Ken Akiba

Ken Akiba
Virginia Commonwealth University | VCU · Department of Philosophy

PhD (Philosophy), University of Southern California, 1994

About

36
Publications
9,327
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237
Citations
Citations since 2017
7 Research Items
98 Citations
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20172018201920202021202220230510152025
Introduction
I have just published the book, The Philosophy Major's Introduction to Philosophy: Concepts and Distinctions, from Routledge. Aside from that, I have particular interests in metaphysical vagueness and quantification.

Publications

Publications (36)
Article
Full-text available
This paper offers the Boolean many-valued solution to the Sorites Paradox. According to the precisification-based Boolean many-valued theory, from which this solution arises, sentences have not only two truth values, truth (or 1) and falsity (or 0), but many Boolean values between 0 and 1. The Boolean value of a sentence is identified with the set...
Preprint
Full-text available
This paper offers the Boolean many-valued solution to the Sorites Paradox. According to the precisification-based Boolean many-valued theory, from which this solution arises, sentences have not only two truth values, truth (or 1) and falsity (or 0), but many Boolean values between 0 and 1. The Boolean value of a sentence is identified with the set...
Book
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Many philosophy majors are shocked by the gap between the relative ease of lower-level philosophy courses and the difficulty of upper-division courses. This book serves as a necessary bridge to upper-level study in philosophy by offering rigorous but concise and accessible accounts of basic concepts and distinctions that are used throughout the dis...
Chapter
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This paper offers philosophers' viewpoint on the issues surrounding vague-ness in a manner accessible to general readers and scientists. In particular, the paper aims to help answer the following two questions: First, wherein lies vagueness? And second, why do philosophers roundly dismiss fuzzy logic? On the first issue, two kinds of vagueness, wor...
Conference Paper
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A new solution to the Sorites Paradox, the Boolean many-valued solution, is presented in this talk. According to the Boolean many-valued theory of vague properties, properties such as being a heap, being bald, and being tall exist as genuine vague properties. A degree property, such as temperature or velocity, is a property which has degrees (e.g.,...
Article
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This paper introduces Richard Montague's theory of determiner (or quantifier) phrases to the philosophically-oriented readers who are familiar with the traditional Frege-Russell treatment. Determiner phrases include not only quantifier phrases in the narrow sense, such as 'every man', 'some woman', and 'nothing', but also NP conjunctions such as 'A...
Article
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The Boolean many-valued approach to vagueness is similar to the infinite-valued approach embraced by fuzzy logic in the respect in which both approaches seek to solve the problems of vagueness by assigning to the relevant sentences many values between falsity (or 0) and truth (or 1), but while the fuzzy-logic approach postulates linearly-ordered va...
Article
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Classical (or Boolean) type theory is the type theory that allows the type inference $\sigma \to \bot) \to \bot => \sigma$ (the type counterpart of double-negation elimination), where $\sigma$ is any type and $\bot$ is absurdity type. This paper first presents a denotational semantics for a simplified version of Parigot's lambda-mu calculus, a prem...
Article
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Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams claim to offer a new ontic theory of vagueness, the kind of theory which considers vagueness to exist not in language but in reality. This paper refutes their claim. The possible worlds they employ are ersatz possible worlds, i.e., sets of sentences. Unlike reality, they don’t contain concrete and often ma...
Article
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J. Robert G. Williams argues that referential indeterminacy may arise as a result of ontic indeterminacy, and that lambda-abstraction is not applicable to indeterminate identity statements, i.e., statements of the form, 'it is indeterminate whether a is identical with b,' if they involve such ontically induced referential indeterminacy; so Evans's...
Chapter
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This paper presents shadow theory, according to which, for every object of some type, σ – object in the broadest sense of the term, including truth values and functions – there is another object of the same type, the negative shadow of the object, and for every (finite or infinite) set of objects of a single type, σ, there are two other objects of...
Article
Full-text available
On the one hand, philosophers have presented numerous apparent examples of indeterminate individuation, i.e., examples in which two things are neither determinately identical nor determinately distinct. On the other hand, some have argued against even the coherence of the very idea of indeterminate individuation. This paper defends the possibility...
