



Surveillance of the worlds of tourism: Foucault and the eye-of-power

Keith Hollinshead*

Department of Recreation, Park, and Tourism Sciences, Mail stop 2261, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-2261, USA

Abstract

During the last decade, particularly following the publication of Urry's (1990, *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Society*. London: Sage) text, the perspectival concept of the institutional/professional "gaze" has come into currency in tourism studies. While few reviews of Urry's important work on the place and significance of tourism in postmodern society pay much attention to the French litero-philosophical construction *le regard* (which gave rise to the English term "the gaze"), Leiper has produced a useful foundational review of Urry's debt to Foucauldian thought. This current article endeavours to take over where Leiper left off, and provides a more searching critique of the power of surveillance (*le regard*) in tourism, as it yields a dialectical inspection of Foucauldian thought concerning the eye-of-power as it acts through the institutions/organisations/agencies of tourism and travel (and of tourism and travel research). Such a power of surveillance – such a power of judgement and governance – is shown to be an authoritative mix of normalising discourse and universalising praxis which routinely privileges certain understandings of heritage/society/the world in and through tourism – as the eye-of-power can do in any institutional, professional, or aggregative setting. Through this Foucauldian vision, the individual who works in tourism (and he/she who travels!) is seen to be *homo docilis* – i.e., someone who not only participates in the regulation of the world and in the mastery of its social, cultural, natural and geographical environments, but who regulates and thereby constrains himself/herself through the ocularcentric outlooks which he/she upholds. The article seeks to reinvestigate the involvement of decision-making individuals in both investigative agendas in tourism research and in development practices in tourism management by hopefully making them much more other-regarded (and also self-aware) in terms of the governing suppositions and presuppositions they work to. © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Tourism; Travel-trade outlooks; Foucault; The Gaze (*Le Regard*); Eye-of-power; Surveillance; Subjects; Power-knowledge; Will-to-power; Self-regulation; *Rapport à Soi*; Governmentality

1. Introduction: 'Le Regard' and Foucault's eye of power

A few years ago, Leiper (1992) produced a most useful review of Urry's (1990) landmark study, *The Tourist Gaze*. Leiper's eleven paragraphs were a valuable and uncomplicated assessment of Urry's text on objectification in tourism, and Leiper is to be congratulated on the strident simplicity with which he variously registered his considered praise and his mild distaste for the features of the said Urry publication. On the surface it appears that Leiper has once again been vigilant to the depth and breadth of scrutiny deployed in the analysis of tourism, a service he has performed particularly well before (Leiper, 1979). But Leiper tends to dart rather too quickly

over a number of matters covered by Urry, notably over those questions of authority which Urry raises in the shadow of the writings and observations of Michel Foucault, the eminent French intellectual of and about the governance of things in given ages. These Foucauldian matter of commission, influence, and supremacy within the business of tourism (albeit questions that are often raised obliquely and in scattered fashion by Urry) warrant weightier deliberation. Foucault's insights into authority and sanction have been deemed to be "the most important event in thought of our century" (*l'évènement de pensée le plus important de notre siècle*) (Veyne, 1984) and while that itself may be a somewhat fustian claim, the Foucauldian cognizance into the violence of power deserves a sterner examination.

This paper will examine the matter of vision, presupposition, and governmentality in and through tourism in

* Present address: Luton Business School, University of Luton, 48 Park Street, Luton, Beds Lu1 3Ju, UK. E-mail: Keith.hollinshead@luton.ac.uk

the following fashion:

- First, a numbered preliminary observations will be made as to the apparent nature of the Urry and Leiper standpoints on and about the disciplinary vision(s) of tourism.
- Second, closer scrutiny will be given as to what Urry conceivably stated about the governing “gaze” in and over things in tourism, and of the degree to which his 1990 publication was genuinely Foucauldian in approach, detail, and spirit.
- Third, crystallisation will be provided as to what Foucault himself had generally meant by such constructions as ‘the governmentality of things’, ‘the power of truth’, and ‘institutional surveillance’, and as to what he had specifically meant by such critical aspects of the eye-of-power as ‘power-knowledge’, ‘carceral society’, and ‘normalisation’.
- Fourth, synthesis will be given on the larger ‘understandings’ (i.e., the macro-messages) which emerge from Foucauldian thought in terms of the morphology of interpretations (or of the *grammar of utterances*) which institutions are seen to hold about the order of things in and of the world.
- Finally (following a short critical reflection on the value and the problematics of adopting Foucauldian thought on the eye-of-power *anywhere* in the human sciences), an endnote will be given as to the *personal* value of Foucauldian insight on the essentialising vision of institutions and of the related forms of active individual agency it tends to cultivate. Readers of *Tourism Management* will therefore be encouraged to reflect on the degree to which they themselves are currently held captive under the particular panoptic surveillance of institutional thought and action, and of the extent to which they themselves serve as self-regulating agents-of-normalcy of those carceral outlooks upon peoples, places, and pasts. They will thus be encouraged to reflect upon their own *rapport à soi* as they possibly privilege certain ‘freedoms’ and as they regulate and enforce other ‘un-freedoms’ in their everyday service of tourism and travel.

Hence, the purpose of this paper is on one level to register *how tourism (often unsuspectingly) matters* in the making dominant of some inheritances/narratives/attractions and in the suppression or the denial of other traditions/storylines/drawcards, and on another level how individual managers, developers, researchers in tourism and travel quickly engage in small and large games of cultural, social, environmental and historical, cleansing, as they promote and project some socio-political universes and chastise or omit other possible contending worldviews. Accordingly, this paper on Foucauldian surveillance in and across the tourism industry adds both a philosophical analysis of the conse-

quence of tourism as a worldmaking mix on institutional languages and institutional practices, and a reflexive statement on the cumulative impact of the micro-decision made by bureaucrats, business-development managers, brochure-writer, backroom researchers, etc., throughout tourism.

But let us first clarify what Urry conceivably wrote, and what Leiper conceivably recognised.

2. Background: Foucault and the sightliness of Urry and of Leiper

Leiper welcomes the freshness of Urry’s treatment of the changing political economy of travel and the tonic it provides in terms of tourism’s interface with issues of modernity and postmodernity. He applauds the way in which Urry reveals as tourism to be engaged with a welter of other social and cultural practices. Yet Leiper finds Urry’s adoption of Foucault’s clinical gaze schema to be feebly modelled. In fact, he finds Urry’s borrowing of the Foucauldian analogy to be ‘confusing’ and ‘unsatisfying’ (Leiper, 1992, p. 606). Both the Leiper and the Urry expositions on the gaze are contrasted in Table 1 with Hollinshead’s (1999) abridgment of Foucault’s original supposition on the gaze/the eye-of-power/panopticism.

I now urge Leiper to reflect a little longer on Urry’s appropriation of the Foucauldian *le regard*, for *The Tourist Gaze* could indeed be said to contain a litany of subtle primings and gentle probings on the governmentality of things. One perhaps suspects that Urry has been so understated in his catechism of and about ‘the gaze’ that Leiper has missed the architectural presence of the “eye-of-power” in so much of what Urry has questioned and presented.

Indeed, as suggested in Table 1, Urry’s book can be seen to be a sustained interrogation of tourism as disciplinary society. It is an imaginative and enduring inspection of the substratum constraints and the deep-seated objectifications which characterise “the eye-of-power” as it is becoming institutionalised within parts of the tourism industry. Yet, for such an interpretation of Urry’s book to hold, perhaps fuller comment ought to be first provided on Foucault’s *panopticism*, that is, the meaning of his concept of visionary power and the unconscious authorities it beckons.

Foucault’s notions of ‘power’, ‘discipline’ and ‘knowledge’ have made a profound imprint on thought in many fields of human concern and socio-political action in the last three decades, but they have perhaps been the kind of expansive Parisian philosophical conceptualisations which have *not* been recognised as hard currency in tourism research – witness only one solitary reference to Foucault in the 170 pages of the multidisciplinary review of the social sciences that appeared in the *Annals* of

Table 1

The tourist gaze in tourism and travel: three interpretations on/of Foucault's institutional and governing gaze

Leiper's simple 'takeaway' interpretation as in *Annals of Tourism research* (i.e., a review of Urry's usage)

The tourist gaze (as codified by Urry) is explicitly the outlook of tourists, per se, and is intrinsically part of the contemporary experience of travel. The tourist gaze is associated with the beginnings of tourism as a social rather than an individualistic phenomenon, and is linked possibly/potentially with the development of mass tourism: it tends to convey stereotyped notions of tourism. The tourist gaze may only be seen to be weakly analogous to Foucault's 'model' of the gaze of clinicians – a model about power and scientific knowledge [sic!]. In tourism, there are in fact many different systematic gazes – not just one – for they vary by society, social group and by historical period.

Source: Leiper (1992).

Urry's complex 'multi-level' interpretation as in the tourist gaze (i.e., ocularcentrism in tourism)

The tourist gaze is that plural mix of socially organised ways of seeing what is highly prevalent and highly powerful in contemporary society. These tourist gazes constitute aggregate ways of seeing, encountering, and understanding things, and these ways of seeing and explaining the world have important historical, economic, social, cultural, and visual ramifications. While the tourist gaze approximates to Foucault's institutional gaze of the medic and the professional, it tends to be rather broader in its occurrence and force across society. Much of the tourist gaze in contemporary society is concerned with the consumption of goods and services which are in some senses unnecessary: they are consumed because they supposedly generate pleasurable experiences which are different from those encountered in everyday life: thus the plurality of gazes are constructed through those assumptions about or perspectives on 'difference', ipso facto. As patterns of tourism change, so the tourist gaze(s) alter: they are significantly connected to the broader cultural changes of postmodernity, and are themselves becoming more universalised. While it is important to note what gets authorised or 'authenticated' by the tourist gaze(s), the activity of gazing in tourism in the contemporary world is becoming gradually harder to distinguish from other social practices, such as shopping, or participating/watching leisure, sport, cultural, or educational pursuits.

