

# Established and Rising Great Powers

The United States, Russia, China, and India

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THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS conventionally regard great powers as the most important actors in international politics. Research on norms, however, has placed little emphasis on their activities (see chapter 1). Research on great powers, in turn, has for the most part neglected the role of norms and focused mainly on material aspects. Highlighting the role of the normative fabric of the international system in this volume compels us to look at the roles great powers play as norm entrepreneurs in arms control regimes.

The theory of hegemonic stability (first articulated by Kindleberger 1973) makes the robustness of norms contingent on the productive, protective, and enforcing role of hegemonic great powers, but this theory has lost popularity with the appearance of Keohane's "After Hegemony" (1984). However, even if, as Keohane argues, a regime can be alive and well in the absence of a hegemon, great powers can still exert considerable influence on the creation, development, and decay of norms and regimes. Hegemonic stability theory, however, is of limited value because it only deals with one type of great power: those that have invested heavily in the existing order and can thus be expected to have a stake in maintaining and improving it.

As power transition theory (Organski 1958; Tammen et al. 2000) reminds us, rising powers may be less satisfied with the norms of the day that may deny them proper participation and status. Being denied the fulfillment of their ambitions, they view the existing order as unjust and try to change it by repealing existing norms and replacing them with norms that better fit their own

interests and values. This notion stands in some contradiction to the proposition in norm research that middle powers have broad opportunities for norm entrepreneurship *within* an established order. Thus, some rising powers may have chosen to engage as norm entrepreneurs before they began to rise and, from this perspective, might have acquired some ownership in the existing regimes. This would lead to stabilizing rather than challenging activities.

We regard the United States and Russia as established great powers. While the United States has been the dominant power since the end of World War II, the position of Russia is somewhat delicate as it was never a global hegemon but instead was the primary challenger to the US-led international order. Both, however, played a pivotal role in the creation of the regimes under scrutiny here, given the assumption of nuclear parity. They should act valiantly in a) defending and enforcing the regimes and b) opposing norm change; something that the United States—as the permanent number one—is expected to do even more than Russia.

China and India are rising great powers. Both were great empires in the past but were subjected to repression and humiliation during the era of imperialism. They were comparatively weak when the current world order was established in the aftermath of World War II and remained on the periphery of world politics during the Cold War. From the 1980s (China) and 1990s (India) onward, both started a spectacular rise. They can thus be expected to put forward alternative norms to those existing and to justify their proposals by arguing that the present order is profoundly unjust. They might also be more hostile toward those regimes that had been established before their rise began (NPT and BWC) than toward those that have been established later (e.g., CWC, UN PoA).

#### THE UNITED STATES: COVERING THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP

With the establishment of a “balance of terror” between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post–World War II era, arms control became increasingly relevant. More than any other power, the United States shaped the international order and its arms control treaties and regimes. In particular, it engaged proactively in establishing, strengthening, enforcing, and advancing the norm of WMD nonproliferation, covering the whole spectrum of entrepreneurship. The US record is ambivalent, however, because Washington has, at times, also worked toward weakening norms of disarmament and peaceful uses.

## us Arms Control Politics and Policies

Depending on the respective administration, since World War II us foreign policy has oscillated between unilateralist and multilateralist approaches. Common to all is a belief in us exceptionalism and moral significance, if not superiority, that dates back to the Founding Fathers. The degree to which the United States succeeded in building a normative system based on its ideas varied according to the temperature of the Cold War but was also a function of domestic politics.

The United States rarely speaks with one voice on arms control issues. Many key players are involved, often with initially different views concerning a potential agreement. Within the administration, the White House usually leads the process. The success of negotiations often depends on the president's or his national security adviser's commitment and involvement; a lack of leadership allows the warring factions in an administration to delay and obstruct the process. The State Department traditionally views international agreements in a more positive light than the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although at times the latter have played a more facilitating role than conventional wisdom would suggest. Between 1961 and 1997, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was a semi-independent yet important actor in the arms control process until it was reintegrated into the State Department in 1999. All these players often have conflicting ideas about arms control in general or the value of specific agreements. While it is thus difficult for the administrative branch to agree on a coherent position prior to or during international negotiations, it is even more difficult when it comes to winning the approval of Congress.

The legislative branch is in a strong position concerning arms control. The Senate is required to approve the international treaties that the president signs with a two-thirds majority. Congress is also responsible for general legislation and reviews the defense budget; both can have a profound impact on arms control. The ratification of treaties is often dependent on domestic politics. It is generally easier for Republican presidents to get the Senate's approval for arms control treaties. But even they need to offer many concessions, primarily to defense-minded senators. Congress can also act as a keeper of arms control: during the Reagan years, for example, Congress prevented the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and urged the president to start negotiating a comprehensive test ban (Fascell 1987).

US allies also have a certain impact upon the decision-making process. The German position on the NPT and its verification mechanism during the 1960s, for example, had a major impact on the American negotiation position, as was the case with NATO's perspective on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. With regard to NPT RevCons, the United States also coordinates closely with the other nuclear weapon states (NWS). One US arms control veteran observed that these "prenegotiations" within the government and with allies typically took "more time and effort than the negotiations with the Soviets" (Bunn 1992, 6).

*US Arms Control after World War II* The United States, having been the world's strongest military power since 1945, played a critical—whether facilitating or blocking—role in every attempt to control, limit, or reduce all types of weapons and has initiated many of these regimes itself. The earliest attempt to put the power of the atom under international control was the 1946 Baruch Plan, which would have left the United States with a monopoly of nuclear weapons know-how. A long period of strategic build-up followed Soviet rejection of this proposal. Arms control as a third way between total disarmament and an uncontrolled, destabilizing arms race gained prominence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The idea was to focus on small but practicable steps to ensure strategic stability (Krepon 1989, 28). Kennedy concluded the bilateral "Hot Line" agreement and the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 after the Cuban missile crisis had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The era of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as the years of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the late 1980s, saw the biggest successes in arms control efforts with the NPT in 1968, the 1972 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Interim Agreement, ABM Treaty, and BWC, and the 1987 INF Treaty.

*US Arms Control after the Cold War* The "Bush 41" administration successfully seized the momentum of the benevolent environment in the early 1990s, concluded multilateral agreements (Conventional Forces in Europe, or CFE) as well as bilateral agreements (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START) and made progress with regard to negotiations on the CWC.<sup>1</sup> Clinton is sometimes charged with having slowed down the arms control process (Krass 1997, 3). Yet, during Clinton's presidency, the Senate ratified START II, the NPT was extended indefinitely, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature, and the CWC entered into force. Moreover, his administration implemented

the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to prevent the leakage of weapons and materials from the former Soviet nuclear complex. Clinton also supported the initiative to ban antipersonnel mines (APM) and envisaged US accession to the Ottawa Treaty by 2004. If arms control no longer held a prominent position in US foreign policy, this was to a large degree a result of the Republicans having gained control of both houses of Congress in 1994. Henceforth, the emphasis on maximum flexibility and a hostile attitude toward arms control gained strength, culminating in the rejection of CTBT ratification in 1999.

Every president since Lyndon B. Johnson (with the exception of the first Reagan administration) has agreed with the idea that arms control advances national security. The “Bush 43” years marked a clear departure. The Bush administration’s contempt for multilateral instruments, in particular treaties, led to withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001. Moreover, the administration abandoned the CTBT and the Ottawa Treaty; its policy was responsible for serious crises within the BWC (Sims 2003), the NPT (Johnson 2005), and the SALW PoA (Fehl 2008, 270–71). The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) was as much as the Russians could obtain in terms of a binding agreement on nuclear arms control. This skeleton-like treaty reflected the administration’s disdain for what it viewed as anachronistic, rigid, and slow bargaining (Ford 2008). Whereas the United States had always championed transparency, verification, predictability, and stability, the Bush administration now favored flexible, speedy, effective, informal “coalition of the willing” approaches, such as the 2002 G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, or the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

The inauguration of President Obama in 2009 marked the end of the hostile US attitude toward multilateral arms control. Obama declared working toward a world free of nuclear weapons a top priority. With subsequent initiatives, the administration demonstrated that its commitment went beyond declaratory policy. Its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reduced the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy; the administration achieved New START, which entered into force in 2011; it hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 where forty-seven countries discussed strategies for securing all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide; it revived a dormant Plutonium Disposal Agreement with Russia; it released nuclear stockpile figures for the period since 1962 and for warhead dismantlement since 1994 in an unprecedented measure of transparency; and it signaled its determination to reintroduce the CTBT to the Senate, to start talks with Russia about further nuclear reductions (including tactical

weapons), and to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva. Considering the unfavorable domestic environment of a very partisan Congress, these measures should not be dismissed; they are important steps on the road to Obama's long-term goal of global zero.

