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Introduction
Publications
Publications (123)
Decades of research indicate that some of the epistemic practices that support scientific enquiry emerge as part of intuitive reasoning in early childhood. Here, we ask whether adults and young children can use intuitive statistical reasoning and metacognitive strategies to estimate how much information they might need to solve different discrimina...
The majority of research on infants’ and children’s understanding of emotional expressions has focused on their abilities to use emotional expressions to infer how other people feel. However, an emerging body of work suggests that emotional expressions support rich, powerful inferences not just about emotional states but also about other unobserved...
Young children are epistemically vigilant, attending to the reliability, expertise, and confidence of their informants and the prior probability and verifiability of their claims. But the pre‐eminent requirement of any hypothesis is that it provides a potential solution to the question at hand. Given questions with no known answer, the ability to s...
In this study, we investigate whether emotional expressions provide cues to knowledge sufficient for predicting others’ behavior based on their true and false beliefs. We adapted the classic Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) such that children (N = 62, mean: 5.58 years, range: 4.05-6.98 years) were not told whether Sally saw Anne...
Effective curiosity-driven learning requires recognizing that the value of evidence for testing hypotheses depends on what other hypotheses are under consideration. Do we intuitively represent the discriminability of hypotheses? Here we show children alternative hypotheses for the contents of a box and then shake the box (or allow children to shake...
Persistence is crucial for overcoming academic and interpersonal challenges. However, there has been little progress in developing effective interventions to improve persistence in childhood. Here we outline how recent insights from cognitive science can be leveraged to promote young children’s persistence and highlight future directions to bridge...
Young children often struggle to answer the question “what would have happened?” particularly in cases where the adult-like “correct” answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what...
Young children often struggle to answer the question "what would have happened?" particularly in cases where the adult-like "correct" answer has the same outcome as the event that actually occurred. Previous work has assumed that children fail because they cannot engage in accurate counterfactual simulations. Children have trouble considering what...
Few phenomena in childhood are as compelling—and mystifying—as play. We review five proposals about the relationship between play and development. We believe each captures important aspects of play across species; however, we believe none of them accounts for the extraordinary richness of human play or its connection to distinctively human learning...
The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people’ behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory o...
The majority of research on infants’ and children’s understanding of emotional expressions has focused on their abilities to use emotional expressions to infer how other people feel. However, an emerging body of work suggests that emotional expressions support rich, powerful inferences not just about emotional states but also about other unobserved...
Significance
Humans have several different ways to decide whether an action is wrong: We might ask whether it causes harm or whether it breaks a rule. Moral psychology attempts to understand the mechanisms that underlie moral judgments. Inspired by theories of “universalization” in moral philosophy, we describe a mechanism that is complementary to...
From minimal observable action, humans make fast, intuitive judgments about what other people think, want, and feel (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Even when no agent is visible, children can infer the presence of intentional agents based on the environmental traces that only agents could leave behind (Saxe et al., 2005; Newman et al., 2010). Here we show...
We propose that developmental cognitive science should invest in an online CRADLE, a Collaboration for Reproducible and Distributed Large-Scale Experiments that crowdsources data from families participating on the internet. Here, we discuss how the field can work together to further expand and unify current prototypes for the benefit of researchers...
Play is a universal behavior widely held to be critical for learning and development. Recent studies suggest children’s exploratory play is consistent with formal accounts of learning. This “play as rational exploration” view suggests that children’s play is sensitive to costs, rewards, and expected information gain. By contrast, here we suggest th...
The materials used in Wu & Schulz (2019, Child Development): Understanding social display rules: Using one person's emotional expressions to infer the desires of another.
To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say: “What if everybody did that?” In other words, even if a single person’s behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized. We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral ju...
The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people’ behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory o...
In social contexts, people’s emotional expressions may disguise their true feelings but still be revealing about the probable desires of their intended audience. This study investigates whether children can use emotional expressions in social contexts to recover the desires of the person observing, rather than displaying the emotion. Children (7.0–...
