Luka Burazin

University of Zagreb · Faculty of Law (PRAVO)

U ovome se radu raspravlja o sukobima između ustavnih prava i tehnici odvagivanja kao najpoznatijoj i najraširenijoj tehnici za rješavanje takvih sukoba. Kritički se analizira shvaćanje sukoba između ustavnih prava i tehnike odvagivanja Riccarda Guastinija, glavnog predstavnika đenoveške škole pravnog realizma. Cilj analize u ovome radu je odgovori...

The paper deals with the “application of the Constitutionˮ by ordinary courts. On the basis of literature review and preliminary Croatian case law research, six paradigmatic cases of the application of the Constitution by ordinary courts were selected (facts of the case directly regulated by constitutional rules, statutory gaps, avoidable in abstra...

This paper has three aims. The first is to explicate what kind of entity legal offices are and what their specific mode of existence amounts to. The second is to explain in virtue of what these offices can be said to be legal. Finally, third, to show the relevance of the actual use of legal offices for their existence. The main argument is that, on...

The paper discusses the explicitly stated understanding of legal science as it appears in compulsory course textbooks on positive law subjects at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. The first part of the paper describes the research problem and posits the corresponding hypotheses, states the research aims, describes the method of qualitative...

The paper claims that legal systems qua (sequences of) sets of legal norms fit neither of the two traditional ontological categories of entities. Although in an important sense related to contingent concrete entities such as legal officials, citizens, legal practice and normative documents, legal systems themselves are not concrete physical particu...

U radu se opisuje trenutačni stadij poustavljenja hrvatskog pravnog poretka primjenom Guastinijeva teorijskog modela poustavljenja pravnog poretka, koji se sastoji od tri nužna uvjeta i pet aspekata poustavljenja pravnih poredaka. U prvome se dijelu rada utvrđuje ispunjenost nužnih uvjeta poustavljenja hrvatskog pravnog poretka (dug, krut i sudski...

Este artículo pretende explicar el tipo de entidades que son las funciones jurídicas y en qué consiste su forma particular de existencia. Esto es, pretende explicar en virtud de qué puede afirmarse que las funciones jurídicas existen. De igual manera, pretende explica en virtud de qué puede decirse que estas funciones son jurídicas. A pesar de que...

The paper analyses the relationship between legal offices and legal powers. It claims that a set of legal positions which constitutes a legal office necessarily includes at least one legal power. It argues that legal offices are always constituted by power-conferring norms, be they legal or social power-conferring norms. Furthermore, it argues that...

The paper analyses the relationship between legal offices and legal powers. It claims that a set of legal positions which constitutes a legal office necessarily includes at least one legal power. It argues that legal offices are always constituted by power-conferring norms, be they legal or social power-conferring norms. Furthermore, it argues that...

The paper aims to reconstruct and critically analyse efficacy as a condition of validity in Hans Kelsen's General Theory of Norms both in the light of his newly introduced distinction between the conditional and full validity of a norm and the dynamic aspect of the legal order. It also aims to give a systemic account of efficacy as a condition of v...

Resumen: Este artículo pretende explicar el tipo de entidades que son las funciones jurídicas y en qué consiste su forma particular de existencia. Esto es, pretende explicar en virtud de qué puede afirmarse que las funciones jurídicas existen. De igual manera, pretende explica en virtud de qué puede decirse que estas funciones son jurídicas. A pesa...

It is sometimes claimed (in Anglo-American jurisprudential literature) that the rule of recognition sets the criteria for identifying legal norms and that this, therefore, means that canons of interpretation are also part of these criteria. Such a view then faces the problem of theoretical disagreements that call into question the rule of recogniti...

One of the main questions raised by Ken Ehrenberg's book The Functions of Law (OUP, 2016) is how to remain a legal positivist and still adhere to the view that law should best be understood in terms of its ends or functions. Ehrenberg illuminatingly provides answers to both sides of the question by exposing his ontological understanding of law, cla...

The thesis that law is an artifact has several implications: that the instantiations of law have authors and are intentionally created, that law has a function, that law is a special type of artifact, i.e. an institutional, abstract, public and social artifact, and that law cannot exist if it is not socially efficacious. The inquires into the artif...

The comment consists of two parts. In the first part, I will challenge, on analytical grounds, Sampaio’s views on the kind of conflict that emerges between fundamental rights norms. I will claim that these conflicts can in fact be seen as total-total in abstracto conflicts, rather than partial-partial in concreto conflicts. In the second part, I wi...

The essay claims that legal systems are abstract institutional artifacts and that as such they existentially or ontologically depend on collective intentionality in the form of (a we-mode) collective recognition. It argues that this recognition, as a social practice accompanied with its participants’ particular attitude towards it, constitutes a so...

It is sometimes claimed (in Anglo-American jurisprudential literature) that the rule of recognition sets the criteria for identifying legal norms and that this, therefore, means that canons of interpretation are also part of these criteria. Such a view then faces the problem of theoretical disagreements that call into question the rule of recogniti...

One of the senses of the term 'efficacy' refers to the fact that norm-addresses actually behave as is required of them by legal norms. This sense of the term is one which is generally used within the jurisprudential discussions about whether efficacy is the essential element of the concept of law. According to legal positivism, efficacy is in some...

One of the senses of the term ‘efficacy’ refers to the fact that norm-addresses actually behave as is required of them by legal norms. This sense of the term is one which is generally used within the jurisprudential discussions about whether efficacy is the essential element of the concept of law. According to legal positivism, efficacy is in some...

The paper opens with an exposition of the basic ideas of the philosophical school of naturalism and its most widespread version, methodological naturalism. This is followed by three of Leiter’s proposals for the naturalisation of questions of the philosophy of law: the first consists in naturalising the theory of adjudication modelled on replacemen...

