Leo Yang Yang

Leo Yang Yang
Stanford University | SU · Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions

Doctor of Philosophy

About

5
Publications
657
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Introduction
Leo Y. Yang is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science (with a Specialization in Computational Social Science) at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He is currently the Computational Social Science Fellow of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and the student researcher of the China Data Lab of the 21st Century China Center (21CCC). His research interests include computational social science, text as data, and development economics.

Publications

Publications (5)
Article
Full-text available
The prevalence of shadow education in China has been a significant social issue, commonly regarded as a leading factor in exacerbating education inequality and fostering overcompetition. In response to this concern, the Chinese government implemented the Double Reduction Policy in July 2021, which banned for-profit academic private tutoring. We est...
Preprint
Full-text available
In this paper, I explore the unexpected consequences of Weibo's geographic tagging policy in China, a case study that offers broader insights into information control in authoritarian regimes. Using unique high-frequency panel data from 200 influential Weibo accounts and a data leakage incident, coupled with Interrupted Time Series (ITS) analysis,...
Article
Full-text available
This paper explores how factional competition shapes local media's coverage of negative political news. Employing news reports that appeared in Chinese national and local newspapers (2000–2014) coupled with data on the networks of elites, we find that local bureaucrats connected to strong national leaders tend to criticize members of weaker faction...
Preprint
Why do autocratic regimes tolerate and even respond actively to media criticisms? Previous research suggested that autocrats did so out of the intentions of collecting the evidence required to hold their subordinates accountable for wrongdoings. In this paper, I propose an alternative explanation and support it with evidence on how local officials...

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