Across four experiments, we looked at how 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds' (n = 520) task persistence was affected by observations of adult actions (high or low effort), outcomes (success or failure), and testimony (setting expectations—“This will be hard,” pep talks—“You can do this,” value statements—“Trying hard is important,” and baseline). Across experimen...
Four experiments show that 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds (total N = 112) can identify the referent of underdetermined utterances through their Naïve Utility Calculus—an intuitive theory of people’s behavior structured around an assumption that agents maximize utilities. In Experiments 1–2, a puppet asked for help without specifying to whom she was talking (“C...
Effective communication requires knowing the "right" amount of information to provide; what is necessary for a naïve learner to arrive at a target hypothesis may be superfluous and inefficient for a knowledgeable learner. The current study examines 4- to 7-year-olds' developing sensitivity to overinformative communication and their ability to decid...
Preschoolers are sensitive to differences in individuals’ access to external resources (e.g., tools) in division of labor tasks. However, little is known about whether children consider differences in individuals’ internal resources (e.g., abilities) and whether children can flexibly allocate roles across different goal contexts. Critically, factor...
Emotional expressions are typically transient; while we may react emotionally to a new event, we are unlikely to respond with the same emotion once the event becomes familiar. Here we look at whether toddlers understand the relationship between people's epistemic states and their emotional responses. Younger (12-17-month) and older (18-24-month) to...
In this study, we investigate whether emotional expressions provide cues to knowledge sufficient for predicting others' behavior based on their true and false beliefs. We adapted the classic Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) such that children (N = 62, mean: 5.58 years, range: 4.05-6.98 years) were not told whether Sally saw Anne...
Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn pred...
Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theorieswith domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, preschoolers were presented with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard two stories in which two candidate cause...
Toddlers readily learn predictive relations between events (e.g., that event A predicts event B). However, they intervene on A to try to cause B only in a few contexts: When a dispositional agent initiates the event or when the event is described with causal language. The current studies look at whether toddlers’ failures are due merely to the diff...
Previous research suggests that three-year-olds fail to learn from statistical data when their prior beliefs conflict with evidence. Are children’s beliefs entrenched in their folk theories, or can preschoolers rationally update their beliefs? Motivated by a Bayesian account, we conducted a training study to investigate this question. Children (45...
Researchers, educators, and parents have long believed that children learn cause and effect relationships through exploratory play. However, previous research suggests that children are poor at designing informative experiments; children fail to control relevant variables and tend to alter multiple variables simultaneously. Thus, little is known ab...
Motivated by computational analyses, we look at how teaching affects exploration and discovery. In Experiment 1, we investigated children’s exploratory play after an adult pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in th...
In this longitudinal study we examined the stability of exploratory play in infancy and its relation to cognitive development in early childhood. We assessed infants' (N = 130, mean age at enrollment = 12.02 months, SD = 3.5 months; range: 5–19 months) exploratory play four times over 9 months. Exploratory play was indexed by infants' attention to...
We look at the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on exploration, explanation and learning. In Experiment 1, we tested children both with and without differential prior beliefs about balance relationships (Center Theorists, mean: 82 months; Mass Theorists, mean: 89 months; No Theory children, mean: 62 months). Center and Mass Theory children who...
Fig. S1. Prototypical facial expressions of the six basic emotions.
Fig. S2. The structure of the tasks.
Fig. S3. The likelihood of the movie stimuli, people's mental state inferences and model predictions in Experiment 3 Supplemental.
Table S1. The creation and assessment of the photograph stimuli. (See Supporting Information Text 2.1.1 for det...
Effective communication requires knowing the “right” amount of information to provide; what is necessary for a naïve learner to arrive at a target hypothesis may be superfluous and inefficient for a knowledgeable learner. The current study examines four- to seven-year-olds’ developing sensitivity to over-informative communication and their ability...
