Jung-Kyoo Choi- PhD
- Professor (Full) at Kyungpook National University
Jung-Kyoo Choi
- PhD
- Professor (Full) at Kyungpook National University
About
26
Publications
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Introduction
Current institution
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September 2003 - January 2005
Publications
Publications (26)
Institutions are sometimes represented as a state-imposed set of rules of the game regulating social interactions in a population. But the cooperative and egalitarian practices and other enduring social structures observed among foragers in the ethnographic record almost certainly governed social interactions since the appearance of biologically mo...
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player’s strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone’s strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one stochastic strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dil...
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation because they reduce the expected length of mutual cooperation by triggering the conditional retaliation of the coop...
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance, but in terms of cultural learning, it is often difficult to recognize a strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one stochastic strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma, with an a...
Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between ga...
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of imp...
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of imp...
The advent of farming around 12 millennia ago was a cultural as well as technological revolution, requiring a new system of property rights. Among mobile hunter-gatherers during the late Pleistocene, food was almost certainly widely shared as it was acquired. If a harvested crop or the meat of a domesticated animal were to have been distributed to...
We compare the effects of and the motivations behind voluntary punishment and reward in a finitely repeated public goods game. Our experimental results show that (1) the level of cooperation is indistinguishable between the punishment and reward treatments when group membership does not change, but the reward treatment shows stronger endgame effect...
How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Base...
How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the coordination among them. Base...
Details of the derivation of the Bhattacharyya measure.
(PDF)
Most studies on public goods game reported that in a finitely repeated public good game subjects' contributions begin with an average contribution of about 50% of their initial endowment and decay toward the free riding level as the game progresses. Unconditional free ridings were seldom observed. To explain what causes this behavioral patterns, th...
Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for a
prosperous society. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective
action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings,
network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build
new ones. However, the process by which evo...
In group-structured populations, altruistic cooperation among unrelated group members may be sustainable even when the evolution
of behavioral traits is governed by a payoff-based replicator dynamic. This paper explores the importance in this dynamic
of two aspects of group structure: global or local interaction in a public goods game and global or...
Altruism—benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself—and parochialism—hostility toward individuals not of one's own
ethnic, racial, or other group—are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two—which we term “parochial altruism”—is
puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's pay...
This paper studies the effect of ‘trembles’ in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Previous studies have focused on the detrimental effects of trembles and sought to find error-proof strategies. This paper examines a potential benefit of mistakes in play. Even though mistakes reduce the effectiveness of punishment, it will be shown that in the pres...
SantaAbstract Experimental,and,other evidence,demonstrates,that many,individuals,will-
We present agent-based simulations of a model of a deme-structured population in which group differences in social institutions are culturally transmitted and individual behaviors are genetically transmitted. We use a standard extended fitness accounting framework to identify the parameter space for which this co-evolutionary process generates high...