Conceivably, there are five principal sorts of the gaze in tourism, viz., the romantic, the collective the spectatorial, the environmental, and the anthropological. They variously constitute particular scopic regimes which are self-consciously organised by 'professionals' who work in tourism/travel, and they are authorised and projected through different discourses.

Source: Urry (1990, 1992b).

Hollinshead's translation of Foucault's original concept as in *Tourism, Culture and Communication* (i.e., panopticism applied to tourism)

[The panoptic gaze] of a group/community/institution is the power of surveillance (viz., le regard in French litero-philosophy) which individuals within that group/community/institution are found to harness in order to inspect the people and things around them. Such a generally unconscious eye-of-power can enable those individuals in that context to see and then understand phenomena from some vantage points, but not so well at all from others. The gaze concretises held knowledge of and about things overtime as it restrictively hardens into normalising forms of discourse and into universalising forms of praxis. In tourism, the tourist gaze is that aggregate way-of-seeing- and interpreting particular peoples, places, and pasts through what the tourism industry or travellers cumulatively appreciate and disappreciate overtime. Under the tourist gaze, some things/ideas/attractions are powerfully and/or commercially made dominant, while others are subjugated, silenced, or ignored.

Source: Hollinshead (1998).

Tourism Research (1991). Foucault's cogitation on 'the gaze' of professions and of institutions embraces "the complex interlacing of language and vision" (Jay 1986, p. 183). He plumbs the authorities and the sanctions which opaquely lie within institutional language and institutional vision as he critically explores the relationships between the forms of reason which are held within professions/bureaucracies/lines-of-business and the 'modern' domains within society which they control, regulate or represent. In this way, Foucault investigates the very relationship between institutional logic and socio-political existence, or, put another way, the operational relationship between the discourse held within disciplines or agencies. Accordingly, Foucault sounds out the grids of understanding which configure a given arena of life or society, and he traces the thinking which delineates and empowers a particular group or collective agency. Thus, when Foucault explores a set profession or a certain institution, he inspects its "gaze", that is the way its members learn to see and to project preferred versions of reality, and historically, the way that such seeing and projecting privileges certain persons and their inheritances, and subjugates certain others and their inheritances.

Consonantly, the visionary violence that Foucault repeatedly finds within the discourse and the praxis of professions and instructions, is a form of conceptual coercion that dehumanises. He identifies such dangerous rationalities in the 'talk' and the 'text' of disciplines; to him, they are ever-more virulent where they remain unrecognised, "architecturally congealed" in the smalltime but cumulative substantive privileges and preferences (Habermas, 1987, p. 245).

It would, of course, be an injustice to suggest that Urry was the only researcher in tourism studies who had ever probed matters of normalisation and governance in and of tourism. Indeed, it is possible to identify at least twelve sample issue arenas where tourism studies researchers have hitherto been active on what Foucault would call matters of governmentality in tourism. These are:

- in terms of *the relations of power*, Foucauldian analysis could conceivably extend the work of Shames and Glover (1989) in making visible what managers and developers in tourism really do and privilege through their everyday talk and deeds;

- in terms of *the normalising consequences of the exercise of power*, Foucauldian analysis could imaginably stretch the work of Sofield (1996) on the deep-seated clash of values in and under tourism development in the South Pacific to a host of other discursive settings and power-plays (*jeux de pouvoir*) in tourism across the globe;
- in terms of *the ubiquitous illusory projections of tourism*, Foucauldian analysis could supposedly further the work of Edwards (1996) on how the representations of tourism so frequently essentialise and historicise the subjects of tourism *as natural objects*;
- in terms of *the closed fields of knowledge of tourism*, Foucauldian analysis could perceivably spread the work at Fjellman (1992) on the commodification of the appropriated narratives of history/geography/nature/etc., from contained sites like Walt Disney World to a host of other, 'open' the transnational sites and settings in local/national/international tourism;
- in terms of *the political apparatus of tourism*, Foucauldian analysis could hopefully catalyse Hall's (1996) writings on the norms and ideologies which conceivably underpin the policy platforms by which dominant groups act and regulate the social, economic and environmental world about them;
- in terms of *the rhetoric of tradition in tourism*, Foucauldian analysis could assumably refine de Burlo's (1966) insights on the power held within cultural text and esoteric societal-knowledge;
- in terms of *individual action in the management/administration of tourism*, Foucauldian analysis could perhaps enbroaden the study-lines of White and Kanahale (1989) on the internalisation of progressivist/developmentalist norms in tourism, and hopefully render them much more commonplace across tourism studies;
- in terms of *the invisible sites of mediated coercion*, Foucauldian analysis could thinkably enlarge the work of Harrison (1992) in developing the articulations which the modernising policies of tourism reflexively have with other marketplace settings of investment and development 'power' – to large and small regimes of activity in tourism in a host of other multinational scenarios;
- in terms of *transformative political events*, Foucauldian analysis could credibly extend Richter's (1994) work on the political resonance of mega-projects in tourisms to the critique of all manner of transformative 'happenings', transformative 'occasions', and transformative 'utterances' beyond the grand event;
- in terms of *the disjunctive temporalities of dominant/suppressed populations*, Foucauldian analysis could perceivably enrich Hollinshead's scrutiny on the performativity of culture by frequently distilling the latter's Bhabhian lines of synthesis into the dominance of historicist representations of peoples and places with Foucauldian interrogations of disjunctive/epistemic identification (Bhabba, 1994); and,

- in terms of *the creation/invention of 'totalised' objects*, could supposedly encourage the translation of the inquiry lines of Morris (1997) on 'natural' objects and 'precisely-defined' destinations to a litany of other sites of false-specification and false-precision in and of the *totalised* and *totalising* narratives of tourism.

Thus, while the extension of Foucauldian lines of inspection across tourism would not always be a completely fresh approach to matters of discursive power and disjunctive effect in tourism, the very depth, range and ubiquity of its investigative assault upon matters of dominance, subjugation and normalisation could conceivably be of multiplicative value and differentiative potency in and across tourism studies.

3. Urry: Tourism and its magisterial gazes

In his assessment of Urry's seven chapters, Leiper adopts a rather conservative interpretation of what Foucault (and thus, Urry) meant by *le regard*. Leiper evaluates things in terms of the clinical gaze *stricto sensu*, and perhaps under-appreciates the wider ramifications of ocularcentric thought and action as was stridently chronicled by Foucault during his 1970s and 1980s investigations of institutional regimes-of-truth. Leiper's understanding of and vocabulary for 'the visual' is therefore contained and reserved: the 'visual' in Foucault and Urry has much richer sensorium of sensitivities about power, right, and truth. This requires an understanding or interpretation of Urry's conceptualisation of 'The Gaze' and six broad analytical questions can be postulated. These are listed below, while each is accompanied by a short statement derived from Urry's (1992b) paper in the *American Behavioral Scientist* where he revisits the subject of the 'tourist gaze' – the purpose of which was to clarify the original meaning of the term in 1990.

(i) what is the fundamental nature of the tourist gaze?

The tourist gaze at various times and in various places is:

- that set of institutional ways-of-seeing in tourism;
- that highly visual nature of knowing peoples, places, and pasts;
- that highly revelatory way in which things are selectively identified and performatively represented in and through tourism;
- that largely unconscious force by which peoples, places, and pasts are labelled and classified through tourism; and
- that diverse mixed ways different contextual and interpersonal ways of understanding the world.

Clarification from Urry (1992b), pp.172;176: Today, the tourist gaze is a mix different scopic drives by which things of significance in history/culture/nature/experience are identified, signified, and totalised.

(ii) What do ‘gazers’ principally do in tourism and travel?

The tourist gazers are strongly inclined at various times and in various places to:

- satisfy their desires and seek pleasure in their travels;
- consume particular ‘things’;
- seek certain different, revered, or cherished ‘objects’ as identified by their own cultural understandings/ethnocentrism;
- appropriate the narratives or the realities about other people/other places/other pasts; and
- enjoy highly industrialised and highly commodified pursuits.

Clarification from Urry (1992b, p.174): Today, tourist ‘gazers’ tend to privilege ‘the eye’ over other senses as they see, understand, and appropriate desired things.

(iii) What do ‘gazers’ also commonly do in tourism and travel?

In addition, tourist gazes are inclined at various times and in various places to:

- be drawn towards selectively celebrated sites and sights;
- appreciate anti-auratic projections about anti-auratic things;
- welcome newly refabricated interpretation of being/identity/celebrity in the world;
- delight in newly refabricated interpretations of ‘the other’/‘the renewed’/‘the exotic’; and
- support representations in and of tourism which are highly signficatory.

Clarification from Urry (1992b, p. 178): Today, as they internalise various ocularcentric visions, many tourist ‘gazers’ only seek to go where there is appropriate scopic mapping and directive scopic signposting.

(iv) Why else is the tourist gaze important?

The tourist gaze is significant at various times and in various places because:

- it helps travellers/tourists more indulgently self-actualise;
- it helps make the world seem that much more ideal;
- it helps render the world that much more romantic;
- it helps make the world appear that much more illusory; and
- it helps conduct people to all manner of new ecstasies in their travels and enjoyments.