The idea that particular legal institutions are artifacts is not new. However, the idea that 'law' or 'legal system' itself is an artifact has seldom, due perhaps to the ambiguities sorrounding philosophical inquires into law, been directly expressed. Nevertheless, such an idea has recently been more often invoked, though not always developed in gr...

Na početku rada izlažu se osnovne ideje filozofskog pravca naturalizma te pobliže objašnjava njegova najraširenija inačica, metodološki naturalizam. U nastavku se prikazuju tri Leiterova prijedloga naturaliziranja filozofskopravnih pitanja: prvi, koji se sastoji u naturaliziranju teorije presuđivanja po uzoru na zamjembeni i normativni naturalizam...

The paper claims that the rule of recognition, given the way it is presented by Hart, cannot be a constitutive rule of any legal system as a whole, but rather a constitutive rule of legal rules as elements of a legal system. Since I take the legal system to be an institutional artifact kind, I claim that, in order to account for a legal system as a...

The paper claims that the rule of recognition, given the way it is presented by Hart, cannot be a constitutive rule of any legal system as a whole, but rather a constitutive rule of (primary) legal rules as elements of a legal system. Since I take the legal system to be an institutional artifact kind, I claim that, in order to account for a legal s...

Na početku rada izlažu se osnovne ideje filozofskog pravca naturalizma te pobliže objašnjava njegova najraširenija inačica, metodološki naturalizam. U nastavku se prikazuju tri Leiterova prijedloga naturaliziranja filozofskopravnih pitanja: prvi, koji se sastoji u naturaliziranju teorije presuđivanja po uzoru na zamjembeni i normativni naturalizam...

In contemporary legal theory, damage reparation is, by its legal nature, widely believed to be a form of sanction. This view can be dubbed the so-called sanction-based understanding of damage reparation. It has its source in the Roman law of delict and is greatly inspired by natural law writers, such as H. Grotius and S. Pufendorf. On the other han...

With regard to the methodology for determining the subject-matter of legal theory, there are two strands of thought. According to the first and the predominant one, the subject-matter of legal theory is primarily determined on the basis of the a priori conceptual analysis and the intuitions of the theorist expounding his theory of law. In doing so,...

The balancing or weighing of principles by reference to their dimension of weight or importance seems to represent the prevailing method for solving contradictions (antinomies) arising between legal principles when the latter are applied in practice. However, as I argue in the paper, the method of balancing or weighing might not be the only method...

The idea that particular legal institutions are artifacts is not new. It seems intuitively correct to say that a particular legal institution, e.g., a mortgage or a leasing contract, could not exist unless somebody intentionally created it. However, the idea that 'law' itself is an artifact has seldom, due perhaps to the ambiguities sorrounding phi...

The paper first outlines the thesis on (the means of) execution as a kind of legal sanction (esp. in the case of causing damage). It then sets out the basic theoretical arguments for rejecting the viewpoint according to which the duty of repair represents a sanction in the case of causing damage. The paper goes on to present the viewpoints of sever...

Owing to its methodological approach legal theory is usually divided into descriptive, presumably non-evaluative, and normative, i.e. evaluative and justificatory, legal theory. In her Evaluation and Legal Theory Julie Dickson rejects this dichotomy. She argues that all legal theory is evaluative in one way or another. Therefore, she introduces a d...

Conducted empirical research has revealed the average level of knowledge of Croatian citizens about EU institutions. Results show that Croatian citizens on average hold a neutral attitude towards EU institutions. Furthermore, the results of the questionnaire on expectations concerning EU institutions and European law reveal that expectations of Cro...

This paper outlines Hegel's understanding of damage reparation. By taking as its starting point the hypothesis on the embeddedness of paragraph 98 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in Hegel’s general theory of punishment, it sets out the legal nature and functions which Hegel attributes to the institute of damage reparation. It then compares Hegel's u...

The balancing or weighing of principles by reference to their dimension of weight or importance represents the prevailing method of solving contradictions (antinomies) that arise between the general principles of law when the latter are being applied in practice. However, the author argues that in the case of a specific type of antinomy between the...

In order to instil to at least a certain extent additional safety into primary legal relationships whilst not undermining the principle of equality, civil law has made use of the institution of special guarantees that it has regulated by so-called protective legal norms. Civil law uses these guarantees, which according to their nearest legal basis...

By taking as its starting point the results of criticism of the understanding of the duty of reparation as a type of civil law sanction, the article examines the possible changes in the contents of the concept of legal responsibility in the case of causing damage. Therefore, the author first analyzed the concept of legal responsibility from the sta...

H. Kelsen wrote: "The legal duty of an individual to make good the pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage which he or someone else caused to another person is frequently regarded as a sanction, and therefore this duty is denoted as responsibility. This construct confuses the concepts of duty, responsibility and sanction." In an attempt to solve the fore...

In the attempt to determine one of the kinds of civil law sanction, the author presents two close theoretical concepts, built upon the criticism of the traditional concept of a civil law sanction as a duty of reparation which establish execution (Kelsen) or the means of execution (Dika) as a kind of civil law sanction. By analyzing them, particular...

In the attempt to determine one of the kinds of civil law sanction, the author presents two close theoretical concepts, built upon the criticism of the traditional concept of a civil law sanction as a duty of reparation which establish execution (Kelsen) or the means of execution (Dika) as a kind of civil law sanction. By analyzing them, particular...

By taking as its starting point the results of criticism of the understanding of the duty of reparation as a type of civil law sanction, the article examines the possible changes in the contents of the concept of legal responsibility in the case of causing damage. Therefore, the author first analyzed the concept of legal responsibility from the sta...