### Nonproliferation versus Disarmament and Peaceful Uses

Arms control held a relatively high priority in US strategic thinking during the Cold War. Since Truman, all administrations have adhered to a universal nonproliferation policy and have worked on establishing strong norms against the spread of WMD. Although not always equally influential, the two undercurrents of denial/control on the one hand and peaceful uses/sharing of technology on the other have dominated US policy (Nye 1987, 166). Absolute denial after World War II evolved into nuclear sharing with NATO allies during the 1950s and Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace program. The spread of nuclear reactors for peaceful uses, technological progress, and above all the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, however, strengthened the position of those prioritizing nonproliferation over sharing and led to the US advocating international efforts to constrain horizontal proliferation. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was a driving force toward the NPT and the BWC.

The first American drafts for the NPT did not envisage what would eventually be known as the "grand bargain." Rather, the United States saw the balance of the treaty as lying in the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) and in the renunciation by the NWS, in turn, of the right to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to whomever they like (Holloway 2011, 154). While the United States has always committed many resources to strengthening the nonproliferation pillar of each WMD regime, it has also acknowledged that technological cooperation and exchange for peaceful uses and disarmament are legitimate concerns. Until the late 1990s, it had never tried to challenge this bargain (Joyner 2011, 37). However, the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the development of chemical weapons and missiles by Iraq in the early 1980s compelled Washington to establish closed exporter cartels—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 and the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the mid-1980s—in order to prevent a "race to the bottom" regarding export policies.

Following concerns about noncompliance with Art. II of the NPT, the United States started to prioritize the nonproliferation pillar over the others at the end

of the 1990s. The Bush 43 administration, which had been averse to arms control from the start, reinforced this trend with increased vigor after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the autumn 2001 mailings of anthrax letters. Regarding the NPT, for example, it started to deconstruct what was formerly acknowledged as unquestionable rights and obligations under Art. IV; the United States now declared the right to peaceful uses and technology exchange as strictly conditional upon the NNWS's strict adherence to their Art. II obligations as assessed by Washington (Joyner 2011, 40). Moreover, Art. IV was seen as a loophole that allowed countries to acquire nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs. Bush even suggested in 2004 that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities be limited to states that already operate full fuel cycles and that NSG members should refuse technology and equipment sales to all other states (Bush 2004). At the same time, the administration tried to marginalize the disarmament pillar of the NPT. It did not regard Art. VI as a core provision of the regime and dismissed the "13 steps" of the 2000 RevCon final document as neither binding nor any longer relevant. Moreover, it argued that the United States was in compliance with Art. VI because its arsenal had been greatly reduced since its peak in 1967 (Ford 2007).

Some of the administration's new initiatives, such as the PSI, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the G8 Global Partnership, did not aim at introducing new nonproliferation norms or further developing existing ones, but rather at enforcing them through informal, quick, and effective ad hoc solutions. The imperative to find ways of dealing with WMD proliferation to, and from, nonstate actors was demonstrated by both 9/11 and the disclosure of the A. Q. Khan network. Within the BWC framework, for example, the administration made it clear that member states had to do more in terms of national implementation. It also steered the discussion about biosecurity in the direction of a laboratory-oriented approach and thus a narrow focus on the prevention of deliberate theft and misuse of dangerous pathogens (Revill and Dando 2009). This emphasis on prevention and securing materials is reflected in the administration's efforts to establish criminalizing proliferation as a new norm, leading to Security Council Resolution 1540 (van Ham and Bosch 2007, 6).

### Is There a Place for Justice in US Arms Control?

The United States has usually pursued a utilitarian approach to arms control. Whereas arms control had to serve national security, some triggers for US

engagement went beyond immediate security considerations. When Lyndon Johnson suggested talks about strategic limitations to the Soviets in 1967, budgetary considerations played an important role (Quester 1973, 28). Nixon found himself facing public pressure to engage in SALT negotiations and also considered arms control as part of a broader policy of *détente*. Reagan was urged by NATO allies to negotiate the INF Treaty and considered the talks with the Soviets as “alliance management” that helped to secure NATO countries’ acceptance of US missile deployment on their territories (Hampson 1987, 78; Bunn 1992, 175–77).

Since the end of World War II, the United States has largely been in the position to shape all bilateral and multilateral agreements according to its preferences or, if this was not possible, to deny them any significance.<sup>2</sup> Thus, asymmetries in multilateral regimes favor the United States. Being recognized as a NWS under the NPT, it is one of only five states parties that legally possess the most powerful weapon on earth. Moreover, it is not obliged to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. The United States even benefits from an asymmetric complaints mechanism in the BWC, which, after all, is considered to be a nondiscriminatory regime. Since Art. VI of the convention refers complaints to the Security Council, the P5 can prevent investigations of their own programs or those of their allies (Littlewood 2005, 17). With regard to the CWC, Congress diluted the convention by enacting legislation that exempted US sites from the same verification rules that US diplomats had demanded be included in the treaty during the negotiations (Smithson 2001, 23).

The United States rarely issues an explicit justice claim. The closest it comes is the recurrent reference to the American Constitution as the highest legal authority in US statements within the context of SALW. The US demands that its domestic constitutional and policy choices, as made through a democratic system of representative government, be respected and that the Second Amendment—the right to keep and bear arms—must under no circumstances be infringed by any international agreement (see, e.g., Bolton 2001a, 2001b; Joseph 2006). This remote reference to procedural justice reflects a strong American sense of exceptionalism. While the United States does not tolerate any interference with its Constitution, it was, for example, the key norm entrepreneur with regard to S/RES/1540 with its very intrusive obligations on all states to adapt their national legislation. As one observer of US arms control put it: “Whether intended or not, the United States sometimes conveys the impression that everyone else is supposed to adhere precisely to the rules while the United

States retains full freedom of action” (Krass 1997, 187). Other countries’ accusations of unjust American behavior and their justice-laden language within arms control regimes are mainly dismissed by US delegates and decision makers as strategic use of moral language to either stall or delay progress in negotiations or to improve bargaining positions. The tendency to disregard others’ justice claims might to a certain degree stem from US exceptionalism. The conviction of moral superiority led officials during the Cold War, for example, to misinterpret Soviet striving for parity. The Soviets, according to this view, would not need parity for a credible second strike capability because “they know we won’t attack, therefore, this build-up must be for them to get a credible first strike capability.”<sup>3</sup>

Questions of parity and equality have stirred heated debates, also *within* the United States. The SALT I Interim Agreement codified Soviet numerical superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers but failed to address the US arsenal’s qualitative advantage (e.g., multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, and submarines), or the numerical advantage in strategic bombers untouched (McCain 1989, 165). A number of senators, led by Democrat Henry Jackson, believed that these unequal force ceilings benefited the Soviets and, in conjunction with the ABM Treaty, might place the United States at risk. They gathered support for an amendment that obliged the administration to seek equality in all further strategic talks. This had a huge influence on the following SALT II negotiations (McCain 1989, 77–79). Reagan also made it clear from the start of his presidency that his arms control policy would be guided by the principle of equality across all fields (Rowney 1989, 70–74).

Besides equality, the United States has always put a premium on verification and compliance. It was close to an axiom that treaties, especially bilateral ones with the untrustworthy and opaque Soviets, needed to be verifiable (Haass 1987). While *adequate verification* was the standard for the first decade of strategic arms control,<sup>4</sup> Reagan insisted on an *effective verification* standard that would assure the detection of *every* case of Soviet cheating—regardless of its military implications (Krass 1997, 164). Concern over others’ noncompliance peaked under Reagan, resulting in accusations of Soviet violation of key provisions of SALT I, SALT II, and, most significantly, the ABM Treaty. The United States also accused the Soviets of grave violations of the BWC and was, after the end of the Cold War, concerned with breaches of the NPT by Iraq, Libya, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and, recently, Iran. Verification and compliance disputes have

often inhibited progress on arms control and have been a source of contention for opponents: if treaties are signed and not complied with, they become a security liability rather than an asset (Seignious 1987, 4).

This emphasis on equality and compliance could be interpreted as an indication that justice and fairness concerns were underlying currents of US policy (Albin 2001, 183–87). Arguments in the American arms control discourse against other countries' superiority (or even parity) do not necessarily stem from security concerns alone, but also from American self-perception that it is responsible for a stable and liberal world order: since the United States provides the public good of world security, it is entitled to freedom of action. From this perspective, parity, equality, and treaty provisions restricting a military posture that allows for all necessary policy options contradict this entitlement and are thus justice relevant indeed.