Clarification from Urry (1992b, p. 173): Today, it is the tourist gaze which principally endows the tourist experience with a ‘striking’, almost sacred importance.

(v) What are the consequences of the tourist gaze?

The tourist gaze is substantive in its capacity at various times and in various places to:

- transform people and places;
- universalise traits and tastes;
- democratise peoples and places;
- internationalise traits and tastes; and,
- creatively empower the vision of people of and about the world.

Clarification from Urry (1992b, p. 177): Today, a major consequence of the tourist gaze (i.e., of the mix of scopic drives) is that the presentation of peoples/places/pasts becomes increasingly contrived as many tourism, travel, and living experiences become irreducibly superficial.

(vi) what other features or tangential trends of the tourist gaze are significant?

The tourist gaze at various times and in various places is:

- increasingly ubiquitous;
- increasingly varied in its reach;
- increasingly interfused with other discourses and practices of and about life and being;
- increasingly aesthetic; and
- increasingly culturist, where ‘cultural’ interpretations are prone to taking precedence over supposedly ‘natural’ ones.

Clarification from Urry (1992b, pp. 176,184): Today, as an increasing range of places and spaces come under the normalising surveillance of the increasingly omnipotent tourist gaze, an ever-broadening range of sites and sights are exploited and constructed/reconstructed/deconstructed for mainstream consumption.

But what do these 30 elements or characterisations add up to collectively? What does Urry mean by the overall ocularcentrism of tourism?

In probing for the or an objectifying slant within *le regard* in and of tourism, Urry (1990, p. 1) seeks to elaborate “the process by which the gaze [itself] is constructed and reinforced [and he seeks to] consider who or what authorises it.” In this way he aims to uncover the way tourism practitioners *themselves* and tourists *themselves* help normalize some activities and behaviours and define others as bizarre or deviant. As noted Urry explains at the outset that there is no single gaze in tourism (Urry, 1990, p. 1) nor can there be just one, per se; he observes that much of the late growth in tourism stems from a rise in the significance to people of visual consumption, a judgement he has developed further, subsequently, elsewhere (Urry, 1992a, p. 9). He acknowledges that the tourist gaze or, rather, given gazes (plural) in tourism change substantively and longitudinally (1990, pp. 4, 100). He identifies the role or the anxieties of

particular social ‘classes’ or ‘groups’ in formulating the profile of *le regard* in tourism and travel (Urry, 1990, pp. 42, 92, 98, 99). He detects major invigorations to the character of the gaze through the democratisation of travel and through the internationalisation of tourism (Urry, 1990, pp. 16, 39, 48, 54, 82, 83). And he offers lucid and compact analyses of certain other writers on post-industrial tourism whose messages can be valuably utilised to punctuate the insights of Foucault such as Campbell on ‘imaginative hedonism’ and Feifer on ‘post-tourism’ to name but two (Urry, 1990, pp. 13, 100).

Of course, Urry’s treatise on the governmentalities of tourism is no blotless production. The nature of the gaze which has been interpreted above is never explicitly explained in any chapter, or even heavily coloured in anyway, by him in *The Tourist Gaze*. The subject of postmodernity tends to interfere in Urry’s analysis, sometimes dominating all other conceptualisations (Urry, 1990, pp. 82, 83, 120), yet at other times being sometimes mute and surprisingly absent from the evaluation of contemporary tourism and travel. And Hamilton-Smith (1992, pp. 257–258) has a strong point when he suggests that the 1990 Urry manuscript appears to consist of a set of virtually distinct essays rather than being a thoroughly followable and integrated whole.

Yet, overall, Urry *does* offer a challenging Foucauldian critique of tourism at the close of the twentieth century. He *does* open the rhetorical arrangements and the vision of community in and of tourism up to oxygenetic critique. He *does* proffer refreshing ways of understanding the affiliative and ideological consequences of constantly expanding travel of and from the Western metropolis and of comprehending what can be seen as the stultifying axiomata that he maintains is the mix of consciousness which drives the business, the administration of the business and industry of tourism. He *does* draw attention to the existence of tacit limitations upon what is sayable and what is doable in tourism through arbitrary or privileged marking of ‘significance’ and through the signposting of esteemed ‘subjects’ (Urry, 1990, pp. 9, 39, 47, 154). In such ways, Urry shows certain tourist gazes to be rather magisterial within travel and tourism, and he evinces a world shrinking under unbeknown modes and under scarcely suspected means of industry-led and tourist-horde-perpetuated surveillance. Hence, the outlook that Urry tenuously presents is that of a contemporary world increasingly traversed by the disciplining and constraining power of the gaze of urban-industrial expectancy, where an ever-widening range of cultural activities and leisure pursuits around the globe are significantly reordered through the taken-for-granted conformities of mass, packaged and brochured travel. Accordingly, one could read Foucauldian Urry as a prophet of the world now very much in part *in custody to tourism*. One could argue that the universalising surveillance (which Urry suggests inhabits the spread of urban-industrial travel) is

decidedly fascist in the force of its ethnocentric and essentialising sublimities and it is notably dangerous because it is so under-recognised and thereby so easily tolerated. There, quietly and implicitly, lies one’s Foucault in one’s Urry.

4. Foucault: the power of institutional truth

The writing of Michel Foucault are then of no small purpose for tourism and travel. It is, therefore, advisable to reflect a little more directly on the observations of the eminent Parisian politico-philosopher cum historico-philosopher. What did, in fact, Foucault address when he traced given institutional or disciplinary gazes? Why is his insight into professional consciousness and agency praxis so enigmatic and so provocative?

Foucault is one of the perplexing and slippery intellects of our time (Merquior, 1985, p. 13). His purview covered an astounding mix of issues and fields of social science, and “as he moves from one topic to another ... his methods and purposes seem to change. So there may not be a single or a fully intelligible ‘Foucault’ (Hoy, 1986, p. 2). The complexity of the Foucault intellect appears to derive partly from his multi-natured interests, and partly from his craft at noetic prevarication. “He wore masks and he was always changing them” (Georges Dumézil in Eribon, 1991, p. xi), and even his biographer, Eribon, refrained from the task of trying to reveal ‘the truth’ about Foucault: “Under one mask there is always another ... there are several Foucaults – a thousand Foucaults” (Damézil, 1991, p. xi). He summarises that understanding Foucault could thus be said to be like opening an oyster with a damp bus-ticket.

Foucault’s tendency to be obscure is accentuated over the years by the frequency which he stumbled across or sprinted towards new logics of discovery. He was at different times essentially but variously a psychologist, a philosopher, an historian, a political scientist, a sociologist, etc., (Braudel also cited in Eribon, 1991, p. 119). The commonality of his work is elusive, and that is something about which Foucault himself often tantalised. The preface to *Naissance de la Clinique*, one of his major works, published in 1963, commences with the sublime line: “The book is about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze” (Foucault, 1973, p. ix), something which Miller (1993) creatively interprets as Foucault’s desire to understand the ways in which the experiences of individuals are regulated by the preformulated limits which institutional truths, collective power-knowledge, and assumed communal rights quietly and cumulatively impose. And Foucault, an active homosexual, eager to explain how various forms of constraining ‘collective limits’ or limiting ‘communal judgements’ in sexuality as in all forms of *life, governance, and death* can be personally transcended (Miller, 1993, pp. 208–244,

319–353, 354–374), did not help matters by succumbing early at the age of 57 to what Eribon (1991, p. 316) calls the new agonizing plague of our era. And this sudden exit from the world was before the limit-transcending Foucault had really commenced the integrative/umbrella ‘history-of-the-present’ which he had always intended to produce to tease out his lifework ideas on life, governance, and death. This important master work upon the constraints on human experience was going to be called *Le pouvoir de la Verité* (The Power of Truth).

So, without *Le Pouvoir*, the world is left largely with Foucault’s ‘gaze’, “a foray into the unconscious realms of knowledge”, as Georges Canguilhem summarized in 1988 at the Paris colloquium held in memory of the political-philosopher, four years after that sudden aids-related death. In terms of organising ideas, the world is accordingly now left with Foucault’s adoption of Bentham’s (1791) Panopticon, the central guard-tower construction, from which prison wardens are able to *always* view the backlit activities of prisoners and its metaphorical adaptation to other or all forms of regulatory inspection in and of institutional agency life (Parker, 1989, p. 63). The world is thereby left with Foucault’s conceptualisation of the panopticon as the eye-of-power/the eye-of-authority/the new-power-of-universal-surveillance which inhabits each and every institutional setting.

But by Foucault’s account, the power that operated each discipline’s gaze is not merely metaphysical: it is an everyday-of-the-world matter of individual and collective human practice. So, for present purposes, let some of the critical elements of the gaze of institutions, of professions, of agencies be recalled. The following section now thereby provides a synthesis of some of Foucault’s key outlooks or constructions on how the eye-of-power reinforces itself within the talk and the deeds of respective daily institutional settings. Together, they yield a short, and critical, commentary upon Foucault’s eye-of-power (that is, of the authority of universal surveillance). The selected Foucauldian constructions are the following:

4.1. *The power-knowledge dyad!*

Power, as such, does not exist in an isolatable sense according to Foucault. It is not the fixed power of objects, but a power of meaning(s) in circulation within talk and action which counts. What mattered to Foucault’s is the nominalistic relationship between knowledge and power, two twin-concepts which Foucault considered to be indistinguishable (Hoy, 1986, p. 129). In this sense, the power behind a found gaze is the very social cohesiveness which stands behind the gazing discipline, the gazing institution, or the gazing agency. That ‘power’ is seen by Foucault to be the unspoken warfare which is waged silently and secretly through the language and the actions of that body’s everyday routine and seemingly unspec-

tacular enactments (Merquior, 1985, pp. 110–111). Hence, the power of the gaze is not a distinct resource, or something akin to what two opponents fight with at battle at a given place or moment, it is more like the relations ‘government’ expansively engaging in to structure the field of play on which all participants take part for a given human field of concern or endeavour:

Power in a game of chess is [according to Foucault, not exercised] by one piece over another at the moment of capture. On Foucault’s model, the capture is indeed a ‘micro-power’, but it is also the effect of the overall arrangement of the pieces at the time *as well as* of the strategy leading up to and including the capture (Hoy 1986, p. 135).

