Mamadou GueyeParis Dauphine University | UPD · Dauphine Economics Research Center
Mamadou Gueye
Doctor of Philosophy
About
8
Publications
959
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22
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Introduction
Ph.D. in Economics, my research is on behavioral and experimental economics and focuses on two lines of inquiry. First, experimental work on individuals’ social preferences in coordination games. Second, understanding individuals' behaviors under environmental related choices. I also have a great interest in behavioral contract theory. Specifically on contracting with externalities with an emphasis on behavioral approach.
Additional affiliations
May 2015 - June 2019
Publications
Publications (8)
Agroecosystems are facing new challenges in the context of a growing and increasingly interconnected human population, and a paradigm shift is needed to successfully address the many complex questions that these challenges will generate. The transition to providing multiple services within an agroecosystem is a starting point for heightened multifu...
Agroecosystems are facing new challenges in the context of a growing and increasingly interconnected human population, and a paradigm shift is needed to successfully address the many complex questions that these challenges will generate. The transition to providing multiple services within an agroecosystem is a starting point for heightened multifu...
Motivated by the potential tension between coordination, which may require discriminating between identical agents, and social comparisons, which may call for small pay differentials, we analyze the optimal reward scheme in an organization involving agents with social preferences whose tasks are complementary. Although a tension exists between the...
While incentive contracts are extensively used to tackle environmental issues such as biodiversity losses, their efficiency remains understudied so far. This paper considers a principal-agents model to study how spatial characteristics-retention effects and diffusion effects-, which occur in certain public good provisions (environmental goods for i...
Motivated by the potential tension between coordination, which may require discriminating among identical workers, and social comparisons, which may intuitively call for small pay differentials , we analyze the design of optimal rewards in an organization with inequality-averse workers whose tasks are complementary. Inequality aversion surprisingly...
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of social preferences in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Inequality is increased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, inequality aversion may lead to a n...
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordination success in a game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Equity is decreased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, difference aversion may lead...