Chapter
Full-text available
The standard fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory are degree-functional and thus susceptible to the problem of penumbral connections. This chapter attempts to radically revise them in order to remove this feature. Whereas the original theory assigns any real number in [0,1] to a proposition or set membership, the revised theory, called Boolean-valued s...
Chapter
Full-text available
Book
This unique anthology of new, contributed essays offers a range of perspectives on various aspects of ontic vagueness. It seeks to answer core questions pertaining to onticism, the view that vagueness exists in the world itself. The questions to be addressed include whether vague objects must have vague identity, and whether ontic vagueness has a d...
Article
This paper sets forth a new theory of quantifiers and term connectives, called shadow theory, which should help simplify various semantic theories of natural language by greatly reducing the need of Montagovian proper names, type-shifting, and λ-conversion. According to shadow theory, conjunctive, disjunctive, and negative noun phrases such as 'Joh...
Article
Full-text available
Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that such probabilistic accounts of coherence as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. We will however show all of them have a serious...
Article
Full-text available
This paper offers a theory of quotation by uniting two apparently disparate extant theories, Recanati's pragmatic theory and Washington's identity theory. Recanati draws a distinction between open and closed quotations, and contends that open quotations do not refer. Washington argues that closed quotations refer to various expression types, not ju...
Article
Full-text available
There is no doubt that some sentences are vague. For instance, 'Bruce Willis is bald', 'Jones is on Mt. Everest', and 'Tibbles (my shaggy cat) weighs more than fifteen pounds' are, or at least can be, vague, lacking definite truth values. Naturally, then, questions arise about the nature of vagueness; in particular, the question about wherein vague...
Article
Book Information Conceptions of Truth. Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2003, xiii + 493, £50.00 (cloth) By Wolfgang Künne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xiii + 493. £50.00 (cloth:),
Article
Field (2000) claims that both inflationists and deflationists can and should accept the existence of linguistic indeterminacy in their own language. This paper shows that inflationists and deflationists consider the nature of indeterminacy quite differently; in particular, deflationists’ notion of indeterminacy lacks the kind of objectivity inflati...
Article
Deflationists cannot make sense of the notion of referential indeterminacy because they deny the existence of substantive reference. One way for them to make sense of the objective existence of linguistic indeterminacy is by embracing the worldly (or objectual) view of indeterminacy, the view that indeterminacy exists not in reference relations but...
Article
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Article
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I present a modal conception of vagueness and vague objects, according to which a vague object is a transworld object which coincides with one precise object in one world and with another precise object in another world. Such worlds are called precisifications; they are modal, worldly counterparts of the precisifications postulated in supervaluatio...
Article
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Article
This paper offers a novel method for nominalizing metalogic without transcending first-order reasoning about physical tokens (inscriptions, etc.) of proofs. A kind of double-negation scheme is presented which helps construct, for any platonistic statement in metalogic, a nominalistic statement which has the same assertability condition as the forme...
Article
Full-text available
Field's claim that we have a notion of consistency which is neither model-theoretic nor proof-theoretic but primitive, is examined and criticized. His argument is compared to similar examinations by Kreisel and Etchemendy, and Etchemendy's distinction between interpretational and representational semantics is employed to reveal the flaw in Field's...
Article
Full-text available
I interpret Mill’s view on logic as the instrumentalist view that logical inferences, complex statements, and logical operators are not necessary for reasoning itself, but are useful only for our remembering and communicating the results of the reasoning. To defend this view, I first show that we can transform all the complex statements in the lang...
Article
La doctrine linguistique de la verite logique, selon laquelle les verites logiques sont vraies par convention linguistique, a laquelle les positivistes logiques s'etaient rattaches, passe pour avoir ete definitivement refutee par Quine. L'A. analyse les arguments de Quine et vise a montrer qu'une certaine forme de conventionnalisme est toujours tre...
Article
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1994. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 186-195).

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Projects (6)
Project
Publish a textbook for philosophy majors.