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Publications (25)
Direct reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation when players are sufficiently equal, such that they have similar influence on each other. In the light of ubiquitous inequality, this raises the question of how reciprocity evolves among unequal players. Existing studies on inequality mainly focus on payoff-driven learning rules, which rely o...
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different pers...
Motivated by the vital progress of modeling higher-order interactions by hypernetworks, where a link connects more than two individuals, we study the evolution of cooperation on temporal hypernetworks. We find that temporal hypernetworks may promote cooperation compared with their static counterparts. Our results offer new insights into the impact...
Imitation is an important social learning heuristic in animal and human societies that drives the evolution of collective behaviors. Previous explorations find that the fate of cooperators has a sensitive dependence on the protocol of imitation, including the number of social peers used for comparison and whether one's own performance is considered...
In repeated social interactions, humans often have the freedom to opt out and be absent due to unpleasant experiences or low benefits. Yet most studies on direct reciprocity neglect this option of opting out and implicitly assume that repeated interactions are compulsory. Here, we introduce a general framework of repeated optional multiplayer games...
Update rules, which describe how individuals adjust their behavior over time, affect the outcome of social interactions. Theoretical studies have shown that evolutionary outcomes are sensitive to model details when update rules are imitation-based but are robust when update rules are self-evaluation based. However, studies of self-evaluation based...
The structure of social networks is a key determinant in fostering cooperation and other altruistic behavior among naturally selfish individuals. However, most real social interactions are temporal, being both finite in duration and spread out over time. This raises the question of whether stable cooperation can form despite an intrinsically fragme...
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption negle...
Analytical fixation probability is in good agreement with simulation results.
Solid lines present the analytical fixation probability of cooperators (ρA) and dash lines show the analytical fixation probability of defectors (ρB). Dots show results by computer simulations (see S1 File, Section 6 for simulation details). Parameters in (a) follow Fig 2...
Division of labor could reduce the free-riding behaviors for n > 2.
On graphs with n types of edges, the production of benefits requires cooperation from players linked by each type of edges. Note that the focal player and its neighbors linked by edges of type 1 play the same role in producing benefits. Here the increasing number of cooperators doe...
Theoretical deviations.
Calculations of fixation probabilities and structure coefficients for evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with n types of edges in finite populations. Derivations of the replication equation for evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with n types of edges in infinite populations.
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Analytical results qualitatively predict the evolutionary outcomes in a real-world friendship network.
The details about this network are provided in S1 File, Section 5. This network consists of 2539 nodes and two types of edges, i.e., type 1 and type 2. On average, each node is linked to 4.3 other nodes by edges of type 1 and 4 other nodes by edge...
How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies have shown that the update rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically modify the evolutionary outcome of the population as a whole. This hints at the complexities of considering the personality of individuals in a population, where...
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglec...
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest that whether individuals use such social information for strategy updating may be crucial to the outcomes of so...
Cooperation is key for the evolution of biological systems ranging from bacteria communities to human societies. Evolutionary processes can dramatically alter the cooperation level. Evolutionary processes are typically of two classes: comparison based and self-evaluation based. The fate of cooperation is extremely sensitive to the details of compar...
Table of personal aspiration values in simulations.
In the table, personal aspiration values for different simulations are listed. For example, the second column (Column B) shows aspiration values of all the individuals indexed from 1 to 100 and it corresponds to Set 1 of the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] used in Figs (1) and (3) (red...
How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies have shown that the updating rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically modify the evolutionary outcome of the population as a whole. This hints at the complexities of considering the personality of individuals in the population, w...
In microbial populations and human societies, the rule of nonlinear group interactions strongly affects the intraspecific evolutionary dynamics, which leads to the variation of the strategy composition eventually. The consequence of such variation may retroact to the rule of the interactions. This correlation indicates that the rule of nonlinear gr...
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally assume that each individual adopts an identical strategy to interact with all its neighbors in each generation. Considering the prevalent diversity of individual interactions in the real society, here we propose the concept of interactive diversity, which allows individuals to adopt different strategies...
The structure of social networks is a key determinant in fostering cooperation and other altruistic behavior among naturally selfish individuals. However, most real social interactions are temporal, being both finite in duration and spread out over time. This raises the question of whether stable cooperation can form despite an intrinsically fragme...
In the real world individuals often engage in group interactions and their payoffs are determined by many factors, including the typical nonlinear interactions, i.e., synergy and discounting. Previous literatures assume that individual payoffs are either synergistically enhanced or discounted with the additional cooperators. Such settings ignore th...
