Kene Boun My

• Laboratory Manager at CNRS, University of Strasbourg

Introduction Ambiguity is part of most of the daily life decisions. It can affect the way people deal with environmental threats, especially when they face a social dilemma. Method We run an experiment where every group of four subjects is exposed to a risk that may result in a loss for each member. Subjects must decide on the allocation of their...

This study examines factors determining farmers’ investment in organic farming using a contextualized lab-in-the-field experiment with 220 small household farmers in Northern Vietnam. We focus on the role of network structure, information nudge, and social comparison between farmers using three types of networks: circle, star and complete. Our resu...

In the standard beauty contest game of Morris and Shin Morris and Shin (2002), agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental value and with the conventional value expected to be set by the market. In doing so, agents respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either motive being set e...

There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper, we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behavior through the formation of anchors. We recreate experimentally five different double‐auction market structures (perfect com...

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3750651

Central banks’ disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than that predicted in theoretical models. In a beauty contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents equilibrium level of attention, which...

In a two-stage investment-effort game, we model altruistic investment in another agent’s capacity to benefit from synergies between the two agents’ efforts. We conduct the theoretical analysis of the game by assuming that agents who invest in others have no direct utility from their giving behavior, i.e., without considering other-regarding prefere...

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who...

Nudge and tax in an environmental public goods experiment: Does environmental sensitivity matter? (vol 55, pg 24, 2019)

This paper studies individuals’ preference for reducing advantageous inequality in the distribution of gains and losses. Combining the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3):817–868, 1999) with loss aversion à la Kahneman and Tversky (Econom J Econom Soc:263–291, 1979), we predict the relative dislike for advantageous inequa...

An experiment is proposed in which the subjects could contribute to a public good which could be thought of as reducing pollution, which was stochastic. A nudge (announcement of the socially optimal contribution) and a tax are implemented to improve the level of contributions. The environmental sensitivity and optimism of the subjects are also elic...

Le papier présente une revue de la littérature théorique et expérimentale sur les préférences sociales dans le Jeu du Dictateur et dans le Jeu de la Con…ance. Deux types de préférences sociales sont analysés, l'aversion à l'inégalité associée aux préférences distributives et l'aversion à la culpa-bilité associée aux préférences dépendantes des croy...

Europe is oscillating between increased integration and permanent risk of dissolution. In this framework, one often debates the role of bilateral relations, with the following question: does bilateralism foster or delay overall co-operation? We address this question in an experimental framework where we study the behaviour of agents who are confron...

We study the effect of voluntary participation in the context of a collective-good experiment. We investigate whether the freedom to participate in the game or not can affect contribution levels over time. The analysis of two voluntary-participation treatments supports a noticeable effect of an attractive exit option on contribution levels. We conc...

This paper reports laboratory experiments designed to study the impact of public information about past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our design is based on a discrete version of Arnott et al.'s (1990) bottleneck model. In all treatments, congestion occurs and the observed travel costs are quite similar to the predicted one...

Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payoff depends on all participants' decisions and on natural variability as would be the case in the real wo...

This paper presents the results of a contingent valuation in France of the life expectancy gain due to a reduction of air pollution. A questionnaire developed by Krupnick at al. [2002] for North America was translated and administered to 300 individuals aged 40 to 75, but by contrast to the application in other countries, an open question was added...

This paper presents the results of a contingent valuation in France of the life expectancy gain due to a reduction of air pollution. A questionnaire developed by Krupnick at al. [2002] for North America was translated and administered to 300 individuals aged 40 to 75, but by contrast to the application in other countries, an open question was added...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of our experimental game is characterized by efficient imitation but comple...

We report the results of an experiment that examines play in a 50 periods repetition of a two-player coordination game (Stag Hunt game), which admits two pure strategy Nash equilibria that are Pareto-ranked : a payoff-dominant equilibrium and a risk-dominant equilibrium. We consider a 2x3 factorial design, with two different matching rules -global...

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effect...

Nous étudions expérimentalement le comportement de sujets confrontés, dans une population, à une multiplicité de jeux du dilemme du prisonnier, suivant que les interactions sont bilatérales ou multilatérales. Nous observons, (i), une coopération significativement supérieure en cas de bilatéralisme, (ii), son développement dans le temps à l’inverse...

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subs...

We provide a stress experimental test of the ability of (a damaged based version) the ambient tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a nonpoint pollution context. To mirror the features of naturally occurring environments, we consider a convex damage function, uncertainty in measuring the ambient level of pollution, polluters with het...

L’objectif de ce rapport était d’évaluer l’intérêt du recours à l’économie expérimentale en matière d’aide à la décision dans le domaine des politiques de transport. Il a d’abord été montré que, du point de vue des méthodes de production de données existant en transport (préférences déclarées et préférences révélées), l’économie expérimentale possé...

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effect...

Regulation of nonpoint emission problems such as pesticide and nitrogen pollution of lakes and ground water is a major policy challenge. The emissions-based instru- ments that economists usually advocate for cost-effective pollution control are not feasible since emissions are unobservable. Among the policy instruments suggested by the theoretical...

We study the emergence and evolution of cooperation in the context of small groups production through a collective good experiment. Using the data generated by a first treatment we found strong evidence supporting the hypothesis of individual adjustment towards the observed average contribution, in accordance with the distribution of player types d...