### The Whole Spectrum of Entrepreneurship

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the key actor in international arms control. The fate of virtually all treaties and agreements has depended on the American position toward them. Justice concerns impacted on the American position when US military supremacy and freedom of action were endangered by certain treaty provisions or Soviet build-ups. Utilitarian calculation, at times influenced by predominant ideologies favoring or opposing international cooperation and arms control, largely determine US policy.

The United States has used arms control either to constrain the freedom of action of others while preserving its own or to prohibit weapons of no use to its own armed forces but that could present a danger to US interests. Within this framework, the United States has operated as a proactive promoter of norms in the field of WMD nonproliferation. It has also put a lot of effort into enforcing existing regimes and has successfully worked on establishing a new norm of criminalizing the proliferation of all sorts of WMDs after 9/11. At least since the late 1990s, however, it has embarked on strengthening nonproliferation at the cost of disarmament, technological exchange, and peaceful uses. In doing so, it came close to being an active opponent of these norms. The administration and Congress also opposed new global norms in humanitarian arms control, especially with regard to APM, cluster bombs, and SALW, while at the same time remaining committed to the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance and helping countries to dispose of small arms, light weapons, and munitions.

The Obama administration has kept alive almost all of the Bush 43 administration's initiatives and has expanded some of them. At the same time, it has returned to a policy of affirming the grand bargain of the NPT. It appears willing to undertake important steps toward nuclear disarmament. And President Obama's words may indicate that justice has become a more essential part of the equation: "As a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it" (Obama 2009).

#### RUSSIA: EQUALITY FIRST

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was one of two poles in the international system. Today's Russia inherited most of the Soviet military arsenal but has been financially incapable of maintaining it. While Russia's political and economic systems still show weaknesses, the country's energy resources account for its recent geopolitical ascendance. According to the Correlates of War Projects power index, Russia still belongs among the five most powerful states in the world (see CoW 2010).

Two identity elements that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union dominate its foreign and security policy thinking and strategies. First, Russia claims a special position in its immediate environment, the "near abroad," where it strives to be recognized as the hegemonic power. Second, Russia wants to be accepted by the United States—at least symbolically—as a world power of equal weight. In 2009 Russia defined its strategic objectives as follows: "Transformation of the Russian Federation into a world power whose activities aim at maintaining strategic stability and mutually advantageous partnerships under the conditions of a multipolar world" (Russian Federation 2009, III/21). Economic and technological backwardness and the poor condition of the armed forces, however, render the ambition to claim world power status hard to achieve, not only in comparison to the United States but also to China and India with their much larger, and still growing, populations and high economic growth rates. US military superiority further undermines the claim to be seen as equal. The modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal and the maintenance of a large arsenal of substrategic nuclear weapons are attempts to counterbalance this at relatively moderate expense. Arms control could be an alternative way to procure an equalizer (Hansell and Perflyev 2009).

## Status Equality and Equal Security

Early Soviet thinking portrayed arms control as a “bourgeois trick” and therefore rejected it because only complete disarmament would lead to overcoming imperialism and thereby promote peace (Kokoshin 1991, 133). Several severe crises in the early 1960s, particularly the Cuban missile crisis with the concomitant specter of a nuclear war, convinced Moscow of the necessity to pursue arms control talks with the United States and thereby reduce the risk of a nuclear disaster (Kokoshin 1991, 134).

During the following decades, the Soviet Union emphasized parity and stability in its negotiations with the United States (Albin 2001, 184–85). Arms control was not only pursued for national security reasons but also to ensure the basis for both equality of status and security with the redoubtable American rival. The NPT, which saw the Soviets as a leading negotiating party and eventually a depositary power, served the same goal as it eliminated the risk of a global imbalance disfavoring the Soviet Union. In Moscow’s eyes, the treaty mainly served to keep the US allies Germany and Japan nonnuclear. Throughout this period, Soviet arms control policy was conservative rather than proactive and led to the failure of attempts to create new regimes that were seen as a threat to parity—for example, mutual balance in force reductions in Europe or a chemical weapons convention (Garthoff 2001, 190–96, 230). This changed fundamentally under Gorbachev. Convinced that for domestic and security reasons, and to save humankind from a major disaster, military confrontation with the United States had to come to an end, the Soviet president took a number of initiatives (including the unilateral withdrawal of five hundred thousand soldiers from Eastern Europe) and accepted asymmetric rules for INF and the dismantlement of heavy intercontinental missiles. In addition, Gorbachev agreed to innovative and very intrusive verification measures. Indeed, before the endgame of the negotiations for the CWC, the Soviets were ready to accept far-reaching verification earlier than the United States (Evangelista 2004, 94–98). Through these years, Gorbachev had no reason to view the issue of parity with the United States as problematic: first Reagan, and later Bush 41, treated the reform-willing Soviets as equals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nascent Russian Federation no longer showed the same degree of norm entrepreneurship as the late Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Moreover, with the material power base fading year by year, Russia had to accept a number of US proposals that would have been considered incompatible with equality of status

and security claims in the pre-Gorbachev era, such as shrinking the sub-strategic nuclear arsenals or receiving US aid for the ailing Russian nuclear complex.

With Putin's rise to power, Russia returned to the arms control policies of the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union, with a strong emphasis on equal status and equal security. Russia's national security policy reemphasized the role of nuclear weapons in order to maintain the balance of power and strategic stability (Medvedev 1999, 16; Sokov 2007, 208). Within the NPT context, Russia promoted the Additional Protocol and measures to regulate withdrawal from the NPT (Khlebnikov 1995, 7; Kislyak 1995, 10; Mostovets 2002, 1; Russian Federation 2010, 17). Russia also became a party to the CTBT in the hope that the United States would reciprocate. The only remarkable Russian act of norm entrepreneurship, however, was the Moscow Treaty (2002), which the Bush administration accepted only after strong Russian pressure. At the same time, Moscow resisted demands by nonnuclear weapon states for certain disarmament measures such as the closure of testing facilities, renouncing the development of new nuclear warheads, and reducing sub-strategic nuclear arsenals (Müller 2011, 221–22). It justified its reluctance by stressing the unwillingness of other NWS to emulate systematic Russian and American strategic reductions.

The question of status also dominated the Russian position on the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review. For Moscow, the most important outcome of the review was US willingness to revive bilateral arms control and to work with Russia toward finding a solution to the difficult issue of missile defense in Europe: "Strategic stability and approximate parity with the United States in the composition and capabilities of nuclear forces are very important concepts in the domestic Russian security debate" (Podvig 2011a, 39–40). The desire to retain an elevated status vis-à-vis nonnuclear weapon states (Antonov 2004, 8) and to preserve deterrence vis-à-vis the United States played a major role.

The request to participate as an equal in NATO's missile defense in Europe is the most recent case of an attempt to maintain equal status; Russia is keen to keep its nuclear deterrent and rejects reducing its sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the light of US missile defense plans, NATO's conventional superiority, and China's growing military strength (Podvig 2011b, 15–20).

The orientation toward equal security also influences Russian behavior beyond nuclear issues: the refusal to accede to the Ottawa Convention not only reciprocates US and Chinese abstention but is also due to concern about securing its extensive borders with the West and China, very similar to the considerations that determine Russia's attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons (Lavrov 2011).

## Economic Interests versus Arms Control

The Soviet Union was a founding member of the NSG, and Russia inherited this membership. It also acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, its compliance with the guidelines has been contested by critics due to doubts over the effectiveness of national export controls (Crail 2010, 18–20). In addition, Russia is continuing, albeit at a reduced level and with frequent delays, its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia cultivates a liberal interpretation of Art. IV of the NPT. It emphasizes equality before the law and sympathizes with the developing countries' compensatory claims for non-discriminatory assistance (Kislyak 1995, 11; Titkov 1995, 6). This coincides with the interest in profitable exports since nuclear technology is one of the few modern fields in which Russia is a successful exporter. The case of Iran, which has been declared by the IAEA to have been in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations since 2002, demonstrates the priority Russia gives to civilian nuclear cooperation over proliferation concerns. Russia's criticism of Iranian policy is much less acerbic than that of Western governments. This translates into continued nuclear cooperation—including services and fuel supply for the Bushehr reactor after completion of construction—while Western nations have long since terminated any collaboration (Weiner 2011). Apart from the justice-related argument concerning equal rights, Russia justifies this policy with the need to maintain the stability of the NPT by providing assistance to NNWS in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Kislyak 1995).