Effective communication requires knowing the “right” amount of information to provide; what is necessary for a naïve learner to arrive at a target hypothesis may be superfluous and inefficient for a knowledgeable learner. The current study examines four- to seven-year-olds’ developing sensitivity to over-informative communication and their ability...
Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon...
This study investigated whether children learn from exploration and act as effective informants by providing informative demonstrations tailored to observers’ goals and competence. Children (4.0–6.9 years, N = 98) explored a causally ambiguous toy to discover its causal structure and then demonstrated the toy to a naive observer. Children provided...
A key component of most models of pragmatics is that speakers consider more than one way of conveying a message, and how informative each version is in context. Theories of pragmatics, and particularly pragmatic development, are hampered by the fact that while we can often observe what a participant does (either as a speaker or a listener), we can...
Significance
We find that very young children make fine-grained distinctions among positive emotional expressions and connect diverse emotional vocalizations to their probable eliciting causes. Moreover, when infants see emotional reactions that are improbable, given observed causes, they actively search for hidden causes. The results suggest that...
How do we decide what to say to ensure our meanings will be understood? The Rational Speech Act model (RSA; Frank & Goodman, 2012 ) asserts that speakers plan what to say by comparing the informativity of words in a particular context. We present the first example of an RSA model of sentence-level (who-did-what-to-whom) meanings. In these contexts,...
We investigated people's ability to infer others’ mental states from their emotional reactions, manipulating whether agents wanted, expected, and caused an outcome. Participants recovered agents’ desires throughout. When the agent observed, but did not cause the outcome, participants’ ability to recover the agent's beliefs depended on the evidence...
If at first you don't succeed, try again
Does grit—the combination of perseverance and passion popularized in the media—differ from conscientiousness? Personality traits are embedded early in life and remain relatively stable, whereas grit (at least the passion component) may come and go and thus be malleable. Leonard et al. show that infants can l...
How do children map linguistic representations onto the conceptual structures that they encode? In the present studies, we provided 3-4 year old children with minimal-pair scene contrasts in order to determine the effect of particular event properties on novel verb learning. Specifically, we tested whether spatiotemporal cues to causation also info...
How do we decide what to say to ensure our meanings will be understood? The Rational Speech Act model (RSA, Frank & Goodman, 2012) asserts that speakers plan what to say by comparing the informativity of words in a particular context. We present the first example of an RSA model of sentence level (who-did-what-to-whom) meanings. In these contexts,...
We investigate children's ability to use social display rules to infer agents' otherwise under-determined desires. In Experiment 1, seven-to-ten-year-olds saw a protagonist express one emotional reaction to an event in front of her social partner (the Social Context), and a different expression behind her social partner's back (the Nonsocial Contex...
A growing set of studies suggests that our ability to infer, and reason about, mental states is supported by the assumption that agents maximize utilities-the rewards they attain minus the costs they incur. This assumption enables observers to work backward from agents' observed behavior to their underlying beliefs, preferences, and competencies. I...
By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is kn...
We discuss a process by which non-moral concerns (that is concerns agreed to be non-moral within a particular cultural context) can take on moral content. We refer to this phenomenon as moral alchemy and suggest that it arises because moral obligations of care entail recursively valuing loved ones’ values, thus allowing propositions with no moral w...
Researchers have long been interested in the relation between emotion understanding and theory of mind. This study investigates a cue to mental states that has rarely been investigated: the dynamics of valenced emotional expressions. When the valence of a character's facial expression was stable between an expected and observed outcome, children (N...
To help address the participant bottleneck in developmental research, we developed a new platform called “Lookit,” introduced in an accompanying article (Scott & Schulz, 2017), that allows families to participate in behavioral studies online via webcam. To evaluate the viability of the platform, we administered online versions of three previously p...