4.2. *Unfreedom and carceral society*

To Foucault, the knowledge-power dyad which circulates through the gaze is a force which generates unfreedom. It is the fashion in which a society is a whole shaped by an invisible hand (rather than the fashion of rule by which a distinguishable accountable/legitimate/rational state law is enacted). It is seen by Foucault to be governance by systems of thought, where the gazer at any scene or setting owns reason, and where the gazed upon endure reciprocal unreason. Under such common and everyday conditions of unfreedom, the society of the institution/discipline/agency/culture becomes carceral (Walzer, 1986, p. 59), and it comprises a setting or a world where madness is always an *Other* behaviour, but where no one is really free, even the gazer is subject to the limiting unfreedoms of the gaze he/she is helping impose. Hence, contemporary people are born into a myriad of regulations, and into a mire of meticulous rules and fussy inspections as the supervisory force of the gaze is contextualised within the smallest fragments of detailed life within “the schools, the barracks, the hospital or the workshop” (Foucault, 1977, p. 169), and conceivably also within the tourist attractions and travel programmes of that society.

4.3. *Normalisation and ‘Homo Docilis’*

The knowledge–power dyad of the gaze is fundamentally a social phenomenon or rather, a social noumenon. It is a feature embedded in the social growth of, and human agency within, institutions. It helps constitute the social process of normalisation which occurs within and across each society or sub-society, whereby people are regularly chided and quietly chided into being ‘normal’ in contrast to being ‘abnormal’, ‘delinquent’ or ‘deviant’ persons (Hoy, 1986, p. 12). This revolt against the generally smalltime but solid conformisms of the gaze, was an uncovering by Foucault of the systems of ordered procedures which exist within the production of

'language' and through the regulation and distribution of 'statements' about the things which are important in that domain. The creation of language and the fabrication of statements, under the gaze of Foucauldian institutions, agencies and communities, is what comprises the everyday manufacture of disciplinary truth, within those institutions where truth is not some neutral super-human abstraction, but is an active, lively thing of this world (Foucault, 1980, p. 131; Walzer, 1986, p. 64). Hence, under the power of surveillance, the production of language and the distribution of statements within the school, the barracks, the hospital, the workshop (and within the tourist attraction or travel programme!) is part of the micro-fascism of daily life within each given institutional setting. It is a power which is not manufactured globally, but it become a form of dominance which is manifested locally and immediately as a mundane but permeating form of 'micro-power' (Foucault, 1980). And through such truth-production, unreason becomes a social object of customary and profane excommunication by which those who are believed to be 'inadequate' are ostracised or 'silenced' by the so-called/self-confirming 'adequate' (Foucault, 1972, pp. 177–119). Through this anonymous yet cumulatively comprehensive social character of truth-production, the institutionalised person cum disciplinary member is gradually generalised into becoming *homo docilis*, an obedient, conscience-ridden, pliable, and 'appropriate' representative of that agency, that social setting, or that domain, and thereby a useful, rational and efficient moulded citizen as seen in that institution's or that discipline's terms.

4.4. Panoptic authority

The gaze may develop, as Foucault informs us, in any institutional arena or field of relations (Walzer, 1986, p. 56). Panopticism thrives where there are opportunities for the practice of constant surveillance of individuals (Foucault, 1980, pp. 104, 105, 151). Each arena, each loci, each setting develops or defines its own system of truth by which "people are measured, classed [and] examined in various ways, and thus [are] made the better subject [in terms of the given acts of normalisation]" (Taylor, 1986, p. 74). In such respective arenas, particular disciplinary mechanisms reinforce each other over time to ultimately incarcerate not only 'the condemned captives' as *victims* but also 'the condemning victimisers' as *victims* as well (Walzer, 1986, p. 60). As such, those loci become quietly and gradually intolerable (Eribon, 1991, p. 224) and the eye of authority within given arenas becomes even more virulent when it becomes highly articulated with, and mutually reinforcing with, the surveillance of the neighbouring surveillances of proximal domains. Thus, incarceration can become cellular across society, where the normalisations of arena network with the like normalisations of other reflective arena.

4.5. Self-regulating agents-of-normalisation

The technologies of power which comprise particular gazes consist of multiple processes, plural languages, and diverse practices of domination and constraint (Smart, 1986, p. 162). Truth statements, and thereby the eye of power, are transmitted through the particular apparatus common to that arena under surveillance, and the given form of panopticism becomes internalized and self-regulating via the sensation (experienced by both *victim-victims* and *victimising-victims*) which always lie in the target of the operating gaze (Jay, 1986, p. 192). In this sense, it scarcely matters which people in fact operate the eye-of-authority/the-apparatus-of-surveillance. Foucault (1988/1977) clarifies that almost any individual can unconsciously operate these ocular-centric mechanisms. Hence any participant institution member can unwittingly drive the panoptic machine of the domain in question. The gaze almost may be said to have its own ahuman agency, as *its* agents become self-regulating.

5. Foucault's macro-messages on the governmentality of things: and the grammar of utterances (within institutions)

Foucault's discernment on the gaze is part and parcel of the anti-visual paradigm of late French social thought (Poster, 1984), and Foucault himself is indebted to Bachelard, Canguilhem and others who had earlier explored the function of *vision* per se, as the very archetype for cognition in Western intellect (Jay, 1986, pp. 181, 182, 198). But it is Foucault who first locates temporally and spatially so much of the oppressive practices and the conformist languages of contemporary institutions in and of 20th century society. It is Foucault who pointedly identifies the conceivably insidious and participatory character of the discursive and nondiscursive practices which make up the *eye-of-power*. It is Foucault who anatomises the sustaining presence of the gaze of past visions and of past thought within the contemporary institutions of each succeeding epoch.

To Foucault, then, the gaze is a grammar of utterances and a scaffolding of behaviours passively but also actively cultivating within a particular agency and across a particular society overtime, or otherwise within an era. To him. Reality is no transparent, totally visible, or graphic sensation: it is local and customary knowledge which is powerfully driven by human agents-of-normalcy, but which also powerfully drives them via ahuman abstract imperatives. And the consequence of the structuring presence of such a gaze in, over, and through tourism is the possible development of tourism as its own juridical space, and thereby also the generation of distinct and/or networked subsidiary juridical spaces within tourism.

Thus by introducing Foucault's concept of surveillance into tourism, Urry does not so much enable or encourage 'host' or 'foreign' populations to be studied, but he enables and encourages tourism administrators, tourism managers and tourism 'professionals' to be studied almost as if they were a foreign population acting with the domain of tourism. He thereby advocates, for all of us in tourism (as in other domains), that we should undertake exploration not to *distant* lands, but to *proximate* (but as yet unsuspected) *mental territories*. And Foucault with Urry as an echo of and for him in tourism studies teaches that so-called 'savages' are not solely foreigners to be visited in far continents, they are so frequently us, ourselves, our eager normalising-selves. We are all capable of being involved in the unsuspected privilegedging of our own cherished doxa, and coterminously only in the violence and the savagery of the subjugation of other alternative/competing/alien cultural warrants which we quietly engage in and through our tourism and travel operations. Where different populations may not otherwise, be savage, *they may be made to seem savage* through tourism by the mundane surveillances of ourselves acting as orthodox tourists and serving as mainstreaming tour-planners. Such representations, Urry implicitly warns, are conceivably the modalities of power and of the exclusionary forces of held knowledges within the everyday and conventional disciplinary business of tourism management/ development/research: we all 'utter'.

Interestingly, Foucault's apparently idiosyncratic work on the grammar of utterances has been deemed to offer prodigious and original advances to structuralism, to semiotics, to poststructuralism, and to postmodernism, yet it is not necessarily structuralist, semiotic, poststructural or postmodern in or of itself (Jay, 1986, p. 175). If Foucault's oeuvre on the governmentality of things through discourse and praxis is anything (apart from being Foucauldian!), it is a Nietzschean study of the present. For instance, Foucault (1961) announced that his text *Folie et Déraison* had indeed been lit by "the great sun of a Nietzschean search" (Eribon, 1991, p. 323), a search for the endless interpretability of things, not for the power truth of any single thing.

6. Foucault macro-messages on the governmentality of things

So what are some of the broader Foucauldian/Nietzschean understandings which emanate from the mass of Foucault's thinking on the power-knowledge of domains and the governmentality of fields of relations? Five lessons appear relevant for the current context and the translation of his ideas to the administration and development of tourism studies.

