friends, and students of Mancur Olson published to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the publication of his Ph.D. thesis "The Logic of Collective Action".
Article
Full-text available
The paper starts with the definitions of five major voting methods that can be applied in single-member districts. Then the political consequences of single-member districts are discussed. The special attention is paid to those consequences that are considered negative and to potential ways of neutralizing them. The next section compares selected s...
Article
Full-text available
Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why d...
Article
Full-text available
When we assume that a survey reveals respondents' true attitudes we tacitly assume that the subjects understood what we are asking them about and that they had no incentive to be untruthful. In typical studies none of the two assumptions holds. Subjects are asked questions that use undefined terms and they are asked about issues they have no incent...
Chapter
Full-text available
Backward induction (BI) is defined for extensive-form games of perfect information. The relation of BI to Nash equilibrium, the concept of incredible threat, and subgame perfect equilibrium is described. Variants of the procedure include cutting long subgames or cutting any subset of disjoint subgames. The discussion of criticisms is focused on the...
Article
Full-text available
https://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=googlescholar&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA198931229&sid=classroomWidget&asid=fad64799
Article
Full-text available
After atrocities, disappearances, and other human rights violations, the dictatorship in Authoritania falls, and a new democratic regime takes power, changing the country's name to Freedonia. How should Freedonia deal with Authoritania's rulers and their agents? Do they have options between forgiveness and full-scale retribution? Should agents of t...
Article
Full-text available
Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. The authors find the concepts of false conviction and false acquittal more adequate for such evaluation than the conformity with the rule of law and apply a useful classification of truth revelation procedures into incentive-based (ITRs) and evidence-based ones (ETRs...
Article
Full-text available
In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametr...
Article
Full-text available
The paper introduces a generalized spatial model that is motivated by the frequent changes in party identity and electoral laws that characterize transitional party systems. In this model, parties may (1) change their platforms, (2) their identities through coalitions and splits and (3) if they form a winning coalition, the electoral law. The equil...
Book
Full-text available
Prison socializes an inmate to hyper-calculative behavior. It teaches him patience in planning and pursuing his goals, punishes him severely for his mistakes and rewards him generously for smart action. No wonder that inmates are such ardent optimizers. A clever move can shorten one’s sentence, save one from rape or a beating, keep one’s spirit hig...
Article
Full-text available
The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates when a social rule of decision-making can be uniquely characterized with such axioms. The first result shows that every set of axioms that characterize a given rule is equivalent to a set of three algebraic axioms. The second result suggests a method for constructing an algebrai...
Chapter
Full-text available
When given the opportunity, politicians try to manipulate democratic institutions to their own advantage (Riker, 1986). In mature democracies, institutional constraints that prevent manipulation have evolved over time. In contrast, the political systems of young democracies are less restricted in this area and encourage electoral heresthetics. The...
Article
Full-text available
A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organized by the `old crew'. In this article I argue that such initiation rituals are often designed by inmates in order to uncover a rookie's personal characteristics, such as toughness and cleverness. While such rituals may seem violent, they usually invol...
Article
Full-text available
A new inmate, or 'rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces 'tests' and 'games' organized by the 'old crew'. In this article I argue that such initiation rituals are often designed by inmates in order to uncover a rookie's personal characteristics, such as toughness and cleverness. While such rituals may seem violent, they usually invol...
Chapter
Full-text available
The problem of collective action, while noticed early by Rousseau and Hume, received its first model in the 1950’s in the celebrated Prisoner’s Dilemma introduced by Flood and Drescher and motivated by Albert Tucker’s familiar story. Later, with the development of game theory, problems of collective action were thoroughly formalized as variants of...
Article
Full-text available
Electoral reforms had profound political consequences for post-communist Poland. The majoritarian system helped to accelerate the fall of communism, while later changes to the electoral law helped the former communists reclaim power. Despite the high stakes and top priority given to electoral design by political players, their efforts at manipulati...
Article
Full-text available
The electoral law and voter preferences are modeled as a partition-function form game that represents payoffs of electoral coalitions in a multi-party system. Three empirical hypotheses are formulated under the assumption that seat-maximizing parties modify coalitional structures to extract gains from coalescing. The hypotheses say that party syste...
Article
Full-text available
The problem of distributing a single homogeneous divisible good among a variable set of agents, or the ‘rationing problem,’ is analyzed. Examples of rationing include bankruptcy, taxation, claims settlement, cost allocation, surplus sharing, and social choice problems. Agents are described by their personal characteristics, or . A type may be an ag...
Article
Full-text available
During the 1989 Roundtable Talks, Solidarity and PUWP (the Communist Party) were bargaining over the electoral law for the 1989 parliamentary elections in Poland--the first semifree elections held in the Soviet Bloc. The author shows that PUWP's consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic estimate of its popular support. A surprisi...
Article
Full-text available
In several Eastern European countries the breakdown of communism in 1989 was followed by a surprising return to power of postcommunist parties. Yet, some electoral victories of postcommunists look puzzling when contrasted with a small size of a shift in voters' preferences that has led to them. Such is the case of the 1993 Polish parliamentary elec...
Article
Fair Division, From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution, BramsSteven J. and TaylorAlan D. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 272 pp., $18.95 paper, $59.95 cloth. - Volume 11 - Marek M. Kaminski
Article
Full-text available
This article draws on the prison experiences in Poland of the senior author to identify some of the major ingredients of the prison subculture in that country. The dominant inmate pattern of grypsing is described, as is the physical environment of Polish prisons. This article also examines “prisonization” processes and the norms of the grypsing gro...
Article
Full-text available
The electoral law and voter preferences are modeled as a partition-function form game that represents payoffs of electoral coalitions in a multi-party system. Three empirical hypotheses are formulated under the assumption that seat-maximizing parties modify coalitional structures to extract gains from coalescing. The hypotheses say that party syste...
Article
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend von Neumann and Kuhn's classic axiomatic frameworks. Within this setup, I define a modified backward induction procedure that is applicable to all games. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction equilibrium (BIE). The main result compares the set...

Projects

Projects (9)
Project
Electoral system manipulation and paradoxes