• About
    Introduction
    Katarzyna Jasko currently works at the Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University. Katarzyna does research in Social Psychology.
    Current Institution
    Kraków
    Current position
    Assistant Professor
    16
    Research items
    5,736
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    84
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    Anna Kende
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    Projects
    Projects (2)
    Project
    Little is known about why and when people are more likely to conform to social norms in times of threat. With this research, we want to examine the processes underlying norm-related behavior when people lack a general sense of personal control. We focus on why threat to control leads to norm-related behavior and when this lead to norm conformity, norm formation, or attempt to change existing norms. We assume that under lack of control, people aim to restore a sense of agency by identifying with social groups and by acting as group members. We propose two psychological processes that should underlie norm-related behavior. First, we propose that under lack of control and when a relevant social identity is salient, their attention shifts to cues from their social environment that may signal what is normative. Second, we propose that perceived norms are judged as to whether they support group agency or not. We argue that these two processes help to distinguish between three kinds of norm-related behavior (conformity, formation, change) under lack of control. We plan to use a series of lab and field studies to study these processes. This research will not only help to understand why control threat leads to social conformity but also how social innovation and flexibility can be enhanced in times of crisis. Additionally, the studies planned in this project could shed a light on the conditions in which social norms are changed, and how group solidarity and re-categorization processes might contribute to such change.
    Project
    From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy are systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses, and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.
    Research
    Research Items (16)
    In the present study, we applied the quest for significance model of radicalization to explain the use of political violence. According to the model, when people experience loss of personal significance (e.g., due to social rejection, achievement failures, or abuse) the motivation to restore significance may push them toward the use of extreme means. We tested this prediction in a sample of individuals who have committed ideologically motivated crimes in the United States (n = 1496). We found that experiences of economic and social loss of significance were separate and positive predictors related to the use of violence by perpetrators of ideologically motivated crimes. We also found evidence that the presence of radicalized others (friends but not family members) in the individuals' social network increased their likelihood of using violence.
    We outline a general psychological theory of extremism and apply it to the special case of violent extremism (VE). Extremism is defined as motivated deviance from general behavioral norms and is assumed to stem from a shift from a balanced satisfaction of basic human needs afforded by moderation to a motivational imbalance wherein a given need dominates the others. Because motivational imbalance is difficult to sustain, only few individuals do, rendering extreme behavior relatively rare, hence deviant. Thus, individual dynamics translate into social patterns wherein majorities of individuals practice moderation whereas extremism is the province of the few. Both extremism and moderation require the ability to successfully carry out the activities that these demand. Ability is partially determined by the activities’ difficulty, controllable in part by external agents who promote or oppose extremism. Application of this general framework to VE identifies the specific need that animates it and offers broad guidelines for addressing this pernicious phenomenon.
    The issue of attitude-behavior relations is revisited in light of recent work on motivation and the psychology of goals. It is suggested that for object-attitudes to drive a specific behavior, a chain of contingencies must be realized: Liking must be transmuted into wanting, wanting must evolve into a goal, the goal must be momentarily dominant, and the specific behavior must be chosen as means of goal pursuit. Our model thus specifies a set of mediating processes that transpire between attitudes and behavior. Prior theories of attitude-behavior relations are examined from the present perspective, and its conceptual and empirical implications are noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).
    Previous research on superordinate identification demonstrated the positive effects of such identification on intergroup relations. Our study investigated the hypothesis that superordinate identity increases acceptance of intergroup inequalities among members of low‐status groups. The results obtained from two studies supported our predictions. Superordinate identification increased the justification of unequal funding by members of the disadvantaged group (Study 1) and the acceptance of displaying religious symbols in public places among non‐believers (Study 2). In contrast, identification with the low‐status subgroup decreased perceived legitimacy of unequal intergroup arrangements. The results demonstrate that superordinate identification can have a negative influence on willingness to act in line with subgroup interest among members of disadvantaged groups. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
    From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy are systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses, and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.
    We outline a psychological model of extremism and analyze violent extremism as a special case of it. Our Significance Quest Theory identifies three general drivers of violent extremism: need, narrative, and network. The theory asserts that the need for personal significance—the desire to matter, to “be someone”, and to have meaning in one’s life—is the dominant need that underlies violent extremism. A violence-justifying ideological narrative contributes to radicalization by delineating a collective cause that can earn an individual the significance and meaning he or she desires, as well as an appropriate means with which to pursue that cause. Lastly, a network of people who subscribe to that narrative leads individuals to perceive the violence-justifying narrative as cognitively accessible and morally acceptable. We describe empirical evidence for the theory, which was tested on a wide variety of samples across different cultures and geopolitical contexts. We go on to offer a general road map to guide efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism in its various forms.