6.1. The genealogy of the discourse of institutions

Foucault claims to have always been working towards a study of human experience, *ipso facto*, and Dreyfus and Rainbow (1982, pp. 85–103) suggest his overall yet unfinished work may be interpreted as an elaboration of the way human beings constitute themselves as subjects and how they treat and essentialise one another as objects. Thus Foucault's (1966) first possible lesson for tourism and for other social sciences, is that *human experience and social existence readily follow discursive knowledge*. To map that essential communal and political human experience, it is critical that more investigators in tourism studies follow Buck (1993) and chronicle the history of constantly shifting forms of morality, judgement and repression in the management and development of tourism – and therefore study the obstinacies and the silences in societies as well as the dominant constructions (Eribon, 1991, pp. 93–4). Thus, in tourism, what do we repeatedly and systematically privilege in tourism representations, and what do we respectfully and systematically deny and frustrate?

6.2. The non-human agency of power-in-circulation

Foucault's second macro-message concerns his extension of the premise of Marx that power is not reducible to individual's intentions (Hoy, 1986, p. 127), and of Lukes that the character and profile of power is frequently repressed: "*both the dominating group and the dominated may be unconscious of the [ongoing] exercise of power*" (Foucault, 1966, pp. 125–6). Since power circulates within the given body/collective/institution it may not be possessed and retained by particular individuals therein, but it may be accessed from innumerable points in the given circulatory regime-of-truth which many individuals participate in (Foucault, 1984, p. 94). As power travels within and across an institution enwrapped with knowledge, it composes a "gigantic moral imprisonment" of both the subjugated (i.e., those supposedly receiving the power in circulation) and the dominating (i.e., those supposedly wielding the power in circulation). The discourse and the praxis of both are controlled and mastered by this very power-knowledge dyad. Thus, in tourism, are there indeed any received constructions of and about culture, history, nature which are unconsciously used to regulate administered populations, and are there any such constructions which significantly and unconsciously curtail the thinking and the actions of those administrators/planners/developers? Lanfant (1995a, b) indeed calls for such multidimensional and longitudinal inspections: but do they readily exist anywhere yet?

6.3. *The precarious nature of all knowledge-power*

Foucault's third umbrella lesson for the social and human sciences concerns his mapping of the incommensurable systems of the way different institutions order or conceptualise things, not only as distinct from other agencies or societies but differentially within the single agency or society over time. *Within said institutions, the contemplation of things is rarely permanent*: discourse (what people in a given setting say) and praxis (what people in a given setting do) are each "precarious ensembles" (Merquior, 1985, p. 77). The way human subjects conceive of reality (and condition the world they live in) through their talk and their deeds is not given to permanence. Thus, in tourism, what are the new understandings of and about the environment, ethnicity, or 'other' populations which have newly and perhaps unsuspectingly been incorporated into administrative policy or into developmental action and what impulse brought about that change of regard? In these respects, Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) are beginning to build up an impressive research agenda into the ways in which the artefacts, symbols, and associations of the past are adroitly used as heritage commodity, or rather as a legitimating resource, to serve the contemporary needs of populations in power, and they regularly ask the question: *whose heritage is being interpreted by whom and for what purpose?* Certainly their work on the dissonance of heritage interpretations in tourism is a very valuable assault on 'interpretation' in and of tourism as a resource in conflict, but their work on such 'power-knowledge' articulations was only just beginning to take theoretical shape in the mid to late 1990s.

6.4. *The dynamic character of victim-making*

The fourth broad message from Foucault's oeuvre concerns his recognition that the Western model of civic humanism has changed. As new relationships of knowledge-power enmesh to evolve their own coherencies and equilibria, and as they emerge into living systems of cultural, political, or administrative exclusion, they constitute a new model of social life *based no longer on inherited ties of sovereignty/obedience, but on the emanative and reflective impulse of domination/subjugation that is carried by and within the governing invitation*. This evolving civic humanism "cannot be put in terms of who is giving orders to whom" (Taylor, 1986, p. 101): knowledge/power linked to domination/subjugation does not require a demarcated perpetrator or an acting agent, it only requires a receiving victim. Thus, in tourism, what are the dynamic new ideas which are driving the explosive development or the controlled planning of a region? In the ecological concerns of tourism, for instance, has the outlook on sustainability changed from that which privileges some sort of economic rationality to that

which advances some sort of cultural logic. If so, who are the new receiving and administering victims of those new (and unsuspected?) policy thrusts (Dimanche & Smith, 1996)?

6.5. *The agonistics of self-discipline*

The final expansive lesson from a reading of Foucault *in toto* lies with his assessment that when people of the contemporary age constitute or identify themselves, they are simultaneously entrapped as the subject and the object of their own understanding (and of their own praxis) (Eribon, 1991, p. 154). Accordingly, people may live within a 'biopower' specific to their time (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986, p. 116), a form of anatomic-politics of the collective human body in and around the given institution at that time and a disciplinary force administered by and over it (Smart, 1986, p. 161). That state of unfreedom is not deemed to be antagonistic or opposite to freedom, it is agonistic, or rather, is reciprocal, to and with freedom. In that fashion, *biopower reflexively incites, and it permanently provokes* (Hoy, 1986, p. 139). Hence, in tourism, are there any difficult psychic states in which populations are restlessly caught? How, for instance, is the given indigenous community handling the agonistics of its current development (spurred on by tourism) and its welcome appreciation of the new accessibility of consumer goods for all of its population, yet also its coterminous loss of appreciation of sacred/spiritual 'things' by its youthful population? Using the instrumentation of deconstruction, Mason (1990) has recently endeavoured to map what thinkably are the agonistics of 'othered' populations in the Americas as perceived constructions of America within an ongoing European representative monologue, but his description of the personal and societal agonistics of othering plainly belongs within the literature of cultural studies. Tourism studies has not yet thrown up anyone seemingly keen and able to comprehensively inspect the 'biopower' configuration or the self-disciplinary profiles of the encounter with the other in tourism: tourism studies still needs its full-time inspectors of the monologues of cultural representation, and its full-time analysts of what Karp (cited on back-cover of Mason, 1993) called 'the anthropologist of the imaginary'.

7. **Surveillance in and of the world of tourism**

Such insights from Foucault can be of huge instructional value to practitioners in the travel-trade and to researchers in and of tourism. Five important panoptic implications perhaps warrant further explanation.

Firstly, a reading of Foucauldian thought can alert participants in travel provision and tourism management to the kinds of self-deceptive regimes-of-truth they may

be caught within, as Hollinshead (1992) endeavoured to highlight in terms of the way the tourism decision-makers unwittingly imprison 'First Americans'/'Native Americans' in a debilitating 'Red' and 'Indian' identification. Hollinshead's critique was an effort to help practitioners and researchers to comprehend how their own discourse can subsequently organise or curtail life opportunities for the tourist-receiving people, and how their vogue discursive knowledge can rapidly penetrate tourism trade publications, local exhibitions and local media interpretations and thus through embedded ethnocentrism subjugate people, places and pasts through travel. An acquaintance with Foucauldian ideas on knowledge and power can therefore, hopefully help practitioners and researchers cultivate *rappport à soi* (Davidson, 1986, p. 228) where they become alert to the forms of consciousness and historical *a priori* which determine what they themselves recognise as a useable 'tourist attraction'. Thus, in tourism, Foucauldian thought can help practitioners and researchers become vigilant to the fact that their own actions are not as 'neutral' and as aximatically equitable as they may have assumed, and that they are indeed themselves working to entrenched *a priori* understandings in or of cultural, environmental matters, and preformulated understandings about the religion or the spirituality of a distant interpreted population.

7.1. Identifying the silent 'others' in tourism

Secondly, the translation of Foucauldian politico-philosophy into the tourism literature can help develop a critical ontology of and about the industry around them, and of the empowering or debilitating experiences it generates, though the very gain of understanding about 'power at play' within tourism may itself be a difficult conceptual and internal 'power struggle'. Nonetheless, a value of Foucault's insight is that, once internalized, it tends to inspire a continuing regard for the practice of public, institutional, and self criticism; the cultivation, thereby, of ongoing vigilance over and towards the discourse that is contained within company promotions which are embedded within marketplace collective activity in the tourism sector. Such ongoing vigilance can lead practitioners and researchers to recognise the need to discover resistant/alternative/background storylines for given destination, given sectors styles of management cultures and for the given developmental strategies with which they are concerned. Consequently, the rights of host populations are more likely to be identified and respected over time, and the plural or competing interpretations of inheritances ultimately 'known' at particular locales. Tourist-guides and brochure-writers will (hopefully) learn that in each and every setting there will be an *impensé*, an unthought, which "falls outside of [an agency's/a person's] self-representation at that given

point in knowledge" (Merquior, 1985, p. 55), but which maybe strongly regulating cultural of human opportunity.

Gradually, in Dann's (1996, pp. 4–6) view, tourism researchers are in fact becoming ware of *industrial governmentality*, and even the Foucauldian forms of violence that are committed to, on, or over people and things through the very language of tourism they uphold and participate in. Although he does not specifically acknowledge the work of Foucault on knowledge-power, Dann begins to take a quasi-Foucauldian line in his important analysis of the way the use of various languages in and of tourism regulate people and things. To Dann, the key for tourism researchers is to know how mainstream narratives or how particular styles of language are used in tourism to subjugate or silence that which is not privileged in tourism industry promotions and presentations. The problem, however, is that Dann's creative inspection of *greenspeak* (eco-tourism 'talk'), of *gastrolingo* ('talk' about food and drink) of *spasprech* (health tourism, 'talk'), and of *ol'talk* ('talk' on or of nostalgia) only begins to scratch the surface of this massive and inventive industrial representation of peoples, places and pasts. In tourism studies, we need even more comprehensive registers of the governmentality of the discourse and rhetoric of tourism (i.e., the talk), and of the governmentality of action and praxis (i.e., the deeds).

