Loyimee Gogoi

Ahmedabad University · Technology Operations and Decisions Sciences

Cleaning up a polluted river requires coordinated actions among different firms along the river. The key to promoting and enriching the firms’ cooperation is to share the pollution cleanup cost among these firms fairly and reasonably. In this paper, we propose a new cost-sharing scheme, called the entire upstream agents compensation method (the EUA...

We investigate a new allocation rule for network situations, the network Banzhaf value based on the Banzhaf value for cooperative games. We axiomatize it in three distinct ways. We link it to potentials for network games. We also extend network potentials to variable network games. JEL Code: C71, C72

A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a network formation probability distribution, describing certain restrictions on network formation. Expected levels of collectively generated wealth and expected individual pa...

The most popular values in cooperative games with transferable utilities are perhaps the Shapley and the Shapley like values which are based on the notion of players’ marginal productivity. The equal division rule on the other hand, is based on egalitarianism where resource is equally divided among players, no matter how productive they are. Howeve...

A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a network formation probability distribution, describing certain restrictions on network formation. Expected levels of collectively generated wealth and expected individual pa...

This paper presents a sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems. Based on the ascending order of claims, two consequential games are introduced, called the divide-and-choose game and the divide-and-object game. We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of each game is consistent with the allocation of the...

We consider a class of cooperative network games with transferable utilities in which players interact through a probabilistic network rather than a regular, deterministic network. In this class of wealth-generating situations we consider probabilistic extensions of the Myerson value and the position value. For the subclass of probabilistic network...

Microarray techniques are used to generate a large amount of information on gene expression. This information can be statistically processed and analyzed to identify the genes useful for the diagnosis and prognosis of genetic diseases. Game theoretic tools are applied to analyze the gene expression data. Gene co-expression networks are increasingly...

In this paper we introduce the notion of group contributions in TU-games and propose a new class of values which we call the class of k-lateral Shapley values. Most of the values for TU-games implicitly assume that players are independent in deciding to leave or join a coalition. However, in many real life situations players are bound by the decisi...

We survey the recent developments in network games under cooperative framework. Network structures are important in describing and analysing social and economic phenomena through which people interact with each other and are influenced by their peers. Game theory has been successfully applied as a tool for such descriptions and analysis. The corres...

We study the notion of a Bi-cooperative network game and obtain a link based allocation rule for the corresponding class. Unlike classical Network games where players have single motive of forming (or not forming) a network, a player under a bi-cooperative set up has two more variations : all her links attribute exclusively to her positive or negat...

A value of a TU Cooperative game represents an assessment by a player of her gains for participating in a coalition. One of the most important values in the literature of TU games is the Shapley value [18]. It is indeed an aggregation of the marginal contributions of a player based on her bilateral interactions. In this paper we introduce a new val...

We introduce the notion of a Bi-cooperative network game as a graph restricted Bi-cooperative game where interactions among players with bipolar motives are considered only through some exogenously given networks. Once such a network forms, the challenge rests on obtaining a suitable allocation of the payoff accrued by its members. In classical Net...

In this survey, we present recent developments in the literature on Network games. We briefly cover the literature on Communication situations and the corresponding allocation rules. This is followed by a review on the existing player- and link-based fixed and flexible allocation rules for networks. It is worth mentioning that all the allocation ru...

In this short note, we propose the notion of a bi-cooperative network game, con- sidering the possibility that each player in a network can contribute positively to the game, negatively or do not participate. The Myerson value as a possible allo- cation rule for these games is de�ned. Axioms of paired component balance and bi-cooperative fairness a...