Lata Gangadharan

Monash University (Australia) · Department of Economics

Lockdowns were implemented to reduce the transmission of the COVID-19 virus. However, it is unclear how severely curtailed physical interaction shapes individual behaviors that are considered vital for socioeconomic development. In this exploratory study, we investigate the behavior of college students who experienced a strict campus-wide lockdown...

We investigate how information about recipients’ characteristics affects donors’ giving as opposed to when no information is available. In a rational model in which information causes a donor to update her assessment of the recipient's deservingness, we introduce the idea that altruism can be “persuadable” (“dissuadable”) by information about posit...

Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time,...

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to examine the long-term effects of exposure to violence due to the Cambodian genocide (1975–1979), during childhood and adolescence, on individuals’ antisocial behaviors. Since antisocial behavior can co-exist with other preferences, we also investigate the effect of this exposure on prosocial and risk-ta...

Groups such as committees or boards make many important decisions within organizations. Many of these decisions affect external parties. This paper uses an experimental approach to study how the gender composition of three-person groups affects choices and beliefs in a Coordination game with selfish and prosocial equilibria. We find that the social...

We investigate the new institutional design for the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The scheme incorporates two allowance reserves that adjust the supply of allowances in the event of unexpectedly high or low allowance demand. These reserves are enacted if the clearing price breaches a predetermined set of trigger prices. Our experime...

The recent stated preference literature emphasises the importance of incentive compatible elicitation methods, which depend on respondent beliefs that payment can be collected if provision occurs. We investigate this condition in a randomised field experiment where stated choices are incentivised financially. The objective of the treatment was to m...

Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable? We conduct two experiments that investigate whether...

This paper highlights the contributions made by lab-in-the-field experiments, which are also known as artefactual, framed and extra-lab experiments. We present a curated sample of lab-in-the-field experiments and discuss how they can be conducted on their own or combined with conventional laboratory experiments, natural experiments, randomised cont...

Leadership selection often requires candidates to actively choose to express their interest. Using a series of incentivized experiments with more than 1000 participants, we compare such an Opt-in mechanism with an Opt-out mechanism where everyone qualified for the position is in the candidate pool by default, but individuals can choose to opt out o...

Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time,...

While the causes for upward income mobility receive considerable attention, the behavioural impact of the prospect of income mobility has been largely overlooked. We design an experiment and a survey to investigate if the prospect of income mobility influences antisocial behaviour. In the experiment, subjects can, at a cost, reduce others’ payoffs...

Many social dilemmas involve decisions made by firms. We design a laboratory experiment that represents firms’ principal-agent problem and includes an inter-firm social dilemma and stochastic agent performance. Agents’ unobservable effort affects the likelihood of a bad outcome occurring, such as a regulatory violation. This harms the agent's princ...

Researchers increasingly elicit beliefs to understand the underlying motivations of decision makers. Two commonly used methods are the quadratic scoring rule (QSR) and the binarized scoring rule (BSR). Hossain and Okui (2013) use a within-subject design to evaluate the performance of these two methods in an environment where subjects report probabi...

Using data from two sets of experiments conducted in rural India, this paper finds that relative to men, women assigned to be leaders contribute less than what they propose in a public goods game. We examine whether this behavior is influenced by the social environment. We find that female leaders deviate negatively from their proposals more freque...

Understanding decisions in situations involving multiple risks is vital in many contexts, including the provision of aid to developing countries. Aid typically involves trade-offs over multiple, desirable, but risky outcomes. We partner with an aid organisation and design a laboratory experiment to investigate multi-attribute risk preferences in th...

Antisocial behaviour can be observed in response to social comparisons with advantaged others. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if social group affiliation mitigates or increases antisocial behaviour in the presence of inequality. While research has documented the harmful effects of inequality, less is known about how social ident...

In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a nonlinear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources fr...

We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms and sanctions on bribe offers. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic consid...

We consider the relationship between paternalism and motives for giving and assess the role of donors’ perceptions of the recipient. We theoretically incorporate the tradeoffs introduced when donors may choose how a donation is realized, cash or in kind (i.e. paternalistically) and design an experiment to examine how differently motivated donors re...

Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality – a normative conflict – which is overlooked. Agents’ concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We pr...

Results from laboratory experiments using real-effort tasks provide mixed evidence on the relationship between monetary incentives and effort provision. To examine this issue, we design three experiments where subjects participate in two-player real-effort tournaments with two prizes. Experiment 1 shows that subjects exert high effort even if there...

We evaluate stability of preference using a randomized intervention that exogenously changes the income opportunity set of participants. We use a unique panel data, comprising of surveys and lab-in-the-field experiments conducted before and after the intervention, to examine whether our elicited measures of preferences (risk, competitiveness, and c...

Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours...

Many environmental decisions are based on intrinsic motivations in addition to traditional economic incentives. Field experiments allow researchers to isolate a specific causal mechanism which can help advance our understanding of consumer and firm behavior in environmental markets. This article summarizes the literature on the use of field experim...

The management of stormwater runoff via distributed green infrastructures delivers a number of environmental services that go beyond the reduction of flood risk, which has been the focus of conventional stormwater systems. Not all of these services may be equally valued by the public, however. This paper estimates households' willingness to pay (WT...

Microfinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit. We design a three-stage repayment game to examine how the existence of these ancillary activities affect repayment behavior and group attrition. In the first stage, the group borrows under joint liability, each member undertakes a risky project an...