7.2. Understanding the contextuality of competing logics of power in tourism

Third, a merit of the stronger regard for Foucauldian analysis in tourism is that storytellers and storyfinders in travel may more keenly learn to appreciate the logic of the plural and contested contexts in which single destinations may exist, and in which receiving and travelling populations intersubjectively inhabit. The Foucauldian concept of power-knowledge not only opens up the comprehension of what sorts of 'power'/'authority'/'testimony' may circulate within or across a 'host' or 'other' population, but how vibrant those 'powers' may actually be. In Third World environments, tourism decision-makers may then be more considerate to those difficult-but-unsuspected contexts and those troublesome-but-under compromised settings where First World/Western regimes-of-truth may likely collide with local/non-industrial economies of truth in and through tourism (Shames & Glover, 1989). The problem, according to Lanfant is that tourism researchers are generally not very experienced in investigating how the local interacts with the global in tourism, and few tourism researchers have the longitudinal remit in time or the geographical purview to be able to explore the processes by which local knowledge, beliefs, and narratives mirror, are reflexive with, or are transitive with international forms of discourse. For Lanfant and her fellow researchers at the

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris, the fundamental weakness of current tourism research is that tourism is itself axiomatically assumed to only occur *within a given society* (Lanfant, 1995a, p. 1), and the power dynamics which lie outside, i.e., amongst the globalisations and the internalizations of exchange are missed. Thus Lanfant suggests that the forces of tourism are too readily and restrictively assumed to be exogenous ones, and tourism researchers all-too-commonly privilege the unidirectional ‘impacts’ which a locality is believed by them to suffer. To Lanfant, the bi-directionality (even the multi-directionality) by which talk and deed act in tourism is vitally underappreciated. When she calls for much more widespread analysis of “the multiplicity of [repressing, marginalizing and neutralizing] processes” (Lanfant, 1995a, p. 6) which affect the local character of a tourist place, her demand is tantamount to a Foucauldian call for the study of knowledge-power *in capillary circulation* to and from places rather than as unidirectional force acting on that place.

7.3. *Appreciating the quiet power of text in tourism*

Fourth, Foucauldian colour in the literature of tourism would potentially help interpreters of places and populations appreciate the internal economy of the rationality of their discourse. As such, more packagers, programmers and planners in the travel-trade might ponder Foucault’s judgement that there are no deep ‘perceptual logics’ and no ultra-permanent truths within any society on the globe (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986, p. 112). Ultimately, it may be mutually healthier for interpretations of pasts and of explanations sites to be projected as *fields-of-possibility* rather than being seen as ‘perfect’ or ‘authoritative’ accounts of these inheritances. As Derrida, Barthes, Hayden White and other interpretivists of various hues have proffered (along with Foucault) in recent decades, interpretations are pre-built into and within texts rather than being the sum total of found facts: again, and as applied to tourism “the way people talk can [actually] ‘create objects’”. From Foucault (and other continental philosophers), then, has come a late 20th century reinforcement of Nietzsche’s late 19th century realisation that the interpretation of anything is always an infinite and non-completable task (cited in Merquior, 1986, p. 74). Poignantly, to Foucault, the death of interpretation paradoxically occurs with the observer’s or analyst’s belief that there is indeed going to be something concrete *there* findable or viewable in the text, a hidden essence to be discovered and explained, at the culmination of the interpretative ‘voyage’ towards knowing something (cited in Merquior, 1986, p. 74).

At last the field of tourism is beginning to take these misty matters of textual interpretation a little more seriously. Not only did the year of 1996 give Dann’s “The Language of Tourism ...” but it also preferred Tun-

bridge and Ashworth’s “Dissonant Heritage ...”, a study of the myriad fashions by which the interpreted past is increasingly being restyled as heritage commodity to serve contemporary ideological, or business interests. In their analysis of the uses of heritage as a cultural, political, or economic resource, Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, p. ix) explore the ways in which the very interpretations of history and heritage indeed advantage some and inevitably disinherit others, and their probing of the consequences of dispossessed history in the semiology of place is particularly insightful. While Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, p. 15) do draw occasionally upon other French litero-philosophers like Barthes and Lyotard, they do not expressly follow Foucault. Yet at its broadest level, their inspections of the everyday ‘ideological semiotics’ of heritage is very much a Foucauldian-style inspection of the ways in which “tangible physical heritage can [be interpreted and packaged] to wield enormous power, and can be harnessed to social, cultural and political forces of enormous constructive or destructive potential” (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996, p. 32).

7.4. *Comprehending the critical infinity of interpretation in tourism*

Finally, the value of the place of further Foucauldian influence in the literature of tourism might help soften explanations in tourism research of events in the world. To Foucault (as for Nietzsche earlier), there is nothing real in the human/social world, so theories themselves cannot be ‘real’ (Hoy, 1985, p. 5): that is, there is nothing pure and absolutely knowable to be contemplated, anywhere, nor has these ever been (Rorty, 1986, p. 47). Thereby Foucault does not try to offer general, ‘total’ or ‘absolute’ explanatory theories on the governance of things, but only puts forward ‘possible’ interpretative analysis (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1989, pp. 114, 115).

Similarly, Foucault shrinks from providing solutions for the way individuals and/or agencies should act to solve problems of dominance/subjugation in any found setting. He has no global solutions for knowledge/power injustices (Hoy, 1986, p. 145) and his strict anti-Utopian outlook on power/knowledge/truth denies the plausibility of conclusive responses to socio-political queries or to contemporary question (Merquior, 1985, p. 155). He once claimed to be a maladroit forecaster of the past (sic!), and just a neophyte with regard to the future (Eribon, 1991, p. 288). If tourism practitioners and researchers could follow in Foucault’s suit in this respect, such reticence on and about power-knowledge and truth may help tourism researchers not so much towards humility, but towards the cultivation of an acuity about things which refuse to concretely or singularly fix said phenomenon in and of the world. Such would be an important philosophical and practical step towards the appreciation of the relative rights and perspectives of populations.

And such styles of possible or projective interpretive analysis are gradually emerging in tourism studies, and not only through the work of Urry. In examining the fashions in which Walt Disney World quietly tames its visitors through the skilled cultivation of pleasure and desire, Fjellman (1992, pp. 4–5) has begun to show how “the commodity form has increasingly taken over our dignity ... [as] ... one’s energy is directed towards fulfilment as a consumer.” Thus under Fjellman’s interpretation of all manner of objects, practices, and management actions at Walt Disney World, the Disney Corporation is found to regulate its visitors by presenting them with “a massive rush of disconnected [and deinterpreted or reinterpreted] commodities” (Fjellman, 1992, p. 6). Thus commodity-satisfying entertainment has become not only the power by which people self-police themselves, but it has become *the* current form of almost all public discourse as it was decontextualised, destroyed, or denied the possibility of other/alternative/different discourses to things. And Selwyn concurs with Fjellman about the power of desire in the imperatives of contemporary tourism. For Selwyn (1996, pp. 1, 12), the tourist is not so much someone who chooses self-deluding entertainment, but one who chooses or desires self-affirming myth. What needs to be comprehensively studied is the large and small ways in which the tourism system (through the clever invention of deployment of enticing and fabricated myths about culture, nature, and place) manufactures those mythical fantasies, and thereby produces relationships of politico-economic and cultural dependence even while the very possibility of other/alternative/different interpretations of things is cleverly decontextualised, destroyed or denied.

To both Fjellman and Selwyn, culture and the commodity form have become reciprocally interwoven through the inventive rhetorical metastories (for Fjellman) or the reformulated authenticities (for Selwyn) in and of tourism. And, at the general level, both are emergent Foucauldian-style accounts of the role of tourism in recontextualising the inheritances of other-situated peoples and/or of annihilating non-mainstream constructions of places, where anything at all (culture, nature, history, etc.) may become an industry-institutionalised weapon to legitimate or to justify some company’s or some agency’s restrictive and self-seeking outlook on the world. In tourism studies, we need more such explanations of the Foucauldian role and function of tourism in terms of what Berger and Luckman (1996) would call *universe maintenance*. To Fjellman (1992, p. 33), the effort to map the progress of the play of narrative against counternarrative is part and parcel of the cardinal need to the monitor “the charming insidiousness” of decontextualising and recontextualising tourism. And in like regard, to Selwyn (1996, p. 2, after MacCannell (1992)), what is required in tourism studies is the capacity to monitor “the subordination of local people to [all sorts of

inveigled myth making projects in and of tourism] which seemingly depend upon the mythical *reconstitution or reconstruction* of those senses of tradition which have uprooted by the processes of ‘globalisation’ and homogenisation in and of cultures.” Thus it is the seemingly almost absolute triumph of knowledge-generating and power-producing consumerism in circulation within the normalising agencies of tourism which must be thoroughly gauged if tourism studies analysts are collectively to get a meaningful grip on how so much of the travel and the domestic world is fast becoming commodified and its identities refabricated through pernicious vogue storylines and cleverly managed representations of tourism.

8. Recap of surveillance: A critical reflection on Foucault and the will-to-power of institutions

To sum up Foucault’s contribution to human and social sciences, a comment of Habermas (1987, p. 103) warrants re-play: “... what impressed me [about Foucault was] the tension between the almost serene scientific reserve of the scholar striving for objectivity on the one hand, and, on the other, the political vitality of the vulnerable, subjective, excitable, morally sensitive intellectual.” The elusive Foucault is thus not easily categorised.