The balance between Russian economic interest and arms control is even more tilted in the SALW field—Russia is the second largest exporter of small arms worldwide. One major stimulus for the spread of these weapons was the sales, official and non-official, of large quantities of obsolete Warsaw Treaty weapons after the end of the Cold War. However, Russia opposed any strict regulations on global conventional arms transfers. As the “birthplace” of the Khalashnikov, the most exported and used small arm, and of a strong conventional armaments industry that is one of its few high-tech export sectors, Russia has opposed strong norm building in this sector. On the one hand, Russia has been regularly submitting its annual reports (except 2004 and 2009), where it underlines its interest in strengthening the regime. In the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), it assists Uzbekistan and Armenia to make progress in implementing the PoA (Russian Federation 2002, 10). On the other hand, it does not tighten national export control

regulations in order to foster PoA objectives, and there is a discrepancy between the positive tone of the reports and the growth of national arms exports, including surplus weapons (Small Arms Survey 2009, 24).

Russia strongly criticizes the lavish arms exports by the United States to states that Washington regards as allies or at least as good customers. Russia's policy instead is based on an understanding of the PoA as requiring strict equal treatment of members: "We should . . . avoid approaches which could be viewed as restrictions against any state or a group of states" (Littravin 2006). Russia insists on a categorical distinction between (prohibited) illegal and (legitimate) legal trade, based on clear definitions. The aim of this is to transform the PoA into a normative license for legal trade, whereby the decision on whom to supply remains completely under national authority, thus contradicting the objectives of the PoA initiators. Economic interests clearly serve as a limit to Russian norm entrepreneurship.

When commercial interest and arms control objectives coincide, however, Russia is capable of significant norm entrepreneurship. This applies, for example, to the tricky issue of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and fuel guarantees, where Russia has been pioneering two initiatives aimed at reducing the spread of national enrichment facilities. In 2007, Russia and Kazakhstan created the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC), which utilizes existing enrichment capacity at the Angarsk facility in Russia. In the meantime, Ukraine and Armenia have joined the IUEC. While technology remains under Russian control, the center's member states have drawing rights on the enrichment product in proportion to their investments. In 2010, Russia concluded an agreement with the IAEA according to which Russia establishes a fuel reserve equivalent to the fuel loads for two 1,000-megawatt reactors under IAEA control; this reserve can be drawn upon by states in good standing with their safeguards agreements in the event of a supply interruption. Russia thereby wants to set a standard that can be emulated elsewhere and to mitigate the risks emerging from the rapid spread of national fuel cycle facilities (Khlopkov 2011, 6–7).

### Compliance Policy and Noncompliance Problems

The security of the Russian nuclear complex, something that was of great concern in the 1990s (Potter 1993, 4–8), has been improved by domestic efforts and international help; however, problems still remain. The professional culture

of the Russian nuclear community works against nuclear security (Busch and Holmes 2009). On December 16, 2011, for example, the Russian customs control at Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow stopped a piece of luggage with radioactive material bound for Tehran (Reuters 2011). Incidents like this revive doubts concerning Russia's practical implementation of export controls.

Russian institutes, funded by international financial help for unemployed nuclear scientists, have reportedly been engaged in work on Iran's internationally contested Bushehr reactor (Weiner 2011). Russian policies toward Iran and Syria show a reluctant attitude toward enforcing multilateral arms control treaties. Russia is a reluctant negotiator with regard to UN Security Council-imposed sanctions and usually works toward lessening their harshness (Orlov and Trushkin 2011).

There are also doubts about full Russian compliance with its obligations under the BWC (US DoS 2010, 23). The Soviet Union had been conducting a biological weapons program since 1926 and continued these activities after ratifying the BWC in 1975 in clear violation of its commitments. President Yeltsin admitted Soviet noncompliance in 1992 and declared the activities terminated. Concerns remained, however, even after the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia had worked to resolve compliance concerns in the "Trilateral Process," and in 2004 the United States accused Moscow of secretly continuing its offensive biological weapons (BW) program. While Russia participated in the negotiations on a verification and compliance protocol (albeit with rather restrictive positions) it repeatedly insisted on establishing definitions of prohibited substances and related agents (Hart 2006). This, however, would have watered down the general-purpose criterion, the normative backbone of the BWC, since defining prohibited areas could allow the interpretation that all other activities are legal, and newly developed BW agents might not be covered by the prohibition (e.g., Berdennikov 1994, 6). During the negotiations, Russia also insisted that only existing provisions be used to address compliance problems (Russian Federation 1997, 2). These include a central role for the UN Security Council, and the Russian proposal can be seen as an attempt to secure this role against efforts by others to replace it with nondiscriminatory procedures that would not grant veto powers to some treaty members. Russia continued to call for the introduction of binding verification measures after the protocol negotiations failed in 2001 (e.g., Antonov 2006).

Russia has the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons worldwide, and its ratification of the CWC was delayed for political and economic reasons. Russia

needs financial help to destroy all chemical weapons. Further, it called for exemptions in the convention concerning the destruction of all plants involved in the production of chemical weapons. Complying with the convention on this point would have meant the end for large parts of the Russian chemical industry and have imposed a huge financial burden on Russia (Makashov 1997). Russia has been fully committed to complete elimination of its stockpile, but the difficult socioeconomic conditions during the transition in the 1990s prevented it from focusing on chemical weapons demilitarization (Walker 2010); it will not be able to meet the ultimate CWC deadline in 2012.

In the context of the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in 2002, Russian security forces released an unidentified aerosol incapacitant into the theater. Later, special forces stormed the theater and killed all hostage takers, but 129 hostages also died as a result of the incapacitant. Internationally, this incident was not labeled a violation of the CWC as it did not occur in armed combat, but many questions remain (Fidler 2005). There are reports that the Russian army used a similar gas in the context of another incident of hostage taking in 2005. There are also indications that Russia has continued research into incapacitants following, and building upon, the experiences gained during the Moscow incident. Taken together, this raises doubts about Russian compliance with the norms concerning the use, research, and disarmament of chemical weapons (Koplow 2006, 100–104).

### Russian Norm Entrepreneurship: Equality First

The Soviet Union and Russia have shown different attitudes toward norm entrepreneurship in arms control. The Soviet Union acted conservatively, focusing mainly on ensuring norms of equality in US-initiated arms control regimes. For half a decade, in the transition from the Cold War to its end, the Soviet Union became a proactive arms control norm entrepreneur. But this only lasted while Gorbachev was in charge. For a long time after 1991 Russian politicians had no clear understanding of how to define national interests and foreign policy goals; the Russian arms control and disarmament policy was somewhat confused (Tarasov 2000, 70). It receded into passivity under Putin and mirrored positions and attitudes known from the earlier Soviet Union, perhaps with the difference of an occasionally greater acceptance of transparency and verification.

Russia's arms control policy emphasizes equality of status; this particularly

implies equal security because everything else would expose Russia to pressures along its borders, a concern to which the enlargement of NATO has strongly contributed. That the material basis for claiming world power status has vanished enhances anxiety and motivates the use of justice arguments, notably in the NPT context.

The quest for status cuts two ways though. On the one hand, claims for equal security aim at curbing US superiority. On the other, Russia is reticent about demands for disarmament steps in the NPT context and also has misgivings about procedural changes regarding BWC. While in both instances these steps and changes would help to reduce the asymmetry between NWS/P5 and NNWS / non-P5, they would also diminish Russian status and security advantages. Russia thus demands equal security vis-à-vis the United States and accepts that this puts the majority of states—and certainly all NNWS—in a position of unequal security toward Russia.

Overall, Russia has an interest in, and works for, the stability and strengthening of existing norms wherever such norms move it closer to equal status and security. At the same time, status claims, the bias in favor of economic interests once they conflict with the strengthening of regime norms, and occasionally questionable compliance behavior thwart Russian norm entrepreneurship within all these fields. Indeed, instances of noncompliance might signal a degree of dissatisfaction with the norms as they stand. Status concerns and export interests can negatively impact upon Russian norm entrepreneurship and thus weaken the normative frameworks by delaying or preventing needed improvements.

#### CHINA: A NORM ENTREPRENEUR BETWEEN DEVELOPING COUNTRY AND NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE STATUS

Since the second half of the 1990s, the People's Republic of China has adopted a new multilateral approach in its arms control policy that oscillates between disobedience, obstruction, compliance, and cooperation. Domestically, China is undergoing a remarkable transition from a planned to a market economy and from an agrarian to an industrial state. Annual economic growth rates approaching or even exceeding 10 percent, starting in the early 1980s, changed China's international position and induced the country's leadership to consider how to shape its emergence on the global scene.

After the 1949 Communist victory, China seemed to emerge as a revisionist power, dissatisfied with the international order that isolated the "Middle King-

dom” and willing to contest rules such as nuclear nonproliferation, which it defied as discriminatory and supportive of Western imperialism. While experiences of isolation, containment, and humiliation influenced Mao Zedong to pursue a foreign policy informed by *realpolitik*, those generations of leadership who followed him pursued a more cooperative and international norm-oriented strategy (Feng 2009). As a result, there is increasing acceptance of international norms in China’s arms control policy: China acceded to the BWC in 1984 and to the NPT in 1992, signed the CTBT in 1996,<sup>5</sup> ratified the CWC in 1997, and joined the NSG in 2004.