Many important questions about children's early abilities and learning mechanisms remain unanswered not because of their inherent scientific difficulty but because of practical constraints: recruiting an adequate number of children, reaching special populations, or scheduling repeated sessions. Additionally, small participant pools create barriers...
We propose that human social cognition is structured around a basic understanding of ourselves and others as intuitive utility maximizers: from a young age, humans implicitly assume that agents choose goals and actions to maximize the rewards they expect to obtain relative to the costs they expect to incur. This 'naïve utility calculus' allows both...
How do children map linguistic representations onto the conceptual structures that they encode? In the present studies, we provided 3–4-year-old children with minimal-pair scene contrasts in order to determine the effect of particular event properties on novel verb learning. Specifically, we tested whether spatiotemporal cues to causation also info...
How does early social experience affect children's inferences and exploration? Following prior work on children's reasoning in pedagogical contexts, this study examined U.S. children with less experience in formal schooling and Yucatec Mayan children whose early social input is predominantly observational. In Experiment 1, U.S. 2-year-olds (n = 77)...
Children posit unobserved causes when events appear to occur spontaneously (e.g., Gelman & Gottfried, 1996). What about when events appear to occur probabilistically? Here toddlers (M = 20.1 months) saw arbitrary causal relationships (Cause A generated Effect A; Cause B generated Effect B) in a fixed, alternating order. The relationships were then...
Previous research suggests that the ability to make fine-grained distinctions among emotions emerges gradually over development. However, such studies have looked primarily at children's first-person responses to emotional expressions or at whether children can match emotion labels to emotional expressions. Relatively little work has looked at chil...
Adults' social evaluations are influenced by their perception of other people's competence and motivation: Helping when it is difficult to help is praiseworthy, and not helping when it is easy to help is reprehensible. Here, we look at whether children's social evaluations are affected by the costs that agents incur. We found that toddlers can use...
Humans explain and predict other agents' behavior using mental state concepts, such as beliefs and desires. Computational and developmental evidence suggest that such inferences are enabled by a principle of rational action: the expectation that agents act efficiently, within situational constraints, to achieve their goals. Here we propose that the...
Science can delight us with new and surprising findings. Sometimes, however, a study delights us by confirming something we already believed but could not yet prove. This is the kind of pleasure occasioned by Stahl and Feigenson's report on page [91][1] of this issue ( 1 ). In a series of elegant experiments, the authors show that, controlling for...
Previous research suggests that children infer the presence of unobserved causes when objects appear to move spontaneously. Are such inferences limited to motion events or do children assume that unexplained physical events have causes more generally? Here we introduce an apparently spontaneous event and ask whether, even in the absence of spatiote...
Do children know when people tell the truth but not the whole truth? Here we show that children accurately evaluate informants who omit information and adjust their exploratory behavior to compensate for under-informative pedagogy. Experiment 1 shows that given identical demonstrations of a toy, children (6- and 7-year-olds) rate an informant lower...
Theory of mind research has looked at how learners infer an agent's unobservable mental states from observable actions. However, such research has tended to neglect another observable source of data: the agent's reactions to events. In particular, the agent's facial reactions might provide important information about her mental states that are othe...
Research suggests that checklists reduce errors in fields ranging from aviation to medicine. Checklists are effective in part because their content is not randomly selected from available information but strongly sampled from information experts believe is critical. This sampling process supports the inference that unlisted information is unlikely...
This study looked at whether toddlers posit the existence of unobserved causes when events occur probabilistically. Older (18-24 months) and younger (12-17 months) children were introduced to novel events. An experimenter pressed a red handle and a lollipop emerged from a box; she then pressed a green handle and a cake emerged. These events were re...
The idea of the child as an active learner is one of Piaget's enduring legacies. In this chapter, I discuss the ways in which contemporary computational models of learning do, and do not, address learning as an active, child-driven process. In Part 1, I discuss the problem of search and exploration. In Part 2, I discuss the (harder and more interes...