To some, his illuminative logic will always be literature rather than philosophy (Eribon, 1981, p. 313), and his work will always be ungrounded (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1986, p. 113), without historical accuracy, methodological rigour or political effect (Smart, 1986, p. 166): hence, to such observers, Foucault will always be the *terrible simplificateur* (Taylor, 1986, p. 82). Drawing from the observations of Merquior (1985), Hollinshead (1993, p. 270) has highlighted a number of limitations in Foucauldian thought on the governmentality of things, especially with regard to those shortfalls of critique and interpretation which apply to Foucault’s delineation of epistemes within his archaeological lives of analysis. The Merquior/Hollinshead weaknesses of Foucault’s overemphasis on the power of normalisation, allied to his over-victimisation of compliant humans, is reproduced here as Table 2. Elsewhere, Simons (1995) provides a candid assessment of Foucault’s political thought and his call for transgressive practices of the self in aesthetics, politics, and daily action, and he repeatedly call Foucault to task for, for instance:

- trying to stand neutrally and nowhere in his critiques of history, politics, and institutional action (Simons, 1995, p. 61);
- being blind to the truths he himself writes to and within (1995, pp. 45; 62);
- offering no vision of a better future for the governance of things (1995, pp. 50; 64);

Table 2

Weaknesses in Foucault's historical philosophy – as is particularly revealed in his early (i.e., his 'archaeological') reasoning

Seven delimiting aspects of Foucault's philosophical prose

- Foucault's presentation of epistemes is inclined to be *monolithic* – he over-emphasizes the fit or place of single epistemes within any given age;
- Foucault's heavy reliance upon unconnected monolithic episteme leads to the neglect of *trapezistemic* thought and knowledge-lines – he fails to recognize that some consciousness and some conceptualizations are multi-rooted;
- Foucault's insistence that epistemes come and go all of a sudden overlooks the *epistemic lags* that commonly occur with streams of thought – epistemes may be expected to have natural 'pioneers' and natural 'diehards' who extend the life-course of thought-lines;
- Foucault's tight explanation of epistemes fails to respect theories and knowledge which *return to conceptual popularity* after periods of disfavor – or which undulate in conceptual appeal over time;
- Foucault's neat search for patterns of understanding for, or within, given ages becomes (perhaps) a search for epistemes, per se – it is inclined to *overstress the force and acceptance* of some streams of thought and to raise them to the level of "needed" epistemes;
- Foucault's resultant search for ordered/understandable/communicable epistemes also generates *intraepistemic* problems – he tends to under-account for collapses or splinter effects with epistemes;
- Foucault's resultant quest for solid/integrated/distinct epistemes is inclined to overlook the existence of *intraepistemic breaks* – he accentuates the discontinuities between epistemes, but under-profiles those within epistemes.

Source: Hollinshead (1993, p. 270), drawing from Merquior (1985, pp. 56–75).

- failing to account for the sheer range of different practices by which people are variously subjugated today (1995, p. 83);
- being unappreciative of the various capacities of resistance and perduring counteraction which are commonly open to certain oppressed groups (1995, pp. 83; 91);
- saying next to nothing about the seductive and monstrous power of the marketplace on human relations, per se (1995, p. 40); and for,
- remaining rather gender blind (1995, p. 106).

To others, however, Foucault is *the* intellectual of systems of thought, a passionate interrogator of grounded subjects and received wisdoms, an opponent of cloudy notions of unitary reason and fixed Cartesian realities and the identifier of modernity not as "a specific historical event but [as] a historical conjuncture which has happened several times in ... history" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986, p. 117).

But Foucault does not have to be this or that to be useful: he does not *have* to be 'right' on or about anything to have critical value. In fact, no critical philosopher does! In tourism, then, the merit of Foucault largely comes with his constant and everyday questioning of the kind of universal truths and of the terminal Western rationalities by which one may assume the Western-borne tourism industry quietly and after inexpectantly advances. It is the Western perspective that accordingly dominates by labelling the non-Western as 'Other' and thereby inherently inferior, and it is the Western perspective (quietly and tacitly re-conveyed through travel and tourism) that dominates again by stimulating and then facilitating in situ gazing of those who have been so labelled 'Other'. By Foucault's (1988/1977) reckoning, this is a double subjugation of local non-Western peoples; the Western industry condemns them, and then it also coerces them. Thus, cultivated appreciation of

Foucault's interpretative analytic can conceivably help decision-makers in travel and tourism self-consciously measure the need in and across the industry for reins to be applied on the continuing spread of Western and other forms of a *priori* reasoning across the globe through the vehicle of travel and tourism.

Foucault, then, is a lead figure in that rich vein of recent French social theorists who have probed how people in all sorts of applied settings have socially and collectively constructed their science, formed their objects, and manufactured their selves. The philosophical, scientific, institutional, political, economic, and industrial forms of truth he interrogates at both the structural and at the vernacular levels clarifies the view that there is no single order for human life to which we all have or ought to submit, there is no neutral human nature which can be harnessed to judge or weigh up all of the contrasting/competing ways of life: "there are only different orders imposed by men [sic!] on primal chaos, following their will-to-power" (Taylor, 1986, p. 93). The world that Foucault spies, therefore, is a strange one not grounded or energised by individual human action, but one established and realised by collective and resolutely *foreconscious* will. To Foucault, individual human agency is only the conduit of the knowledge-power that each imperious 'will' has available to it, in tourism and travel, or in any sphere of economic, political or cultural interest.

9. Endnote of governmentality in and of tourism: 'Practique de soi' in the surveillance of the world

So, how much of these Foucauldian insights does Urry kindle for us? When Urry (1990, p. 156) writes on the spectacle-isation of place, he keenly prys over the mechanisms of power in tourism and travel with a fine sense of infra-red Foucauldian vision, even if Urry is not always explicit and indubitable about the Foucauldian character

of his analysis at each and every instance of it. Urry helps us see the discipline of will-to-power at work in tourism in the van of the industry's twentieth century global boosterism. In analysing the understandings and the privileges which regulate the management and development of tourism, he helps us up onto Foucault's high shoulders to peek towards future worlds which Foucault himself had glimpsed (Rorty, 1986, p. 48), a new and helpful panorama of cultures and societies where each have their own tectonic inheritances and their mutually valued differences, but where of course there will be no single, central eschatology, just the continual play of difference against difference, and worldview against worldview, but a world where no single group will ever be able to rule the panoptic roost indefinitely.

In this sense, the tourism activities and the travel experiences which Urry writes about tend to disappear before one's eyes, like all subjects do (or tend to do!) in Foucauldian thought. And *tourism* itself becomes so connected to everyday life that it softens, fogs, and loses its own distinctiveness as a subject. What Urry presents is the connectedness of tourism and travel as a vehicle for (largely) industro-urban intrigue and late-capitalist display. Tourism is offered to us, by Urry, as an interfusive part of the menu of art, science, aesthetics and life which we have before us today. His coverage of the institutions and technologies which are providing that menu of 'difference', 'identity', and 'experience' being peddled through the domain of tourism and elsewhere indeed relegates human agency, in fine (if at times implicit rather than manifest) sympathy with Nietzschean Foucault. To Urry, it is more the discourse and practices of those institutions and technologies which entangle us, than it is the whim and choice of individual managers and individual companies. In this way, Urry (1990, pp. 84, 85), borrowing heavily from Lash (his Lancaster campus colleague), problematises the realities of travel and tourism, as he probes the mechanisms of domination and suppression which are quietly and unsuspectingly at work in broadcasting preferred 'tourist site' realities (1990, p. 88) and in reshaping the very urban and rural landscapes which locals want to celebrate, and to which tourists are coaxed (1990, p. 135).

The history of tourism and travel which Urry wanders through, then, is not an authoritative history of tourism in its own right, but it is a larger Foucauldian history of the social, moral and imaginary contexts in which tourism has thrived amongst other aspects of living, and within other arenas of communal and institutional understanding. It is an attempt to trace out important anchorages of power, right, and truth in the contemporary business and cultural aesthetics of tourism, and to un-knot the ties and the stays which constrain the way players within the travel trade see and subsequently produce consumable tourist places in their everyday decision-making. And Urry's work helps us by also highlight-

ing the short-term nature of these masterful sectoral and institutional wills, a temporality which Urry (1992, p. 6) moves even more zestfully into in his 1990s follow up work to *The Tourist Gaze*. Overall, therefore, Urry does indeed introduce us to the forms and the threats of normalised power as unfettered 'architects' within the industry at every level of decision-making go about their mundane decision-making normalising of this and that as they further the often unsuspected volitions that course through them. In so doing, Urry may not have loudly and heavily harangued readers of *The Tourist Gaze* to make them all wide-awake in their responsiveness to Foucauldian thought, but he does taciturnly lure the careful reader into becoming so much more wide-eyed. Foucault, himself, would no doubt have commended Urry for the inevitable *pratique de soi* which that sort of de- and refocussing encourages amongst such decision makers in and across the-industry-of-difference.

And so, back to Leiper's review. Leiper's judgement upon what Urry covers and offers is, then, by such criteria, somewhat harsh. Leiper has perhaps, himself, run with a rather literal interpretation of the meaning of the gaze. He has identified the relevance of Foucault's clinicians'/physicians' term to Urry's insights on the practices of professionalism and institutional thinking in tourism and travel, but he does not seem to esteem the insidious and reflexive character of the Foucauldian critique which Urry slips past us. Indeed, Leiper is not even satisfied that Urry has effectively followed the Foucauldian model, yet he (Leiper) seems incurious about the underground interrogation of *will* and *unconsciousness* by which Urry does faithfully, if tacitly at times, borrow from Foucault. Thus, much of Urry's implicit Foucauldian insight are conceivably missed in Leiper's hurried and work-limited review.