China’s new multilateralism includes, but at the same time balances, motives such as cultural traditions, historical experiences, and national interests. In arms control, these motives can be in harmony with each other but also contradict each other. Their specific dimensions change depending on the respective issues in question and also change depending on the context, considerably influencing the degree to which China acts cooperatively at the international level and complies with norms. Founded on traditional Confucian and Mencian philosophy, China’s current security strategy pursues the objective of a “harmonious world” and “peaceful development.” As this concept views the world as generally harmonious, conflicts are rejected, but when occurring, they should be accommodated through moral, exemplary, and nonviolent persuasion (Yuan 1998, 87; Feng 2009, 172). The use of force is only considered legitimate when exercised defensively and proportionately.

Foreign policy attitudes reflect the weight of history: the forced opening by imperial powers in the nineteenth century made China shift from a “Middle Kingdom” to a semifeudal and semicolonial vassal state (Yuan 1998, 91). These experiences as well as US nuclear threats toward China during the Korean War caused a heightened appreciation of state sovereignty and an acute sense of equality and justice. Nowadays, these values are dominant parts of China’s identity, leading to a dichotomy of rising self-confidence, accompanied by an increasing willingness to engage in multilateral diplomacy and institutions, and a historically founded inferiority complex leading to insistence on unconstrained sovereignty. As a consequence of those traditions, historical roots, and social experiences, national interests play an essential role in the Chinese approach to arms control. These interests predominantly include the wish to expand influence and economic growth as well as secure regional stability and resource capacities. In some cases, especially when core national interests are affected, they seem to hinder Chinese compliance and norm support.

Technically, the politics of Chinese arms control can be described as closed, concentrated, and complex. Policy is officially formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Special responsibility is mainly assigned to the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, founded in 1997, which is the core and nexus of related knowledge informing Chinese policy (Johnston 2008, 55) and the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, which is responsible for UN negotiations. The ministry, in turn, is supervised by the foreign policy department of the Communist Party.

### Disarmament and Equal Security

Immediately after its first nuclear test in 1964, Beijing called for the complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons (China 1964). China has since repeatedly taken a position in favor of disarmament across all fields and still gives this objective higher priority than nonproliferation (e.g., Sha 1997; China 2005a).

The readiness to progress in international disarmament efforts is grounded on a distinct claim for equality, which is primarily motivated by the wish to safeguard China's status as an equal power within the international system on equal footing with the United States. "Unequal security" that would allow others to intimidate and pressure China is therefore not acceptable, particularly not in the light of the past (Foot and Walter 2011). Therefore, disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction toward a downward balance (e.g., China 2005a). Unilateralism as well as double or multiple standards in the regimes should be discarded (Hua 1998; Zhang 2005). The United States and Russia, possessing the largest nuclear arsenals, bear primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament (China 1999a). As long as they have not reduced their arsenals in "a verifiable and irreversible manner" (China 10SC 2009), reportedly below a thousand warheads each, China refuses to reduce its own stockpile.

Even though China supports disarmament under the terms of the NPT, it is the only NWS that is actually expanding its comparatively still small nuclear arsenal. China justifies this behavior by its right to self-defense, which, from its perspective, is jeopardized by the asymmetry in military strength between China and the United States, culminating in America's long-range, precise offensive strike options and extensive plans for missile defense (Twomey 2009). This moral dilemma between a defensive nuclear weapons posture and the

improvement of its nuclear capability is openly recognized by recent Chinese white papers (Yuan 2010, 17). The principle of nuclear counterdeterrence is an argument often cited to justify China's nuclear expansion. This may also be explained, however, by Chinese anxiety about the existing international order's apparent incapacity to prevent war effectively (Yan 2011, 63–64).

China proposes that the NWS should embrace the principle “not to be the first to use nuclear weapons” (China 1999b) as long as a complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not achieved. Beijing promotes this no-first-use pledge, *inter alia*, via draft texts to the NPT, a bilateral declaration, and in a 2000 joint statement with the other four nuclear-weapon states.<sup>6</sup> No-first-use would deprive nuclear powers of an offensive, first-strike option that is conceivable only for states with large, highly sophisticated nuclear arsenals. While this posture contributes to avoiding a confrontational relationship with the United States and therefore serves China's strategic security interests, it also reflects the traditional defensive culture as well as how closely China's positions match those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Shen 2009, 6; Feng 2009, 183).

In a 1998 white paper, the government under Jiang Zemin promoted mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination through dialogue, and the promotion of common security through cooperation as universal parts of its “new security concept.” The white paper also called for guaranteeing the right of all countries to equal participation in international arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation affairs. While promoting this normative concept in every arms control regime, China's mediation to solving the North Korean nuclear problem under the roof of the six-party talks is the first practical implementation of this diplomatic strategy (Christensen 2009).

Although its permanent membership in the UNSC strengthens China's self-confidence, Beijing continues to keep a low profile by declaring that it still sees itself as a developing country (Carlson 2006, 234). However, a readiness to engage in multilateralism with a more constructive approach is becoming more and more evident (Foot and Walter 2011). As is obvious in the six-party talks, China is even prepared to pursue regional security interests in multilateral negotiations rather than doing so unilaterally or bilaterally.

### Sovereignty versus Nonproliferation

As officially stated, “in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, the Chinese Government always bases its policy-making on

the judgment whether it serves to safeguard national sovereignty and security” (China IOOSC 2006). Sovereignty and noninterference are central parts of China’s historically formed identity, particularly formulated in the five principles of peaceful coexistence, promoting mutual respect for territoriality and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and equal rights for the members of the international community.

Since this approach has been incrementally changing toward the acceptance of international norms, the Chinese conception of sovereignty is undergoing a sometimes ambivalent transition as well: in the norm conflict between non-proliferation and the peaceful use of science and technology, China on the one hand claims that “non-proliferation efforts should not undermine the legitimate rights of countries, especially the developing countries” (China 2005b, 2010) and therefore sides with the NAM. Simultaneously and somehow contradictory to these claims, China also tries to strengthen nonproliferation by calling for preventing proliferation activities under the pretext of peaceful uses and supporting the role of the UN “in further consolidating international consensus and deepening international cooperation” (China IOOSC 2006).

China’s most significant step toward complying with international nonproliferation norms was the adoption of domestic export control laws and regulations (Medeiros 2007, 212–14). Although the 2005 white paper on arms control and disarmament states that “China values the important role of the multilateral export control mechanism in the field of non-proliferation,” a gap remains between official nonproliferation policy and repeated violations of established rules and regulations (Yuan 2007). For example, China emphasizes the sovereign right of countries to choose their technological path to development and insists on the peaceful character of the transferred goods, for example, in its much criticized dealings with Pakistan or Iran. Similar to its stance regarding the North Korean crisis, China rejects economic sanctions, emphasizing principles of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states, and seeks to settle disputes through dialogue and negotiation. While this stance clearly supports Chinese regional and strategic interests,<sup>7</sup> it also demonstrates China’s dilemma between acting as a responsible great power and practicing solidarity with Third World states. However, what seems to be contradictory from a Western perspective owes more to different evaluations of certain situations. For example, the assistance to Pakistan in the construction of several nuclear power reactors finds justification in the exemption granted to India from the NSG embargo against non-NPT states, and the ensuing US-India deal that grants

India access to US reactor technology and fuel. Regarding Iran, Beijing, unlike many Western countries, simply sees no immediate threat in Iran's nuclear program and therefore no need for taking action such as imposing international sanctions on Iran (International Crisis Group 2010, 3).

China does not refuse arms control for SALW in general but opposes certain measures, such as export controls that violate China's understanding of state sovereignty. It insists, for example, that "[i]n the process of combating the illicit trade in SALW, the sovereignty of each State should be respected, and the right of each State to legally manufacture, possess and transfer SALW should not be infringed upon" (China 2005c). During the negotiations on the PoA, China blocked the adoption of stronger standards: it refused to accept a general norm for the protection of human rights by a ban on small arms in the preamble, which was seen as essential by many other delegations. China's refusal to also regulate state-to-state arms trade and its refusal to ratify the Firearms Protocol of 2001 underline the limits of Beijing's support for humanitarian arms control (Garcia 2006, 114).

Nonetheless, China argues for stronger supportive measures for regions in crisis where the abundance of SALW presents an actual threat (G. Wang 2006). Its growing presence in sub-Saharan Africa could even lead the Chinese government to shifting to a more forthcoming position that would protect their own nationals from falling victim to small arms and keep African pro-China sympathies.