Adults recognize that if event A predicts event B, intervening on A might generate B. Research suggests that young children have difficulty making this inference unless the events are initiated by goal-directed actions [1]. The current study tested the domain-generality and development of this phenomenon. Replicating previous work, when the events...
Analogies between scientific theories and children's folk theories have been central to the study of cognitive development for decades. In support of the comparison, numerous studies have shown that children have abstract, ontologically committed causal beliefs across a range of content domains. However, recent research suggests that the comparison...
We look at the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on exploration, explanation and learning. In Experiment 1, we tested children both with and without differential prior beliefs about balance relationships (Center Theorists, mean: 82 months; Mass Theorists, mean: 89 months; No Theory children, mean: 62 months). Center and Mass Theory children who...
Toddlers readily learn predictive relations between events (e.g., that event A predicts event B). However, they intervene on A to try to cause B only in a few contexts: When a dispositional agent initiates the event or when the event is described with causal language. The current studies look at whether toddlers' failures are due merely to the diff...
Previous research suggests that 3-year-olds fail to learn from statistical data when their prior beliefs conflict with evidence. Are children's beliefs entrenched in their folk theories, or can preschoolers rationally update their beliefs? Motivated by a Bayesian account, we conducted a training study to investigate this question. Children (45 mont...
Although prior research on the development of causal reasoning has focused on inferential abilities within the individual child, causal learning often occurs in a social and communicative context. In this paper, we review recent research from our laboratory and look at how linguistic communication may influence children's causal reasoning. First, w...
Motivated by computational analyses, we look at how teaching affects exploration and discovery. In Experiment 1, we investigated children's exploratory play after an adult pedagogically demonstrated a function of a toy, after an interrupted pedagogical demonstration, after a naïve adult demonstrated the function, and at baseline. Preschoolers in th...
Sixteen-month-old infants (N = 83) rationally used sparse data about the distribution of outcomes among agents and objects to solve a fundamental inference
problem: deciding whether event outcomes are due to themselves or the world. When infants experienced failed outcomes, their
causal attributions affected whether they sought help or explored.
Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize "action possibilities" (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isola...
Previous research suggests that three-year-olds fail to learn from statistical data when their prior
beliefs conflict with the evidence. Are young children’s causal beliefs are entrenched in their folk
theories or can young preschoolers rationally update their beliefs with evidence? Motivated by
Bayesian accounts of rational inference suggesting th...
How does explicit instruction affect exploratory play and learning? We present a model that captures pedagogical assumptions (adapted from Shafto and Goodman, 2008) and test the model with a novel experiment looking at 4-year-olds' exploratory play in pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts. Our findings are consistent with the model predictions:...
The ability to make inductive inferences from sparse data is a critical aspect of human learning. However, the properties observed in a sample of evidence depend not only on the true extension of those properties but also on the process by which evidence is sampled. Because neither the property extension nor the sampling process is directly observa...
This book outlines the recent revolutionary work in cognitive science formulating a "probabilistic model" theory of learning and development. It provides an accessible and clear introduction to the probabilistic modeling in psychology, including causal model, Bayes net, and Bayesian approaches. It also outlines new cognitive and developmental psych...
Adults' causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn pred...
We used a new method to assess how people can infer unobserved causal structure from patterns of observed events. Participants were taught to draw causal graphs, and then shown a pattern of associations and interventions on a novel causal system. Given minimal training and no feedback, participants in Experiment 1 used causal graph notation to spon...
Young human learners possess a remarkable ability to make inductive inferences from sparse data. Recent research suggests that children"s generalizations are sensitive to the process by which data are generated (i.e., teacher-driven vs. learner-driven sampling; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). In general, sampling process and properties of objects are tightl...
Some researchers have suggested that correlation information and information about action are bound in a single representation: "causal knowledge". If children have only observed correlation information, do they spontaneously try to generate the effect? Do they represent the relationship as potentially causal? We present three action and looking-ti...