But yet, we do need to hear more from Leiper. His very appearance as an Australasian analyst of the industry is vital to the health of critique within worldwide tourism research and practice. In many senses his own condemnation of the unduly-fixed English focus of *The Tourist Gaze* is a minor and meritorious Foucauldian irruption in itself, emanating from what some would see as the under-served regime of so-called 'antipodean' thought in tourism research. That antipodean zone is itself a subjugated dark-ground which too frequently is silenced beneath the presumptive weight of dominating North Atlantic thought, as Douglas Pearce (1992, p. 348) has recently and heavily scolded. Thus, while Leiper's short examination of Urry's Foucauldian mission may be seen as a somewhat conservative assessment of both Urry and Foucault, and an all-too-brief commentary on thought, itself, as continuous human/institutional *practice*, it is itself a valuable perspective from what some would see as the 'non-sovereign' geographic and psychological periphery of tourism studies, though as such, hopefully something that will not nowadays be so rare now that *Tourism*

Management has itself been blessed with a New Zealand based editor who too has commented upon Foucauldian perspectives (Ryan, 1997). In some ways, then, it is a pity that Urry (seemingly alone) is writing further pieces on the normalisations in and of tourism in the wake of *The Tourist Gaze*. Ironically, Foucault might himself have hugely valued epistemic chapters from the altered positions of the likes of Leiper and Pearce for the relatively underheard differences of their southern hemisphere contributions to the discourse and praxis of tourism. It is not so much a matter that the world *needs* innumerable focuses: the world already *has* innumerable focuses, some just get themselves used and deployed thicker and faster than others. That Foucault saw for all orders-of-things. That Urry saw for the 'subjects' and 'objects' of tourism. Now, therefore, whose talk and deeds in tourism management and research will those insights impact: whose *pratique de soi* is nowadays being guided by a more widely informed vision-quest? What do we now each and all of us see as being only right and normal as we plague the world with our privileged tourism t-(error)-orisms?

Acknowledgements

The article constitutes a paper that was presented at The 6th International Symposium on society and Resource Management at Penn State University, USA, in May 1996. The opening and closing paragraphs of this paper first appeared in a short commentary in *The Annals of Tourism Research*: 21: 2: 387–391 in 1994 and are here reprinted with the permission of the editor. Also, the author would like to warmly acknowledge the world-processing assistance and proof-reading skills of W.C. 'Basel' Hunter and Monica Weiser (Graduate Students in Tourism Studies at Texas A&M University) in the revision and compilation of this paper.

References

- Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise on the late sociology of knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.
- Bhabha, H. (1994). *The location of culture*. London: Routledge.
- Buck, E. (1993). *Paradise remade: The politics of culture and history in Hawai'i*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Dann, G. (1996). *The language of tourism – A sociolinguistic perspective*. Wallingford, Oxford: CAB International.
- Davidson, A. I. (1986). Archaeology, genealogy, ethics. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 221–234). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Davidson, A. I. (Ed.). (1997). *Foucault and his interlocutors*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- de Burlo, C. (1996). Cultural resistance and ethnic tourism on South Pentecost, Vanuatu. In R. Butler, & T. Hinch (Eds.), *Tourism and indigenous peoples* (pp. 255–277). London: International Thomson Business Press.
- Dimanche, F., & Smith, G. (1996). Is ecotourism an appropriate answer to tourism's environmental concerns? *Journal of Hospitality and Leisure Marketing*, 3(4), 67–76.
- Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1982). *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1986). What is maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What is enlightenment?' In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 109–122). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Edwards, E. (1996). Postcards: Greetings from another world. In T. Selwyn (Ed.), *The tourist image: Myths and myth making in tourism* (pp. 197–222). Chichester: Wiley.
- Eribon, D. (1991). *Michel Foucault* (trans. B. Wing) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fjellman, S. M. (1992). *Vinyl leaves: Walt Disney World and America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Foucault, M. (1961). *Folie et déraison*. Paris. (Reprinted in 1965 as *Madness and Civilisation*. Trans. R. Howard. New York).
- Foucault, M. (1966). 'L'Homme est-il Mort?' Interview. *Arts et Loisirs*. June 15.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *Histoire de la folie à l'Age Classique*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings – 1972–77 (Michel Foucault)*. (Ed. and trans by C. Gordon et al.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1981). The order of discourse (trans., I. Mcleod) In R. Young (Ed.), *Untying the text*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Foucault, M. (1988). *Politics, philosophy, culture: Interviews and other writings – 1977–1984* (trans. A. Sheridan) New York: Routledge.
- Habermas, J. (1987). *The philosophical discourse of modernity* (trans. F. Lawrence) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hall, C. M. (1996). *Tourism and politics: Policy, power and place*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Hamilton-Smith, E. (1992). Book review: The tourist gaze: Leisure and travel in contemporary societies – J. Urry. *Australia and New Zealand Journal of social science*, 27, 257–259.
- Harrison, D. (1992). *Tourism and the less developed countries*. London: Belhaven Press.
- Hollinshead, K. (1992). 'White' Gaze, 'Red' people – Shadow visions: The disidentification of 'Indians' in cultural tourism. *Leisure Studies*, 11, 43–64.
- Hollinshead, K. (1993). *The truth about Texas: A naturalistic study of the construction of heritage*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dept. of Recreation, Park, and Tourism Sciences. Texas A&M University. College Station, TX, U.S.A.
- Hollinshead, K. (1999). *Tourism and the Forbidden Zone. Tourism Management* (in press).
- Hoy, D. C. (Ed.). (1986). *Foucault: A critical reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Jay, M. (1986). In the empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the denigration of vision in twentieth-century French thought. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 173–204). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lanfant, M-F. (1995a). Introduction. In M-F. Lanfant, J. B. Alcock, & E. M. Bruner (Eds.), *International tourism: Identity and change* (pp. 1–23). London: Sage.
- Lanfant, M-F. (1995b). International tourism, internationalization and the challenge to identity. In M-F. Lanfant, J. B. Alcock, & E. M. Bruner (Eds.), *International tourism: Identity and change* (pp. 24–43). London: Sage.
- Lash, S. (1990). *Sociology of postmodernism*. London: Routledge.
- Leiper, N. (1979). The framework of tourism: Towards a definition of tourism, tourist and the tourist industry. *Annals of Tourism Research*, Oct/Dec, 390–407.
- Leiper, N. (1992). Review of J. Urry's 'The tourist Gaze'. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 5, 604–607.
- MacCannell, D. (1992). *Empty meeting grounds*. London: Routledge.
- Merquior, J. G. (1985). *Foucault*. London: Fontana Press.
- Morris, M. (1997). A question of cultural studies, In A. McRobbie (Ed.), *Back to reality?: Social experience and cultural studies* (pp. 36–57). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Nietzsche, F. (1969). *On the genealogy of morals*. In W. Kaufman (Ed.), New York: Random House (Vintage Books).
- Nietzsche, F. (1989). *Human: All too human* (trans. R.J. Hollingdale) Cambridge.
- Parker, I. (1989). Discourse and power. In J. Shotter, & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), *Texts of identity* (pp. 56–69). London: Sage.
- Pearce, D. G. (1992). A response from the periphery on authorship analysis. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 19(2), 347–349.
- Poster, M. (1984). *Foucault, marxism and history*. London: Blackwell.
- Richter, L. K. (1994). The political dimensions of tourism. In J. R. B. Ritchie, & C. R. Goeldner (Eds.), *Travel, tourism, and hospitality research: A handbook for managers and researchers*. New York: Wiley.
- Rorty, R. (1986). Foucault and epistemology. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 41–49). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ryan, C. (1997). *The tourist experience – A new approach*. Cassell: London.
- Selwyn, T. (1996). *The tourist image: Myths and mythmaking in tourism*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Shames, G. W., & Glover W. G. (1989). *World class service*. Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, Inc.
- Simons, J. (1995). *Foucault and the political*. London: Routledge.
- Smart, B. (1986). The politics of truth and the problem of hegemony. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 157–173). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sofield, T. H. B. (1976). Anuha Island resort, soloman Islands: A case study of failure. In R. Butler, & T. Hinch (Eds.), *Tourism and indigenous peoples* (pp. 176–202). London: International Thomson Business Press.
- Taylor, C. (1986). Foucault on freedom and truth. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 69–102). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Urry, J. (1990). *The tourist gaze: Leisure and travel in contemporary society*. London: Sage.
- Urry, J. (1992a). The tourist gaze and the 'environment'. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 9, 1–26.
- Urry, J. (1992b). The tourist gaze 'revisited'. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 36(2), 172–186.
- Veyne, P. (1984). Obituary for Michel Foucault. Paris: Le Monde. Cited in Merquior. 1985.11.
- Veyne, P. (1997). A Foucault revolutionizes history. In A. I. Davidson (Ed.), *Foucault and his interlocutors* (pp. 146–182). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Veyne, P. (1997). B The final Foucault and his ethics. In A. I. Davidson (Ed.), *Foucault and his interlocutors* (pp. 225–233). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
- Walzer, M. (1986). The politics of Michel Foucault. In D. C. Hoy (Ed.), *Foucault: A critical reader* (pp. 51–68). Oxford: Blackwell.
- White, M. & Kanahale, G. S. (1989). Tourism: Keeper of the culture. In G. W. Shames, & W. G. Glover (Eds.), *World class service*. (pp. 51–59). Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press.