    This paper considers the current state of the field in social psychology. On the one hand, we have made enormous progress in integrating our research with other disciplines, reaching out to general publics and using our knowledge toward addressing major societal ills. On the other hand, social psychology has been recently mired in a crisis of confidence concerning the appropriateness of our methods and the robustness of our findings. We propose that shifting our attention to theory, method, and application, as well as away from a pervasive “outcome focus,” can extricate social psychology from its current doldrums and allow it to realize its potential as an indispensable social science.
    Locomotion regulatory mode is the self-regulatory aspect concerned with motion and progress from state to state (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Given that motion is typically oriented forward (i.e., toward the future), locomotors’ preoccupation with movement should lead to their greater focus on the future. Accordingly, we review empirical research demonstrating that high locomotors are more likely to plan for the future, less likely to focus on the past, and more likely to initiate and maintain commitments toward desired future states. The potential positive and negative implications of a high locomotion orientation, as well as future directions for this line of research, are discussed.
    Reflecting on Roy Baumeister’s guidelines for a general theory of motivation, we relate his ideas to our own perspectives and interests. In those terms we consider, among others, the role of motivation in cognitive processes, the emergence of motives from basic needs, the mental representation of motives in memory, and the issue of free will. Roy’s paper compellingly demonstrates the indispensability of motivation to psychological phenomena writ large, and it aptly identifies critical junctures where further motivational research is needed.
    In two studies, we examined the influence of behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and need for closure (NFC) on information processing in decision making. We expected that BIS would regulate behavior in a decisional context and that this relationship would be mediated by epistemic motivation expressed by NFC. In addition, drawing on contradictory findings in the literature on anxiety, NFC, and information processing, we investigated the moderating role of decision rules. The results supported our predictions. BIS was strongly and positively related to NFC, and through NFC it was related to decision-making style. Moreover, decision task characteristics moderated the relationship between NFC and decision making. When a task did not offer a confident decision rule, high NFC participants prolonged the information search more than low NFC individuals. However, when a reliable strategy was suggested, high NFC participants behaved in line with it. These results are discussed within an uncertainty management framework.
    The aim of the present study was to investigate the moderated mediation model of the relationship between the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), need for closure (NFC) and working memory capacity (WMC) in the decision making process. It was assumed that NFC works as a motivational mechanism that enables individuals high in BIS to deal with uncertainty; therefore, NFC mediates the effect of BIS on behavior in a decision-making situation. Moreover, as uncertainty management requires cognitive resources, we expected WMC to moderate this relationship. In line with our hypothesis, we found that NFC mediated the relationship between BIS and the information search about the job candidates, and this effect occurred only for individuals high in WMC. We discuss these results in the context of effective self-regulation, as well as motivational and cognitive determinants of effort.
    The paper reported two correlational studies. The aim of the Study 1 was to examine the hypothesis that age moderates the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and cognitive structuring. Results of the study revealed that aging with increased need for closure was associated with better recognition of irrelevant information than schema-relevant items, in testing hypotheses about the target person. These findings are interpreted as demonstrating the age-associated failure of cognitive abilities (i.e., low efficacy at fulfilling the need for closure), reducing tendency to behave according to the level of epistemic motivation. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that older participants are characterized by higher NFC but by lower EFNC than young participants. These results are consistent with the conclusion that the negative relationships between NFC and cognitive structuring demonstrated by the older participants in Study 1 can be attributed to their lower level of EFNC.
    Two studies were conducted to examine the relationships among need for closure (NFC) and schematic information processing in younger and older adults. The results show increased NFC to be associated with less schematic processing (i.e., less memory for schema-consistent items, and more memory for schema-irrelevant items, out of all items memorized correctly), among older than younger adults. The findings of the studies are interpreted as demonstrating the age-associated deficit in information processing consistent with the level of NFC. Moreover, the results indicate that positive mood may play a role in facilitating information processing consistent with the level of NFC among older and younger adults. Finally, we present a framework for predicting when older adults will and will not effectively use schematic processing, considered a compensatory strategy for decline in cognitive abilities.
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