While China is not a party to the Ottawa Convention, it announced a moratorium on the export of any mines that do not comply with the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1996 and has not exported antipersonnel mines since then (ICBL 2011). China has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions "due to national defence needs" (Q. Wang 2010). It holds the view that the use or transfer of cluster munitions lies within the scope of state sovereignty. There are also commercial interests at stake because state-owned companies such as the China Northern Industry Cooperation are major producers and exporters of cluster munitions. China thus takes a largely norm-blocking position in humanitarian arms control.

In the various nonproliferation regimes, China has been notorious for its reluctance to accept verification measures. This position has been consistent throughout Chinese positions at NPT RevCons. During the 2010 conference, China opposed all efforts at increasing transparency, in particular the demand for a uniform scheme of reporting on nuclear arsenals and disarmament

measures. When there was an overwhelming majority favoring this request, China eventually acquiesced and accepted the conference action plan (Müller 2011, 223).

Moreover, within the chemical weapons (CW) context, China is concerned that *challenge* inspections could infringe upon state sovereignty. Therefore, it regularly expresses its reluctance to allow access to sensitive information and has been treating challenge inspections in the CWC as an exceptional measure that is acceptable only in extremis once consultation, clarification, and cooperation on a case of suspect noncompliance have been exhausted without success.

China allegedly conducted offensive CW programs in the early years of the CWC (US DoS 2005). While this could have accounted for China's reluctance to accept stronger verification measures, more plausible reasons are the fear that other states might gain access to sensitive military information, concerns about the vulnerability of China's nuclear deterrent to a first strike by the United States, and the belief that transparency is only meant "to hurt countries that are not of equal power status" (Croddy 2002, 31).

### Compensatory Justice and Nondiscriminatory Norms

While China uses equality and justice claims to defend its own position vis-à-vis the United States, it also refers to inequality, injustice, or discrimination to demonstrate its solidarity with the NAM. More than any other NWS, China, as a former victim of imperialism, supports the interests of the developing world (Gill 2009, 246). Its most significant normative project is the unconditional promise not to "use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones" (Sha 1997). By also demanding unconditional security guarantees for nonnuclear weapon states China intends to mitigate the inequalities in the NPT.

The priority of cooperation with, and special assistance to, developing countries in the WMD regimes is another strand of China's pro-NAM policies. China demands, for example, broad financial and technical support in the peaceful uses of biotechnology (Q. Wang 2009). Thus, China promotes the NAM position on BWC Art. X and joins in with their concerted criticism against supposedly unjustified export controls by industrialized states. China takes the same position within the CWC context (NAM and China 2007). It sees the survival of the Convention as contingent on its nondiscriminatory implementation and an intense exchange of technologies, materials, and equipment for peaceful pur-

poses in the field of chemistry. Existing restrictions, according to Beijing, discriminate against developing countries and thus obviate the idea of peaceful development. Hence, China supports the NAM request to adopt an action plan for realizing Art. XI (Cheng 2008).

Nevertheless, China has never formally joined the NAM. This combination of solidarity *with*, and a distanced and privileged position *toward*, the NAM can find some explanation in the traditional pre-Qin approach, assuming a hierarchical structure of power in the international system with China at its center (Sinocentrism). In that sense, the discrepancy between China's claim to be a developing country and the concurrent demand for a leadership position are not contradictory in the Chinese mind, but simply reflect two different aspects of Chinese identity (Carlson 2006, 234).

### Between Developing Country and Nuclear Weapon State Status

From the Chinese point of view, "the key to international power is political power, and the key to political power is a morally informed political leadership" (Yan 2011, 12). China knows that it needs to comply better with accepted normative standards and further expand its own normative culture to become a responsible power. This is reflected in the increasing commitment to, and compliance with, multilateral norms. However, the application of these norms is weighed against persistent Chinese principles and interests.

Within multilateral arms control, China's identity oscillates between being a developing country and a nuclear weapon state. At times it acts as a norm entrepreneur, but also as a norm blocker. Influenced by tradition, history, and contemporary economic and strategic interests, China on the one hand actively promotes its own normative standards such as its "new security concept," no-first-use, security guarantees for NNWS, cooperation in peaceful use, equality, nondiscrimination, and the principles of peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, it opposes intrusive verification, harsh sanctions, strict export controls, transparency, and any other measures that could breach state sovereignty or lead to further discrimination. Both security and commercial interests explain a large share of Chinese arms control policy; yet, both factors are deeply intertwined with the sense of historical (in)justice and the claims that China asserts based on its past.

With the upcoming transfer of power in the autumn of 2012, the Chinese leadership will undergo a generational change that might also be reflected in

foreign policy. In the course of technocratic professionalization and bureaucratization, it remains to be seen to what degree tradition and history remain important determinants of China's arms control policy.

#### INDIA: AN IMPEDED NORM ENTREPRENEUR

As a rising power India should be prone to challenge the pre-established international normative structure continuously and comprehensively. Indian idiosyncrasies, however, yield a rather ambivalent picture: Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and the longstanding tradition of non-alignment let India shine as a moral beacon of international politics. Indira Gandhi, Vajpayee, and the Indian nuclear bomb, on the other hand, refer to the dark side of Indian power. In the end, the idiosyncratic perspective prevails: its behavior and argumentation in the regimes under scrutiny do not qualify India as a consistent "norm challenger." Rather, New Delhi acts inconsistently across different regimes, largely due to a mixture of interest, moral, and justice-driven motivations.

#### India in Arms Control

Since independence, India has always regarded itself as an important international actor. Only in recent years, however, has the international community begun to recognize India as a rising great power, primarily due to its remarkable economic growth.

Moved by its colonial past but also because of the history of partition,<sup>8</sup> India attaches great importance to its sovereignty. This attitude strongly influences its international behavior.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the central tenets of India's foreign policy are fueled by two seemingly opposing positions: on the one hand by New Delhi's dedication to the power-politics-averse principles of non-alignment, which date back to Nehru, and on the other hand by India's desire to be recognized as a great power and as a pole in a multipolar world.

This dichotomy is reflected in descriptions of India as an actor in multilateral arms control and disarmament that usually take one of two extreme positions: either India is seen as a self-serving pariah with no real interest in the aims of international arms control (Cheema 2010, 2–3), or India—largely for moral reasons—is regarded as a merely misunderstood honest champion of disarmament (Raghavan 2011, 2–3).<sup>10</sup>

India is neither a member of the NPT nor the CTBT and, besides North

Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, is the only non-NWS under the rules of the NPT to possess nuclear weapons (see chapter 2). On the other hand, India joined the IAEA in 1957, ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, was among the first countries calling for a CTBT, and has observed a unilaterally declared nuclear test moratorium since its 1998 weapon tests. Furthermore, India principally supports a nondiscriminatory and verifiable FMCT (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2010, 128).

In stark contrast to this rather selective engagement in the field of nuclear arms control, India has been supportive toward the other regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction: India ratified the BWC on July 15, 1974. The CWC was signed in 1993 and ratified on September 9, 1996. This makes India one of the original signatories of the convention, a fact that India proudly reiterates in many official documents (India Ministry of External Affairs 2007, 112). India supports both regimes in general, but not in all of their aspects.<sup>11</sup>

India's record in humanitarian arms control is mixed. It is a member of the CCW and all subsequent protocols, and it has supported the SALW Programme of Action. On the other hand, it abstained from voting for the Arms Trade Treaty resolution in the UN and refuses to accede to the conventions on APM and cluster munitions.

### Discrimination, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation

In the conflict between *nonproliferation* and *disarmament* in the context of nuclear arms control, India shows potential for real norm entrepreneurship.<sup>12</sup> A first misunderstanding between India and its (mainly Western) critics concerns the definition of terms.<sup>13</sup> Whereas it is not unusual in Western circles to distinguish sharply between arms control and disarmament (Gupta 2010, 51–52), in India both terms are seen as inseparable (M. Singh 2009, 3).<sup>14</sup> To pursue arms control or nonproliferation measures without concurrently aiming at meaningful disarmament is considered counterproductive: “Total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only comprehensive and effective non-proliferation measure” (Jasjit Singh 1998a, 287). India is interested in stopping and rolling back vertical proliferation.<sup>15</sup> Focusing only on horizontal proliferation without any disarmament component is flawed beyond redemption in Indian eyes.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, India does not take part in measures that sidestep or circumvent the aim of global nuclear disarmament (Saran 2010, 10).

