M. R. X. Dentith

Beijing Normal University | bnu · International Center for Philosophy

Looking at set of 76 representative articles published by social psychologists between 2017 and 2023 (reviewed between December 2022 and February 2023), I examine the role of motivating examples- --a kind of illustrative example, typically used by researchers at the beginning of their work to motivate the issue or problem they want to resolve or ad...

Looking at the early work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, I put in context the papers in this special issue on new work on conspiracy theory theory (itself the product of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory held in February 2022), showing how this new generation of work not only grew out of, but is...

Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work (such as Cassam Quassim, Keith Harris, and M. Guilia Napolitano), yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers (myself included) like Br...

In this paper I interrogate the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’, arguing that the term `debunk’ carries with it pejorative implications, given that the verb `to debunk’ is commonly understood as `to show the wrongness of a thing or concept’. As such, the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’ builds in the notion that such theories are...

Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is at the very least understandable---because conspiracies occur---and that if we take an evidential approach, judging individual conspiracy theorie...

There has been a recent spate of academic work concerning these things called conspiracy theories . Part of that debate concerns the apparent irrationality of belief in conspiracy theories. I argue that what is missing in the literature is a fulsome analysis of how we define what counts as a conspiracy theory . It turns out that many of our working...

Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists – those who dare believe some conspiracy theory – have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered...

Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call...

Looking at the recent spate of claims about "fake news" which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. The phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indifference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. This indifferen...

In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse would appear to be what we mean by a “conspiracy”: a secretive plot between two or more people toward some end. Yet what, exactly, is the connection between something being a conspiracy and it being secret? Is it possible to conspire without also engaging...

A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger's piece, '“They” Respond: Comments on Basham et al.’s “Social Science’s Conspiracy-Theory Panic: Now They Want to Cure Everyone”.

A reply to Patrick Stokes' `Reluctance and Suspicion'---itself a reply to an early piece by myself replying to Stokes---in which I clarify what it is I intend when talking about how we should investigate conspiracy theories.

A reply to Patrick Stokes' “Between Generalism and Particularism About Conspiracy Theory".

A reply to Lee Basham's “The Need for Accountable Witnesses: A Reply to Dentith".

Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy...

Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases, belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy...

Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon in academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories looks at whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded. ©...

We hear conspiracy theories at the breakfast table, at work and in the media. People go around saying ‘I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but …’ trying to persuade you that, say, the oil companies are conspiring to keep cheap, renewable energy sources from entering the marketplace, or health professionals discovered the cure for cancer in the 1960s but...

We can all cite examples of conspiracy theories: they are the kinds of things David Icke travels the world advocating, or Glenn Beck presents on his own — widely syndicated — American television network.

It is one thing to be skeptical about whether conspiracy theories can ever be the best explanation, but it is another to be skeptical about the existence of conspiracies. Conspiracies happen in the boardroom, in meetings, in deciding who gets selected as a political candidate, and so on. Not only that, but criminal conspiracies are successfully pro...

If we are to judge a particular conspiracy theory on its merits, this means examining the evidence put forward in support of the said theory. However, one worry some conspiracy theory theorists have about belief in conspiracy theories is that the kinds of evidence used to support them look suspicious.

There is a view found in the work of several conspiracy theory theorists that goes something like this: theories with official status — to wit, theories endorsed by some powerful institution — that happen to cite conspiratorial activity cannot be conspiracy theories.

No matter what your personal view on whether belief conspiracy theories can ever be rational, the fact that conspiracies can and do occur here and now — in both the private and public spheres — is challenging for some. For example, if it turns out that pharmaceutical companies are suppressing new and cheaper treatments — in order to increase their...

Much of this book has been concerned with countering the common sense but misinformed suspicion that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational. As we have seen, the fact that some theory is a conspiracy theory is no reason to automatically assume it is false, or that it is irrational to consider it seriously.

The most minimal conception of what counts as a ‘conspiracy theory’ is that it is a theory about a conspiracy: conspiracy theories posit that some conspiracy explains the occurrence of an event. For example, some people believe that there exists a shadow world government, made up of political elites, organisations like the Freemasons, and dynastic...

Conspiracy theories explain the occurrence of some event or state of affairs with the claim that some set of conspirators intended it.1 Take, for example, the cluster of New World Order conspiracy theories that are behind some — but by no means all — of the rhetoric of the ‘Occupy’ movement. Members of Occupy are concerned with increasing wealth in...

In the 1930s Joseph Stalin, the then leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was convinced that his former ally (but now enemy-in-exile) Leon Trotsky was plotting to take control of Russia. So concerned was Stalin about this possibility that he ordered his agents to keep close tabs on not just Trotsky but also those who might still be sy...

In the previous chapter we looked at one reason for adopting a general and non-pejorative definition of conspiracy theory: it helps us avoid a particular trap, which is confusing the pathological psychology of some conspiracy theorists with the question of whether it is rational to believe certain conspiracy theories. However, even if we divorce ta...

Social activists like to claim that the Government and the various state agencies which act for it should not be trusted. Looking at a relatively recent example of a series of Police raids concerning potential terrorist activity in New Zealand, I will argue that: 1. Sometimes activists not only have good grounds to be suspicious of various state ag...

Drawing on recent work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the topic of rumours, I will develop a theory which exploits the distinction between rumours and rumour-mongering. Whilst it seems true to think that mere rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents what can be called a pathology of the normally reliable...

One of the arguments that belief in Conspiracy Theories is irrational stems from a common preference for what might be called " Official Theories, " " Official Stories " or the " Received View. " Official Theories, in an ideal world, would be theories with good epistemic credentials endorsed by some appropriate set of authorities. However, some Off...

A presentation at the Department of Philosophy Seminar Series at the University of Auckland

A presentation at the University of Canterbury Graduate Conference, held in Kaikoura, New Zealand.