Keisuke Hattori

• Ph.D. in Economics
• Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University

Does partial coalition among players help mitigate the issue of underprovision of public goods? This study considers endogenous coalition formation and endogenous technology choices in a model of the private provision of global public goods. We show that the possibility of future interstate (partial) coordination may hinder the current adoption of...

Social interactions in the workplace can generate reciprocal peer effects and narrow the psychological distance for team prosociality among coworkers. Incorporating such a psychological interdependence into a team production model, we investigate how the optimal social interactions characterized by the type of task the team is performing (complemen...

This study develops a model in which a “genuine” producer supplying genuine products competes with competitive “third-party” producers supplying compatible third-party products. We use this model to examine (i) how the strategic behavior of the genuine producer to drive out third parties (running comparative advertising, establishing technical barr...

This paper considers effective leadership selection in a simple two-person team production model with heterogeneous agents. We demonstrate leadership success through synergy by showing that the existence of synergy makes effort complementary, implying that the leader devote more effort than the follower and that a team with a leader yields greater...

This paper studies the optimal pricing and diffusion of durable goods that exhibit positive network externalities, when consumers are heterogeneous in their expectations about future network sizes. We consider the existence of naive consumers, as well as of sophisticated consumers having fulfilled expectations. We find that the firm charges the seq...

Under what conditions will a carbon tax encourage environmental innovation? Can a regulator design an optimal environmental policy to reduce emissions and to promote clean technologies? This paper studies optimal environmental policy in the situation where a monopoly innovator develops and licenses clean production technologies to downstream pollut...

Using a team production model with heterogeneous workers, we investigate the short- and long-run efficiency effects of skill diversity and leadership in teams. Our analysis focuses on the effects of various team structures on workers’ incentives to change their skills or motivation. In the short run, heterogeneous pairing yields greater total produ...

We investigate the social desirability of free entry under co-opetition where firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect industry-wide demand. Our findings indicate that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient market entry, depending on the commitment of investment in common prop...

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products...

Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper investigates the endogenous formation of within-group cooperation. We show that the equilibrium outcomes may result in a prisoners’ dilemma, depending on the characteristics of between-group externalities. If between-group externalities are strongly positive (negati...

This paper investigates the feasibility of full/partial complementary alliances in composite goods markets with network structure. There are multiple producers who each provide a complementary component of the composite good. In another related market, one single firm (a monopolist) produces another composite good which could be a substitute or com...

This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly and lack of regulatory commitment, and compares the incentives under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. We examine whether policy coordination (choi...

Abstract This paper builds a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with horizontal product differentiation and advertising externality between firms. We investigate the effects of regulating misinformation on market competition, behaviour of firms, and social welfare. We show that the degree of advertising externality and...

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneousl...

We develop a Hotelling model of horizontally and vertically differentiated brands with misleading advertising competition. We investigate the question of who benefits or loses from the misinformation created by advertising competition and related regulatory policies. We show that the quality gaps between two brands are crucial for determining the e...

Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper investigates how endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is affected by differ-ent types and degrees of between-group interactions. We show that when between-group interactions are of the same directions and weak (strong), within-group cooperation for provi...

In this paper, we examine the incentive of the home government to mislead home consumers by sending misinformation. We nd that positive misinformation on home products and negative misinformation on foreign products always increases the pro t of the home rm, while when the marginal costs of home and foreign rms are the same, a small amount of posit...

This paper examines the relationship between misinformation about product quality and quality standards, such as minimum quality standards and certi cation criteria, when products are vertically dierentiated in their health/safety aspects. We investigate the welfare eect of regulating misinformation and strengthening MQSs. We nd that when the amoun...

This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly, and compares them under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. Under any policy regime, whether firm incentives are either excessive or insufficient fr...

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the compos...

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental prefe...

This paper investigates the welfare effects of international transfers of environmental technologies in open economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution, and shows that policy differentiation between the donor and recipient countries and/or product differentiation between the donor and recipient firms play a critical role in...

The purpose of this comment is to correct some mathematical and implicational errors in Roelfsema [in J.Environ.Econom.Management 53, 270-275 (2007)] who points out a new theoretical possibility explaining the discrepancy between theory and evidence about 'the race to the bottom' in non-cooperative environmental policy making. We also mention the p...

This paper investigates the welfare effects of unilateral or multilateral technological progress in a world with global public goods. We focus on the consumption relation between the private and the public good, and then show that technological progress may be“self-centered” (benefit oneself but harm others), “self-sacrificing” (harm oneself but be...

In this paper we reconsider the completely crowding-out effect in a model of the private provision of public goods with non-linear technology for government contributions. Even though there are no free-riders, government contributions financed by lump-sum taxes crowd out private contributions only marginally. We also investigate the relationship be...

This paper incorporates pollution emissions from international transportation into the standard model of strategic trade and environmental policies, and investigates the effect of trade liberalization and some form of environmental agreement on national welfare and environment. Our model explicitly includes the imperfectly competitive market for in...

In this paper, we characterize optimal environmental policy in a case where innovation in clean production technologies is developed and provided by a monopoly. Two policy instruments are considered: an emission tax on downstream polluting firms and an R& D subsidy for an upstream innovator in clean technologies. We find that (i) a higher emission...