India itself has traditionally been proactively engaged in bringing forward

global nuclear disarmament: it presented numerous proposals in the international arena toward this aim and also joined forces with other disarmament-minded actors, such as in the “Group of Eight” and the “Six-Nation, Five-Continent Peace Initiative.”<sup>17</sup> However, it has not been very successful, even though Indian resolutions are often adopted by large majorities or even unanimously in the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, India pushes for other measures it considers suitable for bringing about nuclear disarmament, such as a no-first-use treaty, the de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons. However, India wants these measures to be embedded in a larger framework with an agreed-upon time plan and a “concrete, focused, outcome oriented approach.”<sup>19</sup> These points are constantly and continuously made by Indian politicians, diplomats, and academics. Indian activity for nuclear disarmament is motivated not only by moral reasons, but also—even though it has become a nuclear power itself in the meantime—by the belief that a nuclear-weapon-free world would serve India’s security and therefore its national interests.<sup>20</sup>

India proved its disarmament credentials in the context of the cwc. After initially denying it had a chemical weapons program, India confessed to the existence of a chemical arsenal in 1997 and destroyed all stocks in accordance with the rules, regulations, and timeframes—India was granted an extension of the original deadline by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—by 2009.

India is less active but not as destructive as its staunch criticism would suggest in the field of nuclear nonproliferation. In upholding the related norms India has—apart from its own nuclear tests (1974 and 1998)<sup>21</sup>—an impeccable record: it neither tried to convince the official nws to help it with its weapons program, nor did it disseminate its knowledge or hardware once it crossed the threshold. This is all the more impressive given the approaches India rebuffed: Libya, Iraq, and Iran all sought Indian cooperation in nuclear technologies in vain (Parthasarathy 2006, 364).<sup>22</sup> India does, however, object to the nonproliferation enforcement system, which—in the end—lies in the hands of the UNSC and thus increases the already discriminatory nature of the global nonproliferation regime.<sup>23</sup>

### Discrimination, Technological Exchange, and Peaceful Use

India is also engaged in and takes a firm position in the conflict between *non-proliferation* and *peaceful use*. Like many NAM states, India maintains that the

original agreement has been compromised<sup>24</sup>: While (mainly) developing states did forgo WMD developments, the industrialized countries failed to provide the promised cooperation and free access to technologies (nuclear, biological, and chemical) in an adequate manner (Chari and Deshingkar 2002, 250–52; e.g., Sabharwal 2007). Accordingly, India works to strengthen the cooperation norm in the BWC and CWC. In the BWC, for example, India especially emphasizes the implementation of Art. X and calls continuously for a *nondiscriminatory* practice (e.g., Sood 2001). India emphasizes the destructive and norm-bending role of so-perceived *technology-denial regimes* such as the NSG and the Australia Group (e.g., Cowsik 2003), having been on the receiving end of trade restrictions (especially in the nuclear sector) for a long time. One of the primary goals of New Delhi has always been to weaken if not abolish those regimes and regain full access to technologies. It has been partly successful with the recent US-India nuclear deal (see chapter 5 in this volume).

India, however, is no opponent of export controls in general, as long as they are implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, and in contrast to more radical actors, India emphasizes the role of both Art. III and Art. X in the BWC (e.g., India 1997).

As in other aspects (see below) India's approach to these issue areas has gradually become more pragmatic in recent years. In 2010, for example, New Delhi declared its intention to join the NSG, the MTCR, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Agreement. This may be related to the fact that India is increasingly becoming a technology provider, rather than merely a technology seeker.

### Discrimination, Justice, and Interest

As already indicated, justice claims play an important and recurring role in the Indian argumentation. In 1968 the Indian UN ambassador cited five reasons for Indian opposition to the NPT: "It emphasized only horizontal and not vertical non-proliferation; it did not address the special status of superiority associated with nuclear weapons; it did not provide for a balance of obligations and responsibilities between the NWS and NNWS; it did not outline an approach towards nuclear disarmament; and it was discriminatory in regard to the safeguards and controls, which were imposed only on NNWS" (Sethi 2010, 250). Two of these reasons refer to the missing disarmament component (and therefore the central norm conflict), while the other three all refer to discernible

justice matters. Thus, besides the fact that the Indian aim of nuclear disarmament remained unfulfilled in the NPT, the main motivation of Indian aversion—reiterated in all relevant international forums—is the discriminatory character of the regime, which points to a staunch Indian claim for (status) equality as the underlying justice principle.

This call for nondiscriminatory rules, regulations, and regimes has run through Indian statements throughout the last fifty years. As early as 1961 Nehru told the United Nations General Assembly concerning international arms control: “Those agreements cannot be merely agreements of some countries, however great. They must represent all the members of this United Nations in this great body” (Nehru 1961). During a debate in the Indian *Lōk Sabhā* his daughter Indira Gandhi reiterated this point and furthermore criticized the unequal treatment of different states (Gandhi 1968). India in turn would support nuclear disarmament as “it is only through nuclear disarmament that *discrimination* would be eliminated and *equality between nations* reestablished” (Gandhi 1968, emphasis added). More than twenty-five years later, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh sounds similar: “India holds that genuine and lasting non-proliferation can only be achieved through agreements that are based upon *equality* and *non-discrimination*, for only these can contribute to global peace and stability” (2000, emphasis added).

This justice-driven opposition transcends Indian domestic political party lines. Thus Prime Minister Moraji Desai, whose broad coalition of parties was able to break the dominance of the Congress Party for a short time in the late 1970s, declared to the United Nations General Assembly: “Our objection to the Treaty is because it is so *patently discriminatory*” (1978, emphasis added). The first prime minister from the Bharatiya Janata Party, who ordered the nuclear tests of 1998, likewise told the Indian parliament in the same year: “[The] balance of rights and obligations was not accepted [by the nuclear powers]” (Vajpayee 1998).

The main thrust of the moral- and justice-laden Indian critique is well captured by the notion of “nuclear apartheid” (Jaswant Singh 1998), which was coined in India.<sup>25</sup> However, after the nuclear tests of 1998, the Indian position has started to become gradually more pragmatic: India declared several times that it could—under certain circumstances<sup>26</sup>—join the CTBT. At the same time, India now seems to embrace nuclear deterrence strategies, unlike Indian politicians from Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi, who previously had demonized the deterrence system and branded it as morally unjustifiable (Bidwai and Vanaik 2000,

129). This might indicate that India's new status as *de facto* NWS has more influence on the Indian mindset than the ongoing rhetoric suggests.

The other WMD regimes are judged by India through the lens of (regime) justice as well. By doing so, India positively contrasts them with the NPT.<sup>27</sup> India praises the CWC explicitly because “it testifies to the legitimacy and validity of the global campaign—which India consistently advocated—for a universal and non-discriminatory approach to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction” (Mansingh 1997b). India's willingness to declare the existence of and destroy its chemical arsenal (see above) reinforces the credibility of Indian justice arguments within the NPT context as well: India was prepared to renounce a whole category of WMD (that it already possessed) in a regime it regards as principally “just.”

In its BWC statements India also often links this regime directly or indirectly to the NP regime by maintaining that the way biological weapons have been outlawed is exemplary. India specifically praises that BWC has been “the first multilateral, non-discriminatory treaty banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction” (India Ministry of External Affairs 2011, 122; see also Rao 2009). Sometimes the linkage is made very explicit; in these cases India claims “the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions provide a good example for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” (Prasad 2006) or simply demands “[w]e need a similar effort in the area of nuclear weapons” (Prasad 2007).

In stark contrast to the nuclear field, moralistic and justice-laden arguments play no role in framing Indian positions on humanitarian arms control. Indeed, India officially recognizes the humanitarian necessity of sparing innocent civilians from the danger of these weapons (Nepram 2009, 484–85), but at the same time it maintains there is a need to strike “a balance between humanitarian and security considerations” (India Ministry of External Affairs 2011, 121). For example, India justifies not acceding to the Ottawa Convention—though principally supporting its goals—because the convention “fails to take into account the legitimate security interests of countries which necessitate the usage of landmines for defensive purposes” (India Ministry of External Affairs 2007, 113). India holds a similarly ambivalent position in the SALW context, where on the one hand it emphasizes the necessity of controlling illicit trade and preventing nonstate actors and terrorists from obtaining SALW while at the same time stressing its need to engage in legal trade with these weapons. Concerning cluster munitions India further makes the point that their use is “lawful and legitimate” (Nepram 2009, 486) as long as humanitarian international law is

observed, and mainly stresses the military advantages of these weapons (Kanwal 2010, 1406). Thus, as a country that has long land borders, including borders with two difficult neighbors, perceived security interests trump the moral- and justice-laden impulse to join these regimes.

