Marco Facchin

Marco Facchin
University School for Advanced Studies IUSS Pavia · Human and Life Sciences

Doctor of Philosophy
Ph.D. In cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind @IUSS Pavia. Representations, cognitive extension and more.

About

11
Publications
5,579
Reads
How we measure 'reads'
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Learn more
21
Citations
Citations since 2017
11 Research Items
21 Citations
2017201820192020202120222023051015
2017201820192020202120222023051015
2017201820192020202120222023051015
2017201820192020202120222023051015
Introduction
Ph.D. in cognitive neursocience & philosophy of mind (@ IUSS Pavia) Empirically informed philosopher working mostly on (a) neural/cognitive representations (b) extended mind/extended cosciousness (c) the mark of the mental. Amatour interested in imagination and AI. Always open to cooperation (drop me an email) https://marcofacchinmarcof.wixsite.com/site

Publications

Publications (11)
Article
Full-text available
I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used....
Article
Full-text available
Commentary on: Bruineberg, J., Dolega, K, Dewhurst, J. & Baltieri, M.(2021) The Emperor's new Markov blankets. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21002351 Abstract: I argue that there is no viable development of the instrumentalist Inference within a model research program. I further argue that both Friston and Pearl bl...
Article
Full-text available
Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly suΜcient conditions identifying all and only the instances of cognition. They claim the mark is necessary to answer diΜcult questions concerning the nature and distribution of cognition. Here, I will argue that, as things stand, given the current lan...
Article
Full-text available
The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mi...
Article
Full-text available
Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural repr...
Article
Full-text available
Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully...
Article
Full-text available
Within the field of neuroscience, it is assumed that the central nervous system is divided into two functionally distinct components: the brain, which does the cognizing, and the spinal cord, which is a conduit of information enabling the brain to do its job. We dub this the “Cinderella view” of the spinal cord. Here, we suggest it should be abando...
Article
Full-text available
Philosophers interested in the theoretical consequences of predictive processing often assume that predictive processing is an inferentialist and representationalist theory of cognition. More specifically, they assume that predictive processing revolves around approximated Bayesian inferences drawn by inverting a generative model. Generative models...
Article
Full-text available
Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffolded, non-basic, cognitive activities constitutively involve the manipulation of mental contents. Here...
Article
Full-text available
The deflationary account of representations purports to capture the explanatory role representations play in computational cognitive science. To this end, the account distinguishes between mathematical contents, representing the values and arguments of the functions cognitive devices compute, and cognitive contents, which represent the distal state...
Article
Full-text available
Consciousness vehicle externalism (CVE) is the claim that the material machinery of a subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff a...

Network

Cited By