In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources f...

This paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance. Our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance. In the Random Audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection. In the Tournament Audit mechanism the prob...

This paper uses data from artefactual field experiments and surveys conducted in 61 villages in India to examine whether men and women respond differently to women as leaders. We investigate the extent to which behavior towards female leaders is influenced by experience with women in leadership positions. We find evidence of significant male backla...

Do women as leaders behave differently from men? Using field experiments conducted in rural India, we show that women leaders are more deceptive compared to men. This is especially true in villages that have experienced a female village head as a result of an affirmative action policy designed to encourage greater representation of women in leaders...

This paper combines unique experimental and survey data to examine the determinants of self-selection into a training program. Women residing in selected disadvantaged areas in New Delhi, India were invited to apply for a six-month long subsidized training program in stitching and tailoring. A random subset of applicants and non-applicants to the t...

Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Agents' concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We provide evidence for this from a public good ex...

Cultural traits play a significant role in the determination of economic outcomes and institutions. This paper presents evidence from laboratory experiments on the cultural integration of individuals of Chinese ethnicity in Australia, focusing on social preferences, risk attitudes, and preferences for competition. We find that greater exposure to W...

In this paper, we examine the determinants of self-selection into a vocational training program in India. To do this we combine data from an artefactual field experiment with survey data collected from the targeted community. We find that applicants and non-applicants differ in terms of socio-economic characteristics (measured using a survey), as w...

We conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance. Participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner-take-all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time. Competition increases dishonesty and lowers ou...

This paper presents an experimental study of two mechanisms for managing common pool resources. Decentralized peer punishment (swords) has been shown to increase cooperation in related social dilemmas, but only with linear private benefits and costs of public goods provision. We investigate the effectiveness of this mechanism for a more realistic n...

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for th...

Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of pee...

Firms often cooperate explicitly in certain dimensions, such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from R&D expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in other...

In recent years, some of the most influential policies have been either tested or evaluated using experimental methods. Experiments have provided significant insights on the implications of different designs on market outcomes and the lessons learned have helped improve academic debate and the interaction between policy makers and researchers. In t...

This paper presents an experimental study of two mechanisms that influence incentives to reduce ambient pollution levels. In the formal mechanism individuals face a penalty if the group generates total pollution that exceeds a specified target, whereas in the informal mechanism individuals can choose to incur costs to punish each other after observ...

This paper combines unique survey and experimental data to examine the determinants of self-selection into a vocational training program. Women residing in selected disadvantaged areas in New Delhi, India were invited to apply for a 6-month long free training program in stitching and tailoring. A random subset of applicants and non-applicants were...

Assessing Singletons The one-child policy introduced by the government of China in 1979 increased the proportion of urban families with an only child; later referred to as "little emperors" in media reports. In 2010, Cameron et al. (p. 953 , published online 10 January) recruited approximately 400 residents of Beijing who had been born either befor...

We study dishonesty in an individual task experiment. In contrast to the existing literature, we collect participant level data. We find that men are not only more likely to be dishonest than women, they are also more dishonest.

Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering security-differentiated water rights can make the market more efficient and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We conduct a laboratory experiment which compares two designs for water rights; one with a single security lev...

Evidence suggests that rental properties are often associated with lower levels of energy efficiency than owner-occupied buildings. Policy makers are increasingly concerned about this energy efficiency gap. In this paper, we investigate the energy investments made and the market efficiency gains associated with different policy interventions at the...

To harness the potential of stormwater to overcome water shortages, reduce urban temperatures, and improve waterway health and the landscape of Australian cities.

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for th...

Cultural traits play a significant role in the determination of economic outcomes and institutions. This paper presents evidence from laboratory experiments on the cultural integration of individuals of Chinese ethnicity in Australia, focusing on social preferences, preferences for competition, and risk attitudes. We show that the greater the share...

Many new and proposed emissions trading systems involve multiple countries and regions. The introduction of interregional trading raises questions about how flexible state- or national-level authorities should be in allowing individual firms to trade with firms or authorities in other states or countries. This paper uses laboratory methods to evalu...

We study the role of economic versus intrinsic motivations for dishonesty in two different experimental tasks. In the theft task, participants have the opportunity to steal real physical money, by taking more than they have actually earned in the task. In the reporting task, we use a production task with self-reporting of accidents to study the fra...

Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering different levels of security for rights can make the market more sophisticated and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We compare results from a laboratory experiment with two water right designs, one with a unique securit...

We report results from an experiment that investigates truthfulness in self-reporting under different reporting regimes. The experiment involves a production task with self-reporting of accidents, with reporting compulsory for some participants, but only voluntary for others. We find that dishonesty is prevalent, but accident reporting is more freq...

Water markets are xpected to lead to ecient use of scarce water by re-allocating water from low value uses to high value uses. However a water allocation system must not only allocate specic volumes of water among users but also allocate the risk of supply shortages. The existence of both a market of water rights and a spot market of water allotmen...

Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers' relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a random productivity shock ensures that the allocation is n...

We use the voluntary contribution mechanism to investigate whether smaller action sets lead to higher cooperation rates. We find that this is the case for groups of four players.

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual's accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) an...

"This paper uses laboratory evidence from public goods games to examine how in payoff-equivalent situations, decision makers contribute toward private or public goods when they are exposed to different kinds of risks and uncertainties in the provision of these goods. We find that location matters with subjects moving away from the environmental unc...