### Impeded Norm Entrepreneurship

The initial expectation that India, as a rising great power, should be characterized by uniform norm-challenging behavior is not supported by evidence: Indian actions in WMD regimes differ profoundly in the nuclear realm on the one hand and the chemical and biological realms on the other hand. Justice claims and especially the disdain for discriminatory instruments of any kind may explain a large part of this variance. Indian statements clearly show that India regards the global NP regime as inherently unjust, whereas the nondiscriminatory BW and CW regimes are regarded as principally just orders, with a caveat for their cooperation norms.

The example of the NP regime shows that perceived justice problems can deter India from joining a regime, even though India shares many core norms and considers the goals of the regime as lying in its own interest. The cases of BWC and CWC show India's willingness, in principle, to contribute to multilateral arms control in "just" regimes. Yet, India's behavior in the area of humanitarian arms control shows that the *absence* of justice concerns does not guarantee Indian regime participation, especially when India feels its security interests could be disturbed.

This mixed result makes it difficult to unambiguously assign India to one specific type of norm entrepreneurship. In the nuclear realm, where it is most dissatisfied with the existing regime, it acts as norm entrepreneur, advocating disarmament continuously and proactively. At the same time, New Delhi sent ambivalent signals first by not irrevocably renouncing and by ultimately obtaining nuclear weapons, thereby compromising the credibility of the Indian position.

India's effect on international norm dynamics is therefore ambivalent. Whether ongoing Indian insistence on international compliance and the proactive proposal of its own resolutions for achieving this aim have really served disarmament, or whether Indian resistance to offer its own contribution has impeded it, is difficult to decide. It is safe to say, however, that India has not succeeded in building *momentum* for global nuclear disarmament. Rather,

the Indian example could be read by other actors as a model for how to remain outside the NPT, develop nuclear weapons, and gain some sort of recognition, without being compelled to give them up. Even though—as our analysis suggests—the Indian motivation is seriously shaped by justice concerns, this does not necessarily hold true for potential imitators. In this important aspect India can thus be called an impeded norm entrepreneur at best.

#### CONCLUSION: IDIOSYNCRATIC NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP

There is no uniform great power status-induced behavior in our four cases. Neither can the United States and Russia be regarded as adamant norm keepers and enforcers across all regimes and times, nor are the actions of China and India bold and defiant enough to qualify them as challengers of the entire normative system. The rising powers do indeed challenge some norms in some regimes, but they do so very selectively. In other regimes they work smoothly within and indeed try to strengthen the pre-existing framework, even if it was established before they gained their current power position.

While power status-related issues had a discernible impact on the countries' performance in the various regimes, great power status alone tells us little about the behavior of these actors in normative contexts in general and about the level of norm entrepreneurship in particular; this is just as true for rising as it is for established great powers. The impact of power status on policies is mediated by self-images, political traditions, domestic politics, and interests as defined by the ruling elites. Policies are thus quite path-dependent and idiosyncratic and defy abstract predictions based on power status alone. The belief in its exceptionalism influences US approaches toward norms and regimes; this accounts for the basic stance of retaining stability and freedom of action at the same time, a combination of objectives that at times compels the United States to work hard for maintaining established norms, while occasionally challenging them in an almost revolutionary way, as during George W. Bush's presidency. China is motivated at least to an extent by its wish to consolidate its great power status and become accepted as a *responsible* great power. This may explain the tripartite approach of engaging in multilateral efforts to keep existing norms, maintaining the freedom to interpret them in a very Chinese way, and preserving freedom of action for granting China's security vis-à-vis the United States. All in all, our findings thus corroborate Foot and Walter's surprising insight that the hegemon, rather than defending the existing normative order, displays

incoherent policies of compliance and noncompliance, not out of strategic considerations but rather for domestic reasons. China “the challenger,” on the other hand, demonstrates increasingly better compliance the closer it comes to posing a true challenge (Foot and Walter 2011).

Regarding the remaining two great powers, many of Russia’s actions can be explained by its determination to desperately *hold onto* or *reclaim* its former status as one of the only two superpowers. The demand of both Russia and China for “equal security” vis-à-vis the United States also indicates the feeling that there is an unjustified advantage in security that compromises their desired great power status. However, the notion of equal security remains rather exclusive, as exemplified by the reluctance to accept the NNWS call for a world free of nuclear weapons, thus keeping them in a permanent situation of “unequal security.” India’s continued claims for nondiscrimination and equality point to its aspiration of becoming acknowledged as a member of the great powers club. So far, India is caught between being out and being in. This accounts for India’s seemingly disparate policies, namely the continued calls for change, the observation of existing norms, and the refusal to acknowledge norms that may constrain national security and military power.

Justice claims are least commonly put forward by the dominant great power, the United States, and most commonly voiced by the weakest great power, India, with China and Russia falling somewhere in between. Interestingly, we find justice claims to be used both in a more tactical manner (Russia) and as a more genuine sentiment (India). One should caution, however, that, once a country’s elite and population are convinced that their country is entitled (on whatever basis) to belong to the club of great powers, any action or structure perceived as discriminatory gives rise to complaints about injustice that are most probably quite authentic. Establishing precise distinctions between the various usages and levels of authenticity may not always be easy and depends on more than just the great power status of the state voicing such a complaint.

### Notes

1. The forty-first president, George H. W. Bush, is referred to as “Bush 41” to distinguish his presidency from that of his son George W. Bush, or “Bush 43.”
2. The Ottawa Convention, which the Clinton administration could neither control nor stop (Wurst 1997), is an exception to this generalization.

3. Interview with Morton Halperin, senior government official in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton administrations, conducted by Marco Fey, September 28, 2011, Washington.

4. The term *adequate verification* was coined in the Nixon administration and meant that the US needed to be able to detect significant violations of an agreement in time to permit an adequate reaction (Krass 1997, 164).

5. It should be noted that signing the CTBT was hotly contested, as even without ratification it imposes the duty not to act contrary to the objectives of the treaty. Some Chinese defense experts feared China's nuclear deterrent would thus remain forever technologically inferior to the US one (Johnston 2008, 106–7).

6. In a bilateral statement in 1994, China and Russia declared their mutual acceptance of this norm.

7. There is little doubt that Pakistan and Iran receive Chinese help because of their respective roles as a regional partner and as an important supplier of fossil fuel (Gill 2007, 79–82).

8. Interview with Madhu Balla, professor at the University of Delhi, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 30, 2009.

9. Interview with senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 26, 2009; interview with Srikanth Kondapalli, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 1, 2009.

10. Interview with Onkar Marwah, national security expert at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 3, 2009.

11. India played a rather dubious role during the BWC protocol negotiations, which was overshadowed only by the even more destructive actions by the US.

12. India emphasizes the primary goal of disarmament in the other WMD regimes as well, but there is no conflict around this issue.

13. Interview with Rajiv Nayan, arms control expert at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 25, 2009.

14. Interview with senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 3, 2009.

15. India believes that the NPT reverses these priorities (Sreenivasan 2010, 172).

16. Interview with senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 26, 2009.

17. For a detailed discussion of the initiatives see Sethi (1998) and Barnes, Ogilvie-White, and Valdés (2010).

18. E.g., the Indian resolutions “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” and “Reducing Nuclear Danger,” which India has been tabling annually at the UN General Assembly since 1982 and 1998, respectively.

19. Interview with senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 3, 2009.

20. Interview with Harinder Sekhon, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 30, 2009.

21. India emphasizes, however, that its nuclear policy did not break any signed contracts or other political commitments (Jasjit Singh 1999, 520; interview with Rajiv Nayan, arms control expert at IDSA, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 25, 2009; interview with senior official at the Ministry of External Affairs, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 3, 2009). This is a debatable claim, as it is disputed whether the test of 1974 can truly be regarded as a *peaceful nuclear explosion*. See Perkovich (1999).

22. India on the one hand refuses to sign the CTBT and criticizes it for its lack of disarmament perspective and its discriminatory character (Gupta 2010, 57; Sethi 2000, 1820), but on the other hand India maintains its unilaterally declared nuclear test moratorium of 1998.

23. India is thus the only great power under scrutiny here that is not routinely included in this system.

24. Interview with A. Vinod Kumar, arms control expert at IDSA, conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, November 25, 2009.

25. In similar fashion a former high-ranking Indian diplomat described the nuclear order as a kind of “colonial situation” and an “emotional thing.” Interview conducted by Carsten Rauch, New Delhi, December 4, 2009.

26. E.g., ratifications by the US, China, and Pakistan, a certification of the credibility of the existing arsenal, and verification that India’s “nuclear complex is capable of sub-critical testing and simulation-based improvisations” (Kumar 2009).

27. Indian diplomats repeatedly discuss India’s position concerning nuclear disarmament even at BWC or CWC meetings, underlining the centrality of nuclear issues for India. E.g., Mansingh 1997a; Ghose 1996.

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